JUDGMENT
B.S. Chauhan, J.
1. This special appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment and order dated 21.7.2004, passed in Writ Petition No. 17809 of 1996, Mohd. Aslam v. State of U. P. and Ors., wherein the relief of employment in lieu of the land acquired which was sought, has been dismissed.
2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that petitioner-appellant filed writ petition in 1996 on 20.5.1996 contending that his land had been acquired to establish a tube-well, and as per the Government order dated 15.6.1985, he was entitled for employment on compassionate ground. The writ petition was subsequently amended by filing an application in 2002, vide Order dated 21.11.2002 seeking the same relief in pursuance of the Government order dated 29.2.1996. The said petition stood dismissed only on the ground that the petitioner had not pleaded anywhere in the petition that his land had been acquired by the State, thus, the aforesaid Government orders were not applicable. Hence, this appeal.
3. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant and the learned standing counsel appearing for the respondents.
4. The petition was filed by the petitioner-appellant without taking any specific pleadings, disclosing any particular of the land acquisition as on what date under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called the Act) Notification was issued ; on what date Section 6 declaration had been made ; and how much of the petitioner’s land had been acquired. For establishing a tube-well, not much land is required. Petitioner-appellant does not disclose what had been his total holdings and how much has been left out.
5. Acquisition of the land is one of the modes of sale and purchase of the land under the Act. Acquisitions have been made compulsory, i.e., against the wishes of the land owners, for public purpose in larger public interest, the provision of providing solatium etc. had been made. Acquisition of land is also permissible on agreed terms between the parties as provided under the proviso of Section 11 of the Act. Such acquisition would amount to sale by private negotiations as the award is to be made in the terms of that agreement. The person interested cannot claim the benefit of the provision for solatium or making the reference under Section 18 of the Act or approaching the further appellate forum in such an eventuality, being the acquisition by private negotiation. (Vide State of Gujarat and Ors. v. Daya Shamji Bhai and Ors., (1995) 5 SCC 746 and Ishwarlal Premchand Shah and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Ors., AIR 1996 SC 1616).
6. While the land is acquired for the purpose of an industrial unit for a private or Government company, Section 41 of the Act enables the Government to enter into an agreement imposing certain conditions. However, that agreement has to be entered into before the declaration under Section 6 is issued. The agreement is required to be published in the official Gazette in view of the provisions of Section 42 of the Act. Without publishing of the said agreement in the Gazette, the terms of the agreement cannot be enforced. Such a publication is not a mere empty formality.
7. The case of the appellant requires to be examined in the aforesaid settled legal propositions. The Government order dated 15th June, 1985, provides for an agreement giving employment to those who are dispossessed of their land. It clearly provides that there will be preference to the dependants of persons whose land is acquired who have to be rehabilitated. However, it will apply only in case of class C and D employments in the industrial establishment for which the land had been acquired. It further provides for preference among the dependants of those persons. The relevant part of the same reads as under :
“Where the land for establishment of an industrial unit has been acquired, the preference shall be given for employment in the following sequence :
(a) those whose total land had been acquired ;
(b) those whose land had been acquired partly ; and
(c) those whose small part of the land had been acquired.”
8. In view of the above, it simply provides for preference in employment depending upon the area of land acquired.
9. The Government order dated 29th February, 1996, provides for a similar provision for employment of those persons who required rehabilitation because of their dispossession of the land by establishment of industrial unit by entering into the agreement as required under Section 41 of the Act. It further provides for giving preference being other things equal.
10. There is nothing on record to show as what was the total land owned and possessed by the petitioner ; how much of his land had been acquired ; and at what time the acquisition took place. Even in the application filed by the petitioner it has simply been mentioned that his land had been taken for establishment of the tube-well. Therefore, he was entitled for employment. The aforesaid Government order provides for preference being other things equal. Even otherwise, law is well-settled that preference can be given to a person when other things are equal. (Vide Government of Andhra Pradesh v. P. Dilip Kumar and Anr., (1993) 2 SCC 310 ; Executive Officer v. E. Tirupalu and Ors., (1996) 8 SCC 253 and Secretary, A. P. Public Service Commission v. Y.V.V.R. Srinivasulu and Ors., (2003) 5 SCC 341).
11. Even otherwise, the purpose of giving employment to those persons whose land had been acquired is to rehabilitate the persons who have been deprived of the right of their livelihood. Such a rehabilitation is required to be done immediately. As such an employment can be compared with the compassionate employment in service law, no relief can be claimed at such a belated stage.
12. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Butu Prasad Kumbhar and Ors. v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Ors., JT (1995) 3 SC 428, has held that the displaced persons due to acquisition of their land cannot claim preferential treatment for employment as a matter of right as there had been no violation of the fundamental rights of the tenure holders and their land had been acquired in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and they have received compensation for the same.
13. Similar view has been reiterated in Gas Authority of India v. State of U. P. and Ors., 2003 (6) AWC 5012 : (2004) 1 UPLBEC 731.
14. Thus, in view of the above, the sanctity of the aforesaid Government orders becomes doubtful.
15. In the instant case, writ petition has been filed with an inordinate delay, i.e., in 1996. Such employment cannot be claimed as a matter of right. It is not the case of the petitioner that any agreement had ever been reached under Section 41 of the Act or it had been published in the official Gazette. No employment can be had without such an agreement. The petitioner did not lay any factual foundation whatsoever, on the basis of which his claim can be tested. Appellant was duty bound to furnish material facts necessary to determine his case. As in a writ petition no evidence can be adduced orally, it becomes the duty of every litigant to provide proper pleadings and adduce the evidence to substantiate the same. Case cannot be decided on vague or incomplete pleadings (Vide B ha rat Singh and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors., AIR 1988 SC 2181 ; Larsen and Toubro Ltd., etc. v. State of Gujarat and Ors., AIR 1998 SC 1608 ; National Building Construction Corporation v. S. Raghunathan and Ors., AIR 1998 SC 2779 ; Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani and Ors., (1999) 1 SCC 141 ; Smt. Chitra Kumari v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 2001 SC 1237 ; State of U. P. v. Chandra Prakash Pandey, 2001 (2) AWC 1399 (SC) : AIR 2001 SC 1298 ; Atul Castings Ltd. v. Bawa Gurvachan Singh, AIR 2001 SC 1684 and Vithal N. Shetti and Anr. v. Prakash N. Rudrakar and Ors., (2003) 1 SCC 18).
16. In the instant case, as no pleadings whatsoever have been taken to establish the case, the controversy cannot be determined.
17. Appeal is devoid of any merit, and accordingly, dismissed.