ORDER
P. Ramakrishnam Raju, J.
1. The petitioner who is the respondent in I.A.No. 10/91 in A.T.C. 1/89 on the file of the Special Officer-cum-District Munsif, Kamalapuram, is challenging o the order dated 7-4-1992 in this revision petition.
2. The petitioner filed A.T.C. 1/89 on the file of the Special Officer-cum-District Munsif, Kamalapuram for declaration that he is the cultivating tenant and for permanent injunction restraining the respondents herein, from interfering with his possession over the petition-schedule land. The respondents engaged an advocate, but since the Advocate reported no instructions, the petition was allowed ex parte on 6-9-1991. Thereafter, the respondents filed an application to set aside the ex parte order. As there was a delay of one year and nine months in filing the said application, they have also filed an application-I.A. 10/91 to condone the delay in filing the application to set aside the ex parte order dated 6-9-1991. The contention of the respondents herein, in the said application is that since the petitioner approached them for settlement and as the mediators settled the matter, the petitioner agreed to surrender the land and give possession of the land to the 3rd respondent within two years and that he had agreed to withdraw A.T.C. 1/89. Therefore, their advocate reported no instructions in view of the said settlement. But, however, the petitioner did not withdraw A.T.C. as agreed, but obtained ex parte order on 6-9-1991. Therefore, the said order should be set aside. Since they came to know about the said order only when they asked the petitioner for possession of the land, the petitioner showed the order of the Court and as such, they are not aware of the said order earlier and so, the delay that occurred in view of the above circumstances, should be condoned. However, the Petitioner had denied the said allegations. The learned Special Officer allowed the application by his order dated 7-4-1992 on payment of costs of Rs. 50/-. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner preferred the above revision petition.
3. Sri Koneti Raja Reddy, learned Counsel for the petitioner, submitted before me that the learned Special Officer has no power to condone the delay in filing an application to set aside the ex parte order in view of the fact that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, has no application to the proceedings before the Special Officer under the A.P. Tenancy Act. He also further contended that in fact, the impugned order is not an ex parte order but, it is an order on merits and therefore, the only remedy open to the respondents is to file an appeal, but not an application to set aside the said order. Relying upon a decision of the Division Bench of this Court reported in K. Venkaiah v. K.V. Rao, AIR 1978 A.P. 168 the learned Counsel contends that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to the proceedings under the Tenancy Act i.e., Andhra Pradesh (Telengana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 and that the authorities under the Act have no power to extend the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal or revision before the authorities under the said Act who are Tahsildar, Tribunal, Collector and the Board of Revenue.
4. The learned Counsel for the respondents countered these arguments and submitted that the Special Officer-cum-District Munsif, is a Civil Court which is specially constituted for the purpose of deciding the disputes that arise between the landlord and the tenant which are nothing but civil nature only and as such, the provisions of the Limitation Act are applicable to the proceedings before the Special Officer who is invested with all the powers of a Civil Court. He relied upon a decision reported in T. Venkateswarulu v. District Judge, Guntur, 1989(2) ALT (NRC) 27.
5. So, the point for consideration is, whether the Special Officer-cum-District Munsif is entitled to invoke the aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the proceedings before him.
6. A Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in K. Venkaiah v. K.V. Rao (1 supra), has concluded that Section 5 of the limitation Act does not apply to the proceedings under Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 and therefore, the authorities under the Act have no power to extend the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal or revision before the authorities under the Act. The learned Judges have observed that we have to look to the functions and not to the functionary in order to ascertain whether it is a Civil Court. Though the learned Judges have held that the authorities are Courts but not Civil Courts and observed as follows:–
“……for the Limitation Act to apply, it must be suit, or appeal or an application made under the provisions of the Civil P.C. Bound as we are by the aforesaid decisions, we must hold that even though the authorities under the Hyderabad Tenancy Act are ‘Courts’ within the meaning of the said expression employed in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, yet it has no application, for the reason that they are not Civil Courts, and hence the Limitation Act itself has no application to proceedings before such authorities, except, of course, in so far as they are expressly made applicable by the special enactment. Section 93 of the Hyderabad Tenancy Act makes only the provisions of the Limitation Act, relating to the computation of the period of limitation applicable to the said proceedings, and not the other provisions”.
7. The Supreme Court which had occasion to consider the correctness of this view in Sakuru v. Tanaji, observed as follows:-
“On a plain reading of the section it is absolutely clear that its effect is only to render applicable to the proceedings before the Collector, the provisions of the Limitation Act relating to ‘computation of the period of limitation’. The provisions relating to computation of the period of limitation are contained in Sections 12 to 24 included in Part III of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5 is not a provision dealing with ‘computation of the period of limitation’. It is only after the process of computation is completed and it is found that an appeal or application has been filed after the expiry of the prescribed period that the question of extension of the period under Section 5 can arise. We are, therefore, in complete agreement with the view expressed by the Division Bench of the High Court in Venkaiah’s case that Section 93 of the Act did not have the effect of rendering the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to the proceedings before the Collector”.
8. In the Andhra Pradesh (A.A.) Tenancy Act, 1956, as amended by Act 39 of 1974, there is no provision extending the period of limitation by the Special Officer or the Tribunal. Since the Special Officer is not a Civil Court, as discussed earlier, though manned by an officer of the Judicial cadre, the Limitation Act, had no application to the proceedings before him since the application of the Limitation Act either wholly or partly, is not expressly provided for in the said Act. Reference may be had for an authority for this proposition to the decision reported in Sakuru v. Tanaji, again, whereunder, it is stated as follows:-
“The Collector before whom the appeal was preferred by the appellant herein under Section 90 of the Act not being a Court, the Limitation Act, as such, had no applicability to the proceedings before him. But even in such a situation the relevant special statute may contain an express provision conferring on the appellate authority, such as the Collector, the power to extend the prescribed period of limitation on sufficient cause being shown by laying down that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall be applicable to such proceedings”.
In the absence of any provision to this effect in Andhra Pradesh (A.A.) Tenancy Act, 1956, as amended by the Act 39 of 1974, no such power to invoke the provisions of the Limitation Act to extend the time for filing such application, can be inferred.
9. In a case arising out of Andhra Pradesh Co-operatives Societies Act, reported in N.D.C.M. Society v. Co.Op. Tribunal, 1987(1) ALT 551 M.N. Rao, J. held that the District Munsif or the Subordinate Judge, as the case may be, constituting the Tribunal under Section 75 of the Act, will not be functioning as Civil Court, but only as a persona designata under Section 75(1) of the Act and held that the relevant Act has no application to the proceedings before the Tribunal under the Co-operative Societies Act.
10. The learned Counsel for the respondents, cited a decision reported in Hukumdev v. Lalit Narin, wherein, the Supreme Court has taken the view that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act do not govern the filing of Election Petition or their Trial by the High Court. Therefore, this decision does not help him.
11. The learned Counsel has also relied upon another decision reported in Mangu Ram v. Delhi Municipality, . In this decision, the Supreme Court observed that in case where an application for special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal is filed after coming into force of Limitation Act, 1963, Section 5 of the Act would be available to the applicant. It cannot be disputed that the regular Civil or Criminal Courts which are empowered to dispose of Criminal Appeals, have got the power to invoke the aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, this decision is no authority for the proposition that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to a Tribunal other than Civil or Criminal Courts.
12. The learned Counsel has also relied upon a decision reported in Vidyacharan v. Kliubochand, which has no application to the facts of the case. As observed earlier, the learned Counsel for the respondents, relied upon a decision reported in T. Venkateswarulu v. District judge, Guntur (2) supra. In this decision, the question of extending time by the Special Officer-cum-District Munsif did not arise for consideration. What was considered in the said decision was, whether the Special Officer and the District Judge, have got power under Civil Procedure Code, to dismiss the application for default. Therefore, this decision also does not render any assistance to the respondents.
13. Therefore, what emerges from the conspectus of the above discussion is inasmuch as there is no express provision in Andhra Pradesh (A.A.) Tenancy Act, 1956, as amended by Act 39 of 1974, the Special Officer has no power to condone the delay in filing an application to set aside the default order. Therefore, the order under revision is without jurisdiction. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and the revision is allowed, but in the circumstance, without costs.