PETITIONER:
A.K. GOPALAN AND ANOTHER
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
NOORDEEN
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
15/09/1969
BENCH:
SIKRI, S.M.
BENCH:
SIKRI, S.M.
MITTER, G.K.
REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN
CITATION:
1970 AIR 1694 1970 SCR (2) 410
1970 SCC (2) 734
ACT:
Contempt of Court's Act (32 of 1952) ss. 3 & 4--Murder
First information Report lodged--Statement charging for
murder made--Arrest accused thereafter--After arrest
statement published in newspaper-When contempt committed.
HEADNOTE:
A first information report was lodged on Sept. 11, 1967
regarding the loss of life of a person when two groups of
people clashed. On Sept. 20, 1967 the first appellant made
a statement charging one of the groups being guilty of
deliberate conspiracy to commit the murder and alleging that
a prominent member of that party had given instructions for
this. The respondent along with his two brothers was
arrested on Sept. 23, 1967 and on the next day the
Magistrate remanded the accused to police custody. In its
issue dated Sept. 23, 1967 a newspaper of which the second
appellant was the editor printed the statement of the first
appellant. Later on all the three accused were produced
before the Magistrate. The respondent filed a petition
under ss. 3 and 4 of the Contempt of Court's Act, 1952
against the first appellant, second appellant and the
printer of the newspapers. The High Court found all the
persons guilty of contempt of court.
In appeal by certificate obtained by the first and
second appellants this Court,
HELD :--(Per Full Court):---The second appellant was
guilty of contempt of court, as proceedings in a court were
imminent on Sept. 23, 1967 when the statement was published
in the newspaper. When the accused had already been
arrested on September 23, 1969 in connection with a serious
cognizable case proceedings in a court were imminent on that
date. The fact that the police might, after investigation,
come to the conclusion that the accused was innocent. would
not make the proceedings any the less imminent. To advance
the day of imminence to the day when the police makes a
report under s. 173 Cr. P.C. would do untold harm to those
who may actually be ultimately prosecuted. [418 B-D]
(Per Sikri and Jaganmohan Reddy, JJ.) :--The first
appellant was not guilty of contempt of court as there was
no evidence that any proceedings in a court were imminent on
the date when the statement was made. The lodging of a first
information report does not by itself establish that
proceedings in a court were imminent. It would depend on
the facts proved in a particular case whether the
proceedings are imminent or not As far as the first
appellant was concerned the relevant date was Sept. 20, 1967
when he made the statement and not Sept. 25, 1967 when the
newspaper published the statement. There was no evidence
that the first appellant was instrumental in getting this
statement published on Sept 25, 1967. Even the accused were
not arrested till September 23, 1967, and ordinarily until
an accused is arrested it cannot be said that any
proceedings in a court are imminent against that person
because he may never be arrested or he may be arrested after
a lapse of months or years. [416 E, F; 4 17 A-C]
411
Surendra Mohanty v. State of Orissa Cr. A No. 107 of
1956 dt. 23-1-1961. relied on.
It would be an undue restriction on the liberty of free
speech to lay down that even before any arrest has been made
there should be no comments on the facts of a particular
case. In some case no doubt, especially in cases of public
scandal regarding companies, it is the duty of a free
press to comment on such topic so as to bring them to the
attention of the public. [417 D]
R.v. Savundranayagan and Walker, [1968] 3 All E.R. 439',
referred
(Per Mitter, J. dissenting) :--A contempt of court may
be committed by a person when he knows or has good reason to
believe that criminal proceedings are immigrant. The test
is whether the circumstances in which the alleged contemnor
makes the statement are such that a person of ordinary
prudence would be of opinion that criminal proceedings would
soon be launched. The first appellant must have realised on
September 20, 1967 that the investigation by the police was
sure to lead to cognizance of the offence being taken by a
Magistrate and prosecution of some persons for the offence
of culpable homicide. The first appellant was not an
illiterate person who could not be reasonably expected to
know that Criminal proceedings were bound to be launched in
respect of the affair; whether anybody would be successfully
prosecuted is a different matter. but that would depend upon
the evidence which would be brought before the court. But
no person with any experience of worldly affairs, much less
a person of the standing of the first appellant, a member of
Parliament and a leader of a political group could be
ignorant of the fact that a murder in broad day light when
two group of people clash is sure to be investigated into
and made the subject of criminal proceedings. His
statement suggested that he had some personal enquiries in
the matter and had come to gather therefrom that certain
members of a particular political party had entered into a
conspiracy to murder and had actually carried their plan
into execution. There, can be no doubt that the first
appellant's motive and object was not only to further the
cause of a particular political party but also to create an
atmosphere of prejudice against members of that party and
charge some of them with one of the most serious offences
known to law, namely, that of conspiracy to murder folio.wed
by actual homicide. [422 H-423G]
Surendra Mohanty v. The State of Orissa, Cr. A. No. 107
of 1956 dr. 23-1-1961, distinguished.
Rex v. Parke, [1903] 2 K.B. 432, R.V. Daily Mirror.
[1927] 1 K.B. 845, 851, Ragina v. Odhams Press Ltd. [1957] 1
Q.B. 73 at 81, R.V. Savundaramareyagan and Walker, [1968] 3
All, E.R. 439 at 441, Tuljarama Rao v. Sir James Tavlor.
I.L.R. 1939 Mad. 466 at 476, In the matter Tribune, Lahore.
I.LR. 25 Lahore 111, and Attorney-General v. Butterworth &
Ors. [1962] 3 A.E.R. 326, referred to.
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.71 of
1968.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated January 15,
1968 of the Kerala High Court in O.P. No. 4394 of 1967
(Contempt).
A.S.R. Chari and B.R.G.K. Achar, for the appellants.
A. C. Jose, S.K. Mehta, K.L. Mehta and Sona Bhatiani, for
the respondent.
412
M.R.K. Pillai, for the Advocate-General for the State of
Kerala.
The Judgment of S.M. SIKRI and P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, JJ.was
delivered by SIKRI, J. MITTER, J. gave ‘a dissenting
Opinion.
Sikri, J. In this appeal by certificate of fitness
granted by the Kerala High Court two questions arise: (1)
Whether on the day when the appellant, A.K. Gopalan, made
the statement complained of or when it was published in
“Deshabhimani” any proceedings in a court could be said to
be imminent; and (2) whether this statement amounts to
contempt of court.
The facts in brief are that on September 11, 1967, the
ruling parties in Kerala State staged what is called ‘Kerala
Bandh’. A serious incident took place on that day during
the course of which one C.P. Karunakaran lost his life at a
place called Kuttoor. A First information report was lodged
on that very day. On September 12, 1967 the first
information report was transferred to another police
station. On September 20, 1967, the appellant, A.K.
Gopalan, made the following statement:
“Tearful story
It was the story of a young man who had to
sacrifice his life to the naked goondaism of
Congressmen, that was heard from the trembling
lips of so many people in Kuttoor. Had this
tragedy occurred in the course of a sudden
fight one could have understood it. But what
I was able to make out was that it was in
prosecution of a deliberate conspiracy to
commit murder. It appears that a prominent
Congress leader of the Cannanore District had
given instructions for this the previous day.
It was as a result of being pounced upon and
stabbed while he was in a peaceful and
disciplined manner calling for the observance
of the Bandh by the closure of shops that
Comrade C.P. Karunakaran suffered
martyrdom. Comrade Kunhikannan who was with
him also suffered serious injuries. The
police have seized an unlicensed loaded gun
and other weapons from the shop of a
congressman at the scene of occurrence.
Murder too was planned.
Is it not to be inferred from all this
that there was a prearranged plan to commit
murder ? The enlightened people of the
locality were determined to press forward to
the chosen destination of that class for whom
Comrade. Karunakaran has sacrificed his life.”
413
On September 23, 1967 K.P. Noordeen was arrested along-
with his two brothers. On September 24, 1967 the
Magistrate remanded the accused to police custody. In its
issue dated September 25, 1967, the Malayalam Daily
newspaper called “Deshabhimani” of which P. Govinda Pillai,
the second appellant,was the editor and M. Govindankutty was
the printer, printed the statement which we have reproduced
above. On September 29, 1967, all the three accused were
produced before the Magistrate. On October 5, 1967, bail was
refused by the District Magistrate but was granted by the
Sessions Judge. On November 1, 1967, Noordeen filed the
petition under ss. 3 and 4 of the Contempt of Court’s Act
(32 of 1952) impleading the three respondents, A.K. Gopalan,
P. Govinda Pillai and M. Govindankutty.
The High Court held all the three respondents guilty of
contempt of court and convicted them accordingly. The High
Court imposed a sentence of fine of Rs. 200/- on the first
respondent and of administering an admonition to respondents
2 and 3. The High Court discharged respondents two and
three after due admonition. The appellants A.K. Gopalan and
P. Govinda Pillai havingsecured certificate of fitness under
Art. 134(1)(c) the appeal is now before us.
This Court in Surendra Mohanty v. State of Orissa(1) exa-
mined the question whether the publication of a statement at
a time when the only step taken was the recording of first
information report under s. 154, Cr. P.C., could be contempt
of court. As the judgment in this case has not been
reported we think that we should reproduce the main portion
of the judgment. Kapur, I., speaking on behalf of the
Court, observed:
“Before the publication of the comments
complained of, only the first information
report was filed in which though some persons
were mentioned as being suspected of being
responsible for causing the breach in the
bund, there was no definite allegation
against any one of them. In the chargesheet
subsequently filed by the police these
suspects do not appear to be amongst the
persons accused. It was, therefore, argued
that by the publication there could not be any
tendency or likelihood to interfere with the
due course of justice. The learned Additional
Solicitor-General for the State submitted on
the other hand that if there was a reasonable
probability of a prosecution being launched
against any person and such prosecution be
merely imminent, the publication would be a
contempt of court.
The Contempt of Courts Act confers on the
High Courts the power to punish for the
contempt of inferior Criminal Appeal 107 of
1966 decided on 23-1-1961
414
courts. This power is both wide and has been
termed arbitrary. The courts must exercise
this power with circumspection, carefully and
with restraint and only in cases where it is
necessary for maintaining the course of
justice pure and unaffected. It must be shown
that it was probable that the publication
would substantially interfere with the due
course of justice; commitment for contempt is
not a matter of course but within the
discretion of the court which must be
exercised with caution. To constitute contempt
it is not necessary to show that :as a matter
of fact a judge or a jury will be prejudiced
by the offending publication but the essence
of the offence is conduct calculated to
produce an atmosphere of prejudice in the
midst of which the proceedings will have to go
on and a tendency to interfere with the due
course of justice or to prejudice mankind
against persons who are on trial or who may be
brought to trial. It must be used to preserve
citizens’ right to have a fair trial of their
causes and proceedings in an atmosphere free
of all prejudice or prepossession. It will be
contempt if there is a publication of any news
or comments which have a tendency to or are
calculated to or are likely to prejudice the
parties or their causes or to interfere with
due course of justice.
As to when proceedings begin or when they are imminent
for the purposes of the offence of contempt of court must
depend upon the circumstances of each case, and it is
unnecessary in this case define the exact boundaries
within which they are to be confined.
The filing of a first information report does not, by
itself, establish that proceedings in a court of law are
imminent. In order ‘to do this various other facts will
have to be proved and in each ,case that question would
depend on the facts proved.”
Then Kapur J. examined the facts of that case and observed:
“In the present case all that happened was
that there was a first information report
made to the police in which certain suspects
were named; they were not arrested;
investigation was started and on the date when
the offending article was published no
judicial proceedings had been taken or were
contemplated against the persons named in the
first information report. Indeed after
investigation the suspects named in that
report were not sent up for trial. At the
date this offending publication was made there
was no proceeding pending in a court of law
nor was any such proceeding imminent.”
415
On the first point it seems to us clear that on the
facts of this case it cannot be said that any proceedings
were imminent on September 20, 1967 in a court. It is true
that the first information report was lodged on September
11, 1967, but this Court has definitely held in Surendra
Mohanty’s case(1) that lodging of a first information report
does not by itself establish that proceedings in a court
were imminent. This court further said that it would depend
on the facts proved in a particular case whether the
proceedings are imminent or not. There are no other facts
which tend to establish the imminence of proceedings in a
court. Even the accused were not arrested till September
23, 1967, and even if it be relevant there is no proof that
arrest was imminent on September 20, 1967. Ordinarily
until an accused is arrested it cannot be said that any
proceedings in a court are imminent against that person
because he may never be arrested or he may be arrested after
a lapse of months or years.
It would be an undue restriction on the liberty of free
speech to lay down that even before any arrest has been made
there should be no comments on the facts of a particular
case. In same cases no doubt, especially in cases of public
scandal regarding companies, it is the duty of a free press
to comment on such topics so as to bring them to the
attention of the public. As observed by Salmon, L.J., in
R.v. Sayundranaragan and Walker(“). “It is in the public
interest that this should be done. Indeed, it is sometimes
largely because of facts discovered and brought to light by
the press that criminals are brought to justice. The
private individual is adequately protected by the law of
libel should defamatory statements published about him be
untrue, or if any defamatory comment made about him is
unfair”. Salmon, L.J. further pointed out that “no one
should imagine that he is safe from committal for contempt
of court if, knowing or having good reason to believe that
criminal proceedings are imminent, he chooses to publish
matters calculated to prejudice a fair trial.”
The learned counsel for the State urges that the crucial
date is not September 20, 1967, when the statement was made,
but September 25, 1967, when the newspaper published the
statement. The latter date may be relevant in the case of
the other appellant but as far as Gopalan is concerned it is
September 20, 1967, which is the relevant date.. There is
no evidence that he was instrumental in getting this
statement published on September 25, 1967.
We are accordingly of the opinion that the appellant
Gopalan was wrongly convicted by the High Court. There is
no evidence that any proceedings in a court were imminent.
(1) Cr. A. 107 of 1956 decided on 23-1-1951.
(2) [1968]3 All E.R. 439.
416
Let us now examine the case of P. Govinda Pillai, the
second appellant. The statement was published, as we have
already said, in the daily newspaper Called “Deshabhimani”
on September 25, 1967. Were any proceedings in a court
imminent on that date ? The accused had already been
arrested on September 23, 1969, in a serious cognizable
case. Arrest means that the police was prima facie on the
right track. The accused must have been produced before a
magistrate within 24 hours of the arrest in accordance with
Art. 21 of the Constitution, and, the magistrate must have
authorised further detention of the accused. In these
circumstances it is difficult to say ‘that any proceedings
in a court were not imminent on that date. The fact that
the police may have after investigation come to the
conclusion that the accused was innocent does not make the
proceedings any the less imminent. Proceedings in a court
may be imminent on one day and yet not be brought the next
day. For instance, the accused may in the meantime die
or he may be proved innocent. To advance the day of
imminence to the day when the police makes a report under s.
173, Cr. P.C would do untold harm to those who may actually
be ultimately prosecuted. Not only will it tend to harm the
accused but would also tend to subvert the scheme of our
criminal law and procedure. It would subvert it because it
would tend to encourage public investigation of a crime and
a public discussion of the character and antecedents of an
accused in detention. The investigation of a cognizable
case is eminently the province of the police, and if a
person has information relevant to the commission of a
particular crime there is nothing to prevent him from
transmitting it to the police. This it seems to us would be
the ordinary rule in the case of an investigation of a
murder. It may be that in an investigation involving
prolonged examination of account books of companies and the
ramifications of a conspiracy, proceedings may not be said
to be imminent as soon as the accused is arrested. Some of
these cases take a long time to investigate and as observed
by this Court, it is difficult to lay down any inflexible
rule. But as far as an investigation of a charge of murder
is concerned once an accused has been arrested proceedings
in court should be treated as imminent.
In view of this conclusion we must hold that as far as
the appellant P. Govinda Pillai is concerned proceedings in
a court were imminent on September 25, 1967.
It has not been argued that Govinda Pillai did not know
of the arrest of the accused or that he had good reasons to
believe that no arrest had been effected by September 25,
1967. It is true that the statement does not mention the
name of the accused but it does suggest that the person who
committed the deliberate murder was acting as a result of a
conspiracy and it was not a
417
case of a sudden fight. It seems to us that the statement
would tend to prejudice mankind against the accused.
In the result we maintain the conviction entered by the
High Court against the appellant P. Govinda Pillai.
Accordingly the appeal of A.K. Gopalan is allowed and
the appeal of P. Govinda Pillai dismissed. The fine, if
already paid by A.K. Gopalan, shall be refunded.
Mitter, J. With respect I agree with the order proposed
as regards Govinda Pillai but I am unable to concur in
allowing the appeal of the first appellant. The facts are
stated sufficiently in the judgment of my learned brother
and need not be repeated. He has held and indeed there can
be no doubt that any publication or comment which has a
tendency to or is calculated or likely to prejudice the
parties or their causes or with the. due course of justice
in pending proceedings would constitute a contempt of court.
It is also universally accepted that even if proceedings
have not actually begun but are imminent conduct of the kind
referred to above would be punishable. In my view the
consensus of authorities both in England and in India is
that contempt of court may be committed by any one making a
comment or publication of the exceptionable type if he knows
or has reason to believe that proceedings in court though
not actually begun are imminent. There does not appear to
be any decision of this Court on the last aspect and it is
therefore necessary to make a brief reference to the.
authorities.
It is agreed that there were no proceedings pending in a
court when the first appellant made his statement on
September 20, 1967 which was actually published in the
Malayalam Daily newspaper in its issue dated September 25,
1967. In my view although no criminal proceedings Were
actually pending in any court on 20th September, it is not
possible to hold that at that time such proceedings were not
imminent or that the first appellant had no reasonable cause
to believe that they were not imminent.
The Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 does not purport to
define what actually constitutes such contempt. This was
done with a purpose as attempts to interfere with the course
of justice are of so many different kinds and may be
committed in circumstances so various that the Legislature
possibly thought it unwise to define the limits thereof.
Courts in India have referred to the manifold aspects of the
law of Contempt of court and accepted the principles laid
down in English decisions which go back to a date well over
a century. Early in the present century in Rex v. Parke(1)
one Dongal was brought up before the petty Sessions of
Saffron Walden charged with forgery and remanded without any
evidence
(1) [1903] 2 K.B. 432
418
being taken. Articles to his disadvantage appeared in a
newspaper of which the defendant was the editor. A rule was
issued by the High Court to show cause why he should not be
committed for contempt of court. A point was taken that the
jurisdiction would not be attracted if at the time of the
publication of the article complained of there were no
proceedings actually pending in any court but the petty
sessions court and that the jurisdiction to punish the
publishers of articles of the kind before the court was
confined to cases in which at the moment of publication
there was some cause actually de:ending in the High Court.
In rejecting this contention Wills J. observed:
“The reason why the publication of
articles like those with which we have to deal
is treated as a contempt of court is because
their tendency and sometimes their object is
to deprive the court of the power of doing
that which is the end for which it
exists–namely to administer justice duly,
impartially, and with reference solely to the
facts judicially brought before it. Their
tendency is to reduce the Court which has to
try the case to impotence, so far as the
effectual elimination of prejudice and
prepossession is concerned …. If it be
once grasped that such is the nature of the
offence, what possible difference can it make
whether the particular Court which is thus
sought to be deprived of its independence, and
its power of effecting the great end for which
it is created, be at that moment in session or
even actually constituted or not.”
Dealing with the argument that the remedy only existed when
there was a cause pending in the court the Judge said:
“. in very nearly all the cases
which have arisen there has been a cause’
actually begun so that the expression quite
natural under the circumstances, accentuates
the fact, not that the case has been begun,
but that it is not at an end. That is the
cardinal consideration. It is possible very
effectually to poison the fountain of
justice* before it begins to flow. It is not
possible to do so when the stream has ceased.”
In a recent judgment of the Court of Appeal in England
observations have been made which run counter to the dictum
in the lust sentence.
The last extract from the judgment of Wills, J. was
quoted by Lord Hewart C.J. in R.V. Daily Mirror(1) and by
Lord Goddard C.J. in Regina v. Odhams Press Ltd.(2).
Dealing with the ques-
(1) [1927] I K.B. 84.5 at 851.
(2) [1957]1 Q.B. 73 at 81.
419.
tion whether mens rea was necessary to constitute the
offence the learned Chief Justice said:
“It is obvious that if a person does not
know that proceedings have begun or are
imminent, he cannot by writing or speech be
said to influence the course of justice or to
prejudice a litigant or accused person, but
that is no answer if he publishes that which
in fact is calculated to prejudice a fair
trial.”
In R.V. Savundaranayagan and Walker(1) to be
referred in detail later the Court of Appeal in England
expressed similar views in no unmistakable terms.
We may now turn to the decisions of our High Courts. In
Tuljarama Rao v. Sir James Taylor(“) and–in the matter of
“Tribune”, Lahore(3) opinions were expressed that a comment
on proceedings which were imminent but not yet launched in
court with knowledge of the fact was as much a contempt as a
comment of a case actually launched. According to the
Lahore High Court it was sufficient that the proceedings
were imminent to the know]edge of the person charged with
contempt.
It was pointed out in Surendra Mohanty v. The State
of, Orissa(4) that:
“As to when proceedings begin or when
they are imminent for the purposes of the
offence of contempt of Court must depend upon
the circumstances of each case, and it is
unnecessary in this case to define the exact
boundaries within which they are to be
confined.
The filing of a First Information Report
does not, by itself, establish that
proceedings in a court of law are imminent. In
order to do this various other facts will have
to be proved and in each case that question
would depend on the facts proved.”
The facts in Surendra Mohanty’s case(4) were that there was
a breach in a bund in a big reservoir between August 12 and
13, 1953 as ‘a result of which some fields were flooded. On
August 13, 1953 a first information was lodged at a police
station stating that it had been cut and the cutting was
suspected to have been done by one or more of the persons
whose names were therein mentioned, The police thereupon
started investigation and on the 24th September under the
orders of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate statements of five
witnesses were recorded presumably under s. 164 Criminal
Procedure Code. On October 26, 1953 a report called the
charge sheet for an offence under s. 430 I.P.C. was received
(1) [1968] 3 All E.R. 439 at 441.
(2) I.L.R. 1939 Mad 466 at 476.
(3) I.L.R. 25 Lahore 111.
(4) C.A. 107 of 1956 decided on 23-1-1961.
420
,by the Magistrate who took cognizance and summoned the per
sons accused therein and the proceedings were continued in
the court of the Magistrate. Between August 14 and October
26, 1953 two Oriya papers published comments in regard to
the incident thus:
“In the year 1952, a water reservoir
had been constructed at Dangarpara in the
Titlagarh Sub-Division of the District of
Bolangir by the Government at a cost of Rs.
33,000. This has been breached due to heavy
rainfall.
It is heard that 15 days before the
breach of this bund, Abhut Sankh, Chintamani
Subudhi and Bhagaban Das and others of Lakhana
on seeing the condition of the reservoir
apprehended a breach and brought it to the
notice of the S.D.O. and requested him to open
an escape for the discharge of the surplus
water. But in spite of ‘hearing this, the
S.D.O. did not open an escape. When there was
excessive accumulation of water, the Bund was
unable to withstand and gave way.
It is heard that the S.D.O. in order to
conceal his own fault is accusing Mangra
Naihi of Bana Bahal, Nilamani Mahakud of
Kumanbahal and Satya Ganda, Banemali, Nariha
and others of Dangarpara of the offences of
cutting the bund and trying to create evidence
by assaulting them through the police and by
keeping watch (over the locality).
If actually the aforesaid persons had
reported to the S.D.O. regarding the said bund
and the S.D.O. neglected in taking proper
steps himself, why he should not be
responsible for this.”
This Court held that the order of conviction by the High
Court could not be sustained in view of the facts that on
the date when the offending article was published no
judicial proceeding had been taken or were contemplated
against the persons named in the first information report.
According to the report the breach was not caused through
any natural cause but was due to cutting by some persons who
were suspected. Indeed, after investigation the suspects
named in that report were sent up for trial. On the date
when offending publication was made, there was no
proceeding pending in a court of law nor was any such
proceeding imminent.
It is difficult to hold on the facts of this case that
the first appellant did not know or had no reason to believe
that proceedings in court were not imminent when he made the
statement on 20th September. It is common knowledge that
whenever a man loses
421
his life through a cause other than natural the police will
invariably come to the scene, take custody of the dead body
and start investigations. Indeed under s. 174 Cr. P.C. even
when information is received that a person has died under
circumstances raising a reasonable suspicion that some other
person has committed an offence, it is the duty of the
officer in charge of the police station within whose
jurisdiction the death occurs to give intimation thereof to
the nearest Magistrate empowered to hold inquest and to
proceed to the place where the body of such deceased person
is, to make an investigation and draw up a report.
Here a person lost his life in broad day light not by
accident but by stabbing when two groups of people clashed.
One of the groups was charged by the statement of the first
appellant to be guilty of deliberate conspiracy to commit
murder and it was further alleged that a prominent member of
that party had given instructions for this, the day prior to
the violent disturbance. The first appellant was not an
illiterate person who could not be reasonably expected to
know that criminal proceedings were bound to be launched in
respect of the affair: whether anybody would be successfully
prosecuted is a different matter, but that would depend upon
the evidence which would be brought before the court. But no
person with any experience of worldly affairs, much less a
person of the standing of the first appellant, a member of
Parliament and a leader of a political group–could be
ignorant of the fact that a murder in broad day light when
two groups of people clash is sure to be investigated into
and made the subject of criminal proceedings. The statement
of the appellant suggests that he had made some personal
enquiries in the matter and had come to gather therefrom
that certain members of a particular political party had
entered into a conspiracy to murder and had actually carried
their plan into execution. He had also charged a leader of
a rival party, who was not named, with having given
instructions the previous day. There can be no doubt that
the motive and the object was not only to further the cause
of a particular political party but also to create an
atmosphere of prejudice against members of that party and
charge some of them with one of the most serious offences
known to law, namely, that of conspiracy to murder followed
by actual homicide.
In the case of R.V. Savundranayagan and Walker (1) the
Court of Appeal in England although of opinion that a free
press had the right and duty to comment on topics of public
interest so as to bring them to the attention of the public
like the failure of an insurance company in which the moving
figure was a man with an unsavory record who appeared to
have used large sums of the company’s money for his own
purposes and disappeared abroad
(1) [1968] 3 All E.R. 439.
up. CI/70–15
422
at a point of time when there was nothing to suggest that
criminal proceedings were even in contemplation, yet took a
different view of the television programme depicting an
interview with the appellant shortly after his return to
England, when according to the Court:
“It must surely have been obvious to
everyone that he was about to be arrested and
tried on charges on gross fraud”.
Salmon, L.J. added:
“It must not be supposed that proceedings
to commit for contempt of court can be
instituted only in respect of matters
published after the proceedings have actually
begun. No one should imagine that he is safe
from committal for contempt of court if,
knowing or having good reason to believe that
criminal proceedings are imminent, he chooses
to publish matters calculated to prejudice a
fair trial.”
How jealously courts of law regard the preservation of the
purity of the course of justica and the prevention and
punishment of any attempt at pollution or perversion thereof
as a solemn obligation will appear from a recent decision of
the English Court of Appeal in Attorney-General v.
Butterfield & others(1). The words of Lord Denning, M.R.
are worth repeating. He said:
“I have no hesitation in declaring that
the victimisation of a witness is a contempt
of court, whether done while the proceedings
are pending or after they have finished.
Such a contempt can be punished by the court
itself before which he has given evidence: and
so that those who think of doing such things
may know where they stand, I would add that,
if the witness has been damnified by it, he
may well have redress, in a civil court for
damages.”
In my view, we should hold that a contempt of court may be
committed by a person when he knows or has good reason to
believe that criminal proceedings are imminent. The test is
whether the circumstances in which the alleged contemnor
makes the statement are such that a person of ordinary
prudence would be of opinion that criminal proceedings would
soon be launched. In my way of thinking the first appellant
must have realised on September 20, 1967 that the
investigation by the police was sure to lead to cognizance
of the offence being taken by a Magistrate and the
prosecution of some persons for the offence of culpable
homicide. His statement itself shows that to his knowledge
the police
(1) 1962] 3 All E.R. 326.
423
were on the track of the ,guilty and had seized an
unlicenced loaded gun and other weapons from the shop of a
person belonging to a political party some members whereof
were being accused of the crime. I would therefore dismiss
the appeal by the first appellant also.
ORDER BY COURT
In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the
appeal of A.K. Gopalan is allowed and the appeal of P.
Govinda Pillai is dismissed. The fine, if already paid by
A.K. Gopalan, shall be refunded.
Y.P
424