ORDER
V.K. Agrawal, Member (T)
1. The issue involved in the present appeal filed by M/s. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. is the relevant date for determination of rate of duty under Section 15 of the Customs Act, 1962.
2. Briefly stated the facts are that the Appellants presented a Pre-Bill of Entry for home consumption for import of 54000 MTs of Crude Oil per vessel ‘Lance Naik Karam Singh’ on 19-3-1990. The Bill of Entry was assessed provisionally and provisional duty amounting to Rs. 5,72,40,000/- was paid by them. On account of the proposals in Budget for 1990-91, presented in Parliament on 19-3-1990, the rate of duty on Crude Oil was revised upward. The Customs Department issued a show cause notice dated 11-4-1990 demanding duty at the enhanced rate. Assistant Collector, under order dated 23-7-1990, confirmed the demand of duty amounting to Rs. 2,65,40,443/-, holding that the entry inward was not given to the vessel carrying the impugned crude oil on 19-3-1990; that the said vessel arrived on 19-3-1990 at 20.24 hrs. and berthed at Butcher Island on 20-3-1990; that the final entry was granted on 21-3-1990 and the relevant rate of duty applicable on the date of entry inward being Rs. 1000/- + Rs. 500/- PMT was correct. On appeal, the Collector of Customs (Appeals) confirmed the demand, holding that the application for seeking entry inwards for vessel “Lance Naik Karam Singh’ was submitted by the agent only on 21-3-1990; that the vessel was not even eligible for grant of entry inwards prior to 20-3-1990; that in view of the specific provisions of Section 15 of the Customs Act, the rate applicable to the subject goods would be the rate available on 21-3-1990, i.e. the date on which entry inwards’ to the vessel was granted under Section 31 of the Customs Act.
3. Shri R. Sankaran, Representative of the appellants, submitted that the vessel carrying the crude oil arrived at Mumbai on 19-3-1990 at 20.24 hrs. and started discharging Oil on 20-3-1990 which was completed at 8.00 A.M. on 21-3-1990. In support of his submissions, he referred to the report dated 3-4-1990 from M/s. J.B. Boda Surveyors Pvt. Ltd. He further submitted that under the procedure established by the Customs House, Bombay, they had filed Kutcha Bill of Entry for home consumption on 19-3-1990; that they had observed all the procedural requirements specified in the standing order No. 6612 dated 12-8-1977; that the Appraiser, Bombay Customs House made an endorsement on the reverse side of the B/E for allowing the tanker to discharge the crude; that even the Central Excise Officer incharge shore tanks was directed to supervise the intake of crude oil into the duty paid tanks as per the endorsement on the reverse side of the Bill of Entry. He also mentioned that the relevant date for the purpose of determination of rate of duty was 19-3-1990, as the entry inward was granted on that date; that there is no provision in the Customs Act for granting provisional entry inward; that either the entry inward is granted by the Customs House to a ship or not granted; that it is apparent from Bill of Entry and all directions given on the reverse side of the Bill of Entry that the entry inward was granted to the vessel Lance Naik Karam Singh on 19-3-1990 and according to the provisions of Section 15(1) of the Customs Act, the rate of duty applicable to any imported goods shall be rate in force on the date on which a bill of entry is presented and if a bill of entry has been presented before the date of entry inwards of the vessel, the bill of entry shall be deemed to have been presented on the date of entry inward; that as the entry inwards was granted on 19-3-1990, the duty would be leviable at the rate of duty in force on that day. He emphasised that all formalities and documentation were complete in all respect, import manifest was filed on 19-3-1990 alongwith application for entry inwards and bill of entry was also submitted on that day on which the proper officer had given the order to break bulk, nothing remained to be complied with by them for the purpose of grant of entry inwards; that the inference of the Collector (Appeals) that entry inwards was granted on 21-3-1990 is wholly unjustified; that when the commencement of discharge operation had taken place on 20-3-1990 itself there was no warrant to conclude that entry inwards was granted on 21-3-1990 after the completion of discharge operation.
4. Countering the arguments, Shri H.K. Jain, learned SDR, submitted that the appellants had filed only prior Bill of Entry and as such the date of filing of the Bill of Entry cannot be taken for the purpose of determination of rate of duty; if the entry inward had been granted on 19-3-1990, there was no need for the appellants to file a prior Bill of Entry; that the Preventive Officer of the Bombay Customs House had passed the order on 20-3-1990 for discharge of oil and not on 19-3-1990. Relying upon the decision in the case of Collector of Customs v. G. Dass & Co. -1983 (13) E.L.T. 1511 (S.C.), in which it was held that if the consignment covered by the Bill of Entry consisted of several package and the landing was spread over several days the date of landing of the last package would be deemed to be the date of the delivery of the Bill of Entry, he contended that as the discharge was completed on 21-3-1990, the rate of duty in force on that date will be applicable. He also mentioned that entry inward on prior I.G.M. is granted to provide facility to the importer so that all formalities could be completed in time. He also referred to the decision in the case of Jain Shudh Vanaspati Ltd. v. U.O.I. -1983 (14) E.L.T. 1688 (Del.) wherein it was held that no superfluity can be attributed to the legislature when specific rate of duty is given under Section 15 of the Customs Act. Therefore, it is not permissible to indulge in any alternative exercise to find other dates because ignoring of reference to dates in Section 15 really amounts to corroding and making section 15 redundant. He finally submitted that as entry inward was granted on 21-3-1990, as per Section 15, the rate of duty prevalent on that date is applicable for levying the Customs duty.
5. In reply, Shri R. Sankaran, referred to the standing order dated 12-8-1977 according to which after payment of revenue deposit, A.O./Oil unit would authorise on the reverse of the B/E the Boarding Officers to allow the tanker to discharge and the Central Excise Officer, incharge (shore tanks) to receive the crude oil into the shore tanks.
6. We have considered the submissions of both the sides. Section 15 of the Customs Act provides that the rate of duty applicable to any imported goods shall be the rate in force on the date on which Bill of Entry is presented. Provisio to Section 15 of the Act provides that if a Bill of Entry has been presented before the date of entry inwards of the vessel by which the goods are imported, the Bill of Entry shall be deemed to have been presented on the date of such entry inwards. It is an admitted fact that in the present matter a Kutcha Bill of Entry was filed by the appellants for import of crude oil. The relevant date for determining the rate of duty applicable to the crude oil is the date on which entry inwards was granted to the vessel carrying the impugned imported goods. It has been contended by the appellants that date of entry inwards should be deemed to have been granted on 19-3-1990 as the vessel Lance Naik Karam Singh which was carrying the impugned goods had arrived at Bombay on 19-3-1990 and they had completed all formalities as per the standing order issued by the Bombay Customs House. They have also emphasised the fact that the order of discharge of the oil was given by the appraiser on 19-3-1990 itself and the discharge of the oil, in fact, commenced from 20-3-1990. The Department on the other hand has contended that no entry inwards was granted to the vessel in question on 19-3-1990 as the records of Bombay Customs House shows that no inward entry was granted to the said vessel on 19-3-1990. The Department has also contended that standing order No. 6612/77 merely prescribes the procedure for filing of Kutcha Bill of Entry in absence of proper documents and provisional assessement and release of goods. The standing order further lays down that the assessment is to be completed after receiving the documents. According to the Department the standing order does not have relevance to the determination of the rate of duty which is to be determined as per the provisions of Section 15 of the Customs Act. This submission of the Department is full of substance as it is mentioned in the standing order itself that it was issued on the representation made by the appellants. According to the standing order M/s. BRL & HPCL had stated that sailing time of crude oil tanker from Gulf to Bombay was about 3 days. The Bill of Lading/Loading certificate was brought by the master of the vessel as it took longer to get the same by post; therefore, they had requested that tankers may be allowed to discharge without filing of IGM. Accordingly, the procedure was prescribed for discharge of crude oil on filing of the Kutcha Bill of Entry itself. The appellants now cannot claim that as the discharge order has been granted by the Department it should be deemed that the entry inwards had been also granted to the vessel. As rightly contended by the learned DR, this procedure was prescribed to facilitate the discharge of the crude oil immediately on arrival of the vessel. However the legal provisions as contained in Section 15 of the Customs Act cannot be made redundant by standing order issued by the executive authority. The learned SDR had relied upon the decision in the case of Metro Exporters (P) Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay -1997 (94) E.L.T. 427, wherein it was held by the Tribunal that merely the fact that the ship had commenced discharge of the cargo does not in any way affect the legal position that it is the date on which the entry inwards was granted is the relevant date for the purpose of assessment of custom duty as in that case the entry inward was granted only subsequently. The Tribunal held that the departmental authority were justified in taking into consideration the rate specified in the notification. The Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Surfactants Pvt. Ltd. v. U.O.I. -1989 (43) E.L.T. 189 (S.C.) held that the words in Section 15(1)(a) of the Customs Act namely, “date of entry inward of the vessel by which the goods were imported” means that the date of entry inward for the purpose of Section 15(1) (a) and provisions thereto is the date when the entry is made in the Custom’s register. In the present matter the date of entry inward mentioned as per the Department, is 21-3-1990. According to the Supreme Court it is the date recorded as such in the custom register which is relevant. Accordingly, the rate of duty which was in force on 21-3-1990 will be the rate of duty applicable in the present matter. We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the impugned order and reject the appeal filed by the appellants.