PETITIONER: THE STATE OF BOMBAY Vs. RESPONDENT: R. S. NANJI. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/01/1956 BENCH: IMAM, SYED JAFFER BENCH: IMAM, SYED JAFFER DAS, SUDHI RANJAN BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H. JAGANNADHADAS, B. SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P. CITATION: 1956 AIR 294 1956 SCR 18 ACT: Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 (Bombay Act XXXIII of 1948), s. 5 (1)-Requisition of premises by Bombay Government for housing an officer of State Road Transport Corporation- Whether for a public purpose-Expression 'public purpose'- Meaninq of Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950 (Parliament Act LXIV of 1960), S. 19(1)(c)-Corporation empowered to provide living accommodation for its employees-Premises requisitionedfor Corporation-Whether for a public purpose. HEADNOTE: In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of s. 5 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 the Government of Bombay requisitioned by an order dated 12th May 1952, the premises specified therein, for a public purpose, namely, for bousiing an officer of the State Road Transport Corporation which is a public utility service. On a writ application under Art. 226 of the Constitution filed by the respondent the requisition order was set aside by the Bombay High Court on the ground that the requisition was not for a public purpose and therefore could not have been made under s. 5 of the Requisition Act. On appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court. 19 Held (1) that in the circumstances of the present case the requisition was for a public purpose and the impugned order had been wrongly set aside by the High Court; (2) the phrase 'Public purpose' includes a purpose, that is, an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals is directly and vitally concerned. It is impossible to define precisely the expression 'public purpose'. In each case all the facts and circumstances will require to be closely examined to determine whether a public purpose has been established; (3) the Corporation has power to provide for its employees suitable conditions of service including............... living accommodation, places for rest and recreation and other amenities vide s. 19(1) (c) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950; (4) the provisions of the Road Transport Corporation Act read as a whole lead to the conclusion that if the premises specified in the impugned order had been requisitioned for the Corporation, the requisition would have been for a public purpose; (5)in the present case the Corporation is a public utility concern and the general interest of the public is directly and vitally concerned with its activities and undertaking. Providing living accommodation for its employees is a statutory activity of the Corporation and it is essential for it to provide such accommodation in order to ensure efficient working of the road transport system and therefore the impugned order was validly passed under the Requisition Act. Hamabai Framjee.Petit v. Secretary of State for India in Council ([1914] L.R. 42 I.A. 44), The State of Bombay v. Bhonji Munji and Another ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 777) and The State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan ([1955] 2 S.C.R. 867), referred to. JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 235 of 1954.
On Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
the 26th day of February 1953 of the Bombay High Court in
Appeal No. 120 of 1952 arising out of the Order dated the II
the day of September, 1952 of the said High Court in its
Ordinary Original Jurisdiction in Misc. Application No. 216
of 1952.
M.C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India (B. Sen and R. H.
Dhebar, with him) for the appellant.
Sri Narain Andley, J. B. Dadachanji and Rajinder Narain, for
the respondent.
20
1956. January 17. The Judgment of the Court was delivered
by
IMAMJ.–By an order dated 12th May 1952, hereinafter
referred to as the impugned order the Government of the
State of Bombay requisitioned under section 5 of the Bombay
Land Requisition Act, 1948 (Bombay Act XXXIII of 1948),
hereinafter referred to as the Requisition Act, the premises
specified therein. The impugned order, so far as it is
relevant to the present appeal, stated,
“Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by
sub-section (1) of section 5 of the Bombay Land Requisition
Act, 1948 (Bombay Act XXXIII of 1948) the Government of
Bombay is pleased to requisition the said part of the
building for a public purpose, namely, for housing an
Officer of the State Road Transport Corporation which is a
public utility service”.
The respondent filed a writ application under Article 226
of the Constitution in the Bombay High Court and the
application was beard by Tendolkar, J. who set aside the
impugned order. Against his decision the appellant appealed
and a Division Bench of the said Court affirmed the decision
of Tendolkar, J. The present appeal is by special leave
against the decision of the High Court.
The principal ground upon which the impugned order was set
aside was that the requisition was not for a public purpose
and therefore could not have been validly made under section
5 of the Requisition Act.
On behalf of the appellant, the Attorney-General has
urged that in the circumstances of the present case, the
requisition was for a public purpose and the impugned order
had been wrongly set aside by the High Court. In support of
his submission he relied upon certain provisions of the Road
Transport Corporations Act, 1950 (LXIV of 1950), hereinafter
referred to as the Act, the decision of the Privy Council in
the case of Hamabai Framjee Petit v. Secretary of State for
India in Council(1) and the decisions of this Court in
(1) [1914] L.R. 42 I.A. 44.
21
The State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji and Another(1) and The
State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan (Civil Appeal No. 229 of
1953) decided on the 4th of October 1955(2). On the other
hand, Mr. Andley, on behalf of the respondent, contended
that to requisition the premises to house an employee of the
State Road Transport Corporation, hereinafter referred to as
the Corporation, could not be regarded as a public purpose
because that was a matter in which the general interest of
the community was not directly and vitally concerned. He
urged that although their Lordships of the Privy Council
rightly approved the observations of Batchelor, J.
concerning the expression ‘public purpose’, they erred in
their decision in Hamabai’s case. In any event, Hamabai’s
case could be distinguished as in that case there was a
scheme for constructing houses for Government servants
generally and not procuring residential accommodation for
one particular individual. The validity of the impugned
order was also questioned by him on the ground that nothing
had been established to prove that by housing an officer of
the Corporation in the requisitioned premises the needs or
the purposes of the Corporation would be served or that it
would contribute to the efficiency of the officer concerned.
Before Tendolkar, J. two points bad been raised (1) that
no enquiry, as required by section 5 of the Requisition Act,
was held and (2) that the impugned order was invalid as the
requisition was not for a public purpose. The former
question was decided against the respondent while the latter
was decided in his favour. In appeal, the first point does
not appear to have been put forward as there is no reference
to it in the judgments of the learned Judges of the Division
Bench. In this Court the only point argued was as to
whether the requisition was for a public purpose or not.
Before proceeding to consider that question it is necessary
to make some reference to the purpose for which the
Corporation is established, its compo. sition, the extent of
control exercised by the State Government over it and its
activities.
(1) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 777.
(2) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 867.
22
It was not disputed before us that the Corporation is a
public utility concern and is governed by the provisions of
the Act. The purpose for which the Corporation was created
may be gathered from the provisions of section 3 of the Act
which enables a State Government to establish a Road
Transport Corporation having regard to the advantages
offered to the public, trade and industry by the development
of road transport, the desirability of coordinating any form
of road transport with any other form of transport and the
desirability of extending and improving the facilities for
road transport in any area and of providing an efficient and
economical system of road transport service.
The Corporation consists of a Chairman and members
appointed by the State Government who are removable by that
authority. Where capital is subscribed by the issue of
shares under section 23 of the Act provision is made for the
representation of the share-holders in the Corporation and
the manner in which they are to be elected in accordance
with rules to be framed under the Act. Its Chief Executive
Officer or General Manager and its Chief Accounts Officer
are to be appointed by the State Government. The other
officers and servants are to be appointed by the Corporation
but the conditions of appointment and service and the scales
of pay shall be determined by regulations made under the Act
subject to the provisions of section 34, which authorises
the State Government to issue directions and general
instructions to the Corporation and these instructions may
include directions relating to the recruitment and
conditions of service.
The Corporation is under the effective control of the
State Government. In addition to what has already been
mentioned when referring to the composition of the
Corporation, the capital of the Corporation may be provided
by the Central and State Governments in such proportion as
is agreed between them. When no such capital is provided,
the Corporation may raise capital, as is authorised by the
State Government, by issue of shares. These shares are
guaran-
23
teed by that Government. The budget of the Corporation has
to be submitted to the State Government for approval and its
accounts are to be audited by an auditor appointed by that
Government. The balance of the net profits, after providing
for various matters mentioned in section 30 of the Act, is
to be made over to the State Government for the purpose of
road development. The Corporation can be superseded by the
State Government or that Government may, after an enquiry
under section 36, authorize a person by notification in the
official Gazette to take over the Corporation and administer
its affairs during the period the notification is in force.
The activities of the Corporation are manifold in pursuit
of which there is a statutory duty to so exercise its powers
as to provide, secure or promote the provision of an
efficient, adequate, economical and properly coordinated
system of road transport in the State or part of it and in
any extended area (vide section 18 of the Act). The powers
of the Corporation are stated in section 19 of the Act.
These powers, although not exhaustive, cover a wide field.
Particular reference need be made only to some of them.
Section 19(1) provides:
“Subject to the provisions of this Act, a Corporation
shall have power:-
(a)……………….. (b)………………..
(c)to provide for its employees suitable conditions of
service including fair wages, establishment of provident
fund, living accommodation, places for rest and recreation
and other amenities”.
Section 19(2) excluding the explanation to clause (a) and
some clauses with which we are not immediately concerned,
states,
“Subject to the provisions of this Act, the powers
conferred by subsection (1) shall include power:-
(a) to manufacture, purchase, maintain and repair rolling
stock, vehicles, appliances, plant, equipment or any other
thing required for the purpose of any of the activities of
the Corporation referred to in sub-section (1).
24
(b) to acquire and hold such property, both movable and
immovable, as the Corporation may deem necessary for the
purpose of any of the said activities and to lease, sell or
otherwise transfer any property held by it.
(d) to purchase by agreement or to take on lease or under
any form of tenancy any land and to erect thereon such
buildings as may be necessary for the purpose of carrying on
its undertaking.”
The provisions of the Act read as a whole lead us to the
conclusion that if the premises specified in the impugned
order had been requisitioned for the Corporation, the
requisition would have been for a public purpose. Indeed
the learned Judges of the High Court were of this opinion
and Mr. Andley did not contend to the contrary. According
to him, in this case., the requisition was not for the
Corporation but for an employee of the Corporation and for
his convenience which could not be a public purpose.
The expression ‘public purpose’ has been considered in
many cases and it is unnecessary to refer to them except the
three cases cited by the Attorney-General. In Hamabai’s
case(1) the observation of Batchelor, J. to the effect
“General definitions are, I think, rather to be avoided
where the avoidance is possible, and I make no attempt to
define precisely the extent of the phrase ‘public purposes’
in the lease; it is enough to say that, in my opinion, the
phrase, whatever else it may mean, must include a purpose,
that is, an object or aim, in which the general interest of
the community, as opposed to the particular interest of
individuals, is directly and vitally concerned” received the
approval of the Privy Council. Their Lordships, however,
rejected the contention that there cannot be a ‘public
purpose’ in taking land if that land when taken is no it in
some way or other made available to the public at large.
This contention had been raised because the Government had
resumed lands, which had been the subject of a lease and a
sana , the terms of which permitted the Government to resume
the lands for any public purpose, with a view to erect
(1) [1914] L.R. 42 I.A. 44.
25
thereon dwelling houses for the use of Government officials
as their private residence on adequate rent. The concluding
portion of the judgment of the Privy Council is important
and needs to be quoted. It stated, “But here, so far from
holding them to be wrong, the whole of the learned judges,
who are thorough conversant with the conditions of Indian
life, say that they are satisfied that the scheme is one
which will redound to public benefit by helping the
Government to maintain the efficiency of its servants. From
such a conclusion their Lordships would be slow to differ,
and upon its own statement it commends itself to their
judgment”. In Bhanji Munji’s case(1) the requisition was
for housing a person having no housing accommodation. After
considering the affidavits, the facts and the circumstances
of the case, Bose, J . observed “The Constitution authorizes
requisition for a public purpose. The purpose here is
finding accommodation for the homeless. If, therefore, a
vacancy is allotted to a person who is in fact homeless, the
purpose is fulfilled”. In Ali Gulshan’s case(2) the
requisition was for the purpose of housing a member of the
staff of a foreign Consulate. This Court held that the
requisition was for a State purpose, which it is needless to
say must be regarded as a public purpose. An examination of
these and other cases leads us to the conclusion that it is
impossible to precisely define the expression ‘public
purpose’. In each case all the facts and circumstances will
require to be closely examined in order to determine whether
a ‘public purpose’ has been established Prima facie the
Government is the best judge as to whether ‘public purpose’
is served by issuing a requisition order, but it is not the
sole judge. The courts have the jurisdiction and it is
their duty to determine the matter whenever a question is
raised whether a requisition order is or is not for a
‘Public purpose’. The cases of Hamabai, Bbanji Munji and
Ali Gulshan are merely illustrative. In each of them
primarily the person directly and vitally concerned -would
be the person to whom the residential accommodation would be
(1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 777.
(2) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 867,
4
26
allotted with which prima facie the general interest of the
community would not be directly concerned at all. We must
regard Hamabai’s case as a decision to the ,effect that the
general interest of the community was directly and
vitallyconcerned with the efficiency of the Government
servants because it would be to its benefit to have such
servants and, therefore, providing living accommodation for
them was a public purpose. The decision in Bhan Munji’s
case must be read as one in which the general interest of
the community was directly and vitally concerned with pre-
vention of lawlessness and disease and to house the homeless
in order to avoid such a contingency was a public purpose.
In Ali Gulshan’s case a State purpose was served because the
State Government was interested in its own trade or commerce
and in the efficient discharge of his duties by a foreign
Consul who would be concerned with such trade or commerce.
In the present case it is possible to construe the
impugned order as a requisition on behalf of the Corporation
as it does not name any individual for whom the requisition
is being made. In other words the requisitioned premises
were at the disposal of the Corporation to house one of its
officers to be named later on. Apart from that, there is a
statutory power in the Corporation under section 19 (1) (c)
of the Act to provide living accommodation for its employees
and under section 14 the Corporation appoints such number of
its officers and servants as it considers necessary for the
efficient performance of its functions. It may be assumed,
therefore, that the Corporation appoints only such officers
as are needed for the efficient discharge of its functions
and that the State Government was requested to requisition
some premises as living accommodation for one of them whose
posting at Bombay was necessary. Indeed the affidavit of
Mr. Nadkarni, Accommodation Officer of the Government of
Bombay, states that the official of the Corporation has to
perform his duties in Bombay. Having regard to the
provisions of section 19 (2) (a) and (b) of the Act, the
power in the Corporation
27
to provide living accommodation for its employees must be
regarded, as one of its statutory activities undersection
19(1). Theword ‘acquire’ may include the power to purchase
by agreement but is wide enough to enable the Corporation to
request the State Government to acquire property under the
Land Acquisition Act (I of-] 894) in order to provide living
accommodation for its employees. The activities of the
Corporation under section 19 (1) are so interlinked with its
successful functioning as a Road Transport Corporation that
requisitioning or acquisition of property to advance and
ensure those activities must be regarded as for a public
purpose. It would not be sufficient to merely establish the
Corporation. It has to have an adequate and efficient
staff, living accommodation forwhom would be an absolute
need of the Corporation. Its officers have to be efficient
in the discharge oftheir duties, for upon them depends the
successful working of the road transport system upon which
the public must rely and thus it would be directly and
vitally concerned with the efficiency of ‘the employees of
the Corporation. It was suggested that a line must be drawn
somewhere, otherwise there was no guarantee to what lengths
the powers of requisition might be exercised by the
Government. It is sufficient to say that each case would
have to be decided upon the facts and the circumstances ap-
pearing therein. Here the Corporation is a public utility
concern and the general interest of the community is
directly and vitally concerned with its activities and its
undertaking. A breakdown in the Organisation of the
Corporation, leading to dislocation of the road transport
system would create a chaotic condition to the detriment of
the interest of the community. Providing living
accommodation for its employees is a statutory activity of
the Corporation and it is essential for it to provide such
accommodation in order to ensure an efficient working of the
road transport system and it must, therefore, be held that
the impugned order was validly passed under the Requisition
Act.
In the result the appeal is allowed and the decision
28
of the High Court is set aside.
Costs in the appeal in this Court shall be paid by the
appellant to the respondent as directed by the order
granting Special Leave. Each party, however, will bear his
own costs in the High Court.