ORDER
1. This is an application in revision by two persons. Petitioner No. 1 claims to be the sebait and trustee of certain trust and the properties appertaining thereto. Petitioner No. 2 is the President, Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts (hereinafter referred to as the Board) established under the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Feeling aggrieved by the order dated 27-6-1974 of the District Judge at Arrah in Miscellaneous Judicial Case 1 of 1974, they have moved this court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the setting aside of the said order,
2. At the time of the hearing of this civil revision application cause has been shown on behalf of opposite party No. 1 (hereinafter called the opposite party) alone. No other opposite party has appeared to oppose this application.
3. Facts may be stated in a narrow compass. In relation to the trust in question complaints were made by the villagers before the Board that the trust and its properties were being mismanaged by the first petitioner (hereinafter called the petitioner) and his brother. On an earlier occasion the petitioner took the stand that It was a private trust and the Board had no control over it. The President of the Board made an order on 2-4-1973 under Section 32 (1) of the Act setting a scheme for proper administration of the trust. Seven persons including the opposite party were appointed as members of a committee for the proper administration of the trust. The opposite party, as it appears from the order of the District Judge, was appointed the Secretary of the committee. A writ application was filed by the petitioner against the order of the Board but that failed. Thereafter the petitioner filed Miscellaneous Judicial case 12 of 1973 before the District Judge, Arrah, under Sub-section (3) of Section 32 of the Act to challenge the scheme framed by the President of the Board. Certain developments took place during the pendency of that miscellaneous Judicial Case. First an order of injunction was made, later it was vacated and then ultimately the miscellaneous Judicial case was withdrawn by the petitioner, because during its pendency he seems to have accepted the position that the trust was a public trust of the kind which was governed by the Act, It may be stated here that undisputedly the scheme settled by the Board on 2-4-1974 had not been published in the official gazette as required by Sub-section (2) of Section 32 nor had the Board appointed any date from which the scheme was to come into force. The Board modified the Scheme so settled earlier and settled a fresh scheme, in which the petitioner who was a member of the 7-men committee was also included as a member. The opposite party who was a member of the previous committee was left out. This scheme was published in the gazette and seems to have come into force. The opposite party challenged this scheme in C. W. J. C. 1522 of 1973. He was allowed to withdraw this writ application on 29-11-1973 by a Bench of this court in order to enable him to avail of the adequate alternative remedy of a proceeding under Section 32 (3) of the Act. Accordingly the opposite party filed the present miscellaneous Judicial case being M. J. C. 1 of 1974 before the District Judge, Arrah, to challenge the final scheme which was published in the gazette.
4. In the application filed by the opposite party under Section 32 (3) of the Act it is stated in paragraph 12-
“That the management of the trust properties are now being conducted by the petitioners under the Presidentship of the S. D. O. Sasaram respondent No. 3.”
The opposite party filed an application for injunction in the court below, in paragraph 6 of which it was asserted that the petitioner was interfering with the management of the trust properties at the hands of the opposite party and was creating breach of peace; hence he should be injuncted from interfering with the management and the operation of the order of the Board dated 14-11-1973 by which the final, modified scheme was framed, should be stayed. The learned District Judge felt persuaded to accept the stand of the opposite party and has made an order restraining the petitioners from interfering with the management of the trust property and has stayed the operation of the revised scheme till the disposal of the miscellaneous judicial case.
5. In our opinion, the order of the learned District Judge is wholly without jurisdiction. He has committed two serious errors, while feeling persuaded to make an order in favour of the opposite party. The first is that the scheme settled by the Board on 2-4-1973 never came into force. If the learned District Judge would have taken care to look to the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 32, perhaps, he would not have committed the mistake which he has done. The scheme was never finalised, never published in the
gazette and never came into force. That being so, the claim of the opposite party that he had started managing the trust properties and had actually come in physical possession of them was a bogus one. It was not tenable in law at all. Such a stand ought to have been rejected on these facts. The petitioner was disputing this and the learned District Judge fell into an error in accepting such a stand of the opposite party. It is to be remembered that admittedly the petitioner was a trustee of the trust and its properties. He had not been removed either by the Board in exercise of its power under Section 28 (2) (h) or by the District Judge on an application made to him under Section 48 of the Act. He, therefore, continued to hold the office of the trustee and consequently he was the person who was entitled to remain in physical possession of the properties appertaining to it, unless by a validly framed scheme which had come into force the management had been directed to be made by the Board in such a fashion that it brought about for the time being physical dispossession of the trustee from the trust properties. Nothing of the kind happened in this case. In such a situation it is plain that on this ground alone the order of the District Judge is without jurisdiction.
6. The second reason is that the scope of a proceeding before the District Judge under Sub-section (3) of Section 32 is a limit-ed one. In such a proceeding the District Judge can vary, modify or set aside the scheme settled by the Board. No other power has been conferred on the District Judge under Sub-section (3). Sub-section (2) indicates that in such a proceeding the District Judge has got power to stay the coming into force of the scheme settled by the Board. He may have the power consequently, if the scheme is challenged by the trustee, to restrain the persons appointed as members of the committee under the scheme from interfering with the management of the trust by the trustee. But it is difficult to under-stand how in a proceeding started under Sub-section (3) of Section 32 of the Act by a person to challenge a scheme which has been settled by the Board and accepted by the trustee, the trustee can be asked not to disturb the alleged possession of the applicant. It is something which is quite foreign to the nature of the proceeding started by such an applicant. Of course, the only part of the District Judge’s order which can be legally supported is the staying of the coming into force of the scheme and, as we have said above, the District Judge had this power in view of Sub-section (2). The Board feels aggrieved by it. And, we are quite at a loss to understand how merely staying the coming into force of the scheme made on 14-11-1973 will be of any help to the opposite party–rather, it will give a free hand to the petitioner unbridled by whatever scheme has been finalised by the Board. The learned District Judge really
has given no reasons in his order in support of its second part. He was, as it appears carried away by the untenable stand of the opposite party to allow him to remain in possession of the trust properties–a thing which was highly unjust to do even in exercise of the inherent power of the District Judge, assuming that he had such a power in this case. Instead of preventing an abuse of the process of the court, the order was clearly bringing about an abuse and must be set right by this court.
7. For the reasons stated above, we allow this civil revision application with costs payable by opposite party No. 1 and set aside the impugned order of the learned District Judge, hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 64/-only.