JUDGMENT
P.R. Gokulakrishnan, C.J.
1. This special civil application is to quash the S. 4 Notification dt. 12th Oct., 1977 and S. 6 Notification dt. 18th Sept., 1980 on the ground that they are illegal, erroneous, mala fide, vitiated by non-compliance with the due procedure and provisions of the Ss. 8 and 9 of the Land Acquisition Act, In the alternative it is prayed for giving a direction to the respondent authorities to pay the petitioner compensation for the land actually used i.e. 1 1/2 acres and 7620 square metres on the basis of the current market price and compensate the petitioner for the losses that he has suffered with interest on the said amount of compensation at the current market rate, at the rate of 18 per cent per annum.
2. Notice before admission was issued to the respondents and the respondents 1 and 3 are represented by Mr. D. H. Karia, learned counsel for the State and Respondent 2 is represented by the learned counsel Mr. A. H. Mehta. The Respondents have also filed reply affidavits and contested the admission.
3. The short facts of the case for the purpose of deciding this admission are that the Government for the benefit of Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation acquired lands at Vapi in order to create the industrial township and industrial area. For this purpose large chunk of lands measuring several acres belonging to the family of the petitioner and others were acquired. Subsequently further acquisition notification was issued in respect of several survey numbers belonging to the petitioner. The present dispute in this special civil application pertains to survey No. 552/ Part admeasuring 3 hectors, 67 acres and 25 square metres in the village Vapi, Taluka Pardi at Valsad District. In respect of these lands earlier S. 4 notification was issued on 13th Mar., 1968 followed by S. 6 notification on 11th Mar., 1972. The petitioner represented to the authorities concerned the advisability of dropping the acquisition of 34 this survey number stating that the family of the petitioner was co-operating in the land acquisition effected by the Government for establishing the industrial township at Vapi Industrial Area. Appreciating the request of the petitioner, it is stated by the petitioner that the Government denotified the lands of survey number 552 of the petitioner and excluded the same from the acquisition. It is also stated by the petitioner that except for the portion wherein a road has been built in survey number 552, the rest of the survey number was denotified. The petitioner, on the strength of the denotification and the promise made by the authorities concerned has invested more than Rs. one lakh in developing a dairy farm in the said land and thus changed his position detriment to his interest. While things stood ‘thus, the Government issued another S. 4 notification on 12th Oct., 1977 for acquisition of the land in survey number 552 which was denotified as early as 30th Mar., 1972. Subsequently S. 6 notification was issued oil 18th Sept., 1980 in spite of the objections raised by the petitioner herein. The petitioner made several representations for denotifying this survey number from the acquisition and having filed in such representation the petitioner has come forward with the present special civil application alleging various irregularities including that of promissory estoppel, mala fide intention and other infirmities.
4. The respondents have categorically denied all the allegations raised by the petitioner and has also specifically stated that originally S. 4 notification was dropped owing to the fact that notification was tinder S. 6 could not be issued within the prescribed time. Subsequently finding that this land in questions necessary for the industrial area, the notification under S. 4 was issued.
5. Mr. Oza, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner made the following submissions :
1. That the land in question is not needed in foreseeable future. Hence an acquisition having in mind the use of land at a distant future cannot be sustained.
2. The statutory power vested with the authorities under Land Acquisition Act has to be used within a reasonable period and inasmuch as in this case there is an inordinate delay in every phase, the acquisition has to be quashed.
3. On the promise and on the strength the land in question was denotified originally from acquisition and the petitioner acting upon such a promise has made improvements on the disputed lands to the tune of a lakh of rupees and as such the Government is estopped acquiring the land in dispute on the principles of promissory estoppel.
4. The acquisition as such is by the Government and the Government alone can decide as to whether a particular land has to be acquired or not and not the acquiring body, i.e. the Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation. In as much as the Government was inclined to drop the acquisition proceedings by writing a letter to GIDC, the Government should not have acted upon the recommendation of GIDC for proceeding with the acquisition.
5.The Government has acted arbitrarily in not releasing the land from the acquisition and hence the acquisition has to be quashed on the ground of arbitrary exercise of power.
6. The powers exercised is with mala fide intention and further it has not followed the Government circulars in acquiring such, lands and that the Government has acted in a discriminatory fashion by releasing certain lands from acquisition at the instance of political influence and proceeded with the acquisition of the land in question.
7. Procedure provided in S. 8 of the Land Acquisition Act has not been followed and as such the acquisition proceedings has to be quashed.
8. There is a failure of service of S. 9 notice on the petitioner and as such the land acquisition proceedings has to be quashed.
9. Inasmuch as the earlier land acquired is not utilised for the purpose for which it is acquired, the present proceedings have to be quashed.
10. There is a violation of the fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 14 of the Constitution owing to the fact that the guidelines fixed for acquisition of the lands’ have not been followed.
6. As regards the first contention that the lands cannot be acquired if the need for such land is not within the foreseeable future but the possibility of using such land is only at a distant future, Mr. Oza, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner cited the decision in the case of Patel Shankerbhai Mahijibhai v. State of Gujarat reported in (1980) 21 (2) Guj LR 239 : (AIR 1981 Guj 67). In that, decision a Bench of this High Court dealing with the Land Acquisition proceedings for the purpose of Gujarat Housing Board quashed the S. 4 notification on the ground that the need is illusory and that such illusory need at a distant future cannot be sustained. The Bench observed: (at p. 74 of AIR)
“The expression ‘is needed’ has reference to the existing need. The expression ‘is likely to be needed’ has reference to the future need. It cannot be Gain said that a future need has reference to a foreseeable future. If land is not needed for a public purpose in a foreseeable future but is likely to be needed at a very distant or remote point of time for an anticipated need which may or may not come into existence, then, unless the need can be, foreseen in a foreseeable future, no resort can be had to S. 4.”
Pressing this decision into service Mr. Oza said that the land is not needed either in the near future or in a foreseeable future.
7. We find from the affidavit-in-reply filed by Mr. Kanubhai Manilal Shah, Incharge Officer on Special Duty No.2, Land Acquisition, that “the rate at which the industrial tempo of Gujarat increases, it, may be that the land of the petitioner may be situated some day in the middle for the future acquisition for expansion of industrial estate for GIDC”. He further states that with the passage of time, the need of the GIDC for setting up and/or expanding industrial estate increased and the industrial tempo in the State of Gujarat also increased with the result that there was considerable need for industrial estate to be set up by GIDC and/or expanding the same. He further states that in those circumstances the second notification dt. 11 th Oct., 1977 under S. 4 of the Act was issued by the State Government which was published in the State Government Gazettee dt, 29th Dec., 1977. Objections were invited from the persons interested in land which were sought to be acquired. The petitioner was served with notice to file his objections in the enquiry to be held under S. 5A of the Act. The acquisition was for large tracks of area and not for the petitioner’s land alone. The State Government after considering all the objections including the objections filed by the petitioner issued S. 6 notification on 18th Sept., 1980. This officer has also averred in the affidavit-in-reply that there is an enormous development of Industry in the State of Gujarat and that the need to acquire more lands for the industrial development of Gujarat is essential.
8. Mr.H.S.Vora, who is an Incharge Officer on Special Duty No. 2, Land Acquisition, in his Affidavit-in-sur-rejoinder has specifically stated that very large area comprising of 41 survey numbers were acquired for setting up GIDC Industrial Estate. This is an extension of an already existing industrial estate, viz., Vapi Industrial Estate, which is one of the largest industrial estates in whole of Asia. Obviously, setting up an industrial estate is a matter of detailed planning. According to him, for this purpose various industrial zones had to be planned, their needs had to be envisaged, infra structures such as roads, sewerage facilities, water supply etc. have to be provided for. Further, applications have to be invited from various entrepreneurs to set up industries. Plots are disposed of as and when such applications are received. Obviously no application will be received unless there is an industrial estate in existence. This deponent further states that it is, therefore, wrong to say that the land was not needed or was not likely to be needed in the near future for the public purpose for which the land is acquired. There is a further averment to the effect that the entire procedure referred which costs crores of rupees in developing an industrial estate cannot be finished in a short time. The industrial estate is a planning which has necessarily to take into consideration not only the present need, but also the future requirement for industrial development. Such industrial development creates employment in the State of Gujarat, produces consumer goods that keep the prices stable and in some cases the goods which are produced are import substitutes which save huge foreign exchange to the nation.
9. No doubt, the petitioner has, in his affidavit-in-sur-rejoinder averred that large chunk of land acquired earlier are unutilised with the result grass is being grown in those lands and the GIDC is selling the same. In the inter-departmental communication, the Deputy Administrator (Land), Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation received a letter from the Revenue Department seeking clarification as to the advisability of deleting the land in question from the acquisition. In reply to this communication which is at annexure ‘G’ to the special civil application, the GIDC has replied that the land in question was originally got excluded from the requisition due to lack of time for issuing S. 6 notification, that this land is essential and necessary for the use of the Corporation and that as such it cannot be exempted from the land acquisition proceedings. This letter of the GIDC is at Annexur effort to the special civil application. Subsequently we find the letter dated 9th September, 1986 from the Revenue Department, Sachivalaya, Gandhinagar stating that the land in question is situated in the middle of the GIDC estate and it is not possible to release the land from acquisition since it is absolutely necessary to acquire. The letter further states that the land in question does not appear to have been acquired with mala fide intention.
10. Considering the above said particulars. in the light of the judgment referred by Mr. Oza, we are of the view that the land in question is needed for the development activities in the industrial field for the State of Gujarat and it cannot be said that such acquisition for developing the industry which is said to be one of the largest industrial estates in the whole of Asia, is done with a mala fide intention for development in an unknown future which may or may not fructify. In (1980) 21 (12) Guj LR 239 : (AIR 1981 Guj 67) a Bench of this High Court has clearly stated “If land is not needed for a public purpose in a foreseeable future but is likely to be needed at a very distant or remote point of time for an anticipated need which may or may not come into existence, then, unless the need can be foreseen in a foreseeable future, no resort can be had to S. 4. ”
11. Foresability and its reasonableness depend on vision and the foresight of the planner and the project. The project like Narmada Project or establishment of new capital or an industrial township has to take care of the future needs not only of decades but even of the next century. If it is not done at the right time, later the lands would have been already put to such other usages which would make it impossible to implement the project. Therefore, it cannot be said that in every land acquisition the question of likelihood of the need has to be in the immediate future, that has to be examined having regard to the details and facts of each case and the public purpose.
12. In the report under S. 5A of the Land Acquisition Act it has been specifically stated that construction of certain stables as alleged by the petitioner in the disputed land and also having certain portion of the land for the purpose of cattle grazing cannot be accepted as an important public purpose when compared to the acquisition for the purpose of developing the industrial estate. As regards the contention that more than 125 hectares of the land of the petitioner have already been acquired and the present land can be denotified, the report in the SA enquiry clearly states as follows :
“It is true that the land of the petitioner has been acquired previously, but the land under acquisition is needed for suitable planning of the entire land in the estate.”
From the facts revealed above the necessity: is genuine, the development is certain and the time taken cannot be, considered as inordinate especially when such development projects for industrial development are resorted to, by acquiring vast area of lands.
13. As correctly contended by Mr. A. H., Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the GIDC, it is for the Government to decide the bona fides of need and necessity for acquiring! the lands. Unless the action taken by the Government was a fraudulent one, the decision taken by the Government for acquiring the lands is a conclusive one. This view is supported by the decision in the case of Ratilal v. State of Gujarat reported in AIR 1970 SC 984. In that decision the Supreme Court observed :
“7. We are unable to accede to the contention of the appellant that a housing scheme for a limited number of persons cannot be considered as a public purpose. It was said that there were hardly about 20 members in the co-operative society in question and therefore the housing scheme for their benefit cannot be considered as a public purpose. It was also urged that there was no need for acquiring any land for the scheme in question. Section 6(3) of the Land Acquisition Act provides that a declaration under S. 6 shall be conclusive evidence that the land proposed to be acquired is needed for a public purpose. Therefore this Court cannot go into the question whether the need was genuine or not unless we are satisfied that the action taken by the Government was a fraudulent one. We are also unable to concede to the proposition that the need of a section of the public cannot be considered as a public purpose. Ordinarily, the Government is the best authority to determine whether the purpose in question is a public purpose or not and further the declaration made by it under S. 6 is a conclusive evidence of the f act that the land in question is needed for a public purpose –See Smt. Somavanti v. State of Punjab, (1963) 2 SCR 774: AIR 1963 SC 151. That decision lays down that conclusiveness in S. 6(3) must necessarily attach not merely to a ‘need’ but also to the question whether the purpose was a public purpose.
14. In yet another decision in the case of Jage Ram v. State of Haryana reported in AIR 1971 SC 1033, the Supreme Court observed :
“8. There is no denying the fact that starting of a new industry is in public interest. It is’ stated in the affidavit filed on behalf of the, State Government that the new State of Haryana was lacking in industries and consequently it had become difficult to tackle the problem of unemployment. There is also no denying the fact that the industrialisation of an area is in public interest. That apart, the question whether the starting of an industry is in public interest or not is essentially a question that has to be decided by the Government. That is a socio-economic question. This Court is not in a position to go into that question. So long as it is not established that the acquisition is sought to be made for some collateral purpose, the declaration of the Government that it is made f or a public purpose is not open to challenge. Section 6(3) says that the declaration of the Government that the acquisition made is for public purpose shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose. Unless it is shown that there was a colourable exercise of power, it is not open to this Court to go behind that declaration and find’ out whether in a particular case the purpose for which the land was needed was a public purpose or not.”
15. Considering the facts which we have discussed above we do not find any fraudulent intention on the part of the Government to acquire the land, but on the other hand, large area is being acquired for establishing one of the Asia’s biggest industrial estates. The need and necessity for acquiring this land was taken: into consideration by the Government and S. 6 declaration has also been made in this, case after 5A enquiry. On the facts and circumstances of the present case the bona fides of the Government in acquiring those lands cannot be questioned.
16. For the second contention to the effect that there is a considerable delay in performing the statutory duties, Mr. Oza submitted that S. 4(l) notification was issued as early as 12-10-1977 and the S. 6 notification was given only on 18-9-1980. The award in this case was given in 1986. In support of his contentions Mr. Oza, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner cited number of decisions.
17. In the case of Satish Kapur v. State, reported in AIR 1982 Punj and Har 276, a single Judge of that High Court observed: (at p. 280)
“The statutory power conferred on the State by the Act, viz. the power to acquire the land compulsorily should be exercised reasonably and fairly which necessarily means that the award must be passed with reasonable expedition. As has already been pointed out in the cases in hand there is absolutely no explanation on behalf of the respondent authorities for the delay that has taken place in the completion of the acquisition proceedings or the passing of the award. In the absence of any such justifiable reason for the delay that has taken place, the action of the respondent authorities is undoubtedly rendered unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of power. The impugned notifications could not be issued for the purpose of pegging down or freezing the price as the case is found to be and then wait for a convenient and opportune time to pass an award – such a fine of thinking and course of conduct is alien to the scheme and intendment of the Land Acquisition Act.”
I8. In yet another decision rendered by the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Radhey Sham v. State of Haryana reported in AIR 1982 Punj and liar 519 held that unexplained inordinate delay in the finalisation of the acquisition proceedings under the Act may well taint it with the vice of colourable exercise of power and this will vitiate the acquisition proceedings. In this Full Bench decision, the Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court rejected the contention to the effect that in finding out the delay in issuing S. 9 notice and subsequently, the award, the statutory period given for issuing S. 6 ‘declaration subsequent to S. 4 notification should also be taken into account. In this respect, the Full Bench observed: (at p. 530)
“The Court has therefore to take into consideration, the whole spectrum for the initiation of the proceedings till the time of the challenge raised thereto by the petitioners in which delay may well be the most important, if not, the conclusive factor. Herein, the statutory period of three years provided for the exercise of the power of declaration under S. 6, does not provide any blanket protection to the respondent State to rest on its oars. Though it must now be held that on the ground of delay alone, challenge to the notification under S. 6 cannot be raised, if it comes within the three years’ period prescribed by the statute, it does not follow therefrom that this is to be entirely excluded from the over all delay that may follow the finalisation of the proceedings after S. 6 notification as well. If, even after the notification under S. 6 the State procrastinates over a number of years then the whole period from the corner-stone of the notification under S. 4(l) has to be viewed in a larger perspective. The intervals between Ss. 4 and 6 notifications are, therefore, not irrelevant as a factor for examining the bona fides of the acquisition proceedings. To use a homely phrase, this period can certainly be tagged to other inordinate delays after the issuance of notification under s. 6 to examine the matter, in, a total perspective. It. deserves recalling that unexplained delay operates, only to the hardship and prejudice of the citizen alone and not to the State which has the power at any time to withdraw from the acquisition either by virtue of S. 48, (and as authoritatively held in Ambalala Purshottam’s case supra) or the broader provisions of the General Clauses Act.”
In this case, the Full Bench has further held that any purported acquisition for a vague public purpose which may or may not arise in the future on the pegged down market value is thus assailable as a colourable exercise of power and an abuse by the State to compulsorily take the property of the citizen at a pittance for illusory futuristic needs. The Full Bench has further held that there exists no explanation at all for long delays to finalise the proceedings and concretise the alleged public purpose the inference inevitably arises that no immediate public purpose existed or was in sight which could be put in practical shape. Once that is so, it may well follow that the exercise of power was a colourable attempt to freeze prices forthwith for an acquisition years later when they well be double or triple of the existing ones. In yet another place, the Full Bench has also observed that a total unexplained in action and procrastination in this context would lead to an inflexible presumption that in fact there was no immediate need for an existing public purpose and the exercise of the power of acquisition would thus be a colourable one. Thus, in the above said decision, the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court has definitely stated that if there exists no explanation at all for long delays to finalise the proceedings and concretise the alleged public purpose the inference inevitably arises that no immediate public purpose existed or was in sight which could be put in practical shape and as such the inevitable conclusion is that the power exercised by the authorities concerned is the colourable exercise of power to freeze the prices. No doubt, the Full Bench has stated that the statutory period for S. 6 declaration should also be taken into consideration since the whole spectrum for the initiation of the proceedings till the time of the challenge raised thereto by the petitioner in which the-delay may well be the most important if not the conclusive factor. In yet another place, the Full Bench has quoted the observation of the Supreme Court, AIR 1980 SC 64 to the effect that the very prescription of time to make S. 6 declaration inheres a belief that the nature and quantum of power and the manner in which it is to be exercised would consume at least that much time which the statute prescribes as reasonable and, therefore, exercise of power within the time could not be negatived on the only ground of unreasonable delay. Taking this observation along with other observations of the Full Bench, it is clear that an explained delay occurred in the land acquisition can be Countenanced and if there is reasonable explanation for such delay, the land acquisition proceedings cannot be quashed as colourable exercise of power by the authorities concerned.
19. In the case of State of Gujarat v. Raghav Natha reported in (1969) 10 Guj LR 992: (AIR 1969 SC 1297), the Supreme Court dealing with the Bombay Land Revenue Code observed: (at p. 1301 of AIR)
“It is true that there is no period of limitation prescribed under N. 211, but it seems to us plain that this power must be exercised in reasonable time and the 1ength of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised.”
In the case of Bhagwanji Bawanji Patel v. State of Gujarat, reported in (1971) 12 Guj LR 156 : (AIR 1971 Guj 64) the principle as regards the limitation stressed in (1969) 10 Guj LR 992 : (AIR 1969 SC 1297) was approved.
In the case of Patel Shankerbhai Mahijibhai v. State of Gujarat, reported in (1980),21 (2) Guj LR239: (AIR 1981 Guj 67) the Supreme Court has accepted the principle that the statutory power must be exercised within a reasonable period of time. What is reasonable period of time in a given case, according to Supreme Court, it depends upon the facts of the case. The Supreme Court further states that it is a highly flexible concept and its application varies from case to case depending upon the facts of each case.
In the case of K. T. Dharanendrah v. R. T.Authority reported in AIR 1987 SC 1324, the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the approval of the scheme published under S. 68(c) of the Motor Vehicles Act. In that case there was inordinate delay in finalising the scheme and in the absence of satisfactory explanation for the delay, the scheme was quashed and remanded back to the authority concerned.
20. Pressing into service the above said decisions, Mr. Oza, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner further states that the award was given only in the year 1986. Thus, according to the learned counsel there is an inordinate delay at every step and as such the whole notifications under Ss. 4 and 6 have to he quashed.
21. Factually the petitioner has alleged that there is inordinate delay between the publication of S. 4 notification and S. 6 notification. It has been alleged by the petitioner that there is much delay in declaring the award. Such, delay, according to the petitioner, clearly spells out that the sole purpose of issuing two impugned notifications is only to peg down the prices to the date of notification under S. 4 of the Act. The petitioner in his affidavit in rejoinder also averred that at the time of issuing Ss. 4 and 6 notifications there was no need for the GIDC to acquire these lands and the very fact that the award was passed on 13-9-1986 shows that there is inordinate delay in exercising the statutory functions by the authorities concerned.
22. As provided by the Act, S. 6 notification has been issued within the period prescribed. For merely the Act as it stood prior to the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Valuation) Ordinance 1907 followed by the Act did not provide any time limit for publication of notification under S. 6 of the Act. In such circumstances, this Court and the Supreme Court-had struck down the acquisition proceedings where there was unreasonable and unexplained delay in issuing the notification under S. 6 of the Act.
In the case of G.S.T. Corpn. v. Valji Mulji reported in AIR 1980 SC 64 the Supreme Court observed :
” 16. The question then is: When a statute confers power and prescribes time within which it can be exercised, could it ever be said that even though the power is exercised within the statutory period yet the Court can examine the question of delay and record a finding that there was an unreasonable delay in exercise of the power, and therefore, the exercise of power is bad? This approach would defeat the very purpose for prescribing a sort of a period of limitation on exercise of power. When a period is prescribed for exercise of power it manifests the legislative intention that the authority exercising the power within the prescribed time could not the least be accused of inaction or dithering and, therefore, such exercise of power could not be said to be bad or invalid on the only ground that there was unreasonable delay in the exercise of the power. The very prescription of time inheres a belief that the nature and quantum of power and the manner in which it is to be exercised would consume at- least that much time which the statute prescribes as reasonable and, therefore, exercise of power within that time could not be negatived on the only ground of unreasonable delay. Therefore in this case it is difficult to agree with the High Court that there was an unreasonable delay in exercise of power and hence the exercise was either bad or invalid.”
In the present case S. 6 notification has been issued within a period of 3 years as envisaged by the amended Act and there is no point in submitting that there is a delay in spite of the fact that S. 6 notification was issued within the period of 3 years as stipulated by the statute. In the same way by the Amendment Act No. 68 of 1984 S. 11A was introduced There is a time limit fixed for the purpose of giving the award. In this case the said time limit has not been transgressed in any way As regards the compensation the amendment to the Land Acquisition Act has taken care of such situations and has made provisions for payment of solatium, interest and other necessary compensations for the aggrieved parties. Without repeating the utility for which such acquisition has been made in the interest of the State and the Nation, we do not find there is such an inordinate delay which remains unexplained in order to quash the notifications 4 and 6. Even if some explanation was required for the period between S. 6 notification and the amendment Act of 1984 it is amply present in this case that the petitioner himself has stated in para 19 of the petition that he was making representations to the authorities and was hoping that his land would be released. The representations of the petitioner and the entire correspondences between the Government and the acquiring body on the representations of the petitioner clearly show that it is because of the representations of the petitioner and its due consideration by the authorities that making of the award is delayed. The delay, if at all, has taken place because of the representations of the petitioner for getting his land released and such representations were duly considered as is revealed from the correspondences of this case. Therefore it is not correct to say that there is any delay on the. part of the Government and there is sufficient and reasonable explanation for the time tag between S. 6 notification and the award. Therefore this contention of delay in acquisition for giving award fails both on facts as well as in law because in fact there is no delay and in law the award is passed within the time allowed by S. 11A of the Act. In fact, the petitioner himself is responsible for this delay and he is estopped from raising this contention.
23. Mr. Oza, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner then contended that on the principles of promissory estoppel, the Government must denotify the acquisition of the land in dispute.
24. The respondents have denied the allegation of promise or there is no evidence of such promise. Even in the objections u/s. 5A such contention is not raised. For the first time it is raised in the petition in 1986 (S. 4 notification is of 1987). For the principles of the promissory estoppel the learned counsel has submitted the decision in the case of M. P. Sugar Mills v. State of U.P., reported in AIR 1979 SC 621. It has been clearly held in that Supreme Court decision that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is an euqitable doctrine and it must yield when the equity so required. The Supreme Court further held: (at p. 644)
“If it can be shown by the Government that having regard to the facts as they have subsequently transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government to the promise made by it, the Court would not raise an equity in favour of the promisee and enforce the promise against the Government. The doctrine of promissory estoppel would be displaced in such a case because, on the facts, equity would not require that the Government should be held bound by the promise made by it. When the Government is able to show that in view of the facts which have transpired since the making of the promise, public interest would be prejudiced if the Government were required to carry out the promise, the Court would have to balance the public interest in the Government carrying out a promise made to a citizen which has induced the citizen to act upon it and alter his position and the public interest likely to suffer if the promise were required to be carried out by the Government and determine which way the equity lies. It would not be enough for the Government just to say that public interest requires that the Government should not be compelled to carry out the promise or that the public interest would suffer if the Government were required to honour it. The Government cannot claim to be exempt from the liability to carry out the promise on some indefinite and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency, nor can the Government claim to be the sole Judge of its liability and repudiate it on an ex parte appraisement of the circumstances. If the Government wants to resist the liability, it will have to disclose to the Court what are the subsequent events on account of which the Government claims to be exempt from the liability and it would be for the Court to decide whether those events are such as to render it inequitable to enforce the liability against the Government. Mere claim of change of policy would not be sufficient to exonerate the Government from the liability: the Government would have to show what precisely is the changed policy and also its reason and justification so that the Court can Judge for itself which way the public interest lies and what the equity of the case demand& It is only if the Court is satisfied, on proper and adequate material placed by the Government, that overriding public interest requires that the Government should not be held bound by the promise but should be free to act unfettered by it, that the Court would refuse to enforce the promise against the Government. The Court would not act on the mere ipse dixit of the Government, for it is the Court which has to decide and not the Government whether the Government should be held exempt from liability. This is the essence of the rule of law.”
The Supreme Court further held :
“It was clear from the letter of the respondent dt. 23rd Jan., 1969 that a categorical representation was made by the respondent on behalf of the Government that the proposed vanaspati factory of the appellant would be entitled to exemption from sales tax in respect of sales of vanaspati effected in Uttar Pradesh for a period of three years from the date of commencement of production. The letter dt. 23rd Jan., 1969 clearly showed that the respondent made this representation in his capacity as the Chief Secretary of the Government, and it was, therefore, a representation on behalf of the Government. The appellant relying on this representation of the Government, borrowed moneys from various financial institutions, purchased plant and machinery from M/s. De Smith (India) Pvt. Ltd., Bombay and set up a vanaspati factory at Kanpur. The facts necessary for invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel were, therefore, clearly present and the Government was bound to carry out the representation and exempt the appellant from sales tax in respect of sales of vanaspati effected by it in Uttar pradesh for a period of three years from the date of commencement of the production. The Government was bound on the principle of promissory estoppel to make good the representation made by it.”
In yet another decision in the case of Union of India v. God frey Philips India Ltd., reported in AIR 1986 SC 806 the Supreme Court observed :
“The, doctrine of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so requires, if it can be shown by the Government or public authority that having regard to the facts as they have transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government or public authority to the promise or representation made by it, the Court would not raise an equity in favour of the person to whom the promise or representation is made and enforce the promise or representation against the Government or public authority. The doctrine of promissory estoppel would be displaced in such a case, because on the facts, equity would not require that the Government or public authority should be held bound by the promise or representation made by it.”
From the above said decisions it is clear if the public interest suffers the equitable doctrine cannot he invoked. On the other hand, in the ordinary course if a citizen is induced to act upon the promise of the Government and he alters his position, on the principles of promissory estoppel, the citizen has to be protected.
25. Applying the above said principles we have to first find out as to whether there was any promise on which the petitioner ere in acted and altered his position. If so whether such an equitable doctrine can be applied in favour of the petitioner herein or not.
26. The petitioner states that the original S. 4 notification has been dropped in order to facilitate the petitioner to have his stables and grazing ground. It is on that basis the petitioner happens to alter his position and incur expenditure to the tune of several lakhs of rupees. After allowing the petitioner to have the possession of the land wherein he has invested a huge amount, the subsequent S. 4 notification and declaration under S. 6 should be quashed on the principles of promissory estoppel. The petitioner also states that he did allow the use of a portion of survey number 552 by the Respondent 2 in building a road which can be considered as a consideration being paid to the Respondent 2 in obtaining the aforesaid promise and therefore the promissory estoppel can squarely be applied to the case of the petitioner and the Respondent 2 is totally Estoppel from going back upon its promise.
27. The petitioner further states that after issuance of the earlier S. 4 notification in the year 1968 there was a negotiation with the second respondent and on an understanding being arrived at the land of the petitioner of Survey number 552 was denotified This, according to the petitioner, is none less than a promise and relying on that promise the petitioner acted to his detriment and invested a sum of more than one lakh in developing the dairy farm and has thus changed his position. Hence, according to the petitioner, the Respondent 2 cannot be allowed to go back upon his promise and cannot be now allowed to acquire the said land. The petitioner further states that when especially the pocket land in survey number 589 is released, the survey number 552 also should have been released on the equitable principles of promissory estoppel.
28. However, from the facts of this case its clear that the original acquisition proceedings was dropped for technical reasons. At that time the land acquisition officer could not issue notification within the time limit and therefore it is stated that S. 41 notification was cancelled. Thereafter again the Corporation initiated the proposal for acquiring this land arid hence fresh S. 4 notification was issued in 1977. In the affidavit in reply filed by Mr. S. D. Desai, who was Regional Manager (Land), Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation, it has been specifically stated that no representations were made for and on behalf of GIDC that survey number 552 will not be acquired if the petitioner co-operated by giving part of land for road out of survey number 552. There is a challenge to the effect that there is absolutely no evidence to support that there was any such representation made by GIDC. Further, in the affidavit in reply filed by Mr. Kanubhai Manilal Shah, Incharge Officer on Special Duty No. 2, Land Acquisition, it has been stated that the State Government never made any promise to the effect that the disputed land of the petitioner will not be acquired in future. In the absence of such representation much less any averment to the effect that the petitioner has acted upon the so called representation in a manner which has prejudicially affected him, the plea of estoppel or promissory estoppel has no application to the facts of the present case. Thus both from GIDC and Government, there is a specific denial with regard to any representation made or promise given to the effect that the disputed land will not be acquired in future. In the absence of any such representation it will not in any way militate the power of the Government to issue4(1) notification for the purpose of acquiring the lands for the Industrial Development Corporation.
29. Mr. N. R. Oza, learned counsel for the petitioner further pointed out that in S. 5A enquiry the petitioner has filed objections stating that he has built a stable for dairy farm in survey number 552 and as such the said land is required for grazing purposes. The learned counsel also points out the cattle shed in the plan and. we are able to see that it is only in a very small portion in the whole survey number 552 which. is sought to be acquired. In the objections filed, the petitioner has nowhere stated that on the promise given to him by the respondents he has invested large amounts in building up stables in survey number 552 hoping that it will not be acquired. If there were to be any promises, the petitioner would have come out with such allegation in the objections he has filed for S. 5A enquiry. Thus, in the absence of such objections, it is too much for us to believe that there was a promise either by the Government or by the GIDC to the effect that survey number 552 will not be acquired.
30. Thus, from the foregoing facts it is clear that there is absolutely no promise either by the GIDC or by the Government for the petitioner to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel to quash Ss. 4 and 6 notifications in this case.
31. Mr. Oza, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner next contended that the Government has not applied its mind and it has delegated its power to the GIDC which ultimately decided the necessity of acquiring the said land. The petitioner has specifically alleged, the question of acquiring the survey number 552 was left to the decision of the Respondent 2 (GIDC). This action, according to the petitioner, of the Respondent 3 is unjust, improper, illegal and unsustainable at law as the authority viz. the State cannot abdicated the power to the Respondent 2. It is further stated by the petitioner that Respondent 3 was fully convinced to denotify the survey number 552 and as such it ought to have acted by itself without in’ any way being influenced by the opinion of the Respondent 2. In this connection Mr. Oza points out the letter dt. 30-4-1986 written by the Government to the GIDC wherein the Government has asked for clarification as to the advisability of exempting the survey number 552 from the land acquisition. Mr. Ova, learned counsel also pointed out the decision taken by the Government as early as 6-10-1981 not to take possession of any land except pocket land still the question is examined by the Deputy Secretary. The GIDC by its letter dt. 13-6-1986 has stated that matter of exempting the survey n umber-552 from the land acquisition was examined and that since the land in survey number 552 of Vapi is in the centre of Vapi Industrial Township of the Corporation, the same cannot be exempted. In this letter the GIDC has also given specific reason as to why the land in survey number 552 is necessary for acquiring the same. Subsequent to this letter we find a letter dt. 24-6-1986 from the Government to the GIDC calling for its explanation regarding the difficulties it experiences on denotifying the acquisition of survey number 552. The Government, after considering various aspects in detail and also taking into consideration the request of the, petitioner to exempt the survey number 552 from the land acquisition proceedings wrote a letter dated 4-9-1986 stating that the land in question is situated in the middle of the G IDC estate and as such it is not possible to release the land from acquisition since it is absolutely necessary to acquire. The Government has further stated that the land in question does not appear to have been acquired with mala fide intention. No doubt, this letter dt. 4-9-1986 is subsequent to the filing of the writ petition on 3-9-1986. We do not think that there is any merit in this contention put forth by the petitioner. There is nothing wrong on the part of the Government to get clarification from the acquiring body and examine itself the possibility of denotifying certain land from land acquisition proceedings. This exercise taken by the Government is in response to the request made by the petitioner for exempting the land from land acquisition proceedings. Ultimately the Government came to the conclusion that it is not possible to exempt this land from the land acquisition proceedings by its letter dt. 4-9-1986. Thus, we are able to see that it is the Government that applied its mind after getting details regarding the request made by the petitioner and ultimately refused the request of the petitioner. Hence we do not find any substance in the argument advanced by the learned counsel on this aspect of the case.
32. Mr. Oza, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner next contended that the acquisition of survey number 552 is on the basis of pick and choose in an arbitrary manner and the Government concerned ought to have released this survey number 552 from acquisition when especially it has released from acquisition the survey number 589. The learned counsel further submitted that in the teeth of specific circular by the Government to the effect that only pocket lands have to be acquired, the acquisition of the survey number 552 which is in the periphery is mala fide in nature since the Land Acquisition Officer has not followed the circular stated above. Mr. Oza pointing out the release of certain lands from acquisition proceedings contended that they were released by the pressure brought upon the Government by the Members of Parliament and the Members of the Legislative Assembly while the land of the petitioner which has survey number 552 was arbitrarily acquired since he has no influence with the Government. These happenings, according to Mr. Oza, clearly indicate the mala fide nature of acquisition and such an acquisition is arbitrary in nature. In this connection Mr. Oza reads the resolution passed as early as 29-11-1983 in the joint meeting held for discussing the subject regarding the release of land under acquisition for Vapi Industrial Estate Expansion. The resolution clearly exempted lands admeasuring about H.A. sq. meter 3-52-64 out of the acquisition of 315 hectares made at that time. Pointing out such release made by the Government, Mr. Oza submitted that his land bearing survey number 552 also ought to have been released. Reading this resolution Mr. Oza also pointed out that a decision was taken not to take possession of any land except pocket lands till the question is examined by the Deputy Secretary, I.M.P.D., Dy.C.E.(1). From this discussion, we are able to see that the release of land as it necessitated as early as 29-11-1983 was discussed in detail and at that time, it was felt that the land mentioned in the Annexure ‘A’ to the said resolution was agree d to be released. In affidavit-in sur-rejoinder filed by Mr. H. S. Vora, Incharge Officer on Special Duty No. 2 (Land Acquisition), it has been clearly stated that it is for the Government to consider the question of release and as such the allegation as if Survey number 552 also should have been released, as has been done in respect of survey number 589 cannot be sustained. It is for the GIDC and the State Government to look into the details and decide as to which of the lands are to be acquired and which of the lands are to be released. Mr. Oza also read the letter written by the Government to the G IDC, dated 30-4-1986 and has stated that the Government was inclined to release the land while the GIDC insisted upon the acquisition with a mala fide intention. We are further able to See from the affidavit-in-sur-rejoinder filed by Mr. H. S. Vora that whenever representations were made either by the persons interested in land or through representatives like M.LA. or M.P., the State Government and the GIDC have considered them on merits and after careful considerations, the acquisition of the land concerned was either continued or discontinued or withdrawn. It is further stated that this. process establishes that there is no mala fides but on the contrary, the lands were acquired after due deliberations and after full application of mind. To substantiate his contention of arbitrary acquisition of the petitioner’s land, Mr. Oza cited the decision in the case of Ramanna v. I.A. Authority of India reported in AIR 1979 SC 1628. In this decision, the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the contract given by the tenderers, who were called for running restaurant and Snack Bars at the Airport. In this connection the Supreme Court observed (at p. 1643) :
“It is true that neither the petitioner nor the respondent has any right to enter into a contract but they are entitled to equal treatment with others who offer tender or quotations for the purchase of the goods. It must, therefore, follow as a necessary corollary from the principle of equality enshrined in Art. 14 that though the State is entitled to refuse to enter into relationship with any one, yet if it does so, it cannot arbitrarily choose any person it likes for entering into such relationship and discriminate between persons similarly circumstanced, but it must act in conformity with some standard or principle which meets the test of reasonableness and nondiscrimination and any departure from such standard or principle would be invalid unless it can be supported or justified on some rational and non-discriminatory ground”
Continuing further in that case, the Supreme Court discussed as to how and when the tender can be accepted and in that connection observed :
“Admittedly the standard or norm was reasonable and non-discriminatory and once such a standard or norm for running a IInd class restaurant should be awarded was laid down, the 1st respondent was not entitled to depart from it and to award the contract to the 4th respondents who did not satisfy the condition of eligibility prescribed by the standard or norm. If there was no acceptable tender from a person who satisfied the condition of eligibility, the 1st respondent could have rejected the tenders and invited fresh tenders on the basis of a less stringent standard or norm, but it could not depart from the standard or norm prescribed by it and arbitrarily accept the tender of the 4th respondents. When the 1st respondent entertained the tender of the 4th respondents even though they did not have 5 years’ experience of running a IInd class restaurant or hotel, it denied equality of opportunity to others similarly situate in the matter of tendering for the contract. There might have been many other persons, in fact the appellant himself claimed to be one such person, who did not have 5 years’ experience of running a Kind class restaurant, but who were otherwise competent to run such a restaurant and they might also have competed with the 4th respondents for obtaining the contract, but they were precluded from doing so by the condition of eligibility requiring five years’ experience. The action of the 1st respondent in accepting the tender of the 4th respondents, even though they did not satisfy the prescribed condition of eligibility, was clearly discriminatory, since it excluded other persons similarly situate from tendering for the contract and it was also arbitrary and without reason. The acceptance of the tender of the 4th respondents was, in the circumstances invalid as being violative of the equality clause of the Constitution as also of the rule of administrative law inhibiting arbitrary action”.
33. Then Mr. Oza pointed out the decision in the case of Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib reported in AIR 1981 SC487. In this decision the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the ambit of Art. 14 of the Constitution. It held that originally Art. 14 was identified with the doctrine of classification because the view taken was that the Article forbids discrimination and there would be no discrimination where the classification making the differential fulfils two conditions i.e. (i) that the classification is founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group; and (ii) that that differentia has a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the impugned legislative or executive action. Continuing further the Supreme Court observed that this principle was enlarged subsequent to the above decisions and pointed out that Art. 14 has highly activist magnitude and it embodies a guarantee against arbitrariness.
34. Citing the above said decision Mr. Oza contended that the failure on the part of the authorities concerned to delete the petitions is land from acquisition is nothing but arbitrary exercise of power with a mala fide intention. Mr. Oza, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner again reiterated that the government in spite of the circulars to the effect that only pocket lands have to be acquired, the petitioner’s land which is in the periphery has been acquired against such directions, that the petitioner on the promise given by the authorities concerned improved the land and as such the authorities are estopped under the doctrine of promissory estoppel from acquiring the said land, that the authorities having deleted lands which are in the middle of the estate and pocket lands from acquisition acted in bad faith in proceeding with the acquisition of the petitioner’s land, that the petitioner willingly gave up certain portion of the land in survey number 552 for the purpose of drainage and laying underground cable in the hope that the rest of the land will be left lathe petitioner for his own purpose, that large chunk of the petitioners land has been acquired situated in other survey numbers and if this land which is very small in extent and also in the periphery of the estate if acquired will ruin the family of the petitioner completely, and that the acquisition is forced by the GIDC with a mala fide intention and the government acted upon such advice without applying its mind and also with mala fide intention.
In order to substantiate the above said contentions that the acquisition is in bad faith, Mr. Oza also cited the decision in the case Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India reported in AIR 1980 SC 872. In that decision the Supreme Court observed :
” 118. Fraud on power voids the order if it is not exercised bona fide for the end design. There is a distinction between exercise of power in good faith and misuse in bad faith. The former arises when an authority misuses its power in breach of law, say, by taking into account bona fide, and with best of intentions, some extraneous matters or by ignoring relevant matters. That would render the impugned act or order ultra vires. It would be a case of fraud on powers. The misuse in bad faith arises when the power is exercised for an improper motive, say, to satisfy a private or personal grudge or for wreaking vengeance of a Minister as in S. Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab (1964) 4 SCR 733: AIR 1964 SC 72. A power is exercised maliciously if its repository is motivated by personal animosity towards those who are directly affected by its exercise. Use of a power for an ‘alien’ purpose other than the one for which the power is conferred is mala fide use of that power. Same is the position when an order is made for a purpose other than that which finds place in the order. The ulterior or alien purpose clearly speaks of the misuse of the power and it was observed as early as in 1904 by Lord Lindley in General Assembly of Free Church of Scotland v. Overtoun, 1904 AC 515, “that there is a condition implied in this as well as in other instruments which create powers, namely, that the powers shall be used bona fide for the purpose for which they are conferred”. It was said by Warrington, C.J., in Short v. Poole Corporation, (1926) 1 Ch 66 that:
“No public body can be regarded as having statutory authority to act in bad faith or from corrupt motives, and any action purporting to be of that body, but proved to be committed in bad faith or from corrupt motives would certainly be held to be inoperative.”
I n Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley, (1956) 1 QB702 at p. 712- 13 Lord Denning, L.J. said :
“No judgment of a Court, no order of Minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud, Fraud unravels, everything.”
See also in Lazarus case at p. 722 per Lord Parker, C.J. :
“Fraud vitiates all transactions known to the law of however high a degree of solemnity.”
All these three English decisions have been cited with approval by this Court in Pratap Singh’s case.”
Pressing these decisions into service Mr. Oza states that contrary to the circulars and to the promise the land of the petitioner has been acquired. Mr. Oza, reading the Government of India circular dated 5th March 1982 which states that the acquisition of land must be limited to the minimum necessary area. He also reads the covering letter dated 4th February 1985 sent by the Government of Gujarat to various acquiring bodies with I tic Government of India circular dt. 5th Mar. 1982. He also read the direction of the State Government which we have already extracted to the effect that the pocket lands have to be acquired for the present industrial estate. Mr. Oza again submitted that GIDC has not brought to the notice of the Government the original de-notification of survey number 552 which, according to Mr. Oza, is on the representation made by the petitioner herein. Referring to these facts Mr. Oza states that there is a fraud on the power exercised by the Government and the acquiring authority and further there is arbitrary exercise of power in acquiring this land contrary to the circulars and directions of the Central and State Government. Pointing out the de-notification of several lands from acquisition Mr. Oza submitted that the land of the petitioner is not at all needed for the industrial estate. The very fact that large portion of lands are lying vacant for number of years shows the futility of such acquisition as at present and that the fact that large pieces of lands acquired are under grass cultivation and grass is being sold by the Government shows that there is no need at present to have more lands to improve the industrial estate. In this connection the learned counsel also cited the decision in the case of Maganbhai Vanarshibhai v. State of Gujarat reported in (1975) 16 Guj LR 839 : (AIR 1976 Guj 84). This is a case in which the petitioner in special civil application questioned the acquisition proceedings and the notification under Ss. 4 and 6 on the ground that the Government, contrary to its declared policy, arbitrarily picked and chose the petitioner’s land for acquisition. In those circumstances, a Bench of our High Court held :
“That in the instant case it was evident that the Government had followed the irrational method of pick and choose so far as the petitioner’s land was concerned and such an action of the Government was contrary to Art. 14 of the Constitution. Furthermore, it was also the declared policy of the Government not to acquire lands surrounding the lands on which residential constructions were raised either by individuals or cooperative societies. According to the said policy no land in the area of quarter or half a mile of such area should be acquired. The Government admitted that the petitioner’s lands are surrounded by several buildings constructed by the Co-operative Housing Societies. The action of the Government is thus contrary to its declared policy. The Government has obviously followed the method of selection of pick and choose in respect of the petitioner’s lands and has acted arbitrarily and also contrary to its declared policy under Secs. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Therefore, the acquisition is illegal and bad.”
As far as our case is concerned, there is absolutely no circular prohibiting acquisition of lands of the present nature. Resolution directing acquisition of pocket lands (till further decision by Dy. Secretary) and also circulars to acquire minimum necessary lands, which we have referred to above, cannot in any way prohibit the acquisition of the present survey number 552. We have already extracted in paragraph supra the reasons as to why the land in survey number 552 is sought to be acquired.
35. In the case of Ambujam v. State reported in AIR 1966 Kerala 187 cited by Mr. Oza, a Bench of the Kerala High Court had occasion to consider an acquisition made by the State Government for a company without properly applying its mind. In that case, the lands that were acquired for the company were lying vacant. On the facts, it was found that the alleged need of the company for the party’s land was a mere pretext to acquire that particular party’s land. In those circumstances, the Kerala High Court found that when the State made the declaration Linder S. 6 that the party’s land sought to be acquired was indeed for the project of the company, it was reached without having been apprised of the true facts. On the facts of that case, the proceedings were quashed observing that the declaration made under S. 6 is vitiated by mala fide since the authority concerned passed the said order without applying its mind. Such an order, according to the Bench of the Kerala High Court, even though there is no evidence of personal ill-will, corrupt motive or other improper purpose, will be construed as mala fide action. Pressing this decision into service, Mr. Oza submitted that nearly 400 acres of land remained unutilised and there is no need to acquire this small piece of land comprised in survey number 552. We are afraid that the decision reported in AIR 1966 Kerala 187 will have any application to the facts of the present case. We have in paragraphs supra clearly discussed the purpose and the necessity for acquiring large area of land to establish Vapi Industrial Complex, which is one of the biggest complexes in Asia.
36. The next decision cited by Mr. Oza is the one in the case of Achhelal Singh v. State, reported in AIR 1980 Patna 49. In that case, the Court came to the conclusion that the acquisition is tainted with mala fides since there is adverse report for the parties concerned against acquisition and other circumstances clearly revealed that the acquisition of the land is absolutely unnecessary. We do not think the said decision will have any bearing to the facts of this case. Mr. Oza, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner reiterated the fact that there were denotification of certain survey numbers from the land acquisition proceedings and hence this survey number also ought to have been denotified. In land acquisition proceedings we have to see only whether the land has been needed and acquired for public purpose or not. From the facts of the present case it is clear that the land has been acquired only for the public purpose. Survey number 552 is in the acquisition proceedings for Vapi industrial estate. The argument that sonic of the lands in different survey numbers have been deleted from the land acquisition proceedings cannot be a ground to delete this survey number also from the land acquisition proceedings. The only thing we have to see is as to whether this survey number has been acquired for a public purpose or not. There is absolutely no averment in the petition to the effect that this land is not needed for public purpose.
37. In the case of Land Acquisition Collector v. Durga Pada reported in AIR 1980 SC 1678 the Supreme Court has definitely held that there is a presumption if there is S. 6 declaration that the lands acquired is for public purpose. To dislodge the presumption by alleging mala fides or colourable exercise of power the burden is very heavy upon the parties who allege mala fides and colourable exercise of power. In this case we are of the view that the petitioner has not discharged his burden of proving mala fides or colourable exercise of power by the State in acquiring the suit land. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the acquisition is for the public purpose and a mere fact that certain lands have been deleted from the acquisition cannot give right to the petitioner to have his land also deleted from acquisition when especially the public purpose for which the land in question has been acquired cannot be assailed. There is absolutely no policy or decision to the effect that the land at peripheral of the estate cannot be acquired. We further see from the facts of the case, out of about 350 hectares originally acquired only about 3 and odd hectare have been released from acquisition. It is not for the petitioner to question as to why survey number 589 has been released from acquisition since the acquisition of survey number 552 is clearly for public purpose in order to establish and expand the Vapi industrial estate and township. We have already extracted in paragraphs supra as to how the Government has taken in all the objections raised in the 5A enquiry and gave reasons for acquiring the petitioner’s land.
38. For the reasons stated by us in paragraphs supra, we do not find any substance in respect of this point also.
39. Mr. Oza next contended that procedure provided under S. 8 of the Land Acquisition Act is not followed. Section 6(2), inter alia, state that the discussion under S. 6 shall state the District or other territorial division in which the land is situated, the purpose for which it is needed, its approximate area and where a plan shall have been made of the land, the place where such plan may be inspected. Section 8 reads as follows :
“8. Land to be marked out, measured and planned. The Collector shall thereupon cause the land unless it has been already measured under S. 3-A or 4 or deemed to be measured under S. 3-C to be measured. He shall also cause it to be measured, and if no plan has been made thereof, a plan to be made of the same.”
It is the case of Mr. Oza that, no plan has been submitted in this case. Without adverting to the question as to whether the failure to supply the plan will vitiate the proceedings, we can straightway dispose of this submission by referring to S. 6 notification for the area now in dispute along with other areas, wherein we find the following statement :
“A plan of the said land can be inspected at the office of the Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition)
GIDC, Ratnagar Building, Ashram Road, Navrangpura, Ahmedabad-9.”
Hence we do not find any substance in this contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner.
40. Mr. Oza, the learned counsel then submitted that S. 9 notice has not been served upon the party concerned. Mr. Kanubhai Manilal Shah, who is in charge Officer on Special Duty No. 2 (Land Acquisition) in his affidavit-in-reply has specifically stated that after the notification under S. 6 of the Act was issued, notices under S. 9(l) and (2) of the Act were affixed at the office of the Mamlatdar, Pardi on May 18, 1981, at the Office of the Gram Panchayat, Carvada on May 19, 1981. He has further stated that individual notices dt. May 8, 1981 was also issued to the petitioner which was duly received by his father holding his power of attorney. To this effect, records were also produced. Mr. H. S. Vora, the in charge Officer on Special Duty No. 2 (Land Acquisition) in his affidavit-in-sur-rejoinder has specifically stated that notices under S. 9(3) & (4) of the Act dated May 9, 1981 were served upon the petitioner’s power of attorney holder which were received by him personally. He has also stated that similar notices were addressed to his brother Kantilal and the same have also been received. This officer has also produced the power of attorney executed, by the petitioner from his record. Copies of the notices issued are also produced before this Court and the power of attorney given to the father by the petitioner herein is shown to this Court and also the receiving of the notice by the said power of attorney who is none else than the father of the petitioner herein. No doubt, Mr. Oza questions the genuineness of the signature on the service of notice under S. 9. We are not convinced with the said argument and we are of the opinion that there is valid service of S. 9 notice on the petitioner herein and the same has been substantiated by the respondents.
41. As regards Point No. 9 which is to the effect that the land acquired was not utilised for the purpose for which it is acquired and the large chunk of land is used for growing grass cannot help the petitioner very much since the possession of the petitioner’s land has not been taken and the phased plan for industrialisation of the area cannot be done overnight. Further, there is absolutely no harm in allowing the lands to have vegetation instead of keeping them fallow.
42. The last point argued by Mr. Oza that the guidelines not followed and hence violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution need not detain us any further since this is covered in our discussion made for points Nos. 5 and 6 taken by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner herein.
43. For the foregoing reasons we do not find any ground made out even for admission of this special civil application. Accordingly the special civil application is dismissed. Interim relief vacated.
44. Mr. Amin, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner along with Mr. Oza, states that he wants the status quo to be continued for some time for the purpose of taking the matter to the Supreme Court. Status quo already granted while notice was issued in this case will continue f or a period of eight weeks from this date.
45. Petition dismissed.