JUDGMENT
K. Govindarajan, J.
1. In all these Second Appeals, the tenants under the respondent/plaintiff who suffered a decree for possession, have filed these Second Appeals.
2. As the issue involved is common, I am inclined to deal with all these Second Appeals jointly.
3. It is not in dispute that the appellants are the tenants and the respondent/plaintiff is the landlord. On the ground that the terms of the tenancy had already expired and the rent was not paid in spite of repeated demands, notices were issued to the tenants to surrender possession of the suit properties. Since no reply was given and no amount was paid, the respondent/plaintiff filed the respective suits for recovery of possession of the suit properties from the appellants/tenants. The same was contested by the appellants/tenants stating that their rights are protected under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1960 as amended by the Act 23 of 1973, herein after called the Rent Control Act 1960, and so the suits cannot be sustained.
4. The trial Court after accepting the case of the respondent/plaintiff decreed the suits and on appeal by the appellants/tenants, the same was confirmed by the lower appellate Court. Hence these Second Appeals.
5. The substantial question of law that arises for consideration in these Second Appeals is:-
Whether the suits filed for recovery of possession of the suit properties against the appellants/tenants at the instance of the respondent/plaintiff are maintainable in law?
6. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants/tenants submitted that the buildings in question are not exempted under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, hereinafter called “the Rent Control Act, 1960” and so the suits cannot be maintained before the civil Court and so the decrees passed without jurisdiction also cannot be sustained. He also referred to the fact that subsequently the respondent/plaintiff had issued a notice under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Public Premises (Eviction of unauthorised occupants) Act, 1975, hereinafter called “the Public Premises Act, 1975”. Even under the Public Premises Act 1975, the suits are barred. On that basis, learned Senior Counsel submitted that on either grounds civil Court cannot have any jurisdiction to pass a decree for possession against the appellants as claimed by the respondent/plaintiff.
7. Mr. Parthasarathy, Learned counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff submitted that the common law remedy to file a suit before the civil Court is always available to parties, if the suit is not specifically barred. Under the Public Premises Act, 1975 filing of suit is barred under Sec. 15, and under Sec. 18, the provisions of the Rent Control Act 1960 also shall not apply to the buildings in question. Since estate officer has not been notified till 1999 with respect to the area in question, the respondent/plaintiff was not able to enforce the provisions of the Public Premises Act, 1975 and in such circumstances, the respondent/plaintiff is entitled to approach the civil Court for appropriate remedy.
8. Sec. 2(a) of the Public Premises Act, 1975 defines “corporate authority” which includes local authority also. “Public premises” is defined under Sec. 2(e) of the Public Premises Act, 1975 which also includes premises belonging to or vested in a local authority. It is denied that the respondent/plaintiff is a local authority for the purpose of applying the provisions of the Public Premises Act, 1975. So in view of Sec. 18 of the Public Premises Act, 1975, the provisions of the Rent Control Act 1960 have no application to the buildings of the respondent/plaintiff unless it is exempted by the Government under Sec.19 of the Public Premises Act 1975. No such notification was pointed out before this Court.
9. Though under Sec. 16 of the Public Premises Act, 1975 civil Court is barred from entertaining the suits in respect of eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of public premises or recovery of arrears of rent, in this case, as submitted by learned counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff, the estate officer has not been notified by the Government exercising powers under Sec.3 of the Public Premises Act, 1975 and the eviction of the occupants can be taken under Sections 4 and 5 of the Public Premises Act, 1975 only if the estate officer is appointed. In the absence of any estate officer as notified by the Government, the provisions of the Public Premises Act, 1975 cannot invoked or enforced. Though the Public Premises Act, 1975 is applicable to the buildings of the respondent/plaintiff, in the absence of any machinery to enforce the said Act, according to learned counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff, they can always approach the civil Court under Sec. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
10. Civil Court is having jurisdiction to try all suits except suits which are expressly or impliedly barred. At the same time, exclusion of jurisdiction of civil Courts is not to be readily inferred. It is well settled that if a statute creates an effective machinery for deciding the issue and to grant relief, then by necessary implication, it bars the maintainability of civil Suit. In this case, though such a statute was enacted, the machinery to enforce the provisions was not put into motion by the Government by issuing notification. So, it cannot be said that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in such circumstances is barred and so the respondent/plaintiff have correctly approached the civil court seeking recovery of possession of the suit properties from the appellants/defendants.
11. But, as submitted by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants/defendants, even when the suits were pending before the trial Court, the Government passed the order in G.O.Ms. No. 49, dated 3.3.1999 appointing the Estate Officer for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Public Premises Act 1975 with respect to the buildings in question and on that basis, learned Senior Counsel submitted that in view of such appointment, the civil Court has lost its jurisdiction to try the suits after the issuance of the said Government Order and also in view of Section 15 of the Public Premises Act 1975. I find some force in the said arguments. Though the learned District Munsif had jurisdiction to entertain the suits at the time of institution of the suits, in view of the above said Government Order creating machinery to enforce the provisions of the Public Premises Act 1975 by appointing the Estate Officer, the civil court’s jurisdiction is ousted in view of the bar under Sec.15 of the Public Premises Act 1975.
12. While considering the notification issued subsequent to the filing of the suit for eviction including the area in question within the purview the Rent Control Act 1960, the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in the decision in Kuruvilla Abraham v. John, 1995(1) KLT 161, following the decisions of the Apex Court in Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra and in M/s. East India Corporation Ltd., v. Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd., , has held that in view of the subsequent notification, the civil Court lacked jurisdiction to try the suit for eviction of the appellants from the building and so the decree has to be set aside. The above said judgment of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court applies in full force to the present case as the facts are similar. It is not in dispute that subsequent to the filing of the suits, the Government issued notification appointing the Estate Officer so as to enable the respondent/plaintiff to take proceedings under the provisions of the Public Premises Act 1975. As a matter of fact, as submitted by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, notices were issued under the Public Premises Act 1975.
13. In view of the above discussion, the order of eviction passed by the civil Court cannot be sustained. Hence the judgments and decrees made in A.S. Nos. 177 and 208 of 1999 and 73/1997, dated 28.8.2002, 28.8.2002 and 3.12.1997 confirming the judgments and decrees made in O.S. Nos. 1043/1995, 581/1988 and 1299/1996 on the file of the Courts below are set aside and these Second Appeals are allowed accordingly. No costs. Connected C.M.Ps., are closed.