High Court Madras High Court

M.M.Rm. Firm By Its Managing … vs Haja Beevi And Ors. on 16 December, 1997

Madras High Court
M.M.Rm. Firm By Its Managing … vs Haja Beevi And Ors. on 16 December, 1997
Equivalent citations: (1998) 2 MLJ 9
Author: S A Wahab


JUDGMENT

S.M. Abdul Wahab, J.

1. The unsuccessful plaintiff in both the courts below has filed this second appeal.

2. The plaintiff filed the suit for recovery of a sum of Rs. 3,100 due on a promissory note dated 20.3.1970. According to the plaintiff, the defendant has paid Rs. 200 on 19.3.1973 and made an endorsement on the pronote, and since the defendant has claimed the benefits under the Tamil Nadu Debt Relief Acts, the suit filed by the plaintiff was not barred by limitation.

3. The defendants’ contention was that the suit was barred by limitation. The defendant is entitled to the benefits of Act 13 of 1980. hence the suit has to be dismissed.

4. The courts below have dismissed the suit on the ground that even though moratorium was there on and from 15.1.1975 as per Act 40 of 1978, the suit could be filed from 19.9.1979 and therefore the suit filed on 7.4.1980 was barred by limitation. The learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the courts below have committed mistake in calculating the period of limitation and the claim is not barred as far as this case is concerned. The moratorium as a matter of fact expired only on 13.6.1979 when the Act 40 of 1979 was published, enabling the filing of the suit. It is admitted that the unexpired period of limitation as far as this case is concerned is one year 2 months and 24 days, Since the moratorium commenced from 15.1.1975 as per Act 10 of 1975, the courts below have chosen to add one year two months and 24 days from 15.7.1978. This is wrong. One year 2 months and 24 days should be added from 13.6.1979. If so added the period expires only on 17.8.1980 and suit filed on 17.4.1980 will be in time because there will be time till 17.8.1980 for the purpose of filing the suit.

5. The learned Counsel for the respondent contended that as per Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the said Act 40 of 1979, it is deemed to be coming into force on 15.7.1978 and therefore the unexpired period should be added only to the period subsequent to 15.7.1978. If the computation is made in that way, the suit ought to have been filed as rightly found in the courts below on or before 19.9.1979.

6. The courts below have not carefully construed the provisions of the Act 40 of 1979, the Tamil Nadu Debt Relief Act 40 of 1979. Tamil Nadu Act 40 of 1979 was published on 13.6.1979. Section 34 of the said Act is as follows:

Exclusion of time for limitation and dissolution of stay proceedings in respect of certain suits and applications: 1. Where, on or after the 15th day of January, 1976, but before the date of the publication of this Act in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, any suit for the recovery of any amount towards any liability arising out of the debt due from a debtor would have been instituted or any application for the execution of a decree passed in any such suit would have been made but for the fact that the institution of the suit or the making of the application was barred by the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Debt Relief Act, 1978 (Tamil Nadu Act XL of 1978), in computing the period of limitation or limit of time prescribed for such suit or application the period commencing on and from the 15th day of January 1976, and ending with the date of the publication of this Act in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette shall be excluded

2. Where any proceedings in any of the suits or applications of the nature mentioned in Sub-section (1) were stayed by any of the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Debt Relief Act, 1978 (Tamil nadu Act XL of 1978) the stay effected in respect of such proceedings shall stand dissolved and such suit or application shall be proceeded with under this Act from the stage which had been reached when further proceedings in such suit or application were stayed.

A reading of the said section clearly shows that the period commencing from 15.1.1976 upto the date of publication of the said Act should be excluded. We have seen above that the publication of the Act was 13.6.1979. So the period from 15.1.1976 to 13.6.1979 has to be excluded for the purpose of calculating the period of limitation for this case.

7. The suit promissory note was executed on 20.3.1970. The endorsement of the payment was made on 19.3.1973. So from 19.3.1973 to 19.3.1976 the suit could have been filed. But from 15.1.1975 there was moratorium. The suit was actually filed on 7.4.1980. Therefore the period upto 13.6.1979 if excluded as per the abovesaid section, the suit will be in time.

8. The learned Counsel for the respondent contended that the Act has come into force from 15.7.1978. Therefore as per Section 1, Sub-section (3) of the said Act, since retrospective effect is given to the said Act for the purpose of calculating the limitation the said date should be taken into account. This is not correct.

9. Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the said Act is only for the purpose of giving retrospective effect. According to the legislature only debts incurred before 14.7.1978 were eligible for scaling down. The debts incurred thereafter upto the publication of Act 40 of 1979 were not eligible for scaling down. Therefore, the Legislature restricted the category of debts for the purpose of scaling down. Only with that intention the retrospective effect is given to cover debt incurred upto 17.7.1978. But Section 34 is with reference to exclusion of the period of limitation. The section specifically says that the period from 15.1.1976 upto the publication of the Act should be excluded. Therefore there is no doubt or suspicion with reference to the exclusion of the period for the purpose of calculating the limitation. In the circumstances, the courts below have committed an error and only by mistake they dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff.

10. The next question is what will be the amount payable by the defendants to the plaintiff for which decree can be given. As it is seen above that Act 40 of 1979 is applicable to the present case. The learned Counsel for the appellant represents that the decree may be passed for the principal of Rs. 1,800 with interest 9% per annum from the date of promissory note as per Section 12 of the Act. The learned Counsel for the respondent is also not in a position to contend that the claim of the counsel for the appellant is not in accordance with the provisions of the Act 40 of 1979. Under these circumstances, the judgments and decrees of the courts below are set aside and the suit is decreed for Rs. 1,800 towards the principle amount. As regards interest, the defendant has to pay interest at 9% per annum from 20.3.1970. However he is entitled to have credit for Rs. 200 paid on 19.3.1973. The plaintiff will be entitled to cost throughout.