IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED: 18.03.2011 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.K.SASIDHARAN C.R.P. No.3475/1998 1.Minor Divya 2.Minor Krithika 3.Minor Manikandan Minors represented by next friend and grand father Sellamuthu Udyar ... Petitioners versus 1.Sengamalai 2.Chinnu 3.Naga @ Nagammal 4.Rani ... Respondents PRAYER: Revision filed against the fair and decretal order dated 06.08.1998, made in O.S.No.54/1997 on the file of the Subordinate Judge Court, Ariyalur. For petitioners : Mr.Jayaramana Krishnan For respondents : Ms.P.Veena O R D E R
Introductory :-
This Civil Revision Petition raises a question, “whether the expression “value of the property” for which the document was executed” as provided under Section 40 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Evaluation Act means the market value of the property or the value specified in the document.
Relevant facts :-
2.The petitioners filed a civil suit in O.S.No.54/1997 before the learned Subordinate Judge, Ariyalur, praying for a decree, directing partition of the suit property into 90 shares and to allot 18 such shares to them with separate possession and enjoyment. The other prayer was to grant a decree of cancellation of the partition deed dated 24 May 1996 in respect of suit A and B Schedule properties.
3.The suit records were examined by the Court Fee Examiner, High Court, Madras, and a check slip was issued directing the Trial Court to collect additional Court Fee. The said check slip was considered by the learned Judge. The learned Judge was of the view that the petitioners have to pay Court fee for the relief of cancellation of the deed of partition. According to the learned Judge, Court Fee should be paid on the market rate under Section 40 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act [hereinafter referred to as ‘the Court Fees Act’]. Accordingly, the learned Subordinate Judge passed an order on 6 August 1998 directing the petitioners to pay a further sum of Rs.74,756.25 in addition to the Court fee already paid by them. Court Fee was estimated on the market value of the property as the relief was to set aside the partition deed in respect of immovable property. Feeling aggrieved by the said order, the petitioners have come up with the revision petition.
Submissions :-
4.The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the prayer was only to set aside the document and as such, the petitioners were expected to pay Court Fee only on the amount shown in the document. Section 40 does not contain a stipulation that the market value has to be assessed for the purpose of Court Fee. Therefore, the impugned order passed by the learned Judge requires interference by this Court. The learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Satheedevi v. Prasanna, (2010) 5 SCC 622 in support of his contention that the value as shown in the document alone has to be taken for assessing the Court Fee for granting a decree to set aside the document.
Consideration :-
5.The petitioners have sought a decree for cancellation of the partition deed dated 24 May 1996 and to partition the property into 90 shares and for allotment of 18 such shares to them. They have paid Court Fee on the basis of the amount shown in the document. The Court Fee Examiner as well as the Trial Court considered Section 40 of the Court Fees Act and arrived at a conclusion that the Court Fee has to be paid only on the market rate. Therefore, the question relates to the interpretation of Section 40 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act.
The Statute :-
6.Section 40 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1879 reads as under :-
40.Suits for cancellation of decrees, etc. –
(1) In a suit for cancellation of a decree for money or other property having a money value, or other document which purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest in money, movable or immovable property, fee shall be computed on the value of the subject-matter of the suit, and such value shall be deemed to be –
if the whole decree or other document is sought to be cancelled, the amount or value of the property for which the decree was passed or other document was executed;
if a part of the decree or other document is sought to be cancelled, such part of the amount or value of the property.
(2) If the decree or other document is such that the liability under it cannot be split up and the relief claimed relates only to a particular item of property belonging to the plaintiff or to the plaintiff’s share in any such property, fee shall be computed on the value of such property or share or on the amount of the decree, whichever is less.
7.Therefore, Section 40 of the Court Fees Act is very specific when it says that fee shall be computed on the value of the subject matter of the suit and such value shall be deemed to be the amount or value of the property for which the document was executed. The legislative intention is very clear that what was intended was only the value shown in the document. There is nothing to suggest that the amount or value of the property should be construed as one of market value.
8.The issue is no longer res integra in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Satheedevi v. Prasanna,(2010) 5 SCC 622.
9.The Supreme Court in Satheedevi case (cited supra) was considering Section 40(1) of the Kerala Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1959. The provision is similar to the one as contained under Section 40 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act.
10.The Supreme Court in Satheedevi Case considered the views expressed by various High Courts in the matter of payment of Court Fee for setting aside the documents. The question raised was as to whether it was the value shown in the document or the present market value that should be taken for determining the Court Fee. The Supreme Court opined that when there is a special Rule in the Act for valuing the property for the purpose of Court fee, that method of valuation must be adopted in preference to any other method. It was further observed that Section 40 of the Court Fees Act certainly contains a special rule for valuing the property for the purpose of Court fee and as such, there was no question of substituting the expression “value of the property” with the expression “market value of the property”. The relevant observation reads thus :-
“19.The deeming clause contained in the substantive part of Section 40(1) makes it clear that in a suit filed for cancellation of a document which creates any right, title or interest in immovable property, the court fee is required to be computed on the value of the property for which the document was executed. To put it differently, the value of the property for which the document was executed and not its market value is relevant for the purpose of court fee. If the expression value of the subject-matter of the suit was not followed by the deeming clause, it could possibly be argued that the word value means the market value, but by employing the deeming clause, the legislature has made it clear that if the document is sought to be cancelled, the amount of court fee shall be computed on the value of the property for which the document was executed and not the market value of the property. The words for which appearing between the words property and other documents clearly indicate that the court fee is required to be paid on the value of the property mentioned in the document, which is the subject-matter of challenge.
20.If the legislature intended that fee should be payable on the market value of the subject-matter of the suit filed for cancellation of a document which purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any present or future right, title and interest, then it would have, instead of incorporating the requirement of payment of fees on the value of subject-matter, specifically provided for payment of court fee on the market value of the subject-matter of the suit as has been done in respect of other types of suits mentioned in Sections 25, 27, 29, 30, 37, 38, 45 and 48. The legislature may have also, instead of using the expression value of the property for which the document was executed, used the expression value of the property in respect of which the document was executed. However, the fact of the matter is that in Section 40(1) the legislature has designedly not used the expression market value of the property.
21.If the interpretation placed by the trial court and the High Court on the expression value of the property for which the document was executed is accepted as correct then the word value used in Section 40(1) of the Act will have to be read as market value and we do not see any compelling reason to add the word market before the word value in Section 40(1) of the Act.
11.Legislature in their wisdom used only the expression “value for the purpose of payment of Court fee under Section 40(1) of the Court Fees Act. Legislature could have very well expressed the word “market value”. In fact, there are other provisions in the Court Fees Act dealing with assessment of market value for the purpose of computing the proper Court Fee.
12.Section 24 of the Court fees Act deals with suits for movable property. Proviso to Section 24(2) indicates that where the allegation in the plaint or the issue framed relates only to a portion of the amount or property, fee shall be computed on one-fourth of such portion of the amount or on one-fourth of the market value of such portion of the property. Section 25 again warrants payment of Court fee on the market value of the property for granting declaratory decree or order whether with or without consequential relief. Section 27 deals with suits for injunction and there again, it was indicated that fee shall be computed on one-half of the market value of the property or on Rs.150/-, whichever is higher. Similarly, Section 28 relating to trust property also mandates payment of Court Fees proportionate to the market value. Section 29 pertains to suit for possession under the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Section 30 relates to suit for possession not otherwise provided for. Section 32 also provides for payment of Court fee on the market value in the case of pre-emption suits. Therefore, a specific distinction was drawn by the legislature between value and market value for the purpose of computation of Court Fees. The language of Section 40 is very clear. It does not call for a different interpretation than the one suggested expressly.
Conclusion :-
13.Therefore, the expression “value” as found under Section 40 of the Act must be treated as the value shown in the document and not its market value.
14.Hence, I am of the view that the learned Trial Judge was not justified in directing the petitioners to pay Court fee on the market value of the property. The petitioner was expected to pay Court fee only on the amount shown in the document. Therefore, I am constrained to set aside the order passed by the learned Trial Judge.
15.Since the suit was filed as early as on 3 February 1997, the learned Trial Judge is directed to take up the matter and dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible and in any case, within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this Order.
16.In the upshot, I allow the revision petition. No costs. Consequently, M.P.No.1/2009 is also dismissed.
tar
To
The Subordinate Judge Court,
Ariyalur