IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED :: 12-04-2011 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE V.DHANAPALAN W.P.Nos.14082 OF 2004, 13342 OF 2009 AND 14792 OF 2009 W.P.No.14082/2004 : M.Govindan ... Petitioner -vs- 1.The Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Land Administration, Chepauk, Chennai-5. 2.The Settlement Officer, Chepauk, Chennai-5. 3.The Assistant Settlement Officer, Thiruvannamalai. 4.The Commissioner, Corporation of Chennai, Rippon Buildings, Chennai-600 03. 5.S.Andal ... Respondents
W.P.No.13342/2009 :
M.Govindan ... Petitioner
-vs-
1.The Commissioner,
Corporation of Chennai,
Rippon Buildings,
Chennai-600 03.
2.The Assistant Engineer,
V Zone,
Corporation of Chennai,
E.V.R.Salai,
Chennai-600 010. ... Respondents
W.P.No.14792/2009 :
S.Andal ... Petitioner
-vs-
1.The Commissioner,
Corporation of Chennai,
Rippon Building,
Chennai-600 003.
2.The Zonal Officer/Assistant Commissioner,
Zone V, Corporation of Chennai,
Poonamallee High Road,
Kilpauk, Chennai-600 001.
3.The Assistant Engineer,
Ward No.67, Corporation of Chennai,
Shenoy Nagar,
Chennai-600 030. ... Respondents
Petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
For petitioner in W.P.Nos.14082/2004 & 13342/2009 :
Mr.T.K.Kulasekaran.
For petitioner in W.P.No.14792/2009 :Mr.V.Jayaprakash Narayanan
For respondents 1 to 3 in W.P.No.14082/2004 : Mr.S.Gopinathan,
Addl.Govt.Pleader.
For respondent 4 in W.P.No.14082/2004, respondents 1 & 2 in W.P.No.13342/2009 and respondents 1 to 3 in W.P.No.14792/2009 : Mr.P.S.Raman,
Advocate General,
assisted by Mr.G.T.Subramaniam.
For respondent 5 in W.P.No.14082/2004 : No appearance.
COMMON ORDER
W.P.No.14082 of 2004 has been filed praying for issuance of a writ of certiorari to call for the records of the first respondent in his proceedings R.Dis.(K1)51525/2001, dated 05.04.2004 and quash the same.
2. W.P.No.13342 of 2009 has been filed praying for issuance of a writ of mandamus, forbearing the respondents or their men, agents and servants from in any way interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the petitioner with respect to the property bearing Survey No.39 (part) and 40/5 (part), New T.S.No.1, Block No.15, at No.77,Periakudal village, Egmore Nungambakkam Taluk, to an extent of about 72 cents and for a direction to respondents to reconstruct the demolished temple originally situated on the land belonging to the petitioner besides replacing the deities numbering 10 or in the alternative to award a compensation of Rs.5.00 lakhs.
3. W.P.No.14792 of 2009 has been filed praying for issuance of a writ of mandamus, forbearing the respondents from in any way interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the land situated at Old Survey No.39 (part) and 40/5 (part), New T.S.No.1, Block No.15, at No.77,Periakudal village, Egmore Nungambakkam Taluk, to an extent of about 72 cents and pay compensation for the loss due to the inaction of the respondents.
4. Since all these Writ Petitions contain identical issues, they are being disposed of in common. For the sake of convenience, let us take the facts in W.P.No.14082 of 2004. The petitioner and four others applied before the third respondent under Section 11 (a) of the Tamil Nadu (Estate Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act,1948 (Tamil Nadu Act 26/48), hereinafter referred to as “the Act” for grant of patta in respect of the land in Old S.No.39 part and 40/5 part, New T.S.No.1, Block No.15, measuring an extent of 72 cents in Periakudal village, Egmore, Nungambakkam Taluk. The third respondent had, after conducting an enquiry and field inspection, passed an order in his proceedings No.S.R.2/2001, dated 13.03.2001, allowing patta for the said land in favour of the petitioner and four others. The petitioner and four others have been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the land before the notified date and they have purchased the said land from the persons who have got patta in respect of the said land before the notified date.
5. While so, the first respondent has issued a show cause notice, dated 13.03.2002, whereby it was proposed to initiate suo-motu revision under the said Act to consider the question of revising the order of third respondent and, thereafter, the first respondent passed the impugned order, setting aside the order of the third respondent. Hence, the present Writ Petition.
6. Petitioner in W.P.No.14792 of 2009 is the joint owner of the property and in absolute possession and enjoyment of the property measuring an extent of 72 cents bearing Old Survey No.39 (part) and 40/5 (part), New T.S.No.1, Block No.15, at No.77, Periakudal village, Egmore Nungambakkam Taluk. She submits that originally the property belonged to one Muthu and one Gopalsamy Chetty, who had pattas bearing Nos.17 and 30 respectively. The ‘A’ Register is also reflecting these entries. She purchased the above property by way of an unregistered sale deed dated 05.10.1952. She is paying the urban land tax in respect of the above said property and is in enjoyment of the same. In the said property, a temple was constructed by the owners named ‘Muthumariammal Temple’ and ‘Sarveguarar Koil’ for the devotion of the joint family and public in general. While so, the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Land Administration, Chennai, issued a show cause notice dated 13.03.2002 in Na.Ka.No.K1/51525/01 whereby they proposed to initiate suo motu revision under the Act. Subsequently, by the order dated 05.04.2004, the patta was set aside. Thereafter, the respondents tried to encroach the above property. Hence, a suit was filed in O.S.No.8243 of 2006 before the XIII Assistant City Civil Court, Chennai, for a permanent injunction restraining the respondents, their men, agents, servants or any one acting under them from in any way interfering and dispossessing the petitioner’s peaceful possession and enjoyment of the said property and the said suit was decreed in favour of the petitioner. To the shock and surprise of the petitioner, the respondents along with their men, with the assistance of police entered the property and highhandedly demolished the temple and also superstructure put up by the petitioner in spite of the petitioner’s protest, which act of the respondents is illegal. Hence, the Writ Petition.
7. Respondents have filed a counter affidavit, stating that the petitioner and four others preferred a petition dated nil before the then Assistant Settlement Officer, Thiruvannamalai, for grant of patta for the land in Old S.No.39 part 40/5 part (New T.S.No.1, Block 15) measuring an extent of 0.72 acres of land in Periakudal Village, stating that they have jointly purchased the property in the year 1952; the then Assistant Settlement Officer, Thirivannamalai, allegedly conducted an enquiry and passed orders, allowing patta under Section 11 (a) of the Act, dated 13.03.2001, which orders are without any authority, jurisdiction and without following procedural rules; therefore, the Settlement Officer, Chennai, in his letter C1/3251/2001, dated 27.06.2001, has recommended to review the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer, Thiruvannamalai. Accordingly, the case was taken up for review under the powers vested with the Commissioner of Land Administration and after following due procedure, the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer was cancelled, as the same was illegal.
8. It is the stand of the respondents that the beneficiaries of the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer were reluctant in receiving the show cause notice. However, the Tahsildar, Nungambakkam, has served the notice on 15.04.2002 to the concerned persons. On receipt of show cause notice, the said persons namely Thiru M.Govindan, Tmt.Kunjaramma, Tmt.Rakkamma, Tmt.S.Andal and Thiru V.Mydeen Kutty have filed a petition on 22.01.2004 in person and requested not to cancel the Assistant Settlement Officer’s orders, stating that Thiru V.Mydeen Kutty has purchased the land through an unregistered document in the year 1952 and there onwards the land is in their continuous possession. Thereafter, the said persons have been examined in detail and it was found that the claimants have no proof and evidence to show that they are entitled for grant of patta for which the Assistant Settlement Officer has no jurisdiction and therefore the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Land Administration has set aside the orders of the Assistant settlement Officer. Even though the village was zamindari, the then Assistant Settlement Officer ought to have obtained copies of S.F.1, S.F.7 and S.F.10 and other connected records, before arriving at a conclusion whether he has jurisdiction to pass any orders. The Assistant Settlement Officer has no locus standi to change the classification of the land which was settled as Government Poramboke, Chennai Corporation, which was beyond his jurisdiction and authority. The petitioner has not complied with the prerequisite condition that the land should be a ryoti land and it should be claimed by a ryot and ought to have been included in the land holder’s chitta and the claimant to the patta should have cultivated the land and proved that the land was in his ancestral occupation and no such document was placed by the petitioner for consideration by the authority.
9. Fourth respondent, namely, Corporation of Chennai has filed a counter, stating that it is the absolute owner of the petitioned properties and the said land in Survey No.T.S.No.2 of Block No.16 was handed over to the Corporation by the then Collector of Madras on 09.04.1953. As per the revenue records, the town survey register also stood in the name of Chennai Corporation and therefore the proceedings of the Assistant Settlement Officer was totally behind the back of the respondents and the said order was erroneous and as such the Special Commissioner has cancelled it on suo motu revision. The validity of the order of the Special Commissioner was challenged before this Court without impleading the owner of the property only for the purpose of grabbing the property. It is also specifically stated in the counter that the alleged sale deed of the year 1952 relied upon by the Assistant Settlement Officer is totally fabricated and mentioning of T.S.No.1 and Block No.15 itself is clear that the document was created, as the said numbers were given only subsequent to the inclusion of the village in the city in the year 1977.
10. Learned counsel for the petitioner attacks the impugned order on the grounds that (i) the first respondent has no locus standi to initiate suo motu revision to cancel the patta granted to the petitioner; (ii) the show cause notice does not contain the reference of the second respondent; (iii) the proceedings initiated by the first respondent are time-barred and (iv) no opportunity of being heard was given to the petitioner, before passing the impugned order. He would cite the following authorities:
(i) The Director of Survey and Settlement v. Ramadoss, 1992 (2) L. W.265 :
“4.We, judges, in our endeavour to solve a problem presented before us, are not supposed to search for the true intention of the legislature beyond the language used by it. The only repository of legislature’s intention is the language it has used. While examining the language, judges always presume that the legislature is well acquainted with the accepted vocabulary of legislative bodies and so known what words are required and considered apt to effect a particular result. If it has not made a provision or used words from which a particular result can properly be found, Judges will not be in order and justified in finding it, on the simple ground, a contrary result would cause hardship to one or the other of the parties. Buller,J. in Jones v. Smart said cansees omissus can in no case be supplied by a court of law, for that would be to make laws”. These principles, which have been recognised and followed by pronouncements of courts all through this country and elsewhere, tells us that it is not for the respondent to assume a suo motu power of revision when there has not been conferring of such power by the specific terms of the Act and the rules framed thereunder. Assessed thus, we could not have any ambiguity in our mind that the respondent lacked suo motu power of revision.
5. However, Mr.K.Ravirajapandian, learned Additional Government Pleader, appearing for the respondent, would endeavour to submit that such a restricted construction of the provisions of the Act and the Rules is not warranted so as to spell out for the respondent suo motu powers of revision. In this connection, the learned Additional Government Pleader drew our attention to a pronouncement of a Bench of this Court in The Board of Revenue, Madras v. K.G.Prema Kalyani and others. In that case, the learned single Judge, who heard the matter initially was concerned with the exercise of power of revision by the Board of Revenue under S.7(c) of the Act for which there is no period of limitation prescribed. Yet, the learned single Judge ventured to pose for himself a question as to whether the Board could revise an order, after lapse of long time and he answered it by stating that a line should be drawn at the conclusion of the Settlement Proceedings under S.22 of the Act. This view of the learned single Judge was not accepted by the Bench and the Bench opined that when the legislature did not think fit to provide for limitation for exercise of the power under S.7(c) of the Act, the Court cannot take upon itself to prescribe the period of limitation. It is true there is an observation that the exercise of the power could as well be suo motu as the Board might to choose. But, we cannot take that as the ratio decidendi of the pronouncement because on facts the Bench was not at all called upon to decide that question specifically.”
(ii) K.Krishnan v. The Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Land Administration and 2 others, 2007 Writ L.R.1016 :
“6.The term opportunity includes all facts of time, place and personal conduct which make it corporally possible for a given person to have been present and doing the act, and also all facts which make it less possible corporally for some other person to have been present and doing it (Field’s of law of Evidence,10th Edition 1970, Volume 1, Page NO.498.
In (M/s.Fedco (P) Ltd and another vs. S.N.Bilgrami and others) AIR 1960 SC 415, the Honourable Supreme Court held in para Nos.8 and 9 thus :-
“8.The requirement that a reasonable opportunity of being heard must be given has two elements. The first is that an opportunity to be heard must be given; the second is that this opportunity must be reasonable. Both these matters are justiciable and it is for the Court to decide whether an opportunity has been given and whether that opportunity has been reasonable…..
9.There can be no invariable standard for reasonableness in such matters except that the Court’s conscience must be satisfied, that the person against whom an action is proposed has had a fair chance of convincing the authority who proposes to take action against him that the grounds on which the action is proposed are either non-existent or even if they exist they do not justify the proposed action. The decision of this question will necessarily depend upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case, including the nature of the action proposed, the grounds on which the action is proposed, the material on which the allegations are based, the attitude of the party against whom the action is proposed in showing cause against such proposed action, the nature of the plea raised by him in reply, the requests for further opportunity that may be made, his admissions by conduct or otherwise of some or all the allegations and all other matters which help the mind in coming to a fair conclusion on the question….”
(iii) Uma Nath Pandey v. State of U.P., 2009 (2) CTC 185 :
“8. The adherence to principles of natural justice as recognised by all civilised States is of supreme importance when a quasi-judicial body embarks on determining disputes between the parties, or any administrative action involving civil consequences is in issue. These principles are well settled. The first and foremost principle is what is commonly known as audi alteram partem rule. It says that no one should be condemned unheard. Notice is the first limb of this principle. It must be precise and unambiguous. It should apprise the party determinatively of the case he has to meet. Time given for the purpose should be adequate so as to enable him to make his representation. In the absence of a notice of the kind and such reasonable opportunity, the order passed becomes wholly vitiated. Thus, it is but essential that a party should be put on notice of the case before any adverse order is passed against him. This is one of the most important principles of natural justice. It is after all an approved rule of fair play. The concept has gained significance and shades with time. When the historic document was made at Runnymede in 1215, the first statutory recognition of this principle found its way into the Magna Carta. The classic exposition of Sir Edward Coke of natural justice requires to vocate, interrogate and adjudicate. In the celebrated case of Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works1 the principle was thus stated: (ER p.420)
[E]ven God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam before he was called upon to make his defence. Adam (says God), where art thou? Hast thou not eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat?.
10. Principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid down by the courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authority while making an order affecting those rights. These rules are intended to prevent such authority from doing injustice.
15. Concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressly in a statute or in rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. What particular rule of natural justice should be implied and what its context should be in a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the statute under which the enquiry is held. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away. Even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. The expression civil consequences encompasses infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In its wide umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in his civil life.”
(iv) Mrs.Brihatakuchambal v. The Presiding Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal and others, 2009 (4) TLNJ 232 (civil) :
“19. At this juncture, we feel it apt to quote a judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in UMA NATH PANDEY AND OTHERS [2009 (2) CTC 185, the Honourable Apex Court has held as follows :
“The adherence to principles of natural justice as recognized by a civilized State is of supreme importance when a quasi-judicial body embark on determining disputes between the parties, or any administrative action involving civil consequences is in issue. These principles are well settled. The first and foremost principle is what is commonly known as audi alteram partem rule. It says that no one should be condemned unheard. Notice is the first limb of this principle. It must be precise and unambiguous. It should apprise the party determinatively the case he has to meet. Time given for the purpose should be adequate so as to enable him to make his representation. In the absence of a notice of the kind and such reasonable opportunity, the order passed becomes wholly vitiated. Thus, it is but essential that a party should be put on notice of the case before any adverse order is passed against him. This is one of the most important principles of natural justice….”
11. Learned Advocate General has rebutted the above contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner, contending that the first respondent has taken up the suo motu revision as provided in the Act; the show cause notice need not contain the reference of the second respondent, as the said show cause notice is conspicuous about the irregularities; no time limit is prescribed for initiating suo motu proceedings by the authority concerned and sufficient opportunities of being heard were afforded to the petitioner before passing the impugned order. He would rely upon the following decisions :
(i) The Director of Survey and Settlement v. Ramadoss, 1992 (2) L. W.265 :
“5. However, Mr.K.Ravirajapandian, learned Additional Government Pleader, appearing for the respondent, would endeavour to submit that such a restricted construction of the provisions of the Act and the Rules is not warranted so as to spell out for the respondent suo motu powers of revision. In this connection, the learned Additional Government Pleader drew our attention to a pronouncement of a Bench of this Court in The Board of Revenue, Madras v. K.G.Prema Kalyani and others. In that case, the learned single Judge, who heard the matter initially was concerned with the exercise of power of revision by the Board of Revenue under S.7(c) of the Act for which there is no period of limitation prescribed. Yet, the learned single Judge ventured to pose for himself a question as to whether the Board could revise an order, after lapse of long time and he answered it by stating that a line should be drawn at the conclusion of the Settlement Proceedings under S.22 of the Act. This view of the learned single Judge was not accepted by the Bench and the Bench opined that when the legislature did not think fit to provide for limitation for exercise of the power under S.7(c) of the Act, the Court cannot take upon itself to prescribe the period of limitation. It is true there is an observation that the exercise of the power could as well be suo motu as the Board might to choose. But, we cannot take that as the ratio decidendi of the pronouncement because on facts the Bench was not at all called upon to decide that question specifically.”
(ii) M.Veeraswamy v. Special Commissioner & Commissioner of Land Acquisition and others, 1996 Writ L.R.554 :
“7.It is next contended that the Board has no jurisdiction to suo motu exercise its revisional powers under S.7(c) and S.7(d) of the Act. The argument proceeds that the Board could exercise such powers only if there is an application before it for revising the order of lower authority. There is no substance in this contention also. The Section does not contemplate any specific application being filed under S.7(c) and 7(d) of the Act. The Section confers powers on the Board to cancel or set aside any orders passed by the lower authority and certainly it is open to the Board to exercise the said power suo motu whenever it is found necessary.”
(iii) The Special Commissioner and Director of Survey and Settlement v. M.Arumugam, 2007 (4) CTC 538 :
“13. In the case of R.Ramadoss (supra), the Division Bench (consisting of Nainar Sundaram and Thanikachalam,JJ.) held that with reference to the exercise of power under Section 5 (2) of the Act, there has been a delineation of the same by the rules framed pursuant to the power under Section 67 (2) (b) of the Act. It must be taken that it is the only way and method in which the power of Revision under Section 5 (2) of the Act could be exercised by the Director and he has no power to act suo motu. It was held that the rules framed under the statute must be treated for all purposes of construction of powers or obligations, as if they are in the statute itself, and are to be of the same effect as if adumbrated in the statute itself. We are unable to agree with the view taken by the learned Judges of the Division Bench in the aforesaid case. It is no doubt true that the rules could be used as aid to interpretation of the provisions of the Parent Act, but only where the meaning of the Act is ambiguous (see Hanlon v. Law Society, 1980 (2) ALL E.R. 199). The provisions of Sections 5 and 7 of the Act confer extremely broad powers on the Director and the Board respectively for correcting the mistakes committed by the lower authorities for the purpose of effectuating the Scheme of the Act and implementing the purpose behind the Act. We are inclined to agree with the view taken in David Pillai’s case and M.Veeraswamy’s case (supra) that the Director of Settlement as well as the Board of Revenue have suo motu powers to interfere with the orders passed by the lower authorities….”
12. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records, coupled with the decisions relied upon.
13. At the outset, it is to be stated, that during settlement, when the lands were notified, G.O.Ms.No.714, Commercial Taxes and Religious Endowments Department, dated 29.06.1987, was issued, calling upon the affected persons to represent their cases and fixing the last date for filing applications as 29.07.1987. Admittedly, the petitioner had not submitted any such application for patta within the time stipulated. However, the then Assistant Settlement Officer, Thiruvannamalai, received an application on 27.02.2001, which was much after a lapse of nearly 14 years, from the petitioner and granted patta under Section 11 (a) of the Act, without calling for necessary documents and examining the same and also without giving an opportunity to the Tahsildar to put forth his case. In this connection, it is worthwhile to refer to Section 11 (a), which reads as follows :
“11.Lands in which ryot is entitled to ryotwari pattas.- Every ryot in an estate shall, with effect on and from the notified date, be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of –
(a) all ryoti lands which, immediately before the notified date, were properly included or ought to have been properly included in his holding and which are not either lanka lands or lands in respect of which a landholder or some other person is entitled to a ryotwari patta under any other provision of this Act.
The proviso clause to the said Section speaks to the effect that no person who has been admitted into possession of any land by a landholder on or after the 1st day of July 1945 shall, except where the Government, after an examination of all the circumstances otherwise direct, be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of such land.
14. It means, every ryot shall be entitled to a ryotwari patta with effect from the notified date in respect of all ryoti lands which, immediately before the notified date, were properly included or ought to have been properly included in his holding, subject to the condition that such inclusion and possession of land should be prior to 1st day of July 1945.
15. In this case, though the claim of the petitioner is that he was in continuous possession of the land in question from 1952 and he derived title and continuous possession from his predecessors-in-title and that the said land had been properly included in A-Register in the names of his predecessors-in-title prior to 01.07.1945, he could not produce any document prior to 01.07.1945 before the authorities to prove that the land was properly included in the holding of his predecessors-in-title. From this, it can be stated that the petitioner had not fulfilled the condition laid down under Section 11 (a) of the Act and that the claim of the petitioner was time barred.
16. On coming to know of the irregularities in granting patta to the petitioner, the Settlement Officer, Chennai, in his letter C1/3251/2001, dated 27.06.2001, recommended to the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Land Administration, first respondent herein, to review the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer, Thiruvannamalai. Accordingly, the case was taken up for review by the Special Commissioner under the powers vested on him under Section 7 (c) of the Act.
17. Section 7 deals with “Powers of control of the Board of Revenue”. Section 7 (c) reads to the effect that “The Board of Revenue shall have power to cancel or revise any of the orders, acts or proceedings of any Settlement Officer other than those in respect of which an appeal lies to the Tribunal or of any managers”. Further, Clause 9 of G.O.Ms.No.1300, Revenue Department, dated 30.04.1971 is categoric to the effect that the orders of the Revenue Divisional Officer/Collector as the case may be granted or refusing to grant patta are subject to revision by the Board of Revenue (Settlement of Estates) Madras either suo motu or on an application to be filed within sixty days of services of the order.
18. Section 7 (c) confers power on the Board, namely, Special Commissioner, to cancel or set aside any order passed by the lower authority and the Board can exercise the power suo motu without an application for revising the order of the lower authority. This is the law laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in N.Veerasamy’s case cited above. Also, the suo motu power of the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Land Administration has been confirmed by a Full Bench decision of this Court in W.A.No.326/2007, dated 24.07.2007, in the case of The Special Commissioner and Director of Survey and Settlement v. M.Arumugam, reported in 2007 (4) CTC 538, holding that the suo motu power can be exercised whenever found necessary.
19. Notification IV to G.O.Ms.No.714, Commercial Taxed and Religious Endowments Department, dated 29.06.1987, reads to the following effect :
“In exercise of the power conferred by section 67 (2) of the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act,1948 (Tamil Nadu XXVI of 1948), the Governor of Tamil Nadu hereby makes the following amendments to the rules published with the Revenue Department Notification dated the 17th October,1955, at page 435 of the Rules supplement to part I of the Fort St.George, Gazette, dated the 19th October,1955 as subsequently amended.
AMENDMENT
In the said rule, for the proviso, the following provisos shall be substituted namely,
“Provided that the Settlement Officer or the Director or the Commissioner of Land Administration may condone delay up to a period of thirty days beyond the period aforesaid, if he is satisfied that the petitioner had sufficient cause for not presenting the petition within the prescribed time.
Provided further that in respect of cases disposed of prior to the date of publication of this amendment in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, the period of thirty days shall be counted from the date of such publication.
Provided also that suo motu powers of the Commissioner of Land Administration under Section 7 of the Act shall not be barred in any case.”
20. Let me now deal with the applicability of the above amended provisos to the case on hand. With regard to the first amended proviso, the Settlement Officer or the Director or the Commissioner of Land Administration may condone delay up to a period of thirty days beyond the period aforesaid i.e., the thirty days already provided for in the G.O., if he is satisfied that the petitioner had sufficient cause for not presenting the petition within the prescribed time viz., thirty days. In this case, even assuming that the petitioner had sufficient cause for not presenting the petition within the prescribed time of thirty days which ended on 29.07.1987, the next period of thirty days, which should be condonable, ended by 28.08.1987. The petitioner had petitioned for patta on 27.02.2001, much after a delay of 14 years, which delay is not provided for condonation in the rules.
21. The second amended proviso is that in respect of cases disposed of prior to the date of publication of this amendment in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, the period of thirty days shall be counted from the date of such publication. This is not the case where it has been disposed of prior to the date of publication of this amendment in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette.
22. The third amended proviso categorically speaks to the effect that suo motu powers of the Commissioner of Land Administration under Section 7 of the Act shall not be barred in any case, which means the Commissioner of Land Administration can exercise his suo motu powers in any case, including the case of the petitioner in question.
23. In the case on hand, pursuant to the initiation of suo motu proceedings, the first respondent had issued show cause notice dated 14.03.2002, calling upon the petitioner for objections, if any, for the proposed suo-motu revision, for which he submitted explanation and thereafter the authority examined the explanation of the petitioner in detail and found that the petitioner had no proof and evidence to show that he was entitled for grant of patta under Section 11 (a) of the Act and accordingly the first respondent cancelled the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer, as it was illegal, from which it appears that the authority had initiated suo motu prceedings in accordance with law and as per the settled rules in force. Therefore, the first contention of the petitioner that the first respondent had no locus standi to initiate suo motu proceedings to cancel the patta granted to the petitioner and that he had not dealt with the same in the manner contemplated under the Act cannot be sustained.
24. As regards the second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is no reference of the second respondent in the show cause notice, it is to be stated that it is not necessary to refer the letter of the Settlement Officer and it would be enough to state for what grounds the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer is taken up for review. Besides, the grounds for which the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer is taken up for review are explicitly stated in the show cause notice. It was from the report of the Settlement Officer only, the Special Commissioner came to know about the irregularities in the order passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer. Since the order passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer is vitiated, as recommended by the Settlement Officer, the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Land Administration has exercised his suo motu powers to correct the wrong committed by the Assistant Settlement Officer. Therefore, this contention also fails.
25. There is no time limit to exercise the suo motu powers under the Act. The corrective measures can be taken whenever the fraudulent and irregular order is brought to the notice of the Commissioner of Land Administration. The Act does not provide for any specific time frame. The time limit of sixty days mentioned in Clause 9 of G.O.Ms.No.1300, dated 30.04.1971, is only for an application to be filed by the aggrieved party for not granting patta but not for the suo motu action by the authority. Therefore, the next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the action of the first respondent in cancelling the patta granted to the petitioner is time barred cannot be sustained.
26. With regard to the last contention of the petitioner that he was not given an opportunity before passing the impugned order, it is to be stated that the petitioner was issued show cause notice dated 13.03.2002, calling upon him for objections, if any, and subsequent to that the petitioner also submitted his objections, dated 22.01.2004, and the same were taken into consideration by the first respondent, while passing the order impugned. Hence, this contention also collapses.
27. The petitioner had produced an unregistered sale deed, dated 05.01.1952, to get the settlement in his favour and the same was reflected in the proceedings of the Assistant Settlement Officer, dated 13.03.2001, and the basis for granting patta under the provisions of the Act. A perusal of the said document would reveal that the unregistered sale deed had been relied upon by the Assistant Settlement Officer in proof of possession and title of the claimant, but the same was disbelieved by the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Land Administration and found to be an improper document for grant of patta. The said unregistered sale deed cannot give valid title on the property to the petitioner. In addition, in the schedule of the document, the survey number is mentioned as T.S.No.1 and Block No.15, which was given to the village only subsequent to the inclusion of the village in the city and reclassification of town survey in the year 1977, which means, there were no such T.S.No.1 and Block No.15 in the year 1952 and the same were added only in the year 1977, subsequent to the inclusion of the village in the city and reclassification of town survey. Therefore, the said document cannot be relied upon. As such, the Special Commissioner has exercised his suo motu powers diligently and cancelled the illegal orders of the Assistant Settlement Officer, Thiruvannamalai. Hence, the one more contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that though the petitioner produced relevant documents in support of his claim the same were not taken into consideration by the authority cannot be countenanced.
28. Though the petitioner had filed O.S.No.8243 of 2006 on the file of XIII Assistant City Civil Court, Chennai, for permanent injunction restraining the defendants, namely, respondents herein, their men, agents, servants or any one acting under them from in any way interfering and dispossessing his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property and the same was decreed in his favour; the same was taken on appeal by the authorities in A.S.No.458 of 2009 on the file of III Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai, and the same was dismissed as against the authorities and decreed in favour of the petitioner, it is submitted by the learned Advocate General that as against the dismissal of A.S.No.458 of 2009, the authorities have preferred a Second Appeal and the same is pending. What may, this Court is not concerned with the civil court’s proceedings, but with the questions of law involved in this Writ Petition.
29. Consequent to the conferment of power under Section 7 of the Act, the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Land Administration is not barred to initiate suo motu revision in any case and issue a show cause notice, calling upon the person concerned for his/her objections, if any, and, thereupon, set right the wrong committed by the Settlement Officer, as per law. This Court, while examining such power exercised by the Commissioner of Land Administration, has no reason to interfere with the same, unless it is found to be arbitrary or against rules. In this case, looked at from any angle and taking into account all the material documents, this Court is of the considered opinion that the power of suo motu revision, exercised by the first respondent, is well within his jurisdiction and cannot be found fault with.
30. In view of my elaborate discussions as above, these Writ Petitions are dismissed. As regards the civil court proceedings, it is open for the parties to work out their remedy in the manner known to law. No costs. Consequently, the connected M.P.Nos.1 of 2009 are closed.
Index : Yes 12-04-2011
Internet : Yes
dixit
To
1.The Special Commissioner and
Commissioner of Land Administration,
Chepauk,
Chennai-5.
2.The Settlement Officer,
Chepauk,
Chennai-5.
3.The Assistant Settlement Officer,
Thiruvannamalai.
4.The Commissioner,
Corporation of Chennai,
Rippon Buildings,
Chennai-600 03.
5.The Assistant Engineer,
V Zone,
Corporation of Chennai,
E.V.R.Salai,
Chennai-600 010.
6.The Zonal Officer/Assistant Commissioner,
Zone V, Corporation of Chennai,
Poonamallee High Road,
Kilpauk, Chennai-600 001.
7.The Assistant Engineer,
Ward No.67, Corporation of Chennai,
Shenoy Nagar,
Chennai-600 030.
V.DHANAPALAN,J.
dixit
W.P.Nos.14082/2004 batch
12-04-2011