ORDER
1. The petitioner claims to be the tenant of the 2nd respondent. In this writ petition, she wants a prerogative writ directing the 2nd respondent to approach the Rent Controller under Section 12 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (hereinafter called the ‘Rent Act’).
2. A reading of the writ affidavit shows that no particular relief is sought against the 1st respondent and the relief is sought only against a private person who is admittedly the landlord. Even in a suit for specific relief, it is well settled that no body can be compelled either to desist from approaching the Court or to approach a legal Forum with a particular remedy. It is left to the exercise of the choice of person to avail such remedies as are available in law.
3. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the landlord requested the tenants to vacate the premises. When they refused he invented, it is alleged a clever method of approaching the 1st respondent to take action under the provisions of Section 456 of the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1955 (for short ‘the HMC Act’) read with the Andhra Pradesh Municipal Corporations Act, 1994. This according to the petitioner is illegal.
4. Two submissions are made. First, he submits that when a building is bona fide required for carrying out repairs, alterations or additions which cannot be carried out without the building vacated, the landlord has to approach the Rent Controller and seek appropriate orders. When such an application under Section 12 of the Rent Act is made, the Rent Controller shall not pass art order permiting the landlord to reerect the building unless the landlord gives
an undertaking to the Rent Controller that the building on completion of the repairs, alterations or additions be offered to the same tenant who delivered such possession pursuant to an order under sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Rent Act. According to the petitioner, when such a procedure is provided by special enactment, the 1st respondent at the instance of the 2nd respondent cannot resort to a remedy under the HMC Act.
5. Secondly it is submitted that the building known as ‘Padma building’ is not in such a dangerous or dilapidated condition that it requires immediate demolition under Section 456 of the HMC Act.
6. The learned Standing Counsel for the 1st respondent submits that in this particular area, the 1st respondent has undertaken road widening work. As and when the road is to be widened in front of Padma building, one tenant or the other is approaching the Court and stalling the work. He also submits that as and when any decision is taken to demolish Padma Building, due procedure of law will be followed as contained under Section 456 of the HMC Act. The said section permits the Commissioner of Municipal Corporation to order for fencing off, taking down, securing or repairing the structure if there is urgent and imminent danger of the ruinous structure falling down even before giving notice or in a case where notice is issued, even before expiry of the notice period.
7. The provisions of Section 12 of the Rent Act are attracted when the Rent Controller on an application made by the landlord is satisfied that the tenanted building is reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for carrying out repairs, alterations or additions which cannot be carried out without the building vacated whereas the provisions of Section 456 of the HMC Act operate in a different environment. If it appears to the Commissioner of Corporation that any structure, building etc., is in a
ruinous condition or likely to fall or in a way dangerous to any person occupying, resorting to or passing by such structure may be ordered to be pulled down, ordered to be secured properly or ordered to be removed or ordered to be repaired. However, before taking any action under sub-section (1) of Section 456 as indicated herein, there is an obligation on the Commissioner to issue written notice to the owner or occupier. Therefore in my considered opinion, insofar as the matters connected with lease, rent and eviction of buildings, the Rent Act is applicable and to that extent, it is a special ‘aw. In relation to the provisions of Section 456 of the HMC Act which deals and which is more concerned with public interest, the interest of occupiers, owners and passers by, the Rent Act is not a special law. In respect of a building which is in ruinous condition, the special provision in the HMC Act is Section 456. Therefore, there is no obligation on the Commissioner of Municipal Corporation to advise the landlord to approach the Rent Controller under Section 12 of the Rent Act. Similarly, any objection by an occupier (tenant) filed before the Commissioner on the ground of Section 12 of the Rent Act is of no avail. If the fall of building is imminent, the law permits the Commissioner to take necessary action. The very purpose of the HMC Act or any Municipal Act is the welfare of the people not for the welfare of a tenant who is trying to protect only his tenancy and his right to carry on some business. Right to life by the passers by should be given precedence over the right of the tenant to carry on the business. In a given situation even when an application under Section 12 of the Rent Act is pending, still Commissioner can take an action under Section 456 of the HMC Act.
8. The procedure contemplated under Section 456 of the HMC Act is a reasonable one. Even before a notice is issued by the
Commissioner, the petitioner has approached this Court. In fact, if the objections filed by the tenants are rejected by the Commissioner, whether the building requires to be demolished or removed is a question of fact which requires to be proved or disproved based on the relevant evidence. At this stage, no evidence is placed before this Court to record a finding that the building is not in a dilapidated condition. The averment in the reply notice issued by the 2nd respondent’s advocate does not be taken to be an admission by the landlord that the building is in a tenable and habitable condition. Indeed, it is not seriously disputed that in the legal notice dated 1-10-1999 issued by the petitioner herself such an allegation is not made. Therefore, in this writ petition the petitioner cannot be allowed to raise the ground that the 2nd respondent is trying to by pass the provisions of Section 12 of the Rent Act. As already found by me, Section 12 of the Rent Act and Section 456 of the HMC Act operate in different fields and they should be allowed to have their full play.
9. In every case of ‘imminent falling down’ of a dilapidated building if a landlord is to be compelled to approach the Rent Controller and obtain orders for demolition, the same would make Section 456 of the HMC Act redundant. If landlord and tenant collude, they can even defeat provisions of Section 456 of the HMC Act, by approaching Rent Controller under Section 12 of the Rent Act by successfully preventing demolition by Commissioner even wherein there is threat to life of inhabitants as well as passers by. Therefore, harmoniously constructing both of them, I am of the considered opinion that if the landlord wants to make repairs, alterations or additions or wants to have new building, then only provisions of Section 12 of the Act attract. Notwithstanding this, if the Municipal Commissioner wants to order for demolition or order for securing properly or order for repairs of the old building-even in a situation
where such an order is passed on the application of the landlord-the considerations are different i.e., the paramount public interest. Therefore, the submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner cannot be countenanced by this Court.
10. However, it should be in the interests of justice that the Commissioner should take necessary steps and come to an objective conclusion before any action is taken under Section 456 of the HMC Act. If the land is to be acquired for the purpose of road widening, the authorities should take necessary action in accordance with law.
11. In the result, I do not find any reason to admit the writ petition. The writ petition is dismissed.