ORDER
1. This is a successive application preferred by the applicant for suspension of sentence and release of the applicant on bail during pendency of the appeal preferred against conviction recorded by the Sessions Court for offences punishable under Section 302 read with Sections 34 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code. The conviction was recorded on July 30, 2004.
2. Learned Advocate, Mr. Agrawal, submitted that the applicant is a lady and is in jail since 28th November, 2002, as she was not on bail during trial. He submitted that the earlier application preferred by the applicant for suspension of sentence and bail during pendency of the appeal came to be rejected by this Court on October 20, 2004 and two years have passed since then. Mr. Agrawal submitted that efflux of time itself is a material change in circumstance. He submitted that Article 21 of the Constitution also envisages a right to speedy justice. The applicant’s appeal has not been listed for final hearing yet and even if it is listed, it is not likely to be heard in the near future. In light of this violation of the right of the applicant to speedy justice, the applicant’s application for bail may be considered.
2.1 Mr. Agrawal submitted that the applicant is a lady. She has four children to be looked after and that her husband is also in jail and, therefore, the applicant may be admitted to bail pending the appeal. Mr. Agrawal has relied on the following judgments in support of his submissions:
(1) Kashmira Singh v. State of Punjab .
(2) Babu Singh and Ors. v. State of U.P. 1978 SCC (Cri.) 133.
(3) Tanvi Pankaj Divetia v. State of Gujarat XVII GLT 362.
(4) Bihar Legal Support Society, New Delhi v. C.J. of India .
(5) Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and Anr. .
(6) Giani Pratap Singh v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. (1995) 5 SCC 591.
(7) Takht Singh and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh .
(8) Smt. Akhtari Bi v. State of M.P. 2001 AIR SCW 1236.
2.2 Learned Advocate, Mr. Agrawal, submitted, alternatively, that the applicant’s appeal may be listed for final hearing and may be taken up out of turn.
3. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Mr. Gohil, has opposed this application. According to him, this being a successive application, it could be considered positively only if the applicant is able to show a substantial change in circumstance. In the instant case, without dispute, there is no change of circumstance except efflux of time. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that in cases of conviction for serious offences like murder, only in exceptional circumstances, sentence can be suspended and bail can be granted, as per the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Kishori Lal v. Rupa and Ors. . Learned Additional Public Prosecutor, therefore, submitted that the application may be rejected.
4. We have taken into consideration rival side submissions and the case law cited by both the sides.
5. There cannot be any dispute about the fact that right to speedy justice is envisaged under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, as has been held in the case of Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and Anr. , relied upon by learned Advocate, Mr. Agrawal. However, a perusal of that judgment itself indicates that right to speedy trial emanates from Article 21 of the Constitution of India and it is properly reflected in the provisions of the Code and time limit for criminal proceedings cannot be drawn.
6. In the instant case, except efflux, learned Advocate is not able to indicate any other change in circumstance or any special circumstances which could be considered sufficient to suspend the sentence and grant bail to the applicant in this successive application. The case of the applicant has already been considered on merits once by this Court when earlier application of the applicant bearing Criminal Misc. Application No. 9139 of 2004 came to be rejected on October 20, 2004.
7. The judgments relied upon by learned Advocate for the applicant in support of his contentions turn on their own facts and in some cases given in respect of under trial prisoners and, therefore, in our opinion, they cannot be of any assistance to the applicant.
8. Efflux of time may be a relevant factor, but the quantum of time is also a relevant factor. In the case of the applicant, her last application was rejected on October 20, 2004. She has been convicted for life imprisonment and, therefore, it cannot be said that there is inordinate lapse of time after rejection of earlier application, which would make the time lag a subsequent and substantive change in circumstance.
9. We have on our hand matters which are much older and the appellants-convicts are awaiting for their case to come up for final hearing. There are no distinguishing circumstances which would make the applicant’s case so special as to give it a special treatment and hear the appeal out of turn.
10. We may refer to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kishori Lal v. Rupa and Ors. , relied upon by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, wherein it has been held that it is only in exceptional cases that benefit of suspension of sentence and grant of bail during pendency of appeal can be granted, where the conviction is for serious offences. It has been observed in paragraph 8 of that judgment that the Court should take into consideration the relevant factors like (i) the nature of accusation made against the accused; (ii) the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed; and (iii) the gravity of offence and the desirability of releasing the accused on bail after they have been convicted for committing the serious offence of murder.
11. Without entering into the merits of the appeal, we may simply observe that the applicant has been convicted for offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code for murder of Kurshidbanu over a petty dispute of drawing water from a tap that had occurred two days prior to the date of incident and the deceased was done to death by pouring kerosene over her and setting her to fire while she was taking bath. In our opinion, certainly, therefore, the offence is of grave nature and has been committed over a petty issue and, in absence of any other circumstances, we are unable to take a different view of the matter from the view taken by the earlier Bench. The application, therefore, must fail and stands rejected.