ORDER
Gowri Shankar, Member (T)
1. The question for consideration is the eligibility to the exemption contained in notification 182/87 as amended to the goods manufactured in the workshop of the appellant. The notification exempts from duty goods “which are manufactured in workshops, situated within the precincts of mines and also are intended for use in the repair or maintenance of machinery used in mines.” In the orders impugned in the appeals. The Commissioner has denied the exemption to the goods under consideration on his view that the workshop in which they were manufactured was located at six kilometers away from the mine and hence not within its precincts.
2. The counsel for the appellant does not dispute that the workshop in question is located six kilometers away from the perimeter of the mine. He contends however that the word “precincts of mine” has been interpreted by the Calcutta bench of the Tribunal in its decision Central Coalfields Limited v. CCE 1997 (23) RLT 269 to exclude a workshop located 50 kilometers away from a mine.
3. In the subject decision, the Tribunal found that “by the definition of ‘mine’ as given in the Mines Act, the workshop is entitled to cater to the needs of all the mines under the same management.” It noted that the adjudicating authority had, notwithstanding the meaning of the term “precinct” in the dictionary, held that “keeping in view of the safety operation of the mines, it may not be viable to hold the ‘precincts’ as an enclosed area.” He has therefore held that the term “precincts” would apply to a mine within four kilometers from the workshop. The Tribunal was of the view that there is no particular sanctity to four kilometers and that if a workshop four kilometers away from a mine is within the precincts the mine within one, fifty kilometers away is also under its precincts.
4. In the proceedings before the bench, the departmental representative did not question the conclusion arrived at by the adjudicating authority. That view itself is in our view entirely incorrect. The term precincts has the following meaning:
“A geographical unit of government, such as election district, a police district or a judicial district.” (Black Law Dictionary)
“Place situate within the close, curtilage, or precincts, forming a factory or workshop.” (Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary)
An administrative district, a district over which a person or body has jurisdiction; a division of city, town, parish, etc…. the area within the boundary of real or imaginary of a place or places, also surrendering environment of a place.” (New Oxford Shorter Dictionary)
5. It is clear from these meanings of this word, that place four kilometers away from the boundary of a mine cannot, by any stretch of imagination, to be said to be within the precincts of the mine. This is something like saying that Lonavla is within the precincts of Greater Mumbai, or Ghaziabad is within the precincts of Delhi. These arguments were not considered in the decision relied upon by the counsel for the appellant, and were not even raised before the bench. We are confident that had they, been the outcome could have been different. We therefore do not feel ourselves bound by the ratio of that decision.
6. The argument that the counsel for the appellant raises in this regard is that because precinct means a district, any workshop located in the district within which the mine falls must be considered to be within the a precincts of that mine. Thus, to continue the analogy we have taken, is like saying, that because Lonavla and Mumbai fall within the same state, Lonavla is under the precincts of Mumbai or Mumbai is under the precincts of Lonavla. The absurdity of such an argument needs no further elaboration.
7. On merits therefore the appellant does not have a case.
8. The notice which was issued on 3.10.1996 however invoked the extended period of limitation contained in the proviso under Sub-section (1) of Section 11A of the Act on the ground that the appellant had not obtain a licence and proceeded to demand duty on the goods cleared between April 1993 to March 1996. The notice does not in fact clearly spell out the basis by alleging that the appellant’s intention to evade duty until that the appellant did not obtain a licence. As we have noted, at least one adjudicating authority had held (in the order that was appealed to the Kolkata bench of the Tribunal) that a workshop within four kilometers within the mine is within the precincts and this reasoning is found favour with the Tribunal. In that situation, it was perfectly possible for the appellant, as its counsel contends, to hold the same view. We do not think that the appellant being a public sector undertaking wholly owned by the Government of India, which would have also a bearing upon the question of intent to evade duty. On the facts of this case, therefore, we hold that the extended period of limitation would not be available.
9. The appeals is accordingly allowed and the impugned order set aside.