ORDER
Balakrishna, J.
1. In these Writ Petitions, the legality and validity of the Government Order dated 13-6-1988 prescribing P.U.C. as the qualification for admission to C.P.Ed. course in substitution for S.S.L.C. is questioned.
2. The petitioners are private Educational Institutions. The petitioner in W.P.No. 18217/88 is running Sri Gnanajyothi C.P.Ed. College at Srinivasapura, Kolar District. The sanctioned intake of the College is 40 for the academic year 1988-89 and the College has admitted 3 P.U.C. students since no other P.U.C. holders came forward for admission and the rest of the students have S.S.L.C. qualification.
The petitioner in W.P.No. 18218/88 is run by Krishna Vidya Samsthe. For the academic year 1988-89, it has admitted 8 P.U.C. holders since no other P.U.C. holders came forward to join the college and the rest of the students have S.S.L.C. qualification.
The petitioner in W.P.No. 18666/88 is running Saraswathi C.P.Ed. College at Sira, Tumkur District. The sanctioned intake of the college is 40. For the academic year 1988-89, the college has admitted 4 P.U.C. students since no other P.U.C. holders came forward to join the college and the rest of the students have only S.S.L.C. qualification.
The petitioner in W.P.No. 1197/89 is running a C.P.Ed. course and the students possess S.S.L.C. qualification.
3. Since common questions of fact and law arise in these Writ Petitions, all the cases were clubbed together and arguments were heard. By this common order, all the Writ Petitions are disposed of.
4. It is the case of the petitioners that P.U.C. is a qualification prescribed for admission to the various degree courses in University education. But the syllabus has absolutely no relevance in so far as Physical Education Instructors are concerned and that the prescription of P.U.C. in the place of S.S.L.C. qualification does not improve the standard of Physical Education or the efficiency of Physical Education Instructors. According to the petitioners, the Physical Education Instructors are appointed in the schools only to engage the students in extra curricular activities like P.T., drill, sports and games and the said subjects are not a part of the curriculum of study in schools and the Physical Education Instructors are not required to perform any academic functions which would help the students in writing examination or improving their knowledge mentally. It is stated that the activities of Physical Education Instructors are entirely devoted to keep the students physically fit, physically alert and physically active and, therefore, for this purpose, the syllabus fixed for P.U.C. student has no relevance and such a prescription is wholly arbitrary and unsustainable.
5. It is contended that the petitioners have a fundamental right to start and run a college in physical education and on account of the prescription of P.U.C. as qualification, the colleges are unable to attract students for admission and, therefore, they are facing serious difficulties and are also threatened with closure. It is stated that these colleges are not aided by the Government and there are no Government colleges in Physical Education in Karnataka awarding C.P.Ed. certificates. In the circumstances, it is contended that by insisting upon P.U.C. qualification, the very right of the petitioners to start and run the college of Physical Education is denied thereby infracting the rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. It is stated that on account of the impugned action of the respondents more than 50% of the C.P.Ed. colleges have been closed down and in the surviving colleges only 10% of the sanctioned intake is filled up. It is apprehended that, if the impugned prescription of the qualification is continued, all the other colleges will have to be closed down since P.U.C. holders are not interested in pursuing C.P.Ed. course. It is also the case of the petitioners that C.P.Ed. course is of a lower order compared to P.U.C.
6. Another contention is that the prescription of P.U.C. qualification is irrelevant either to raise the standard of education in Physical Education or to improve the efficiency in Physical Instructor obtaining a C.P.Ed. certificate. It is contended that compelling such a qualification is a violation of the rights of the petitioners guaranteed under Articles 14 and 15(1) of the Constitution. It is further contended that the qualification fixed is not in public interest, but is arbitrary and the fixation of the qualification is not preceded by any expert opinion or a report of the committee constituted for the purpose and also that the C.P.Ed. course cannot be compared with T.C.H. course inasmuch as the teachers having T.C.H. qualification are required to handle academic classes in curricular activities, whereas the C.P.Ed. course produces Physical Instructors who deal with exclusively extra curricular activities and, therefore, the two courses operate in dissimilar circumstances and they cannot be treated alike.
7. In the statement of objections preferred on behalf of the respondents in substance it is stated as follows:-
The C.P.Ed. course is of one year duration and the Government prescribed the P.U.C. as minimum qualification for admission to C.P.Ed. course by its order dated 29-2-1988 in modification of its earlier order dated 12-3-1987. The effect of the order is the fixation of minimum qualification of P.U.C. with 40% marks in the aggregate and 35% marks in case of S.C. and S.T. and the disabled persons. In so far as other Rules of admission are concerned, the Government Order of 12-3-1987 held good. These Rules were made applicable for the academic year 1988-89 and onwards. The Government Order in this regard was communicated to all the concerned Institutions as far back as 24-6-1988 well before the commencement of the academic year 1988-89. For the academic year 1988-89, one month relaxation was extended to the petitioners colleges as well as other colleges in the State in order to facilitate the Institutions to conduct interviews and to admit students in accordance with the impugned Government Order.
8. According to the respondents, the subjects prescribed for C.P.Ed. course require qualified pupils as in the case of T.C.H. course and other similar courses. Efficiency and merit of the students cannot be discarded for Physical Education course. Physical Education is not an extra curricular activity. In order to improve the standard of education, it is very much required to develop the strength, stamina, healthy habits, quick reflex action and quick reaction among the students. Physical Education is correlated co all other subjects and P.U.C. qualification is essential for a comprehension and assimilation of the importance of physical education which comprises study of Anatomy, Physiology, safety education, first aid, yogasanas and health aspects of life and all these qualities would make the student to inculcate personality traits. The Government took the decision of fixing P.U.C. qualification as the minimum educational qualification after securing useful opinion from the experts. It is necessary to refer to the syllabus prescribed for C.P.Ed. course since it would throw considerable light on the necessity to have at least a P.U.C. qualification for a satisfactory ability to comprehend the subjects prescribed in the syllabus. In fact these Institutions were permitted to start C.P.Ed. course subject to the conditions that are laid down by the Government from time to time to be strictly followed besides conditions and Rules laid down from time to time by the Department of Public Instructions. Having bound themselves by these conditions, it is too late in the day for the petitioners to question the prescription of P.U.C. as minimum qualification. The Government Order is in the interest of public and is aimed at improvement of standard of education and efficiency of the teacher after completion of C.P.Ed. course and, therefore, there is no violation of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The non-availability of the candidates for a particular course cannot be a ground for setting aside the Government Order. There are about 50,000 C.P.Ed. qualified students who are unemployed and what is required today is quality in education. The impugned order is not violative of any law and much less Articles 14 and 15(1) of the Constitution. It is denied that the fixation of the minimum qualification was not preceded by any expert opinion or by a report of committee constituted for the purpose. On the other hand, the impugned order was brought into force only after taking opinion of the experts in the matter. The C.P.Ed. course is not dissimilar to the T.C.H. course and it is on par with T.C.H. course. It is stated that Physical Education is an integral part of general education. It is pointed out that only C.P.Ed. college is required to have a Principal with Master Degree in Physical Education and if such degree holders are not available the candidates with B.P.Ed. degree having 5 years of experience are only eligible for appointment as Principal and that B.P.Ed. is also a post-degree qualification and physical education course is technical in nature apart from being academic in all respects. It is stated that in view of the national policy on education, the teachers are required to measure up to high standards and, therefore, the justification for enhancing the qualification from S.S.L.C. to P.U.C.
9. It was submitted that the impugned order is a product of a policy decision laid down by the Government and it is not open to attack particularly in view of the fact that it is not violative of any law or constitutional provision.
10. The learned Government Pleader also submitted that the change of qualification from S.S.L.C. to P.U.C. was necessitated by the National Policy on Education laid down by the Ministry of Human Resources Development, Government of India which emphasised the need to have radical reconstruction of the education system in our Country and to improve the quality of education in general. He referred to the National Policy on Education, 1986.
11. At the time of argument, Sri Ravivarmakumar, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners in W.P.Nos. 18217, 18218 and 18666 of 1988 submitted that he confines his argument only to the violation of Article 14 of the Constitution on the ground that the change of qualification from S.S.L.C. to P.U.C. is arbitrary. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner in the other case endorsed the argument advanced by the said learned Counsel.
12. The point for consideration is whether the impugned orders infringe the fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed to them under Article 14 of the Constitution.
13. The validity of enhancement of qualification from S.S.L.C. to P.U.C. for admission to T.C.H. Course was challenged in the case of M. MUNIYAPPA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA, . On a perusal of the said decision rendered by P.P. Bopanna, J. it is seen that similar contentions were advanced by both the petitioners and respondents. The following were the points which arose for consideration in the said case;-
(1) Whether the impugned orders violate the petitioners’ fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India;
(2) Whether these impugned orders impose a reasonable restriction on the petitioners’ fundamental rights;
(3) Are the petitioners entitled to plead that the impugned orders are violative of the principles of natural justice;
(4) Are the petitioners justified in contending that the impugned orders are arbitrary and are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution;
(5) Are the impugned orders violative of the provisions of Article 19(6) of the Constitution inasmuch as these orders are executive orders and accordingly, the State Government is not competent to issue such orders but they could have curtailed the rights of the petitioners by recourse to the legislative power in the form of suitable enactment.
14. In para-6 of the Judgment, the Court while answering the first question observed as follows, the first question being “whether the impugned orders are violatlve of fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed under Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution”:-
“That question necessarily raises an important question as to whether the petitioners rights if any are fundamental rights within the scope of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. It is well settled in the light of the decision of this Court in BAPUJI EDUCATION SOCIETY and also in HYDERABAD KARNATAKA EDUCATION SOCIETY v. STATE [ILR (Karnataka) 1983, 251] education is a fundamental right and therefore that right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) would be violated if it is made out that restrictions imposed by the State Government under the guise of regulatory measures affects such a right. But in these cases could it be said that by enhancing the minimum qualification from S.S.L.C. to P.U.C. and by regulating the admission of the students by constituting a centralised committee, the petitioner’s right to run these T.C.H. courses has been completely taken away. In ray view, once it is conceded that the State Government has got the power to impose regulatory measures for enhancing the standard of education in this State, it is not open to the petitioners to contend that their right to carry on the business of imparting education in the T.C.H. course or the C.P.Ed. course has been taken away by the regulatory measures, introduced by the State Government.. A fundamental right to carry on business is distinct from a right to carry on business in whatever manner and wherever possible as observed by the Supreme Court in RAI SAHIB RAM JAWAYA KAPUR AND ORS. v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB . The business that the petitioners were carrying in that case was printing and publishing books for sale in the State. The Supreme Court examined the question whether any fundamental right of the petitioner was violated on those facts.”
While quoting extensively from the said decision of the Supreme Court, the learned Judge observed:-
“Though this case dealt with the right of the petitioners’ therein to carry on business by printing and publishing text books which had been earlier approved by the Government of Punjab, the Supreme Court held that that right was not a fundamental right.”
Significant are the observations made in para-7 by the learned Judge and these observations have a bearing on the question under consideration:-
“In these cases, firstly while dealing with the right of the students, I do not think that the students can come before this Court and say that their fundamental right to acquire Teachers’ Training Certificate is denied to them by enhancing the minimum qualification from S.S.L.C. to P.U.C. The minimum qualification prescribed for any course for that matter has to be prescribed and regulated by the Government or the University as the case may be and there is no dispute about that proposition. Therefore the students in the first Writ Petition have not made out any case for interference with the impugned orders. But the case of the institutions which have been imparting training in the T.C.H. course under the old system by admitting students who have passed the S.S.L.C. course stands on a slightly different set of facts and they will have to be examined in the light of the contentions urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. A number of cases have been cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners and also by the learned Government Pleader. The decisions of this Court in Bapuji Education Society and in Hyderabad Karnataka Education Society cases had not dealt with executive power of the State under Article 162 of the Constitution and therefore they do not require any consideration in order to test the validity of Rule 1…..”
Again in para-8, the relevant observations are:-
“In these cases on hand, the facts are more in favour of the Government. The Government is only introducing a regulatory measure without any financial implications. The Government says that these measures are necessary for improving the quality of education and for preventing the growth of mushroom institutions. A similar case which came before the Supreme Court in STATE OF M.P. AND ANR. v. KUMARI NIVEDITA JAIN AND ORS. would advance the case of the State Government. In that case an executive order completely relaxing certain conditions for admissions to the Medical College as prescribed in the Regulations framed under the Medical Council of India Act, 1956 was challenged on the ground that the State Government could not invoke the provisions of Article 162 of the Constitution for relaxing the conditions imposed under Regulations framed under the Medical Council Act, 1956. The regulation prescribed certain minimum qualifications for admission to the medical course but by an executive order under Article 162 of the Constitution, the M.P. Government relaxed those conditions in the case of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe candidates. The M.P. High Court quashed those orders on the ground it was beyond the competency of the State Government under Article 162 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court in reversal of the Judgment of the M.P. High Court observed as follows:-
‘Entry 66 in List I (Union List) of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution, relates to “co-ordination and determination of standard in institution for higher education or research and scientific and technical institutions.” This entry by itself does not have any bearing on the question of selection of candidates to the Medical Colleges from amongst candidates who are eligible for such admission. On the other hand, Entry 25 in List II (Concurrent List) of the same Schedule speaks of “Education, including technical education, medical education in Universities, subject to Entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I… vocational and technical training of labour”. This entry is wide enough to include within its ambit the question of selection of candidates to medical colleges and there is nothing in the Entries 63, 64 and 65 of List I to suggest to the contrary. We are, therefore, of the opinion that Regulation II of the Council which is merely directory and in the nature of a recommendation has no such statutory force as to render the order in question which contravenes the said regulation illegal, invalid and unconstitutional.
“In the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Lavu Narendranath, this Court held at page 709 of (SCR): (At page 2566 of AIR) – “the executive have a power to make any regulation which should have the effect of a law so long as it does not contravene any legislation already covering the field….”
“Under Article 162 of the Constitution the executive power of a State, therefore, extends to the matter with regard to which the legislature of a State has power to make laws. As there is no legislation covering the field of selection of candidates for admission to medical colleges, the State Government would, undoubtedly, be competent to pass executive orders in this regard.”
After referring to the said decision, the learned Judge observed:-
“In my view, the ratio of this case is applicable proprio vigore to the facts of these cases. The minimum qualification of S.S.L.C. prescribed earlier by the State Government was not pursuant to any legislative provision. That was made under the Grand-in-Aid Code and non-statutory provision. So it is open to the Government to substitute that regulation by a new regulation prescribing a higher qualification in the interest of raising the educational standards pursuant to the National Policy of Education evolved by the Ministry of Human Resources. I have already excerpted the relevant portion of the report which persuaded the State Government to enhance the qualification from S.S.L.C. to P.U.C. Though one of the petitioners complained that the State Government was prejudiced in taking the view that there has been mushroom growth of private institutions leading to a steep fall in the standard of education in the State, it is not possible to countenance the view that the Government was actuated by pejudice in coming to the conclusion that there was mushroom growth in the private institutions in this State. This Court can take judicial notice of the number of cases disposed of so far and is satisfied that the standard and the quality of education to be maintained has deteriorated considerably therefore the Government is duty bound to interfere at the right time and impose certain regulatory measures for improving the quality of education and that quality can only be improved by improving the quality of the teachers who in turn teach the students. As averred by the State Government they have only made a beginning in this regard and there is much more to follow up for giving full effect to the National Policy of Education.
For these reasons, it is not possible to contend that the executive power of the State Government under Article 162 of the Constitution was wrongly exercised with a view to take away the rights of the petitioners from continuing T.C.H. courses with the present staff who have passed only the S.S.L.C. course and for the very same reasons the plea under Article 14 of the Constitution fails. I am at loss to understand as to how the petitioner-institutions can complain of arbitrariness in these Rules. Both aided, un-aided and Government institutions are all governed by the impugned Rules. They must fall in line with the impugned Rules for the academic year 1988-89. Hence there could be no hostile discrimination as urged by the petitioners to invoke the provisions of Article 14. That the impugned Rules are violative of the principles of natural justice do not require serious consideration as no duty was cast on the State Government to hear the petitioners and no civil consequences affecting the rights of the petitioners flow from the impugned orders.”
In respectful agreement with the views expressed by the learned Judge in the above case, I hold that there is no violation of Article 14 of the Constitution and there is no element of arbitrariness in the impugned orders.
15. At the time of argument, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the Government took no valid decision at all and the enhancement of the qualification from S.S.L.C. to P.U.C. was absolutely arbitrary. To support this argument, the learned Counsel relied on a decision of this Court in SRI JAYADEVA INSTITUTE OF COMMERCE v. COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, . The relevant portion of the Judgment requires to be reproduced:-
“The next argument is based on the arbitrariness of the order. From the facts narrated above and the comments made by this Court on those facts, it is evident and also obvious from the records that the necessary data to fix a rational fee structure was not at all available to the Government at any time from the time the Rules were brought into force in 1975 and at each stage of the revisions effected in 1979 and 1984. The very fixation of the initial fee in Appendix 3 of the Rules to my mind appears to have been arbitrarily fixed. Each of its subsequent revisions, therefore, must also be arbitrary. If the Rules read as a whole give the indication to the Court that the Government intends to regulate commerce education in the State, then the duty of the Government was to collect the relevant data required for the purpose of achieving a definite object, namely, a optimum fee structure with sufficient variable so that the students and the managements of Commerce Institutes, could both be able to function without the interest of one impeding the other. That does not appear to have been done. Any order passed can be safely be said to be with proper application of mind if it is demonstrable that the Government did have proper material to pass such an order. That is not the case with the present impugned order. Therefore, I have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the order is without application of mind and therefore arbitrary.”
It is to be noticed that the above observations related to arbitrariness in the absence of necessary data to fix rational and optimum fee structure to subserve the interest of managements and the students.
16. We are not concerned with a similar situation in the instant cases. What we are concerned with is the legality of the enhancement of the educational qualification from S.S.L.C. to P.U.C. for admission of the students to C.P.Ed. course. I must observe that no statistical data is required for the purpose of enhancement of the educational qualification in these cases. It is best left to the wisdom of the executive in laying down its educational policy in this regard. Regulatory measures for the purpose of admission of students to C.P.Ed. course are clearly governed by policy considerations in consonance with the National Policy on Education, 1988. It is not necessary that the Government shouId demonstrate the basis for enhancement of the educational qualification and prove its credentials by supporting the enhancement on a statistical basis to disprove arbitrariness. To apply the data and statistics test to the instant cases, in my opinion, would be less than proper. Such tests are inappropriate in the facts and circumstances of these cases. I do not think the said decision of this Court is of any assistance to the petitioners.
17. In CHARANJIT LAL v. UNION OF INDIA, Patanjali Sastri, J (as he then was) observed:-
“While, for instance, a classification in a law regulating labour in mines or factories may be based on age or sex, it may not be based on the colour of one’s skin. It is also true that the class of persons to whom a law is made applicable may be large or small, and the degree of harm which has prompted the enactment of a particular law is a matter within the discretion of the law makers. It is not the province of the Court to canvass the legislative judgment in such matters.”
It may not be out of place to mention that periodic review and alteration of educational qualifications have to be made in keeping with the temper of the times, tide of events and mores of the day demanding flexibility in order to avoid impediments to progress in qualitative improvement of education in the Country.
18. According to Professor Dworkin “policy should be used to characterise the legislative reasons which seek to show that a decision is in the interest of the community as a whole.”
His most recent exposition of the distinction between principle and policy is:-
“Arguments of principle attempt to justify a political decision that benefits some person or group by showing that the person or group has a right to the benefit. Arguments of policy attempt to justify a decision by showing that inspite of the fact that those who are benefitted do not have a right to the benefit, providing the benefit will advance a collective goal of the community.”
(See R.M. Dworkin on ‘A reply to critics’ in ‘Taking rights seriously’ – Revised Edition, London 1978, 291, 294)
Policy is understood to mean goals or purposes of Governmental programme. It is also interpreted as State craft, political segacity, course of action adopted by Government for public group, and to subserve public interest.. In the process in recent years major efforts to enlarge or alter policies have left their mark on education, transportation etc. In our Country commonly known goals and purposes of Governmental programme are, elimination of poverty, elimination of illiteracy etc. The power of the State under Article 162 of the Constitution to regulate the standards of education as well as the quality of education by fixing qualification for admission by altering the existing standards, cannot be viewed as violation of Article 14.
19. Cautioning against the judicial interference in pragmatic adjustments carried out by legislative process, Wallace Mendelson in “The Rule of Law and Men” vide “Supreme Court State Craft” observed:-
“Let philosophy fret about ideal justice. Politics is our substitute for civil war in a constant struggle between different conceptions of good and bad. It is far too wise to gamble for Utopia or nothing – to be fooled by its own romantic verbiage…by give and take, the legislative process seeks not final truth, but an acceptable balance of community interests. In this view, the harmonising and educational function of the process itself counts for more than any of its legislative, products. To intrude upon its pragmatic adjustments by judicial fiat is to frustrate our chief instrument of social peace and political stability.”
20. Referring to policy decisions, Lord Haldane articulated;-
“I think that there are many things to which Judges are bound to take judicial notice which lie outside the law properly so called and among those things are what is called ‘public policy’ and the changes which take place in it. The law itself may become modified by this obligation of the Judges (some law like the Rule against perpetuities has become) a crystalised proposition forming part of the ordinary common law, so definite that it must be applied without reference to whether a particular case involves the real mischief to guard against which the rule was originally introduced….”
[Rodriguez v. Speyer Bros. L.J.K.B. 88 (n.s) 147, (157-159) 1918] HALDANE L.J.
21. Unless the policy laying down P.U.C. as minimum qualification for admission to C.P.Ed. course is repugnant either to any constitutional provision or to any law, judicial wisdom commends non interference with such policy decisions however far reaching the consequences of the decisions taken by the Government. I do not perceive any transgression of either constitutional provision or any other law, calling for intervention.
22. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners drew my attention to a decision of P.P. Bopanna.J in SAHYADRI EDUCATION TRUST v. STATE OF KARNATAKA, wherein the power of the Government under Rule 12 of Grand-in-Aid Code to impose Kannada as exclusive medium of instruction, came in for consideration. In this context, the Court observed on page 2211 as follows:-
“But, in this case, when there is no formulation of policy at all either under statute or based on expert opinion, the decision taken by the cabinet on the ground of policy could be examined and tested by this Court on the touch stone of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. As noticed earlier, if there had been a policy, it should be applicable to all the primary schools in the State. But in the absence of uniform application of that policy, the same is open to question before this Court and could be laid bare for the scrutiny of this Court and I am of the view that the decision of the State Government based on a policy decision which is neither uniform nor based on an objective consideration of the rights of linguistic minorities is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and on that ground alone, it has to be struck down.”
The ratio of the decision is inapplicable to the facts of the instant cases. No case is made out by the petitioners that the decision of the State Government to enhance the qualification from S.S.L.C. to P.U.C. is not based on a policy decision and objectivity.
23. The learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondents relied on a decision in ASIF HAMEED v. STATE OF J & K, the Court observed:-
“When a State action is challenged, the function of the Court is to examine the action in accordance with law and to determine whether the legislature or the executive has acted within the powers and functions assigned under the constitution and if not, the Court must strike down the action. While doing so the Court must remain within its self-imposed limits. The Court sits in Judgment on the action of a coordinate branch of the Government. While exercising power of judicial review of administrative action, the Court is not an Appellate Authority. The constitution does not permit the Court to direct or advise the executive in matters of policy, or to sermonize qua any matter which under the constitution lies within the sphere of legislature or executive, provided these authorities do not transgress their constitutional limits or statutory powers,”
Again in para-24, the Court observed:-
“The legislature of Jammu and Kashmir having not made any law pertaining to medical education the field is exclusively to be operated by the executive under Article 162 of the Constitution of India read with Section 5 of Jammu and Kashmir Constitution. When the constitution gives power to the executive Government to lay-down policy and procedure for admission to medical colleges in the State then the High Court has no authority to divest the executive of that power. The State Government in its executive power, in the absence of any law on the subject, is the competent Authority to prescribe method and procedure for admission to the medical colleges by executive instructions but the High Court transgressed its self imposed limits in issuing the aforesaid directions for constituting staututory authority. We would make it clear that the procedure for selection laid-down by the executive as well as the selection is always open to judicial review on the ground of unreasonableness or on any other constitutional or legal infirmity.”
It is thus seen that the Supreme Court has laid down the limitations on judicial intervention in policy decisions of the State.
24. In NAGEEB ABDULQADER v. UNIVERSITY OF MYSORE, while dealing with a Regulation prescribing commercial Kannada as subject for acquiring Business Management degree for every one including candidates whose mother-tongue is not Kannada, the Court observed:
“In these circumstances, it is not proper for this Court to interfere with the academic standards to be maintained by the University by insisting on the candidates to pass in the subject prescribed in terms of the relevant regulation.”
The decision supports the contention that if a regulation is brought about for the purpose of maintenance of high academic standards, it would be inadmissible for the Court to interfere in regulatory measures.
25. For the purpose of disposal of these Writ Petitions, it is not necessary to deal with other details of the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners and in the light of the discussion made above, I am of the opinion that these Writ Petitions have no merit and, therefore, are dismissed.
26. In the circumstances of the cases, there shall be no order on costs.