High Court Orissa High Court

Pratap Kishore Mund vs Secretary To Government, Schools … on 18 April, 2002

Orissa High Court
Pratap Kishore Mund vs Secretary To Government, Schools … on 18 April, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2002 II OLR 8
Author: R Patra
Bench: R Patra, P Mohanty


JUDGMENT

R.K. Patra, J.

1. The petitioner in this writ petition seeks to assail the validity of the order dated 20.7.2001 (Annexure-1) by which the Orissa Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”) rejected the application filed by him along with three others on the ground of limitation as well as want of permission to file a joint application as required under Rule 4(4) of the Orissa Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1986.

2. Facts leading to fifing the writ petition are briefly stated hereunder :

The petitioner along with three others filed G. A. No. 1920 of 1993 before the Tribunal Praying for a direction to count the period of services rendered by them in sided schools towards seniority and consider their case for promotion to Senior Subordinate Education Service Cadre. Their case was that they are all trained graduates and were serving as Assistant Teachers in Dharmagarh High School in the district of Kalahandi between 1962 to 1970. Their appointments were duly approved by the Inspector of Schools on 30.8.1971. In May, 1983 the school was taken over by the State Government. The order of the State Government on the strength of which the school was taken over provided that the seniority of the concerned employees would be in their respective cadre under Government from the date of taking over. Despite the aforesaid order, their past services were not taken into account as a result of which they have lost their seniority as well as promotion to higher cadre.

3. It appears from the impugned order that the State Government which was respondent before the Tribunal had not filed its counter affidavit till the matter was decided, although the matter remained pending before it for eight years. The Tribunal ultimately by the impugned order rejected the application on two technical grounds : (1) the application is barred by time; and (2) joint application is not maintainable in absence of permission under Rule 4(4) of the Orissa Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1986.

4. We have heard Shri S. K. Misra for the petitioner and Shri D. P. Sarangi, learned counsel for the opposite parties.

5. So far as the first ground is concerned, it may be stated that the Tribunal has clearly fell into error in dismissing the application on the ground of limitation after keeping the same pending on its file for about eight years. Section 21 of the Administration Tribunals Act, 1985 prescribes certain period of limitation for filing application. Sub-section (3) thereof provides that notwithstanding anything prescribed for filing application, the same may be admitted after period of limitation if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within the prescribed period. From the aforesaid it is evident that the Tribunal is competent to condone the delay if sufficient cause is shown by the applicant in not approaching it within the prescribed period. In the instant case, the Tribunal ought to have examined whether the application was filed within time. Had it been done so at the earliest stage, the applicants could have taken steps to satisfy the Tribunal that they had sufficient cause for not preferring the application within the time. The Tribunal did not examine the matter and admitted the application for hearing and when it came up for hearing after eight years, has thrown the same over-board. This has definitely caused prejudice to the applicants. The law of limitation is more in the nature of procedural law. Therefore, while applying it, the party should not suffer for the lapses committed by the Tribunal.

The Tribunal has also observed in the impugned order to the effect that there is no question of considering condonation of delay, as there is no prayer for it. The applicants filed the application before the Tribunal treating the same to be within time. Therefore, question of making any prayer for condonation of delay did not arise. The Tribunal seems to be under the impression that prayer for condoning the delay should be made by making a petition. Recently we had the occasion to consider such a point in Balajinath Padhi v. Central Administrative Tribunal, (OJC No. 10246 of 1999 disposed of on 21.3.2002) reported in 93 (2002) CLT 794. This is what we have observed in that case :

“….. A bench of this Court as back as 1971 (prescribed
over by Chief Justice G.K. Misra) in Hari Sankar Dikshit

v. Dharanidhar Dikshit, 1971 I.L.R. 1387, has ruled that Section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not prescribe that an application must be filed in writing though the invariable practice is that an application is filed. In absence of an application, if sufficient evidence is available in the case record to condone the delay and the Court is satisfied with it, delay can be condoned…..”

Therefore, merely because there was no formal petition praying for condonation of delay, the Tribunal is not justified to reject the application as a matter of course.

6. With regard to the second ground, we may state that the Tribunal wrongly rejected the application by invoking Sub-rule (4) of Rule 4 of the Orissa Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1986 which provides that the Tribunal may permit more than one person to join together and file a single application if it is satisfied that they have the same interest in the service matter having regard to the cause of action and the nature of relief prayed for. Filing of a joint application is a procedural matter. After all rules of procedure are intended to be a handmaid to the administration of justice. A party cannot be refused just relief merely because of some mistake, negligence, inadvertence or even infraction of the rules of procedure. The aforesaid Rule 4 deals with the procedure for filing applications. When the matter came up for admission, the Tribunal could have pointed out that the joint application was not maintainable. Had it been pointed out at the admission stage, the applicants could have shown that having regard to the cause of action and the nature of relief asked for they have the same interest and thus, the joint application is maintainable. The Tribunal having not pointed out this defect at the initial stage, shall be deemed to have ignored the defect. Therefore, the procedure prescribed under Sub-rule (4) of Rule 4 cannot be used as a hooby trap to reject an application. Moreover, the four applicants have a common cause of action and the relief sought for by each of them is one and the same. Therefore, the joint application made by them is maintainable. The Tribunal could have also confined the case to one of the applicants and decided the case on merit.

For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the Tribunal cannot be sustained in law and the same is hereby quashed. The matter is remitted to the Tribunal with a direction that it will hear the matter on merit. As by now more than eight years have passed, the Tribunal is directed to dispose of the matter by 31st of August, 2002.

The writ petition is allowed.

Pradip Mohanty, J.

7. I agree.