ORDER
K. A. Swami, C. J.
1. This appeal is preferred by the State of Tamil Nadu, Secretary, Selection Committee for MBBS Courses, Director of Medical Education and Director of Government Examinations, against the order dated 17-7-1996 passed by the learned single Judge, allowing W.P. No. 7901 of 1996 and directing the respondents I to 4 in the writ petition, who are the appellants in this appeal to give the writ petitioner/1st respondent herein one seat in any one of the Government Medical Colleges in the 1st year MBBS Course, 1996-97. There is a further direction to respondents 1 to 4 to comply with the order, within a week from the date of receipt of a copy of the order.
2. On behalf of the appellants, it is contended that as the application sent by the 1st respondent (writ petitioner) reached the Secretary, Selection Committee for MBBS Course on 8-6-1996 whereas the last date fixed for receipt of the applications was 7-6-1996, the application having been received after the last date fixed for receipt of such applications was not entitled to be considered, therefore the cover was not opened and the case of the writ petitioner was not considered for admission. It is submitted that as per the instructions given to the candidates in the Prospectus for Tamil Nadu Professional Courses Medical/Dental/Paramedical, 1996-97, it has been specifically stated that completed application forms with enclosures may be delivered in person or sent in the cover provided by registered post/courier service/ speed post to reach the Secretary, Selection Committee, K.M.C. Hospital Campus, Madras 600 010 before 5.00 p.m. on 3-6-1996. However, it is not in dispute that the last date fixed as 3-6-1996 was extended under the Notification dated 22-5-1976 to 7-6-1996. It is also the case of appellants the respondents 1 to 4 in the writ petition that as per decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Vinothkumar, R. v. Secretary, Selection Committee, Sabarmathi Hostel, K.M.C. Etc. reported in (1995) I Mad LW 351, the post office cannot be considered to be the agent of the Selection Committee, therefore the posting of the applications on 6-6-1996 did not enure to the benefit of the writ petitioner and such an application could not be considered as having been received by the Selection Committee on or before 7-6-1996.
2.1. Whereas it is the case of the writ petitioner that she appeared for 1995-96 entrance examination for admission to 1st year MBBS Course, but, she narrowly missed the admission, therefore she appeared for improvement examination in March, 1996 in order to improve her marks in Physics and Chemistry, those marks were not supplied to the petitioner until 6-6-1996, therefore she could not sent the application before 6-6- 1996, that she received the improvement marks card only on 6-6-1996 at 10 a.m. and sent the application on the same day at 10a.m. by speed post, that it has been received by the G.P.O., Madras on 7-6-1996, whereas ii had been delivered to the Selection Committee only on the next day, i.e. 8-6-1996. In addition to this, it is the case of the petitioner that the marks cards were not supplied, therefore a telegram was sent by her to the 4th respondent on 1-6-1996, that she sent another telegram to the 4th respondent on 1-6-1996 regarding the non-receipt of the improvement marks card and requested for extension of the last date for receipt of the applications for admission to the 1st year MBBS Course. Still, one more telegram was sent on 4-6-1996 to the 4th respondent regarding the non-receipt of the marks card. On the basis of these statements, 7-6-1976 was fixed as the last dale for receipt of the applications. Whereas, the marks card, as already pointed out was supplied only on 6-6-1996 at 9.30 a.m. It is also the ease of the petitioner that the last date fixed as 7-6-1996 is itself highly arbitrary in asmuchas along with the application a candidate is expected to enclose all the documents, including the marks card and the improvement marks card, that in the similar circumstances, the last date for receipt of applications for admission to engineering courses was extended from 3-6-1996 to 10-6-1996, whereas in the case of admission to 1st year’s MBBS Course, 7-6-1996 was fixed as the last date, that the reason for extending the time for admission to Engineering Course and also Medical Course was the same in that the relevant marks cards including the improvement examination marks card were not furnished to the intending applicants seeking admission to the several courses. Therefore, under these circumstances, it is the case of the petitioner that as she has obtained the marks far higher than the several admitted candidates and as she belongs to Backward Community, the admission has been denied to her case, because of the arbitrary act of the State Government in fixing the last date for receipt of the applications.
3. In this connection, it is the contention of the learned Advocate General that it is the prerogative of ihe Slate Government to fix the last date for receipt of applications, as long as the State Government fixed the last date as 7-6-1996 which gave sufficient time to the intending applicants to file the applications well in time, that nothing prevented the petitioner and similarly situate others to personally hand over the applications to the Secretary, Selection Committee, if they did not have sufficient time to send the applications by post, that as the petitioner has chosen to send the application by post, she must take ihe consequences, therefore in a case like this, there is no equity involved, that on the interference with the selection or the last date fixed for receipt of applications is bound to result in paralysing the entire admissions made to the medical colleges, where by the public interest suffers, that if it is held that the last date fixed as 7-6-1996 is not reasonable, the entire admission made will be affected. In addition to this, it is also stated in the counter-affidavit, that in all, there are 223 applications received on 8-6-1996 including that of the petitioner and those applications including that of the petitioner have not been opened, because they were received beyond lime. Apart from that, the applications were received on 9-6-1996 and 10-6-1996 and those applications could not be opened. Under these circumstances, it is stated that public ‘ interest demands that the last date fixed by the State Government for receipt of the applications should not be interfered with. In addition to the above, it is also contended that Engineering Courses and Medical Courses being different and governed by different Departments, it is open to the State Government to fix different dates for receipt of the applications, as such the petitioner cannot claim to fall in the category of engineering students and both the Engineering and Medical Courses being different the application of principle of Art. 14 of the Constitution does not arise, as long as the two courses are different and cannot be placed in one and the same class or category.
4. Learned single Judge has held that the petitioner had made all the attempts, what a reasonable person is expected to do in the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore the fact that the application was received on 8-6-1996, even though it was sent by speed post on 6-6-1996 and the petitioner, having regard to the marks secured, could be placed at 30th rank in the entire selection list, therefore it is necessary to adjust the equity. Learned single Judge has also considered the decision of Full Bench of this Court in Vinothkumar’s case (1995) 1 Mad LW 351 and has held that the post office cannot he considered to be the agent of the addressee, viz., Secretary, Selection Committee. Even then, learned single Judge has taken a view that equity demanded that the petitioner’s application should be considered for admission. The reasons given by the learned single Judge are contained in paragraph 4, which arc as follows:–
“The factual position is that the petitioner did send her application on 6-6-1996 by SPEED POST within a few minutes after receiving the marks sheet. In the ordinary course the cover should have been delivered to the fourth respondent on 7-6-1996, in which case the application would have been in time. Actually, it was received by the fourth respondent only on 8-6-1996 after the prescribed last date. How are we to adjust equities and give reliefs to one or other of the parties? Of-course, the culprit is the fifth respondent, but the only relief that could be granted against the fifth respondent is by way of damages. But what the petitioner seeks, is a seat in the Medical College and from her affidavit, I could easily see that she had been longing for this seat right from 1995-96 and the manner in which she had been sending telegrams and the speed with which she had sent the application from within a few minutes after the receipt of the improvement marks sheet, shows that it will be cruel to deny the petitioner a medical seat when she had done everything that is humanly possible and when she had scored such high marks and her medical average 295.08 whereas the cut-off marks for Backward Class candidates is only 288.91. In fact, I am told that her medical average would entitle her to be selected in the open category and she will be getting about 30th rank in the entire selected list. At the
same time, I cannot blame the fourth respondent for not considering the application because they had received the same only on 8-6-1996, and they have not even opened the cover. The vague allegation against the respondents, acting in a concerted manner to discard meritorious application on some technical ground or orher, is certainly not made out and I do not accept the same. Learned counsel tor the petitioner has relied on a passage in Sachin Gaur v. Punjab University, Pattala, . The observation is as follows (at p 115 of ATR):–
“It is his further positive case that this information was only brought to the notice of the Interview Board but in the very nature of things it was not possible for him to have produced the certificate of his having passed the examination and it was to be obtained from Maharashtra. We would strongly recommend the respondent-Institute to find out ways and means to accommodate this student as it was absolutely beyond his control to have produced the certificate, even though it is a fact that he had passed the qualifying examination and result thereof had also been declared before the last date that had been prescribed for admission in the prospectus cum Information Brochure.”
Learned counsel for respondent 1 to 4 raised a further submission that all the seats had been filled up and it will not be possible to create a seat for admitting the petitioner in the First Year M.B.B.S. Course 1996-97.1 am not willing to accept this contention because I have seen in the past that where the Government had given 69 per cent reservation for Backward Class and Scheduled Caste candidates and when subsequently the judgment of the Supreme Court was pointed out to the effect only 50 per cent reservation could be given, they had without any hesitation increased the number of seats and accommdate all the students. The postal department cannot be held to be the agent of the addressee in view of the Judgment in Vinothkumar’s case, 1995 Writ LR 203.”
5. In the light of the aforesaid contention, the following points arise for consideration:–
(i) Whether it would be open to go into the question as to whether fixation of 7-6-1996 as the last date by the State Government is reasonable?
(ii) If answer to point (i) is in the affirmative, whether the fixation of 7-6-1996 can be considered to be reasonable?
(iii) If answer to point (ii) is in the negative, what relief could be granted to the petitioner/ 1st respondent herein?
Point (i):
6. No doubt, it is the prerogative of the State Government to fix a date as the last date for receipt of applications for admission to Engineering Courses, Medical Courses or for that matter, any courses that are conducted by the State Government. Normally, such fixation of the date is not liable to be interfered with, but, that docs not mean that the State Government can fix any date, without reference to the facts and circumstances of the case and without affording a reasonable time for the intending applicants to make applications. The whole object of fixing a date as the last date for applying to certain courses is to enable eligible candidates to make applications, so that selection can be made, according to the results of the entrance examination and marks obtained in the qualifying examination from among the applicants. Selection is necessary, because the applicants are several times more than the seats available. Therefore, there is stiff competition among the applicants. Along with the applications the applicants are required to furnish the supporting documents such as hall ticket for TNPCEE together with its annexure, qualifying examination marks, first appearance for passing, first appearance for improvement, community certificate in the latest permanent community card, transfer certificate, certificate of permanent residence and certificate of special categories. In addition to this, the following miscellaneous documents also are to be submitted along with the applications, viz., attested passport size photograph affixed to common application, self-addressed and sufficiently stamped acknowledgement card. Therefore, it is necessary for any applicant seeking admission to an Engineering Course or Medical Course to enclose the supporting documents referred to above. In fact, the facing sheet of the application itself all the details of the supporting documents to be enclosed; so also the miscellaneous documents. Thus, the instructions also further state that the application with enclosures received up to the last date and time specified only will be accepted by the Selection Committee Office. Therefore, it is clear that any application even though received well in time, if not accompanied by the enclosures, will not be accepted by the Selection Committee. Instruction No. 7 further states that the Selection Committee cannot be held responsible for rejection of applications for delayed receipt or loss in transit on any ground beyond the specified date and time. Therefore, when under the scheme for admission, an applicant is required to furnish the aforesaid documents, the Slate Government while fixing the date, is expected to know as to whether within the time fixed, the intending applicants would be able to submit the applications along with enclosures. The State Government was fully aware of the fact that the improvement marks were not supplied to those candidates, who sat for the improvement examination in order to secure better eligibility to seek admission to the course and such marks cards were not supplied even on 22-5-1996, therefore the date was altered from 3-6-1996 to 7-6-1996, but, the position did not improve even up to 6-6-1996 and the State Government was kept informed of this fact also by the several telegrams sent by the petitioner. It is also not disputed by the respondents that the improvement marks cards were not supplied before 6-6-1996 to the respective institutions and the State Government had been requested by the petitioner to extend the time, in view of the fact that the improvement marks cards were not supplied. Taking into consideration similar circumstances for admission to Engineering Courses, the time was extended to 10-6-1996. A xerox copy of the Office Note submitted for extending the time and the order passed by the State Government for extending it, have been placed before us. They read thus:–
“It has informed by the Director of Govt. Exams, that + 2 results would be published on 21-5-1996. Therefore, the last date for receipt of completed applications for admission during 1996-97 to B.E., B.Tech. and B.Arch. Degree Programmes was fixed as 3-6-1996. But now it has been announced that the H.Sc. results would be published on 25-5-1996. Further, Mark Sheets will be available with the students only on 28-5-1996.
In view of the above, it is for orders whether the last date for the receipt of completed applications (which was fixed on 3-6-1996) may be extended up to 10-6-1996.
It is also for orders whether a short notification in ihis respect may be published on 30-5-1996 in the Hindu (All India Editions), Indian Express (All India Editions), Trinity Mirror (CE), Daily Thanthi (AE), Dinamni (All India Editions) and Dinakaran (All India Editions) in which dailies the earlier notification inviting applications was published.
Subject to orders on (A) and (B) above a short notification, a draft letter to M/s. Adwave Advertising Manager, Indian Express are put up below for approval please.”
ANNA UNIVERSITY; MADRAS-25
Advertisement No. 1600/EA3/96
B.E., B.TECH. & B.ARCH. DEGREE
PROGRAMMES.
It is notified that the last dale for receipt of completed applications for admission to the B.E., B.Tech. (including Industrial Biotechnology) and B.Arch. degree programmes offered by Anna University is extended up to 5.00 p.m. on 10-6-1996.”
Pursuant to that, the Notification has been issued extending the time up to 10-6-1996 for those who are seeking admission to Engineering Courses. Any executive action of the State, if it affects any person, shall have to be tested on reasonableness and the State while exercising the administrative or executive powers, is required to act reasonably and not arbitrarily. If that be so, in the case of fixation of the last date for receipt of the applications for admission to Medical Course, if it is fixed in such a mariner that it is not possible for eligible candidates to make applications in lime, it can be gone into by this Court on its reasonableness. We may also refer to the decision in Tata Cellular v. Union of India , wherein it has been stated thus at paragraphs 80 and 81:–
“80. At this stage, The Supreme Court Practice, 1993, Vol. I, pp 849-850 may be quoted:
“4. Wednesbury principle — A decision of a public authority will be liable to be quashed or otherwise dealt with by an appropriate order in judicial review proceedings where the court concludes that the decision is such that no authority properly directing itself on the relevant law and acting reasonably could have reached it (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Etd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223), per Lord Greene, M.R.)”.
81. Two other facets of irrationality may be mentioned.
(1) It is open to the court Jo review the decision-maker’s evaluation of the facts. The Court will intervene where the facis taken as a whole could not logically warrant the conclusion of the decision maker. If the weight of facts pointing to one course of action is overwhelming, then a decision the other way, cannot be upheld. Thus, in Emma Hotels Ltd. v. Secretary of State, (1980) 41 P & CR 255, the Secretary of State referred to a number of factors which led him to the conclusion that a non-resident’s bar in a hotel was operated in such a way that the bar was not an incident of the hotel use for planning purposes, but constituted a separate use. The Divisional Court analysed the factors which led the Secretary of State to that conclusion and having done so, set it aside. Donaldson, L.J. said that he could not see on what basis the Secretary of State had reached his conclusion.”
Hence, we have no doubt in holding that the reasonableness of the decision of the nature in question can be considered by this Court in a proceeding under Judicial Review of administrative or executive actions. The State action shall be free from arbitrariness and it must be reasonable and must serve the object and the purpose for which it is exercised. Though the right to higher education is not a fundamental right, but the right to seek admission to higher education in order to acquire the requisite qualification for practicing a profession, requiring certain qualifications, which a citizen is entitled to practise as guranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, becomes a fundamental right, inasmuch as without such qualification, the intended profession cannot be carried on. Of-course, it is subject to reasonable regulation, therefore, the eligibility is prescribed for admission to the course and the last date is fixed for making application in exercise of the regulatory powers of the State. However, such exercise of regulatory power must be reasonable. Therefore, any date fixed as the last date for making application to seek admission to higher education shall have to be reasonable and must afford reasonable time and opportunity enabling the eligible candidates to make applications. As such, it follows that such a decision is open to be tested on the ground of reasonableness. Hence, we are of the view that the last date fixed by the State Government, whether it is reasonable or not, can be gone into by this Court in exercise of the power of Judicial Review in appropriate cases. The case on hand is one such.
7. Point (i) is answered accordingly.
Point (ii)
8. In the light of what is stated above, while discussing point (i) that 7-6-1996 fixed as the last date for making an application seeking admission to first year MBBS Course for those who had appeared for first improvement examination and who are also equally eligible to seek admission, just as those Who passed in the original attempt, as such they are entitled to have a reasonable time i’or making applications along with the necessary enclosures. In the instant case, in similar circumstances, for admission to Engineering Courses, time had been extended to 10-6-1996, whereas in the case of admission to Medical Courses, it has been extended only to 7-6-1996. This difference of 3 days has affected very much. We are not made known as to what prevailed upon the State Government to fix 7-6-1996 as the last date for Medical Courses and for the very same reason, as 10-6-1996 for the Engineering Courses. We are left with no explanation. Therefore, we have no option, but to draw an inference that this act of the State Government was an arbitrary act, without taking into account the relevant facts and circumances for fixing 7-6-1996 as the last date for admission. The relevant facts and circumstances, as already pointed out above, are that the availability of marks cards, which arc necessary to be enclosed along with the application were not furnished to the eligible candidates. Of course, it is contended that it would be open to a candidate to submit an application without annexurc and seek extension of time before the last date fixed for receipt of applications to submit the documents. In support of this, instruction number 8 has been relied upon, which reads thus:–
“Request for extension of time for submission of docuemnts called for after the prescribed date and time at the Selection Office will not be entertained.”
Therefore, it is submitted that it was open to the petitioner to make a request for submission of applications before 7-6-1996. As such, nothing prevented the petitioner to send an application even prior to 6-6-1996.
9. It is not possible to read instruction number 8 in the manner the learned Advocate-General would want us to read, in view of the specific instructions contained in instructions 5 and 6, which have been referred to above by us, while dealing with point (i). The hall ticket for TNPCEE together with annexure, qualifying examination marks, first appearance for passing, first appearance for improvement, community certificate in the latest permanent community card, transfer certificate, certificate of permanent residence and certificate of special categories are all essential documents, without which no application seeking admission on the basis of reservation can be considered. Further, instruction No. 8 is referable to the documents, If any, called for by the Selection Committee in addition to those which are required to be enclosed along with the application. Therefore, we are of the view that the contention raised on instruction number 8 cannot at all be countenanced. Having regard to the facts stated above, we arc of the view that the last date fixed, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, cannot be considered to be reasonable. No doubt, the Full Bench in Vinothkumar’s case (1995) 1 Mad LW 351 has held that post office cannot be considered to be the agent of the addressee, viz., the Secretary, Selection Committee, in a ease where it has been specifically stated that the applications must reach before 5 p.m. of the last date fixed and such applications which are received up to the last date and time specified only, will be accepted by the Selection Committee Office, would make it clear that the post office cannot be considered to be an agent of the addressee. The relevant portion of the judgment is as follows:–
“Thus, in my view also, in the case of admissions to colleges and recruitments, there is no contractual relationship involved and as rightly emphasized by the Division Bench, public interest and interest of such of those applicants who submitted their applications so us to reach the concerned authority within the stipulated time are also involved. The application of the principle of agency would result in undermining the very time schedule fixed for finalising selections for admission and making the very selections subject to the vagaries of the postal services and virtually lead to a nebulous situation where finality at the earliest is desirable in public interest.
That apart, the stipulation in the prospectus enabling the applicants to have their applications delivered either in person or sent by Registered Post is meant to ensure to such applicant proper evidence of safe, delivery within the stipulated time and does not involve any nomination of the postal authorities, as the agents of the authorities concerned with the selection. The stipulation in this regard, to my mind, is more a matter of condition, which also operates as aeondition precedent for the very entertainment and consideration of the application itself. Unless the applicant concerned also ensures the delivery of the application within the stipulated time, to the concerned authority, whatever may be the mode of such delivery which the candidate himself has chosen to adopt or avail out of the alternatives available to him, the applicant forfeits his right to have his application considered by the Competent Authority. Merc persona! hardship to the applicants or general notions of justice or abstract consideration of sympathies alone cannot be an effective substitute to exonerate an applicant from his obligation to ensure the delivery of his application to the concerned Selection Authority within the stipulated time. Equally, the normal expectation of the applicant that his application may reach the Authority in time or the actual lapse in the postal services resulting in the belated delivery of the envelope containing the application cannot be used as lever against the Selection Authorities. Unless an applicant is able to have his application delivered to the Authority concerned within the stipulated time, the Authorities concerned with the selection are not obliged and have no duty in law to entertain the same for consideration or consider the claims of such an applicant along with the claims of others whose applications were delivered well within time for selection for admission. The decisions of the Supreme Court relied upon by the learned Judges of the Division Bench (M. Srinivasan and S.S. Subramani, J.J.) in their order rendered in W.P. No. 14308 of 1994 on 29-11-1994 (A. Arul Latha Gold Rep by Father and Natural Guardian K. Ayyappan v. Government of Tamil Nadu and 3 others) on 29-11-1994 will, in my view, have no relevance or application to the case or situation on hand. The decisions of the Supreme Court were concerned more with the fixation ot the sites of sale and the receipt of sale consideration for purposes of localising the place of earnings, the income and have nothing to do with the construction of a clause stipulating a condition, the non-fulfilment of which has the effect of denying an applicant the benefit of consideration of his application. The receipt of the application within the stipulated time being a condition for the very exercise of power by the competent Selection Authority, even if it so desires, to exercise the power in respect of such an application belatedly received, nor could this Court compel the exercise of power by such Authority notwithstanding the non-fulfilment of the condition precedent for its exercise. The decision of the Orissa High Court (Ananda Prasad v. State) for the same reason does not lay down, with great respect to the learned judges, the correct principle of law and for my part, I am. unable to subscribe to the said view expressed, or the view taken by the leavned judges of the latter Division Bench in W.P. No. 14308 of 1994, unaware of an equally binding earlier decision of another Division Bench of this Court. On a careful consideration of the ratio of the decisions of the two Division Benches of this Court referred to supra, the one rendered in W.A. No 1347 of 1994 is more convincing and preferable to the one rendered in W. P. No. 14308 of 1994, for me. With respect, I would stand by the ratio of the decision in W.A. No. 1347 of 1994.
Further, it is seen that adhereing to the uniform practice adopted all these years, such as belated applications received after the stipulated time, during this year also, were not taken out of their envelopes and the covers, received, as forwarded by the applicants, have, been iciaincd without opening them and analysing the same with reference to the particulars furnished therein. Before the Division Bench which dealt with W.A. 1347/ 94 it has been stated that so far as Medical and Para-Medical Courses for which the Selection Committee in question was common, about 2000 of such covers with application have been received beyond the stipulated time and have been not opened at all. So far as first year M.B.B.S. Course alone is concerned, it is stated by the learned Advocate-General that
about 600 and odd such applications including that of the petitioner has been received beyond the stipulated time and the covers were not at all opened. It is by now well settled by the pronouncemnts of the Supreme Court that in matters of those kind relief cannot be granted to the one who comes to the Court alone and cases similar and alike should also be considered on comparative assessment of merits. If that be the position and if all the total number of such applications have to be considered, it may have an adverse impact on the selections already made and that too in respect of other Medical Courses also. Allowing such exercise to be undertaken at this stage would also be unfair and unjust apart from the legality of the said course of action. Therefore, I am in entire agreement with the decision of Janarthanam, J. that this writ petition should be dismissed.”
“I cannot accept the contention that there are 600 and odd belated applications, and if relief is granted to the petitioner, it should be granted to all the other applicants whose applications reached the Selection Committee Office later than the prescribed time. The cut-off marks were published in the newspapers when the results were announced and every condidatc who aspired for admission to the Medical Courses was fully aware of the same. If any other candidte had secured more than the cut-off marks and his application had been rejected on the ground of belated receipt thereof, he could have and would have approached the Court. The writ petitions, which were considered by our Full Bench, were pending in this Court for nearly five months and the pendency thereof was also widely known. Apart from that, it is not known as to how many of the said 600 applicants had posted the applications before the prescribed date and how many of them had secured the required cut-off marks. That is why, I wanted to give a direction to the respondent to open the 600 envelopes which were stated to have been received after the prescribed date and time and ascertain the facts. Rut. I could not convince my learned brothers to agree to the same and such a direction could not be issued. I am of the opinion that justice cannot fail just because it will cause practical inconvenience. No individual can be denied justice just because there were several other persons who are similarly placed. I am reminded of the saying of the immortal Tamil poet Subramani Bharathi whose patriotism is too well known throughout the country:– (Vernacular matter omitted):– (We will destroy the world if an individual has no food.).
The spirit in which the poet said so must be invoked whenever there is a threat of failure ofjustice.
Just as the Supreme Court has in the Institution of Chartered Accountants of India case gives a direction of the Council of Chartered Accountants that all the nominations received upto the end of August 1991, though it was beyond the date prescribed by the Council earlier, must be treated as received in time subject to certain conditions. T would give a direction in this case to the authorities to consider all the applicalions which were posted atleast two days prior to 15-7-1994 and find out as to how many of them are entitled to get admission on the basis of marks.”
We may point out here that the delay has occurred due to the lapse on the part of the Postal Department and this fact was accepted by the learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing for the Central Government and also it was submitted by him that necessary action has been taken against the concerned official. However, in this case, we are concerned with the question as to whether the act of the Slate Government fixing 7/6/1996 as the last date is reasonable and not–the question decided by the Full Bench referred to above. The petitioner has become the victim of such an unreasonable act. Hence, we hold that 7/6/1996 fixed as the last date for receipt of applications, in the facts and circumstances of the case, cannot be considered to be reasonable. Point No. (ii) is answered in the negative.
Point (iii) :
10. The application was not opened by the Selection Committee, nor was it opened by the learned single Judge. However, learned single Judge has acted on the averments made in the petition. During the course of hearing of this appeal, we directed that the sealed cover should be opened and on such opening, we also directed the learned Government Pleader to ascertain as to whether the marks obtained by the petitioner in the qualifying examination and also in the entrance examination would entitle her to admission on the basis that she belongs to backward class, which aspect is not disputed. Accordingly, on obtaining information from the Secretary, Selection Committee, it was submitted before us that the petitioner would have secured 30th rank. Learned Special Government Pleader for Education submitted that on the basis of marks obtained, she would be entitled to admission, as she has secured more marks than those who have been admitted in the backward class calegory. As far as the other applications received on 8-6-1996, we must point out that as none of them has complained about it, they cannot be permitted to make any such grievance and seek relief under Art. 226 of the Constitution hereafter, because the selection was made long back, i.e. on 15-6-1996 and the admissions have been finalised. Therefore, any candidate seeking relief hereafter for admission to the course in question will be guilty of laches. We make it clear that the decision which we have rendered, is confined to the facts and circumstances of the present case and is intended for future guidance of the State Government and shall not be construed as a precedent, much less to the other application received on 8-6-1996, as we are not aware of the facts and circumstances, under which these applications wefe received and it will upset the entire admission made and as such will affect public interest. Hence we confine the decision and the direction to the instant case only. Accordingly, we hold that the petitioner/1st respondent is entitled to admission to the first year MBBS course 1996-97. We also made it clear that our judgment does not disturb the admissions made so far to the first year MBBS course for the academic year 1996-97.
11. For the reasons stated above and not for the reasons stated by the learned single Judge, we dismiss the appeal and also the C.M.P. However, time granted for compliance by the learned single Judge is extended by one week from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. No order as to costs.
12. Order accordingly.