JUDGMENT
S.R.K. Prasad, J.
1. This second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed in AS No.94 of 1986 on the file of the II Additional District Judge, Krishna at Vijayawada.
2. The facts that arise for consideration can be briefly stated as follows:
The defendant is the appellant. The plaintiff wanted to purchase a lorry in the year 1970 and approached the defendant to lend a sum of Rs. 10,000/-, on mortgaging the house of the plaintiff and his mother. The defendant said to have agreed to lend a sum of Rs. 8,000/- only and demanded the plaintiff and his mother late Shaik Ameenabi, to execute an out and out sale deed for a sum of Rs. 8,000/- promising that the plaintiff and his mother could repurchase the house, which was the schedule property, as and when they desire, for a sum of Rs. 10,000/-with in a period of 10 years. It is also agreed that the possession of the house should be delivered to the defendant and the defendant should enjoy the rents and pay taxes. It is also further agreed that the plaintiff should pay a sum of Rs. 10,000/-and get reconveyance. In pursuance of the same the plaintiff and his mother executed a sale deed dated 4-2-1970 and got it registered with the Sub-Registrar, Jaggaiapet. In pursuance of the understanding, a letter is given by the defendant in his own handwriting on 20-2-1970 stating that he will reconvey the suit schedule property, for a sum of Rs. 10,000/- and that the offer stands till 10 years from that day. The plaintiff personally approached the defendant and requested in the last week of July, 1976, to reconvey the property. The plaintiff also issued two notices dated 10-8-1976 and 15-1-1978, but no replies were given by the defendant. Thereafter the plaintiff presented the suit for Specific Performance of the letter of reconveyance, dated 20-2-1970.
3. The contentions of the appellant/ defendant are that the letter dated 20-2-1970 is void and it is devoid of consideration. It cannot be admissible and cannot be enforceable in law and the plaintiff has no capacity to purchase the suit schedule property. The plaintiff never approached the defendant for the purchase of the suit schedule property. It is also contended that the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties, as late Smt. Ameenabi left other heirs as well.
4. After trial, the trial Court found that the suit was barred by limitation and accordingly dismissed the same. The matter has been carried in appeal in AS No.94 of 1986 on the file of the II Additional District Judge, Krishna at Vijayawada. By his judgment dated 31-8-1989, the learned Appellant Court found that the suit was not barred by limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Aggrieved by the same the present appeal is filed.
5. The only point canvassed by the appellant’s Counsel is that the suit is barred by limitation. The appellant Counsel contends that the period of limitation starts from the date of refusal to perform the contract i.e., the last week of July, 1976 and the suit is not filed within three years from the date of refusal. Hence, it is barred by limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act.
6. The learned Counsel for the respondent contends that the period stipulated under the reconveyance is ten years and the limitation has to be reckoned from the date of expiry of 10 years and therefore the suit is not barred by limitation.
7. Adverting to the said contentions Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as follows:
Description of Suit
Period of Limitation
Time from which period begins to run
54. For Specific Performance
Three years
The date fixed foe the performance, or,
if no such date is fixed, when the Plaintiff has notice that performance is refused.
8. In Babu Ram v. Indra Pal Singh, , the Apex Court had an occasion to interpret Article 54 of Limitation Act in respect of contract of reconveyance. The Apex Court has observed at page 38 which is as follows:
“Under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963, it is stated in the third column that the suit for specific performance had to be filed within 3 years from the date stipulated in the contract or from the date of refusal to perform the contract. In the present case, even through a period of 5 years is fixed for exercising the option to repurchase, it is not specified in the agreement that the vendee shall execute the deed of repurchase within a particular period from the date of exercise of option. Hence the first part of the third column of Article 54 does not apply. The second part applies. Time therefore, starts to run only from the 22-7-1968, the date when the defendant refused to execute the deed of reconveyance. The suit was filed on 6-10-1969 within 3 years from 22-7-1968. Suit is in time as held by the trial Court. Point 5 is held in favour of the plaintiff.”
9. It is clear from the facts in the abovementioned case that the period of 5 years has been stipulated for reconveyance and the Apex Court has stated that the period of limitation begins from the date of refusal by the vendee or the defendant. Applying the said principles to the facts of the present case, the period of 3 years mentioned under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall be reckoned from the date of refusal to execute the deed of reconveyance.
10. In the present case admittedly the defendant has refused to reconvey the property, inspite of oral demands and issuance of two notices under Exs.A4 and A6. It is pleaded and admitted that refusal was made in the last week of July, 1976. If three year period’ is reckoned from the said period, it is certainly barred by limitation. The judgment and decree passed by the II Additional District Judge at Vijayawada, reversing the decision of the District Munsif, Jaggiahpet that OS No. 72 of 1979 is barred by limitation, is liable to be reversed and the suit is liable to be dismissed. On a reconsideration of entire matter and after applying the interpretation of the Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 by the Supreme Court to the facts of this case, I find that the suit is barred by limitation and accordingly I, set aside the judgment and decree passed by a II Additional District Judge at Vijayawada, in AS No. 94 of 1986 and dismiss the suit in OS No. 72 of 1994 holding the same was barred by limitation. Each party do bear their own costs as the appellant succeeded in this appeal on technical plea.