?IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS %DATED: 10/03/2010 *CORAM Hon'ble Mrs.JUSTICE CHITRA VENKATARAMAN +WP.577 of 2009 #K.N.Mutyala Rao $Export Inspection Council of India !FOR PETITIONER : K.Chandrasekaran ^FOR RESPONDENT : A.L.Somayaji :ORDER
In the High Court of Judicature at Madras
Dated: 10.03.2010
Coram
The Honourable Mrs.JUSTICE CHITRA VENKATARAMAN
Writ Petition No.577 of 2009
& M.P.No.1 of 2009
K.N.Mutyala Rao
…. Petitioner
Vs.
1. The Chairman, Export Inspection
Council of India, Ministry of Commerce &
Industry, 3rd Floor, NDYMCA Cultural
Centre Building, 1, Jaisingh Road,
New Delhi 110 001.
2. The Director, Export Inspection
Council of India, Ministry of Commerce &
Industry, 3rd Floor, NDYMCA Cultural
Centre Building, 1, Jaisingh Road,
New Delhi 110 001.
3. The Joint Director, Export Inspection
Council of India, Ministry of Commerce &
Industry, 3rd Floor, NDYMCA Cultural
Centre Building, 1, Jaisingh Road,
New Delhi 110 001.
4. The Joint Director,
Export Inspection Agency,
Chennai, 6th Floor, CMDA Tower II,
Egmore, Chennai 600 008.
…. Respondents
PETITION under Article 226 of The Constitution of India praying for the issuance of writ of Certiorari to call for the records of the first respondent in EIC/D/Q/C) VIG/KNM/2008-09/4769 dated 2.12.2008 which confirms the order of the second respondent in EIC/D (Q/C) VIG/DI/KNM/2008-09/2449 dated 25.7.2008 and quash the same.
For Petitioner : Mr.K.Chandrasekaran For Respondents: Mr.A.L.Somayaji, S.C. For Mr.P.Chandrasekaran, SCGSC -------- O R D E R The Writ Petition is for quashing of the order dated 2.12.2008 passed by the first respondent herein, Chairman, Export Inspection Council of India rejecting the appeal presented by the petitioner as an appellate disciplinary authority.
2. The petitioner is working as an Office Assistant in the year 2005 in the office of the fourth respondent in Hyderabad. It is seen from the paper book filed before this Court that there was a news item in Enadu dated 20th January, 2005, Hyderabad Edition under the caption “There everything is corruption” alleging corruption in The Inspection Agency Office, which issues certificates that the items exported to foreign countries are produced in India. The news item alleged that without paying bribe, no work was executed in the office of the Inspection Agency. That Enadu and ETV team stated that the team had personally went to the office of the respondent on behalf of an exporter to collect the certificates and filmed the entire operation and thereby exposed the the clandestine corrupt practices in the Inspecting Agency. Based on the flash news in ETV II Channel in Hyderabad on 20.01.2005, televising the sting operation showing the petitioner receiving certain sum of money for the purpose of issuing GSP certificate, thus casting a shadow on the discharge of the duty as the Government servant, the fourth respondent issued a memorandum to the petitioner on 20.1.2005 and called upon the petitioner to furnish the details about the same on or before 27.1.2005.
3. The petitioner submitted his reply on 26.1.2005, denying the allegation. He submitted that on the crucial date, the office had issued 80 certificates and informed the person concerned that the certificates would be issued only on compliance of the requirement of the Rules. As to the receipt of the money, he pointed out that the Assistant Director had sent to him the petty contingent voucher dated 18.1.2005 for Rs.600/- towards reimbursement of money he incurred on 17th and 18th January, 2005 in connection with the visit of European Union representatives for which the petitioner had given Rs.1000/- from the Ad hoc account of the office and had requested the Assistant Director to send the remaining Rs.400/- to him, which he sent.The petitioner denied the allegation contending that his work was subjected to close scrutiny by the superiors and there were no adverse remarks over the years. On 15.2.2005, the petitioner was called upon to participate in the enquiry to be conducted as per Rule 11 of the Export Inspection Agency Employees (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1978. The petitioner sought for a defence Assistant, a retired Central Government employee, which was however rejected in terms of Rule 11, sub-rule (8) of the Export Inspection Agency Employees (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1978. Instead, he was permitted to avail the services of Mr.Ajit Hyparikar, Senior Accountant, Office of the RPAO, Survey of India, II Floor, Kendriya Sadan, Sultan Bazar, Hyderabad- 95 as Defence Assistant and the same was informed to the petitioner under letter dated 25.6.2007. The petitioner was directed to submit his written statement of defence and to state whether he was to be heard in person. In the course of the proceedings, the evidence recorded from one M.Venkatesh, Cameraman, News Today Private Limited, was also given to the petitioner. After the inquiry, order was passed on 29.6.2007 by the third respondent, whereby the petitioner was found guilty of the charges made. Aggrieved by this, the petitioner filed an appeal.
4. Under order dated 29.10.2007, the appellate authority, the second respondent herein, set aside the order of punishment holding that enough opportunity had not been granted to the petitioner to defend himself through Defence Assistant and directed the inquiry officer to hold further inquiry in terms of Rule 12(1) of the Export Inspection Agency Employees CCS (CA) Rules 1979 from the stage at which oral inquiry was initiated. The petitioner addressed a letter to the second respondent on 17.12.2007, wherein he pointed out that after the closure of inquiry on behalf of both the parties, the order passed was contrary to Rule 12(4) of EIA Employees’ (CCA) Rules, 1978 and considering the case stated by the petitioner, the question of invoking of Rule 12(1) of the Export Inspection Agency Employees CCS (CA) Rules 1979 did not arise. Hence, he pleaded for considering the case of the petitioner as per the provisions of the EIA Employees’ (CCA) Rules, 1978. The petitioner states that there was no further reply to the requisition made. However, he participated in the further inquiry, which ultimately resulted in holding the petitioner guilty of receiving alleged gratification; that the petitioner did not object to the documents S1, S2 and S3 showing the written statement of the cameraman and full opportunity was granted to the petitioner to take the assistance of the Defence Assistant. In terms of the materials available and the participation by the petitioner in the proceedings, the first authority pointed out that the petitioner was given sufficient time for appointment of a defence assistant. However, the petitioner did not avail of the same. It was pointed out therein that the 15 days’ time granted as per letter dated 5.12.2007 to engage the defence assistant was not followed at any point of time by the petitioner; consequently, after granting sufficient opportunity to the petitioner, ultimately, the disciplinary authority held against the petitioner that the charges stood proved in the absence of any material to counter the allegations. By order dated 25.7.2008, the disciplinary authority accepted the Inquiry Officer’s report and imposed a major punishment of reduction to a lower grade, viz., Clerk Grade I for a period of five years and restoration to the present post after the period of five years, only if he was found fit thereafter.
5. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner preferred further appeal before the first respondent herein, wherein, the appellate authority, in his order dated 02nd December, 2008, pointed out that the petitioner had not denied the identity of the person as none else than the petitioner himself who was shown in the film accepting money and the petitioner had not explained as to why he was accepting money from an outsider during office hours in the office premise. Thus the appellate authority confirmed the order. It is relevant to note that the appellate authority pointed out that the petitioner had questioned the disciplinary proceedings only on technical grounds and the fact remains that the incident of bribery and corruption created extraordinary situation for the disciplinary authority, in which, the kind of evidence one looked for might not emerge. In the absence of any evidence of non-involvement, the plea of technical nature to absolve himself of the charges could not be accepted. Consequently, the punishment was confirmed. Aggrieved by the above-said order, the petitioner has preferred the present writ petition.
6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the order passed is illegal and arbitrary in so far as the authorities had failed to follow the principles of natural justice in the matter of conducting the enquiry as well as in the passing of the order of punishment. He pointed out that the enquiry fails to adhere to the terms of the remand order. Given the fact that the respondents’ case rests mainly on the basis of the televised material implicating the petitioner as a person in the conversation and the statement of the photographer who shot the sting operations, the respondents should have granted an opportunity to the petitioner to cross examine the camera man, M.Venkatesh, whose statement was relied on in the proceedings against the petitioner. He said that on a mere video clipping from the telecast, the view of the respondents that the petitioner was involved in the act, could not be sustained. There are hardly any material to indicate as to when the said Venkatesh was examined and in whose presence the statement was recorded. Having regard to the fact that the said Venkatesh had not been produced for further examination by the petitioner, the view of the inquiry officer or the disciplinary authority, including the appellate authority as to the culpability of the petitioner, hence, has to be treated as an arbitrary exercise. Further, on the admitted facts, when the said camera man Venkatesh is dropped from the list of witnesses and documents, then the entire case has to fail. There are hardly any materials even to remotely connect the petitioner to the alleged incident on 20.1.2005. It is stated that the petitioner was not afforded the opportunity of engaging the Defence Assistant and that it was the duty of the inquiry officer to get the No Objection Certificate from the Controlling Authority of Defence Assistant to enable him to act so. He pointed out that there was wide discrepancy between the news item in Enadu and the video clipping. He stated that the punishment was inflicted on the petitioner demoting him to Clerk Grade I and he is presently working at the Agency at Chennai. He further pointed out that even though there is a provision for review before the Council, yet there cannot be a review before the self-same authority, viz., the first respondent, who also sat as an appellate authority. Consequently, the bias which is writ large on the face of the proceedings, the remedy is not an efficacious remedy. Consequently, he has come before this Court seeking redressal under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
7. In this connection, he relied on the decision reported in AIR 1982 SC 82 (V.Vellaswamy V. Inspector General of Police, Tamil Nadu Madras and another) that the self-same appellate authority cannot sit as a reviewing authority for the purpose of considering the case of the petitioner. He pointed out to the decisions reported in AIR 1964 SC 1372 (Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. V. The Government of Andhra Pradesh) and AIR 2000 SC 2587 (Kunhayammed & Ors. V. State of Kerala & Anr.) that considering the limited scope of review, in the absence of any efficacious remedy, the petitioner has to seek relief before this Court only. Quite apart from that, he placed reliance on the decisions reported in (2010) 1 Supreme Court Cases 126 (Satwati Deswal V. State of Haryana and others), AIR 2007 SC 3153 (M.P.State Agro Industries Development Corporation Ltd. And another V. Jahan Khan) and (2008) 8 SCC 236 (State of Uttaranchal & Ors. V. Kharak Sngh) that in the case of a patent violation of the principles of natural justice, the availability of an alternative remedy cannot stand in the way of this Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
8. Commenting on the stand of the respondents that the petitioner had not sought for the cross-examination of the camera man, learned counsel placed reliance on the decision reported in (2008) 8 SCC 236 (State of Uttaranchal & Ors. V. Kharak Sngh) that it is the duty of the prosecution to ask the delinquent officer charged with an offence of this nature as to his desire to examine a witness. Hence, the said violation also falls under the caption of violation of the principles of natural justice. He further referred to the decision reported in AIR 1999 SC 677 (Kuldeep Singh V. The Commissioner of Police and ors.) and submitted that there are no materials to identify the person shown in the telecast as none other than the petitioner. The person who shot the film was not examined to identify the petitioner as one figuring in the screen. In these circumstances, the question of fastening the liability departmentally does not arise. The orders passed against the petitioner are totally devoid of any materials.
9. In answering the stand of the petitioner, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents placed reliance on the decision reported in (2009) 1 SCC 297 (Virender Chaudhary V. Bharat Petroleum Corporation and others) that the jurisdiction of this Court is a discretionary one to be exercised in exceptional cases. In the absence of any material to show that the alternative remedy is not an efficacious remedy, the question of interference by this Court does not arise. He pointed out that the review contemplated under the regulations is not a review stricto senso, as has been understood normally. What is provided is only a revisional remedy to the Government. Hence, going by the Regulations of the Export Inspection Agency Employees (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1978, the remedy available to the revisional authority cannot be brushed aside as not an efficacious remedy on the sole ground that the Chairman being an Additional Secretary in the Council is incompetent of hearing the review and that there is a likelihood of bias entering into the decision making process. There are no merits in the petition for this Court to interfere with the order in an extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
10. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents.
11. I agree with the submission of the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents on the aspect of alternative remedy as well as on the composition of the Council as the reviewing body.
12. Before going into the merits of these contentions, the allegation based on the principles of natural justice needs to be seen.
13. A reading of the provisions relating to the disciplinary rule shows that as against the order of the disciplinary authority, there is an appeal provided to the Chairman of the Council. In a case where the maximum scale of pay exceeds Rs.2,000/-, the appeal should be made to the Central Government. The said provision is contained in
Regulation 21(3) of the Export Inspection Agency Employees (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1978 (hereinafter called as the ‘Rules’). As against the order passed, under Part VIII, a review provision is given, which is in the nature of a revisional jurisdiction. Regulation 26 states that notwithstanding anything contained in these Rules, the Council may exercise its review jurisdiction either suo motu or otherwise as against the order, which is made or is appealable under the Rules and a) to confirm, modify or set aside the order; b) impose any penalty or set aside, reduce, confirm or enhance the penalty imposed by the order; c) remit the case to the authority which made the order or to any other authority directing such further action on inquiry as it considers proper in the circumstances of the case; or d) pass such other orders as it deems fit. Learned senior counsel produced before me the Constitution of the Council, where the Chairman, as an Additional Secretary, also figured in. The provision under Regulation 26(3) of the Rules states that in a case where the scale of pay exceeds Rs.2,000/-, the authority to review the order shall be the Central Government; the reviewing authority is not the Council but the Central Government.
14. A reading of the provisions shows that although it is captioned as review, nevertheless it is in the nature of revision. The petitioner being in the category of drawing salary above Rs.2,000/-, the reviewing authority is the Central Government. The anxiety of the petitioner is that if the petitioner is to go for a remedy under Part VIII, there may be clash of jurisdiction with the appellate authority – the Chairman, who also happens to be the Additional Secretary to sit in the Council to hear the review and that there is every chance of bias marring a fair decision.
15. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1964 SC 1372 (Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. V. The Government of Andhra Pradesh) holding that if before the decision of the review finally the appeal itself had been disposed of, the question of hearing the review did not arise, as the jurisdiction thereby would come to an end. He also referred to the decision reported in AIR 2000 SC 2587 (Kunhayammed & Ors. V. State of Kerala & Anr.) on the issue of maintainability of a review. The decision relied on, hence, has no relevance as far as the present issue is concerned and the said decisions are distinguishable, considering the provision of enactment with which they were concerned.
16. As far as the decision reported in AIR 1964 SC 1372 (Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. V. The Government of Andhra Pradesh) is concerned, it relates to a case of Sales Tax assessment where appeals for the year 1949-1950 were preferred by an assessee against the order of the High Court based on the certificate of fitness granted under Article 133(1) of the Constitution of India. As regards the subsequent year, the High Court refused to grant the same. The assessee, however, preferred a review before the High Court which was dismissed. The assessee approached the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India by way of Special Leave as against the order rejecting the review. After issuing notice, the Supreme Court admitted the Special Leave Petition. On an objection taken at the time of final hearing that the Special Leave granted should be revoked, the Supreme Court rejected the plea and held that where notice is given to the respondent before hearing the application for grant of special leave, no objection as to the maintainability of the appeal or granting leave would be permitted to be urged at any stage after the grant of it, unless the ground arises after the grant of leave or where it could not be ascertained, at that date, notwithstanding the exercise of due care. The Apex Court further pointed out “if on that date no appeal has been filed, it is competent for the Court hearing the petition for review to dispose of the application on the merits notwithstanding the pendency of the appeal, subject only to this, that if before the application for review is finally decided the appeal itself has been disposed of, the jurisdiction of the Court hearing the review petition would come to an end.” The decision reported in AIR 2000 SC 2587 (Kunhayammed & Ors. V. State of Kerala & Anr.) has no relevancy and the same is also a reiteration of the same principle.
17. A perusal of the Export Inspection Agency Employees (Classification, control and Appeal) Rules 1978 part VIII- Review shows that Rule 26 contemplates a review by the Council of any order made or is appealable under the Rules. A reading of this Rule shows that the power is more in the nature of revisional jurisdiction which may be invoked either suo motu by the Council or on an application. Therefore, the content of the Rule thus leaves no manner of doubt that the review power is concerned about the correctness, the propriety or the legality of the order passed by the appellate authority. The Rule contemplates an opportunity to be given to the person concerned
before any order is passed in exercise of this power. It is not denied by the petitioner that the salary of the petitioner exceeds the pay scale of Rs.2,000/- and the authority to review would be the Central Government and not the Council. This is evident from the said Rule in Sub-Clause (iii).
18. Going by Rule 26 of the Rules and that it is not necessary that the Chairman, who happens to be an Additional Secretary, would have to sit as a reviewing authority here, the apprehension that bias would enter into the decision making process is without any basis. Hence, the said contention does not merit acceptance by this Court. In the circumstances, I do not find any justification in the contention of the petitioner that the remedy available is illusory and that bias would enter into the decision making process and is liable to be set aside. Apart from this, on the ground of availability of an alternate remedy, I do not find any justifiable ground for this Court to grant the prayer under Article 226 of the constitution of India. Given the fact that the Central Government is the competent authority under Regulation 26, it is always open to the Central Government to take note of the Chairman being the appellate authority and make such alternate arrangement as the Government may think fit for a fair trial, so that there could be no room for any allegation of bias.
19. This leads us to yet another issue, namely, invoking of this Court’s jurisdiction on account of violation of the principles of natural justice. It is no doubt true that in the decision of the Apex Court, particularly the one reported in AIR 2007 SC 3153 (M.P.State Agro Industries Development Corporation Ltd. And another V. Jahan Khan), the Apex Court pointed out that when there is gross violation of the principles of natural justice, availability of an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar as such for this Court to entertain the Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Apex Court pointed out as follows:
“10…… There is no gainsaying that in a given case, the High Court may not entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy, but the said rule cannot be said to be of universal application. The rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction due to availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, inspite of the availability of an alternative remedy, a writ court may still exercise its discretionary jurisdiction of judicial review, in at least three contingencies, namely, (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. In these circumstances, an alternative remedy does not operate as a bar.”
20. The said view was reiterated by the Apex Court in the decisions reported in (2010) 1 Supreme Court Cases 126 (Satwati Deswal V. State of Haryana and others); (2008) 8 SCC 236 (State of Uttaranchal & Ors. V. Kharak Sngh) and (2009) 1 SCC 297 (Virender Chaudhary V. Bharat Petroleum Corporation and others).
21. The plea of the petitioner as regards the allegation on the violation of the principles of natural justice has to be seen in the context of the order passed by the appellate authority dated 2.12.2008 and the remedy available. Except for a protest that the Chairman would be the reviewing authority to sit as per Rule 26 of the Rules and the apprehension as to the likelihood of bias, there is hardly any material to show that the review remedy, as stated under Rule 26 of the Rules, is not an efficacious remedy.
22. The order under challenge before this Court shows that the petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to engage a defence assistant; however, the petitioner did not avail the same. The appellate authority pointed out that except for a technical plea taken, there was no substantive materials placed before the appellate authority; that the petitioner had not been able to explain as to his involvement in receiving money from an outsider during office hours in the office premise. A reading of the grounds taken before the appellate authority and the order of the appellate authority shows the petitioner did not make use of the opportunities granted to the petitioner to defend his case at any stage by engaging the defence assistant and that the petitioner had not denied that the person seen in the film was the petitioner himself and that he had not been able to explain the receipt of the money. In the background of the findings of the appellate authority and without going into the correctness or otherwise of this observation by the appellate authority, the fact remains that the issues raised by the petitioner as to the identity of the person, who is shown in the film as receiving the money, or for that matter the examination of the photographer therein, and the correctness of the appellate authority’s findings, are all matters which can still be agitated before a reviewing authority.
23. Learned counsel for the petitioner pointed the questions as at whose instance and presence the statement of the photoghrapher was taken are not explained at all by the prosecution. Hence the allegations thus remaining still not proved in the context of the photographer not produced for cross examination, the case of the respondent has to be rejected. It may be seen, persuaded by the plea taken by the petitioner on the first round of litigation as to the request for engaging a defence assistant and on the allegation of the violation of the principles of natural justice, the appellate authority set aside the order and the matter was remitted for an inquiry before the inquiring authority. There are no materials to show that the petitioner made any attempt to let in evidence in support of his contention on the aspect of receipt of money from the Assistant Director and on the aspect of he not being there at the time when the film was made. Whatever be his explanation, a reading of the objections of the petitioner as regards the conduct of the proceedings, shows except for the technical plea taken as the engaging of the services of a defence assistant no issues were raised particularly with reference to the principles of natural justice in relation to the examination of the photographer. In any event, as already pointed out, all these issues can very well be canvassed and considered before a reviewing authority, whose jurisdiction, as is evident from Regulation 26 of the Rules, is as good and wide enough as that of an appellate authority. In the circumstances, in the absence of anything to show that the review remedy is not an efficacious remedy, I am not persuaded by the submission of the petitioner herein that this Court has to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
24. In the light of the decision of the Apex Court reported in (2009) 1 SCC 297 (Virender Chaudhary V. Bharat Petroleum Corporation and others) that when remedial provisions are there for the aggrieved party to vindicate his grievances and the width of jurisdiction is no less than that of an appellate authority, there are no extraordinary circumstances compelling this Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
25. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner pointed out in extenso, the decision of the Supreme Court reported in (2009) 5 MLJ 1377 (SC) (R.K.Anand V. Registrar, Delhi High Court) as to the manner in which the reliance could be placed on this kind of sting operations. The law declared by the Apex Court is binding on every one, including that of a disciplinary authority in this matter. I do not find any extraordinary situation that this Court should exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Considering the extent of jurisdiction of the reviewing authority, it is open to the petitioner to canvass his case by placing reliance on the above-said decision before the reviewing authority.
26. Citing the case R.K.Anand V. Registrar, Delhi High Court reported in (2009) 5 MLJ 1377 (SC) as an example, learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that this Court has every jurisdiction to go into the merits of the case. I do not agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The said decision rests on the peculiar facts and circumstances, as is evident from the narration therein.
27. In the circumstances, I have no hesitation in rejecting the plea of the petitioner. The decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner, particularly the one reported in (2008) 8 SCC 236 (State of Uttaranchal & Ors. V. Kharak Singh) does not, in any way, advance the petitioner’s case. There are no materials to show that the petitioner had asked for cross examination of the photographer, or for that matter, the petitioner was denied of the same. Hence, these are all matters, which can rightly be taken before the revisional authority, if so advised. Hence, if and when the petitioner chooses to invoke the jurisdiction of the reviewing authority, the said authority shall grant full opportunity to the petitioner, including letting in fresh evidence in support of his case and pass orders thereon on the merits of the case. In the circumstances, I do not find any extraordinary ground to exercise this Court’s jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to accept the plea of the petitioner.
Accordingly, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. No costs. Consequently, M.P.No.1 of 2009 is also dismissed.
Index:Yes/No 10.03.2010
Internet:Yes/No
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To
1. The Chairman, Export Inspection
Council of India, Ministry of Commerce &
Industry, 3rd Floor, NDYMCA Cultural
Centre Building, 1, Jaisingh Road,
New Delhi 110 001.
2. The Director, Export Inspection
Council of India, Ministry of Commerce &
Industry, 3rd Floor, NDYMCA Cultural
Centre Building, 1, Jaisingh Road,
New Delhi 110 001.
3. The Joint Director, Export Inspection
Council of India, Ministry of Commerce &
Industry, 3rd Floor, NDYMCA Cultural
Centre Building, 1, Jaisingh Road,
New Delhi 110 001.
4. The Joint Director,
Export Inspection Agency,
Chennai, 6th Floor, CMDA Tower II,
Egmore, Chennai 600 008.
CHITRA VENKATARAMAN,J.
Sl
W.P.No.577 of 2009
& M.P.No.1 of 2009
10.03.2010