ORDER
1. The petitioner was a student of BUMS (Bachelor of Homeopathic Medicine and Surgery) in the 2nd respondent-College. He joined the said course during the academic year 1994-95. He completed three years by 1997-98. According to him in 1996 he was suffering from ‘chronic gastritis’ and underwent treatment at Apple Hospital, Warangal. Again in 1998 while studying third year course he suffered severe stomach pain and was treated at a Hospital in Hyderabad but the pain subsisted and, therefore, he left to his native place and was hospitalised at Rohini Hospital in Hanmakonda. After treatment he appeared for the III year examination and successfully completed the same. Though he came to attend to IV year classes he could not do so as he suffered stomach pain again. Therefore, he went back to his native place at Kazipet to take treatment at Rohini Hospital and he was advised complete bed rest. Hence, he could not attend the classes. Beside these the further allegations are as under.
2. After completion of the treatment for his ailment, the petitioner went to the 2nd respondent-College on the reopening day for the academic year 1999-2000 and submitted an application on 12-7-1999. The 2nd respondent forwarded the same to the first respondent. The first respondent by a letter-dated 1-9-1999 rejected the request of the petitioner as the absence from the college was for more than one year. He was not re-admitted. Therefore, the petitioner
filed this writ petition on 11-10-1999 praying for a direction to the University of Health Sciences and the Government Homeopathy College, Hyderabad to permit the petitioner to continue IV year BHMS Course by declaring the decision of the University as null and void.
3. The petitioner again filed WP MP No.31528 of 1999 seeking to raise additional grounds challenging Ordinance 1 of 1996 framed by the University/ Executive Council and also praying for a direction to amend the prayer. As per the amended prayer, the petitioner seeks a writ of ceriiorari to quash and declare Ordinance 1 of 1996 of the first respondent-University as violative of the principles of natural justice and for a consequential direction to the respondents to admit the petitioner in IV year Bl IMS course for the academic year 1999-2000. This application is ordered.
4. This Court admitted the writ petition on 17-12-1999. When the case was listed before me on 27-1-2000. I heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the Standing Counsel for the first respondent-University. Again the matter was listed on 1-2-2000 and ihe learned Counsel were heard at length. The learned Standing Counsel made his submissions relying on the instructions as the matter is of urgent nature involving the admission of a student.
5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the University rejected the application of the petitioner seeking re-admission relying on Ordinance No.l of 1996. Ordinance No.l of 1996, it is submitted, is illegal and unconstitutional insofar as the same forfeits admission into the course of the candidates who are absent for a continuous period of one year or more without permission. Further, it is submitted that the petitioner made a representation to the 2nd respondent on 12-7-1999 which was forwarded by the 2nd respondent to the first respondent by letter dated 16-7-1999
recommending to the first respondent to permit re-admission of the petitioner into the IV year BHMS course in the 2nd respondent-College. The first respondent rejected the same by letter-dated 1-9-1999, as the petitioner’s discontinuation period is more than one year. This is arbitrary and violative of principles of natural justice.
6. Refuting these submissions, the learned Standing Counsel submits that while giving the application on 12-7-1999, the petitioner did not give reasons for his absence and nowhere says that he was sick during 1998-99 and, therefore, all the allegations regarding ill health of the petitioner are irrelevant. He further submits that the petitioner approached the 2nd respondent on 12-7-1999 after the end of the IV year academic year during 1998-99 and, therefore, as per Ordinance No.l of 1996, the petitioner is not entitled to seek re-admission. The learned Standing Counsel relied on the letter addressed by the Principal of the College and Ordinance No.l of 1996.
7. Ordinance 1 of 1996 reads as under:
“Every student shall attend his/her classes (Theory, Practical and Clinical) on all working days unless he/she is granted leave of absence by the Principal. If a student absents continuously for a period of 91 days or more and seeks permission to attend the course before one year after discontinuation, his/her application shall be forwarded to the Vice-Chancellor is satisfied with the reasons he may grant leave of absence attaching such conditions as he may deem necessary. Candidates who are absent for a continuous period of one year or more without permission shall be deemed to have forfeited the admission into the course and his/her studentship stands cancelled without any further notice.”
8. A plain reading of the Ordinance shows that if a student absents continuously
for a period of 91 days or more and seeks permission to attend the course before one year after discontinuation, his/her application shall be forwarded to the Vice Chancellor, who, if satisfied, may permit re-admission subject to conditions that may be imposed. The Ordinance specifically prohibits any such re-admission in respect of a student who is absent for a continuous period of one year or more without permission and forfeits admission into the course resulting in the cancellation of studentship without any further notice. As per this Ordinance every student shall attend classes (Theory, Practical and Clinical) on all working days unless the Principal grants him leave of absence.
9. The petitioner admittedly did not apply leave and as per his own submission he appeared for 111 year examination in March-April, 1998 and after that he never attended the college or classes. Therefore, for a period of one year after discontinuation the petitioner was absent without leave resulting in forfeiture of admission and cancellation of his studentship. According to the communication sent by the Principal on 29-1-2000 to the camp office of University of Health Sciences, the petitioner did not attend the classes from the commencement of IV year of BHMS course from 16-6-1998. He made an application only on 12-7-1999 for the first time seeking re-admission. The impugned letter of the 1st respondent dated 1-9-1999, therefore, cannot be termed as illegal or unconstitutional.
10. The petitioner’s Counsel, realising this, came forward with an amendment application being WP MP No.31528 of 1999 challenging Ordinance 1 of 1996. The challenge is based on Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is also urged that it does not have retrospective effect.
11. To appreciate the contentions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it is
necessary to notice a few provisions of the University of Health Sciences Act, 1986 (the Act, for brevity). Section 18 of the Act prescribes that the Executive Council shall be an authority of the University. The Executive Council is the principal executive body of the University and has power to make Statutes, to do all such acts and things whether incidental to the objectives and powers of the University. Section 30 enumerates matters in respect of which Statutes may be made by the Executive Council. Section 32 provides for making of Ordinances by the Executive Council provided that the first Ordinance shall be made by the Vice-Chancellor with the previous approval of the Government, it is not denied that Ordinance No. 1 of 1996 dealing with the re-admission of an absentee student is made in exercise of powers under Section 32 of the Act. Therefore, when once Statutes or Ordinances are made, they form part of the Act and have force of law. In view of this, it is not permissible for this Court to issue a writ of cerliorari and quash the Ordinances issued by the University because the Ordinances and Statutes made by the Executive Council shall be deemed to have legislative character (see : Prabhod Verma v. State of UP., ). In the amendment application the petitioner also prayed for a consequential direction to the respondents to admit the petitioner. Therefore, as an incidental question this Court is inclined to examine the question of legality of Ordinance 1 of 1996.
12. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the Ordinance 1 of 1996 is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. No further elaboration or substantiation in support of the submission is made. When an action or decision is challenged as violating Article 14 of the Constitution, the petitioner is required to come forward with specific allegation/submission as to how the impeached provision of law is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
A bald and vague allegation that the impeached action or decision or provision violates Article 14 of the Constitution without supporting facts and submissions would enable the Court to examine the submission.
13. When a challenge is made on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution, two limbs of arguments are possible. One is based on theory of classification and other is the ground of arbitrariness. If. for the purpose of implemenlation of law, persons or things are classified, the classification has to satisfy the twin tests. These are rationality test and nexus test. Rationality test postulates that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia, which distinguishes those that are grouped together from others. Nexus test requires that differentia must have rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the provision, (see Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India, ; State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, ; and Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Tendulkar. ).
14. Ordinance I of 1996, for the purpose of re-admission, classifies students into two categories. The first categoiy includes those students who absent only for a period of 91 days continuously or more and make application before one year after discontinuation. The other group includes students who are absent for more than one year without permission. I fail to see any irrationality in the classification. The object which the Ordinance 1 of 1996 seeks to achieve is that a siudent who is absent for only 91 days without leave of absence by the Principal requires to be considered for re-admission if he comes forward with such a request before one year so that he could be re-admitted either in the current academic year or next academic year. This is keeping in view the standards of University education and continuity of student’s academic career.
The classification noticed hereinabove couldn’t be said to be bad on the ground that it does not seek to achieve the object of Ordinance 1 of 1996. Other aspect in relation to Article 14 is arbitrariness. Here also no serious effort is made by learned Counsel. The provision in my considered opinion is rational and cannot in any way said to be arbitrary. Therefore, the submission that the impugned Ordinance violates Article 14 of the Constitution fails and it is accordingly rejected.
15. The next submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the Ordinance violates principles of natural justice. Ordinance 1 of 1996 provides that a student who is absent for more than one year without permission forfeits admission and studentship of such a candidate stands cancelled without any further notice. This is challenged as violative of the rule of ‘audi alteram partem’. The submission is misconceived. The rule is that the student shall attend classes on all working days and if he is absent for more than one year his studentship stands cancelled. When once a student discontinues for more than one year, it is presumed that he, on his own volition, did not attend classes regularly, absented without cause and prior permission of the Principal and loses right to admission into the college. This does not result in any civil consequences, for it is always implied that admission is subject to the condition that the student shall attend all classes regularly before he/she takes up the final examination. Therefore, I am not able to accept the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner.
16. Yet another submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that Ordinance 1 of 1996 does not operate retrospectively and as the petitioner joined I year BHMS course during 1994-95, the same is not applicable to him. In the affidavit, the petitioner has extracted the
Ordinance, which was replaced by Ordinance 1 of 1996 challenged in this writ petition. Before amendment, the same read as follow :
“After a student admits himself/herself as per the rules and absents himself/ herself for a continuous period of one year or more without permission, his/her studentship shall be cancelled.”
17. The Ordinance as it existed prior to amendment and the Ordinance after amendment insofar as the students who discontinued for one year or more is the same. Even if the Ordinance prior to amendment is applied, the petitioner cannot be in a better position, as his studentship will be cancelled if he absents himself for a continuous period of one year or more without permission. Further BHMS course is a four-year course. Ordinance 1 of 1996 deals with attendance of each academic year and not the entire course. Therefore, though the petitioner joined the first year BUMS course in 1994-95, from second year onwards, Ordinance No.l of 1996 governs him. In view of this, it cannot be said that Ordinance 1 of 1996 is applied retrospectively. A student admitted in a course, which is for more than one year has no right to insist that the Rules, Regulations, Statutes and Ordinances, which existed at the time of admission, should govern him. Such a right cannot be inferred. In academic matters, the wisdom of the experts in the field should be respected. The learned Counsel for the petitioner made no other submission.
18. For all the above reasons, the writ petition is devoid of any merits and the same is accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.