JUDGMENT
Nishita Mhatre, J.
1. Both these Writ Petitions are being heard together as the parties involved are common and the facts involved in both the matters are common.
2. The Petitioner workman was employed in a partnership firm, namely, Hyphosphite & Co. since February 1973. Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are the partners of that firm. The services of the workman came to be terminated on 10th June 1979 whereupon he raised a dispute and the matter was referred for adjudication before the Labour Court. As the firm and its partners did not remain present, though served, the Labour Court passed an ex-parte Award on 29th January 1987 directing the firm and its partners to reinstate the workman with continuity of service and back wages. The firm and its partners refused to comply with the Award and, therefore, the workmen filed an application under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) for recovery of the dues payable under the Award. This application as granted again by annex-parte order on 25th April 1991. The partners then filed an application for setting aside the ex-parte order passed by the Labour Court under Section 33C(2) of the Act. This application came to be dismissed on 20th February 1993 and a review was filed by the firm and its review that the Labour Court acting under Section 33C(2) had no power of review its own order. The review application was partly allowed by the Labour Court on 12th July 1993. The Labour Court negatived the contention of the workman and held that the review was maintainable and directed the Recovery Officer to recover all the amounts as quantified under its order dated 25th April 1991 except bonus and leave wages. Aggrieved by this order, the firm and its partners filed Writ Petition No. 2829 of 1993. The said Writ petition was also directed against the initial order passed by the Labour Court on 25th April 1991 in respect of the recovery of dues payable as also the order dismissing the application for setting aside the ex-parte order of the Labour Court passed under Section 33C(2) of the Act. This Writ Petition was dismissed. Against the dismissal of the Writ Petition, Letters Patent Appeal was moved before this Court which also met with the same fate.
3. Writ Petition No. 3432 of 1993 is directed against the order of the Labour Court, Thane dated 12th July 1993 allowing the review application by and reviewing its own order of 25th April 1991. While admitting this Writ Petition, this Court granted interim relief in terms of prayer clause (a) of the Petition by which the Recovery Officer, who is Respondent No. 4 to this Petition, to recover the entire amount awarded to the Petitioner and to deposit in this Court the amount of bonus and leave wages. This amount was then recovered.
4. In the meantime, an application was filed by the firm and its partners for setting aside the ex-parte Award of 29th January 1987. The Labour Court granted interim relief and stayed the ex-parte Award on condition that the Applicants deposit an amount of Rupees One lakh. The recovery proceedings initiated by the Collector were also suspended by the Labour Court. This order was directly contrary to the order passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 3432 of 1993 on 6th September 1993. The workman, therefore, filed Writ Petition No. 4323 of 1993. At the time of admission of this Writ Petition, by an interim order this court stayed the order dated 18th October 1993 and the proceedings in Misc. Application (IDA) No. 15 of 1993 i.e. the application filed under Rule 26 of the Industrial Disputes (Bombay) Rules, 1957. Accordingly, all the amounts have been recovered by the Recovery Officer. The workman has been paid all the amounts except the amount due and payable as bonus and leave wages which has been deposited in this Court and are invested.
5. Mr. Bapat, learned Advocate who appears for the Petitioner workman, submits that the Labour Court has erred in reviewing its own order since this power can be exercised only when it is expressly conferred upon a quasi judicial authority. He relies on the judgments in the case of Patel Narshi Thakershi and Ors v. Pradynmansinghji Arjunsinghji, and Indian National Congress (I) v. Institute of Social Welfare and Ors. in support of his contention that the Labour Court can only exercise such powers as are conferred on it by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. He further submits that there is no power either express or implied in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder permitting the Labour Court to exercise powers of review. He, therefore, submits that the order reviewing the application filed under Section 33C(2) of the Act requires to be quashed. In respect of Writ Petition No. 4323 of 1993, he submits that the Labour Court has in fact committed contempt of this Court by directing the Recovery Officer not to proceed with the recovery and not to recover the amounts quantified in the application under Section 33C(2) when by way of interim relief in Writ Petition No. 3432 of 1993 this Court had expressly directed the Recovery Officer to proceed with the recovery.
6. The Labour Court is a creature of the statute i.e. the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Therefore, whatever powers are to be exercised by the Labour Court are circumscribed by the powers conferred on it by the statute. The Labour Court cannot exceed such powers. On a perusal of the Act as well as the Rules framed thereunder, there is no express power conferred on the Labour Court for reviewing its own order neither is there any implied power. As held in the case of Patel Narshi Thakershi (supra), the power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law, either specifically or by necessary implication. There is no provision in the Industrial Disputes Act or the Rules framed thereunder, conferring such a power specifically or by necessary implication on the Labour Court. The Labour Court has been empowered under the Industrial Disputes Act to adjudicate references relating to matters falling within the Second Schedule of the Act. It can compute any amount or benefits which can be computed in terms of money, accruing to a workman. The Labour Court is vested with the power for setting aside as ex-parte order or award. But there is no power of review conferred on it at all.
7. In the case of Indian National Congress (supra), the Supreme Court considered whether ancillary or incidental powers of the Commission could be equated with an express power of review. The Apex Court held that an incidental and ancillary power of a statutory authority is not a substitute of an express power of review. Therefore, the Apex Court has in no uncertain terms laid down that the power of review must be express and must be conferred by the statute on a quasi judicial authority.
8. The Labour Court has, therefore, erred in reviewing its own order dated 20th February 1993. The order dated 12th July 1992 passed in Review Application (IDA) No. 15 of 1993 has to be set aside and the workman must be paid all the amounts due and payable as found by the Labour Court in its order of 25th April 1991.
9. Having held so, nothing really survives in Writ Petition No. 4323 of 1993 as that was filed against the order staying the execution of the Award. There is no doubt that except the amount of bonus and leave wages, all other amounts have already been recovered and paid to the workman.
10. In the result, Rule made absolute in Writ Petition No. 3432 of 1993. No order as to costs. The amount deposited in this Court shall be paid over to the Petitioner workman immediately with accrued interest.
11. Rule discharged in Writ Petition No. 4323 of 1993.
12. Parties to act on an authenticated copy of this judgment.