JUDGMENT
G.S. Singhvi, J.
1. Although the prayers made in these petitions are not identical, we are deciding them by one order because the order of resumption of site No. 15, Sector 15-A, Chandigarh, which is the foundation of action taken for ejectment of the petitioners is common to both the cases.
2. The facts necessary for deciding these petitions are that house built on site No. 15, Sector 15-A, Chandigarh was ordered to be resumed by the Assistant Estate Officer, exercising the powers of the Estate Officer, Chandigarh under Section 8-A, of the Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act. 1952 (hereinafter referred to as ‘1952’ Act’) as amended by Chandigarh Amendment Act No. 17 of 1973. The appeal filed by the petitioner, Dr. Mohinder Verma, who was one of the tenants in the said house, against the order of resumption, was dismissed by the Chief Administrator, Union Territory, Chandigarh on July 17, 1990. His revision petition was dismissed on 6.5.1992 by the Adviser to the Administrator, Union Territory, Chandigarh, exercising the powers of the State Government. In the meantime, proceedings under Sections 4 and 5 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1971 Act’) were initiated against the petitioners Mohinder Verma, Krishan Lal Thakur and against the other tenants as well as the owner Shri Waryam Singh. After issuing notices to them, the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Chandigarh, exercising the powers of the Estate Officer under the Act of 1971, issued order dated 26.9.1989 directing the ejectment of the petitioners and others. The appeals filed by all the tenants were dismissed by the learned District Judge, Chandigarh on 13.1.1992.
3. The petitioner, Mohinder Verma, has challenged the order of resumption primarily on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice. He has pleaded that notice and opportunity of hearing was not given to him before the Assistant Estate Officer passed the resumption order. He has also challenged the order passed under the Act of 1971 on the ground that the resumed site cannot be treated as public premises for the purpose of the 1971 Act.
4. The petitioner, Krishan Lal and Ram Asra, who is now represented by his legal representatives have also challenged the impugned order on similar grounds. The respondents have, for the reasons best known to them, not filed written statement to either of these petitions.
5. We have heard Shri G.K. Chatrath, Senior Advocate in support of Civil Writ Petition No. 1086 of 1992 and Shri O.P. Arora, counsel for the petitioners in Civil Writ Petition No. 1499 of 1992 and Shri Sanjay Kaushal and K.S. Gill, counsel for the respondents. The main argument of Shri Chatrath and by Shri Arora is that the order of resumption passed by the Assistant Estate Officer should be quashed on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice. Learned counsel submitted that no notice or opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioners before the order of resumption was passed even though the authorities of the Estate Office were aware of the fact that they were tenants in the premises. Learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 to 3 admitted that notice and opportunity of hearing was not given to the petitioners but argued that in law no such notice or opportunity of hearing was required to be given to the petitioners and the order passed by the Assistant Estate Officer, after giving notice and opportunity of hearing to the land owner who has been found guilty of misuse of the premises cannot be set aside on the ground of non-issuance of notices to the tenants.
6. In our opinion, the argument of learned counsel for the petitioners merits acceptance in view of the decision of the Full Bench in Brij Mohan v. Chief Administrator, (1980)82 P.L.R. 621 (F.B.) and Anr. decision of the Division Bench in Surat Singh v. State of Haryana, A.I.R. 1991 P&H 112. In Brij Mohan’s case (supra), the Full Bench considered the provisions of the 1952 Act and held that the owner as well as the occupier are entitled to be heard before an order of resumption can be passed. This proposition has been followed by the Division Bench while interpreting Section 17 of the Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977 in Surat Singh’s case (supra).
7. The record of the case also shows that the petitioner-Mohinder verma had raised the plea of absence of notice in the appeal before the appellant and the revisional authorities but they brushed aside the same without assigning cogent reasons.
8. In view of our conclusion that the order of resumption passed by the Assistant Estate Officer is liable to be quashed on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice, the orders passed by the competent authority under the Act of 1971 and the judgment of the learned District Judge, which are based on the order of resumption are also liable to be quashed.
9. For the reasons mentioned above, the writ petitions are allowed. The orders passed by the Assistant Estate Officer, the Chief Administrator and the Adviser to the Administrator, Union Territory, Chandigarh under the Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952 are quashed. The order passed by the Sub Divisional Officer under Section 5 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 is also quashed. The judgment of the learned District Judge, Chandigarh, dismissing the appeals filed by the petitioners is set aside. The case is remanded to the competent authority for fresh decision in accordance with law. The petitioners are directed to appear before the Assistant Estate Officer on August 31, 1998, who should also give fresh notice to the other tenants, if any, and the owner of the property and pass fresh orders after giving opportunity of hearing to all of them. The petitioners are given liberty to show to the competent authority that the misuse, which led to the initiation of the proceedings under 1952 Act no longer subsists and, therefore, order of resumption may not be passed against them.
10. Copy of the order be given dasti on payment of fee prescribed for urgent application.
Sd/- Iqbal Singh, J.
ORDER DATED 24th August, 1998.
Since the files of these cases could not be sent to the Registry for about 15 days, we direct that the petitioners shall now appear before the competent authority on 15.9.1998.