ORDER
P.S. Mishra, C.J.
1. We would have preferred to make only a summary order in Writ Appeal No. 172 of 1996 and reiterate the principle that in cases of suspension of the authorisation of the Fair Price Shop dealership, pending enquiry into the allegations of such conduct, which disentitle any person, if proved, to have authorisation for such dealership, suspension is not ordered by the Court as a matter of course, as in the event of enquiry going against the petitioner, his continuance only under the order of the Court will have no justification at all. We are, however, required to state, in some details, the principles which the Court should apply in deciding whether to suspend the order of suspension, pending enquiry, of authorisation to run a Fair Price Shop because in the impugned order in Writ Appeal No. 181 of 1996 a learned single Judge has chosen to state that a Bench decision of this Court in B. Maheswaramma v. M. Ramasubbamma, does not have the ratio decidendi to the above effect.
2. It is not in dispute in the instant cases that the writ petitioner – respondents were given licences to operate Fair Price Shops as dealers in the essential commodities under the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Commodities Dealers (Licensing and Distribution by Card System) Order, 1982, the Order being issued under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act. The competent authrotiy decided, pending enquiry, to suspend the licences granted to them. They have preferred appeals. The appellate authority, however, pending appeal, has not suspended the order of the competent authority under which the dealership licences of the writ petitioner – respondents have been suspended. They have invoked this Court’s jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Learned Single Judge has in separate orders, suspended the order of suspension of the licences under the abovesaid Control Order, pending the enquiry and any order in the appeals by the writ petitioner -respondents before the competent appellate authority.
3. In B. Maheswaramma v. M. Ramasubbamma (1 supra) the Court has, while deciding that a third person, including a person who is granted the licence during the period of suspension of the licence of the original dealer, will have locus standi to appeal against any such order or direction as issued by the learned single Judge under the impugned orders, pointed out as follows:
“We have decided, however, to interfere with the order of the learned single Judge for the obvious reason that no person who otherwise is not qualified or who has disqualified himself for a licence should be allowed to take advantage of any interim order of the Court. A person who has been subjected to a disciplinary action for a wrong doing, should not be allowed to function under an interim order of the Court. In all such case it is not the interest of the party alone but the public interest which is of utmost importance. A person who is a dealer of a fair price shop in essential commodities, is one whose conduct affects a large body of the consumers. The Court, before the final adjudication, shall refrain and not grant any interim order in his/her favour. When we make the above order, however, we are clear in our mind that the authority concerned should not unreasonably delay the disposal of the proceedings and any unreasonable delay in disposal of the enquiry by the Revenue Divisional Officer, may give rise to the suspicion that the petitioner – respondent has been wronged by some motivated order against her. It is necessary for the said reason to reiterate before we conclude that the Revenue Divisional Officer must abide by the time schedule and pass final orders strictly in accordance with law within the time indicated above”.
4. A similar order thus of suspending the order of suspension of the licence has been set aside in the case of B. Maheswaramma v. M. Ramasubbamma (1 supra) by a Bench of this Court on the ground that a person who has been subjected to a disciplinary action for a wrong doing should not be allowed to function under an interim order of the Court. The Bench has stated in the said judgment as follows:
“In all such cases it is not the interest of the party alone but the public interest which is of utmost importance. A person who is a dealer of a fair price shop in essential commodities, is one whose conduct affects a large body of the consumers. The Court, before the final adjudication, shall refrain and not grant any interim order in his/her favour”.
5. The above is the statement of a principle which has been well known and well respected by almost all Courts in India. No order of stay or injunction is granted as a matter of course. Certain cardinal principles are always borne in mind such as – whether the aggrieved person has a strong prima facie case, whether balance of convenience is in his favour and whether in the event of refusal of stay or injunction, he shall suffer irreparable injury, and in case such interim order is not granted but he finally succeeds, he can be compensated in terms of money, etc. In all cases, however, where public interest is involved the Court takes care to protect the public interest and not the interest of any individual.
6. What is of utmost importance in all such cases is that some authorities are vested with the power to see that persons having licence to deal in scheduled commodities do not indulge in practices which are against the very object for which the licence is granted, that conditions of licence are not violated by such a licensee and in cases where there are such violations by a licensee, action is taken against him in accordance with law. Pending the enquiry in which a notice is served upon the licensee to show cause, when orders are passed to suspend the licence, it is obvious a quasi-judicial authority is exercised and it has to be presumed that such authority has been exercised in the public interest of distribution of scheduled commodities to the persons for whom the Licensing Order has been issued under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act.
7. While thus, considering any application to suspend the order of suspension of the licence, the Court cannot afford to have the luxury of accepting the version of the licensee and decide to suspend the action against him pending enquiry unless there are very compelling reasons to do so. When a rule based on principles of equity and fair play is applied to a quasi-judicial action, it is done more as a rule of prudence and less as a rule of law. Unless the Court has good reasons to hold that the suspension order, which is impugned in the writ petition, is without jurisdiction or is actuated by malice either in law or in fact, ordinarily the Court will not suspend the order of suspension of the licence. It will be for the petitioner, however, to make out that exceptional case in which the Court may decide to interfere with such order of suspension pending enquiry, or interfere with the enquiry itself, but not merely because a petitioner has chosen to bring an allegation against the order of suspension of the licence or against the enquiry which has been initiated for the alleged misconduct of the licensee.
8. A statutory licensee is expected to perform strictly within the conditions of the licence. Licence does not create such a right which cannot be withdrawn. Challenge to any order withdrawing the licence or suspending the licence thus cannot be presumed to be an action against an order which is not warranted by law. Arbitrariness of the action of the licensing authority or any other competent authority on grounds as we have aforementioned, however, stand on a different footing.
9. In B. Maheswaramma v. M. Ramasubbamma (1 supra) the Court, however, has hastened to add:
“When we make the above order, however, we are clear in our mind that the authority concerned should not unreasonably delay the disposal of the proceedings and any unreasonable delay in disposal of the enquiry by the Revenue Divisional Officer, may give rise to the suspicion that the petitioner-respondent has been wronged by some motivated order against her. It is necessary for the said reason to reiterate before we conclude that the Revenue Divisional Officer must abide by the time schedule and pass final orders strictly in accordance with law within the time indicated above”.
10. The reason for the above observation is not far to see. Authorities who act under a Control Order or any other statute, are expected to be fair in their dealings in the proceedings in particular when there is an allegation brought against someone that he has indulged in some sort of violation of the Control Order or the conditions of the licence. If the allegations are proved, it is better that the licence is cancelled than it is kept in suspension and the licensee is given an opportunity to make a grievance that his licence has been wrongly suspended. Fair play in quasi-judicial action is a must and if the action of the quasi-judicial authority is brought under the cloud of his doing things arbitrarily, casually or lazily, the Courts may have to interfere. It is, therefore, necessary in all such cases for the competent authorities to act in a fair manner and promptly so that a cause of grievance is not made available to the affected licensee. Proper balance in such a situation will be to order for the disposal of the enquiry as quickly as possible and not to interfere with the interim order of suspension of the licence.
11. In the result, the appeals are allowed; the impugned judgment are set aside and Writ Petitions, however, are disposed of with a direction that the enquiry into the alleged violations of the Control Order /conditions of licence shall be completed within one month and shall not be delayed on any ground beyond the said period.
12. In all these appeals, however, there may be some occasion to examine whether the suspension order or the notice itself for enquiry, is vitiated by mala fide, either in law or in fact. Learned single Judge has, however, not adverted to this aspect of the matter at all. We do not think it necessary to enter into this aspect of the matter ourselves, for, in our opinion, fair justice will be done to the parties, if enquiry, as ordered above, is completed within a period of one month.
13. The appeals are accordingly allowed. No order as to costs.