ORDER
P. Ramakrishnam Raju, J.
1. The fourth respondent in O.S.No. 318 of 1989 on the file of the Additional Subordinate judge’s Court, Tirupati is the petitioner in this revision. He is questioning the order made in LA.No. 10l/92 in O.S.No. 318/89, dt.3-12-1992, wherein, the learned Subordinate Judge recorded a compromise between the plaintiff- D.3 and the proposed plaintiff Nos. 2 to 5 in respect of a part of subject-matter of the suit. The other defendants, admittedly, are not parties to the said compromise and the suit is still pending in all other respects.
2. It is necessary to narrate a few relevant facts, The first respondent who is the plaintiff – His Holiness Sri Srimad Abhindva Ramanuja Brahma Thanthra Swathanthra Parakala Swamiji Mathadhipathi of Parakala Mutt, represented by its General Power of Attorney Holder – N. Nar.asimha Reddy (hereinafter referred to as ‘Parakala Mutt’) filed the suit for a permanent injunction against the defendant Nos.l to 4 who are the respondent Nos. 6 to 8 and the petitioner herein, respectively.
3. The plaintiff’s case is that Parakala Mutt has a 1/4th share in Ac.7.70 cents wet in Survey No. 145; Ac.48.60 cents wet in S.No. 147/1 and Ac.13.35 cents dry in S.No. 148/2 of Avilala village, Chittoor District, which comes to Acs.17 and odd and as the defendants are interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff, the suit was filed for the relief of permanent injunction. By virtue of General power executed by Mathadhipathi, the suit was filed by the General power of Attorney Holder. The defendant Nos. 2 to 4 are contesting the suit. While so, respondent Nos. 2 to 5 herein, filed an application – l.A.No. 586 of 1990 to implead them as plaintiff Nos. 2 to 5 in the suit on the ground that they have purchased Ac.2.00 cents of land in S.No. 148/2 from the plaintiff and therefore, they are proper and necessary parties to the suit. The 8th respondent herein, who is the third defendant in the suit filed I.A.No. 101 /92 under Order 23, Rule 3 C.P.C. for recording a compromise with the proposed plaintiff Nos. 2 to 5 and himself along with the plaintiff, having entered into a compromise in respect of the said Ac.2.00 cents of land. 1, hat compromise, the 8th respondent agreed to take Ac.l .50 cents of land while the proposed plaintiff Nos. 2 to 5 will be given Ac.0.50 cents. The lower Court recorded the compromise on 3-2-1992. This order is challenged in this revision.
4. Sri P.S. Narayana, learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the suit itself is not maintainable since the plaintiff is not properly represented in the suit, inasmuch as the Mathadhipathi of Parakala Mutt has revoked the General power in favour of Narasimha Reddy on 8-1-1990. The Mathadhipathi of Parakala Mutt has executed a sale deed dated 17-3-1990 for the entire suit schedule property in favour of the petitioner and General Power of Attorney was also ‘given to the petitioner by deed dated 20-3-1990 by the said Mathadhipathi. That apart under Order 23, Rule 3 of Civil Procedure Code, a compromise can be effected only between the parties to the suit and not between some parties to the suit, and strangers. The learned Counsel relied upon a decision reported in B.D.M, Rao v. Co-op. Industries Estates, AIR 1975 A.P.305 for the proposition that a Court making a decree by consent, would be performing a judicial act and not a ministerial act. The Court must apply its mind and examine the terms of settlement with care and caution before recording the compromise or before ordering the petition for compromise, since recording of compromise is not purely a formal affair but a question of substance.
5. Inasmuch as the proposed plaintiffs 2 to 5 who are the respondent Nos. 2 to 5 herein, are not impleaded as parties and their application is still pending; they have no locus standi to enter into a compromise and that the lower Court has no jurisdiction to record the compromise. The learned Counsel also con tended that the petitioner is one of the defendants in the suit; no compromise could be effected without notice to him inasmuch as, he is claiming interest in the entire plaint schedule property.
6. Sri M.P. Chandramouli, learned Counsel for the respondents, countered these arguments saying that the revocation of the General Power in favour of Mr. Narasimha Reddy, sale deed dated 17-3-1990 as well as the subsequent deed of General Power are all manipulated and fraudulently obtained by the petitioner and that there is no bar under Order 23, Rule 3 C.P.C. for the parties to enter into such a compromise and for the Court to record the same. He also contended that the extent of Ac.2.00 cents which is the subject-matter of the compromise, cannot be disputed by the petitioner and therefore, the lower Court has rightly recorded the compromise.
7. The disputed questions viz., whether the General Power of Attorney in favour of Mr. Narasimha Reddy is revoked; whether the revocation deed dated 8-1-1990 is valid and whether die registered sale deed dated 17-34990 and the deed of General Power dated 20-3-1990, are true, valid and binding are all matters which have to be considered by the trial Court at the appropriate stage, since the suit is still pending. Therefore, I do not propose to go into those questions in this revision,
8. The only question that falls for consideration in this revision is, whether the lower Court is justified in recording the compromise in question.
9. The provision under Order 23, Rule 3 C.P.C. may be usefully extracted hereunder:-
Order 23,xxxxxxxxxx.
Rule 32 xxxxxxxxxx.
Rule 3. “Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by. any lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject matter of the suit:”
Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment.
Explanation:- An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872) shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule.
10. Order 23, Rule 3 C.P.C. does not expressly say by whom the application itself should be put in. Presumbly it is a party to the suit that has to apply to the Court to record an alleged compromise as an adjustment of the suit wholly or in part.
11. This rule contemplates an order recording lawful agreement, compromise or satisfaction and passing of a decree in accordance therewith so far it relates to the parties to the suit. Hence the words “so far it relates to the parties to the suit” occurring in the said rule do not leave any doubt that recording of an agreement or compromise or passing a decree accordingly shall be between the parties to the suit only. Admittedly,I.A.No. 586/90,anapplicationfor impleading respondent Nos. 2 to 5 herein as plaintiff Nos. 2 to 5 in the suit, is pending. The trial Court has recorded the compromise even before considering the application for impleading these respondents as parties to the suit. If ultimately the trial Court finds that the proposed plaintiffs are not proper or necessary parties to the suit, then what would be the effect of the compromise recorded by the lower Court in the suit between them and some of the parties to the suit? Would it not amount to passing a decree against strangers? When the Court is not competent to pass a decree against strangers to the suit, is it competent to pass a compromise decree against strangers? Certainly not. When they could not implead themselves as parties how could they seek or suffer a decree in the suit through compromise?
12. Somewhat a similar situation has arisen in a case reported in Seethai Achi v. Meyappa, AIR 1934 Madras 337. The plaintiff therein, filed an application to withdraw the suit, while an application for impleading third party in the suit and also an application for compromise are pending. A Bench of the Madras High Court observed therein as follows:-
“A stranger to the suit, though he is a party to the compromise will not be allowed to apply for its enforcement in that suit without he being impleaded in it as a party.”
In view of this authority, I have no doubt in my mind that a stranger to the suit cannot be a party to the compromise. The proper course in such a situation is to consider the application for impleading the strangers as parties to the suit before the question of recording the compromise is taken up, so that the anomaly of recording a compromise between the strangers and some of the parties, when the said strangers are found to be not proper or necessary parties in the suit ultimately, can be avoided.
13. Therefore, the impugned order recording compromise by the lower Court in the present case is liable to be set-aside. Since I have taken the view that the compromise already recorded on 3-2-1992 has to be set-aside, I feel that the petitioner should be given an opportunity to oppose the said compromise if it affects his rights in any way. Therefore, I set aside the order recording the compromise in I.A.No. 101/92 in O.S.No. 318/89 on the file of the Additional Subordinate Judge’s Court, Tirupati dated 3-2-1992 and remand the matter to the said Court for fresh disposal according to law, after disposal of LA. No. 586/90 filed for impleading the proposed plaintiff Nos. 2 to 5 after giving an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner herein.
14. The Civil Revision Petition is accordingly, allowed and the matter is remanded back to the lower Court.