JUDGMENT
Mukul Mudgal, J.
1. This LPA challenges the judgment of learned Single Judge dated 5.7.2004 by which the learned Single Judge held that this Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition filed by the appellant. The learned Single Judge also held that the writ petition was maintainable against the Management Development Institute, Respondent No. 2, with whom the appellant was employed. For the purposes of this appeal, since cross appeal has also been filed by Respondent No. 2, Mr. Bernard D’ Mello shall be referred to as the Petitioner and Management Development Institute (MDI), who is appellant in LPA No. 920/2004 shall be referred to as Respondent No. 1 and Industrial Finance Corporation of India (IFCI) shall be referred to as Respondent No. 2.
2. The Petitioner was appointed as an Associate Professor with Respondent No. 1 by the letter of appointment dated 9.11.1994. This letter was issued in Gurgaon. The Petitioner apparently had differences of opinion on various issues with the Director of Respondent No. 1 leading to the order dated 23.9.2003 which retired the Petitioner upon completion of 50 years of age from the services of Respondent No. 1. This letter was also issued from Gurgaon which is the situs of Respondent No. 1. Aggrieved by the said letter the writ petition No. 6571/2003 was preferred before the learned Single Judge of this Court which led to the impugned judgment dated 5.7.2004. By the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge held as follows:
a. By virtue of the import of Article 226(2) of Constitution of India this Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.
b. The writ petition against Management Development Institute was maintainable in view of the public functions performed by it.
c. In view of the phraseology of Regulation 33 the order of compulsory retirement as per the said clause cannot be faulted.
3. Consequently, by the impugned judgment, therefore, learned Single Judge while upholding the maintainability of the writ petition nevertheless dismissed the writ petition on merits. The dismissal of the writ petition on merits has given rise to LPA No. 723/2004 by the original writ Petitioner, Bernard De Mello and the decision about the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of (a) territorial jurisdiction and (b) public nature of functions performed by the Respondent No. 1 has given rise to LPA No. 920/2004. Both these appeals arising from the same judgment have been taken up together and are being disposed of by the present judgment.
4. The learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 1 who is the Appellant in LPA No. 920/2004 was heard first. He urged that the learned Single Judge was in error in holding that this Court had territorial jurisdiction and that a writ was maintainable against the MDI. He has advanced his arguments on the territorial jurisdiction based on the following pleas:
(a) Appointment of the Petitioner was in an institute in Gurgaon by virtue of appointment letter issued in Gurgaon and the duties of teaching were performed by the Petitioner in the institute in Gurgaon situated in Haryana.
(b) The letter of premature retirement was issued and received in Gurgaon at Haryana. Consequently, since no part of cause of action having arisen in the NCT of Delhi, the learned Single Judge ought not to have entertained the writ petition. In support of his plea, the learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 1 relied upon the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 26th May, 2000 in CWP No. 4455/1998 titled New Delhi General Mazdoor Union (Retd.) v. Government of Delhi.
(c) That since the appropriate Government in respect of an industrial dispute had been determined in respect of the Respondent/MDI to be the State of Haryana, this was a clear indication of the fact that the cause of action in respect of matters arising out of employment, service condition of employment at best would lie in Haryana.
(d) That the above judgment of the learned Single Judge in CWP No. 4455/99 was taken up in appeal which was affirmed by a Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 494/2000, titled New Delhi General Mazdoor Union (Retd.) v. Government of Delhi vide order dated 25th January, 2006. This order of the Division Bench was further challenged by filing SLP(Civil) No. 10539/2006 which petition was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 17th July, 2006.
(e) That since the view taken by the learned Single Judge was not disturbed by the Division Bench or by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, consequently, this factor would weigh heavily in so far as the determination of the territorial jurisdiction of this Court is concerned.
5. Mr. Arora relied upon a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Sector Twenty-one owners Welfare Association v. Air Force Naval House Board, where the Division Bench held as follows:
13. The law as reflected by the above said decisions is that the emphasis has shifted from the residence or location of the person or authority sought to be proceeded against to the situs of the accrual of cause of action wholly or in part. It is also clear that a trivial or insignificant part of the cause of action arising at a particular place would not be enough to confer writ jurisdiction; it is the cause of action mainly and substantially arising at a place which would be determinating factor of territorial jurisdiction. So also it shall have to be kept in view who are the real persons or authorities sought to be proceeded against or against whom the writ to be issued by the Court would run. Joining of proforma or anciliary parties, and certainly not the joining of unnecessary parties, would be relevant for the purpose of Article 226(1).
6. He further submitted that this judgment was followed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in United Builders (Regd.) v. Indian Oil Corporation and Ors. 2002 Vol. 1 AD (Delhi) 574. He has also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Adani Exports Ltd. and Anr. , holding as under:
10. We are unable to accept this finding of the High Court. The view of the High Court that this Court in the case of Oswal Woollen (supra) had held that the existence of the Registered Office of a company would ipso facto give a cause of action to the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Registered Office of such Company is situated, is not correct. As a matter of fact, in the case of Oswal Woollen (supra), the question of territorial jurisdiction in the sense with which we are concerned now did not arise at all. In that case the observations of the Court were as follows:
Having regard to the fact that the Registered Office of the Company is at Ludhiana and the principal Respondents against whom the primary relief is sought are at New Delhi, we would have expected the writ petition to be filed either in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana or in the Delhi High Court. the writ Petitioners, however, have chosen Calcutta High court as the forum perhaps because one of the interlocutory reliefs which is sought in respect of a consignment of beef tallow which has arrived at the Calcutta Port…. We do not desire to probe further into the question whether the writ petition was filed by design or accident in the Calcutta High Court when the office of the Company is in the State of Punjab and all the principal Respondents are in Delhi.
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17. It is seen from the above that in order to confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition or a special civil application as in this case, the High Court must be satisfied from the entire facts pleaded in support of the cause of action that those facts do constitute a cause so as to empower the court to decide a dispute which has, at least in part, arisen within its jurisdiction. It is clear from the above judgment that each and every fact pleaded by the Respondents in their application does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the court’s territorial jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case. Facts which have no bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the court concerned. If we apply this principle then we see that none of the facts pleaded in para 16 of the petition, in our opinion, fall into the category of bundle of facts which would constitute a cause of action giving rise to a dispute which could confer territorial jurisdiction on the courts at Ahmedabad.
7. He has also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India and Ans. , holding as under:
10. Keeping in view the expressions used is Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, indisputably even if a small fraction of cause of action accrues within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in the matter.
8. He has submitted that in view of the above position of law even a small fraction of the cause of action has not arisen in Delhi and accordingly the writ petition ought not to have been entertained in Delhi.
9. The learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 2 has also challenged the impugned judgment on the maintainability of the writ petition per se de hors the issue of territorial jurisdiction by submitting that the MDI did not perform such public functions so as to attract the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India even within the tests laid down in Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India .
10. In so far as the issue of the maintainability of the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, against the Respondent/MDI is concerned the learned single judge held as follows:
a.That in the Annual Report of IFCI, when MDI was set up, it was stressed that management is a crucial input for the success of every venture. Along side the production of goods and services the country needs managerial personnel and talent of the highest order.
b.With the sole objective of developing and upgrading the managerial personnel and managerial talents of the practicing managers in public, private, joint and cooperative sectors of the industry as also of commercial and development banks in the banking sector MDI was set up.
c.That considering the character of MDI and its functions, MDI shoulders public duties and its activities have a public character. If MDI is found to be charged with positive obligations which it is violating, mandamus cannot be denied.
11. We have heard Mr. Sanjay Bhatt on behalf of the IFCI/Respondent No. 2. Some portions of the affidavit of the IFCI make interesting reading as follows:
2. That the Respondent No. 2 is a public limited company incorporated under the Companies act, 1956 and is a Public Financial Institution within the meaning of Section 4A of the Companies Act, 1956. It is submitted that the Respondent No. 2 is a Board managed company with no Government shareholding. It is further submitted that Government doesn’t have deep or pervasive control over the affairs of the Respondent No. 2. Thus the Respondent No. 2 is not a State within Article 12 of Constitution of India.
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4. That the Appellant Society works under its own Memorandum of Association and Rules where under powers are exercised by the Board of Governors, comprising various eminent personalities from the field of Banking, Finance, Industries, Commerce, Administration and Management bodies, reputed industrialists. There is no interference or control of Respondent No. 2 in the day to day working of Appellant Society. As per rules of MDI, the Chairman of MDI is appointed by the Board of Governors of MDI. Any member of the Board, not necessarily, the CMD of Respondent No. 2, can be appointed as Chairman, MDI. However, it is a mere coincidence that during the relevant time the CMD of Respondent No. 2 was appointed as Chairman of MDI by its Board of Governors.
12. We have also perused the Memorandum of Association and Rules of the MDI. Rule 6 of the Rules which describes the composition of the Board reads as follows:
6. (i) The Board shall be composed of the following members:
(1)Chairman;
(2)One representative of the Central Government nominated by the Ministry of Finance, Government of India;
(3)One representative of the Industrial Development Bank of India;
(4)One representative of the Kredittanstalt-fur-Wiederaufbau (KFW), Frankfut;
(5)Not more than seven persons to be nominated by the Industrial Finance Corporation of India to represent business, industry, finance, cooperative and management Institutions, Bodies and Undertakings;
(6)Director of the Institute, ex-officio member;
(7)Not more than three persons to be co-opted by the Board of Governors.
13. The said rule thus clearly shows that IFCI, IDBI and the Central Government have a clear strength of 9 in the Board of Respondent No. 1 which has the maximum strength of 15. Furthermore, even out of the said strength of 15, 3 persons are nominated by the Board of Governors in which itself the Government has the majority of 9.
14. The relevant position of law as laid down by a Constitution Bench of the Honourable Supreme Court while considering the functions performed by the BCCI in the Zee Telefilms case (supra) read as follows:
31. Be that as it may, it cannot be denied that the Board does discharge some duties like the selection of an Indian cricket team, controlling the activities of the players and others involved in the game of cricket. These activities can be said to be akin to public duties or State functions and if there is any violation of any constitutional or statutory obligation or rights of other citizens, the aggrieved party may not have a relief by way of a petition under Article 32. But that does not mean that the violator of such right would go scot-free merely because it or he is not a State. Under the Indian jurisprudence there is always a just remedy for violation of a right of a citizen. Though the remedy under Article 32 is not available, an aggrieved party can always seek a remedy under the ordinary course of law or by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution which is much wider than Article 32.
15. While examining and relying on the decision in Anadi Mukta Sadguru(supra) and the notion of public functions and public duties, the Supreme Court in Zee Telefilms further held that:
33. Thus, it is clear that when a private body exercises its public functions even if it is not a State, the aggrieved person has a remedy not only under the ordinary law but also under the Constitution, by way of a writ petition under Article 226.
16. After considering the arguments advanced and the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court cited by the counsel and the other findings of the learned Single Judge noted by us, we hold that the IFCI and the Central Government has sufficient control on the MDI. Hence the reasoning of the learned Single Judge in so far as the maintainability of the writ petition under Article 226 in respect of public functions is concerned, is based on the established position of law and we hereby affirm the said view.
17. Mr. Gonsalves, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the original Petitioner/Bernard D’Mello, contended on the issue of territorial jurisdiction that the Petitioner had made a serious grievance of his apprehensions about the conduct of the Director of the Respondent No. 1/MDI, Shri Devi Singh to the Chairman of Board of Governors, MDI and Chairman-cum-Managing Director, IFCI, Shri V.P. Singh, by communication dated 10th June, 2003. He submitted that this communication was made to Shri V.P. Singh who was stationed at Delhi and was the CMD of IFCI. He highlighted the fact that the incidents which led to his premature retirement and the animosity between the Petitioner and the Respondent No. 1/MDI were duly highlighted in the said letter and the causes mentioned therein eventually led to the termination of his services. He, therefore, submitted that since the grievances raised in the letter of 10th June, 2003 addressed to Shri V.P. Singh at New Delhi, eventually resulted in the order of termination of services of the appellant, therefore, a part of the cause of action as contemplated by paragraph 10 of Kusum Ingots’ case (supra) as extracted above clearly occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and the writ court accordingly had the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. He has submitted that since the Petitioner/appellant herein was heard on his representation prior to termination in Delhi, the condition indicated in Kusum Ingots’ case (supra) was fully satisfied and entertaining the writ petition in Delhi was therefore clearly justified. He has further relied on a letter dated 21st July, 2003 which was a reminder of the contents of the earlier complaint/letter dated 10th June, 2003.
18. The relevant averments in respect of territorial jurisdiction are contained in paragraph 29 of the writ petition and read as under:
29. That the Respondent No. 1 has its Registered Office in Delhi and this Hon’ble Court has the territorial jurisdiction to hear this case.
19. Mr. Gonsalves has also highlighted paragraph 10 of the rejoinder to reiterate the pleas about his complaint, which reads as follows:
10. I would now like to state what transpired during my meeting with the then IFCI Chairman and Managing Director and MDI Chairman, Shri V.P. Singh in February 2003. When I complained about Respondent No. 4’s harassment and referred to my then confidential complaint of 9-8-2002 to Respondent No. 1 (page 37 of my writ petition), the MDI Chairman told me that he had passed on a copy of this complaint to Respondent No. 4 and suggested to him that he resolve the matter. I also complained about the Registrar and Secretary’s bad behavior and incompetence and he seemed to agree with my assessment. He also told me that he is aware that Prof. Devi Singh has certain negative personality traits in handling people and that I should try and adjust with this, to which I agreed and subsequently tried to make amends (as shown on pages 11 to 15 of my Rejoinder affidavit of 10-12-2003). But, what really shocked me was that Shri V.P. Singh informed me of complaints against Respondent No. 4 related to corruption in the admissions process to the MDI and asked me if I had any information pertinent to investigating these complaints. I was doubly shocked because someone who was then being investigated for corruption charges in the admissions process of the MDI by MDI’s Chairman was then misleading the Board’s Sub-committee to recommend to the Board to retire me prematurely, summarily and purportedly in the interest of the institute.
20. It was the submission of Mr. Gonsalves that while a statutory appeal has not been filed by the Petitioner yet since he had clearly raised the issue in a letter which preceded the impugned order of termination of the services of the Petitioner/appellant, the Delhi High Court has jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.
21. The learned Single Judge in dealing with the said issue has largely based his judgment on Article 226(2) and the situation of the Registered Office in Delhi. The learned Single Judge while dealing with the issue of territorial jurisdiction considered the plea questioning the jurisdiction of this Court by invoking Article 226(2) of the Constitution. It was urged that that since the MDI Institute is at Gurgaon, Haryana and all subsequent events such as the Board’s decision, the communication and receipt of this communication by the Petitioner all occurred at Gurgaon, no part of the cause of action accrued in Delhi and hence this Court did not possess the jurisdiction to entertain the said writ petition. The relevant portion of the Single Judge’s judgment reads as under:
The fact that the Registered Office of the Respondent No. 2 is within the territory of the Union Territory of Delhi would clothe this Court with territorial jurisdiction. It may be noted that prior to insertion of Sub-article (2), some of the High Courts were of the opinion that where the cause of action arose a writ petition could be filed in those High Courts as well. This view was constitutionally recognized by amending Article 226 of the Constitution and insertion of Sub-article (2). In the Statement of Objects and Reasons it was brought that the purpose of the amendment was to clothe the high courts with jurisdiction where the cause of action arose. It may also be noted that in Sub-article (2) the word used is “also”. This clearly shows that the jurisdiction conferred by the Sub-article (2) is in addition to the jurisdiction conferred on the courts under Sub-article (1) and not in derogation thereof. In other words, with regard to writ petitions, it is not only the High Courts within whose jurisdiction the cause of action arose which would have jurisdiction, but even the court within the territorial jurisdiction of which the Respondent resides would have jurisdiction. Residence of a juristic entity would be the place its Registered Office is situated.
22. The learned Single Judge thus held that since that the Registered Office of the Respondent No. 2 was within the territory of the Union Territory of Delhi this Court was equipped with the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.
23. In so far as the question of appropriate Government is concerned, undoubtedly the issue in respect of industrial dispute in respect of employees of Respondent No. 1 stands settled by the learned Single Judge affirmed by the Division Bench and further affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dismissing the Special Leave Petition. We are also of the view the fact that in respect of the industrial dispute of MDI, the State of Haryana is the appropriate Government, would be a relevant though not determinative factor for determining whether or not the writ petition lies in this Court.
24. In our view, the writ petition would have been entertainable in Delhi High Court in case the appeal was preferred to the appellate authority situated in Delhi and the impugned order was passed by the appellate authority in Delhi or any cause of action arose qua the Registered Office in Delhi. However, this is not so. The facts of the present case and indeed the pleadings clearly show that no appeal was preferred pursuant to the impugned order dated 23rd September, 2003. There is no plea in the entire writ petition which refers to any cause of action arising qua the Registered Office situated in Delhi. The Petitioner’s grievance sought to be highlighted in the writ petition which according to Mr. Gonsalves brought in the territorial jurisdiction of this Court was based upon a complaint which preceded the impugned order of termination. There is no grievance raised in Delhi after the impugned order of termination nor is there any prayer in the writ petition which relates to any cause of action which has taken place in Delhi. Even the averments about the cause of action contained in paragraph 29 of the writ petition only proceed on the basis that the Registered Office of the MDI is situated in Delhi. This in our view is not ipso facto sufficient to entitle this Court to entertain the writ petition in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Adani Export’s case and the judgment of this Court in Sector 21 owners Welfare Association case (supra). Accordingly, we are of the view that in so far as the entertainment of the writ petition on the existing pleadings is concerned, the MDI is entitled to succeed. However, this judgment has proceeded on the pleadings of the case and our consequent view that on the existing pleadings, the learned Single Judge ought not to have entertained the writ petition irrespective of the fact of whether this Court had territorial jurisdiction. We are however, not ruling out the territorial jurisdiction of this Court in an appropriate case where there are appropriate pleadings to that effect.
25. It is significant to note that the writ petition prays for the following reliefs:
(a) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing the letter dated September 23, 2003 issued by the Respondents;
(b) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the Respondents to allow the Petitioner to resume his duties;
(c) And pass such other order or orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case.
26. In our view, in the light of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Adani Export’s case this factor alone is not sufficient for decision of the maintainability of the writ petition on ground of territorial jurisdiction particularly in the absence of any pleading in the writ petition about the territorial jurisdiction of this Court save and except the Registered Office of the Respondent No. 2 being in Delhi. Since no part of the cause of action even remotely arose or was pleaded to have arisen qua the Registered Office in Delhi, the Single Judge in our view ought to have declined to entertain the writ petition.
27. Consequently, the appeal of the Management Development Institute is allowed and it is held that the writ petition ought not to have been entertained in the High Court of Delhi on the present pleadings.
28. Since we have held that the High Court of Delhi has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition, any reasoning or findings given on merits is without jurisdiction and without going into merits of the reasoning and the findings given by the learned Single Judge, it is clarified that any observations made, reasoning or findings given in the impugned judgment regarding the compulsory retirement of the petitioner being without jurisdiction stand set aside and will not come in the way of the petitioner Bernard D’Mello, if he opts to file writ petition in the High Court of Punjab & Haryana.