ORDER
N.G.Nandi, J.
1.
In this petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) the petitioner has been praying to quash the complaint case titled “Ashok Kumar Sharma Vs. Yoginder Kumar Sharma” pending in the Court of learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Karkardooma Courts, Shahdara, Delhi.
2. It has been mainly contended by Mr. M.R. Chawla, learned counsel for the petitioner that a cheque issued can be presented for realization as many times as one wants within the validity period of the cheque but once the cheque returns dishonoured and notice under clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) is served by the payee/holder in due course, then the complaint has to be filed within one month from the date of the receipt of the notice by the drawer on failure to make the payment. It is further contended that
the telegraphic demand by the payee after the return of the cheque should be treated as a notice under clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 of the Act. In this regard reliance has been placed on the decision in the case of M/s. SIL Import, USA Vs. M/s. Exim Aides Silk Exporters, Bangalore 79 (1999) D.L.T. p:414 (SC).
As against this, it is submitted by Mr.A.K.Verma, learned counsel for the respondent that the telegram dated 30.3.1994 cannot be regarded as notice within the meaning of clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 of the Act of the Act since it is beyond the period of 15 days, as contemplated in clause (b) of the said provision; that the cheque was again presented on 16.8.1994 and notice under clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 of the Act was issued on 24.8.1994 and the complaint filed on 20.9.1994 and that it is open to the complainant to present the cheque as many times as he wants within the validity period and that the cause of action for the purpose of prosecution under Section 142 of the Act would arise only when there is refusal or failure to make the payment in response to the notice under clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 of the Act.
3. It will be seen from the above that the moot question involved in this petition is whether the telegraphic demand of the amount covering the dishonoured cheque can be regarded as a notice within the meaning of clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 of the Act or not.
4. In the case of M/s. SIL Import, USA Vs. M/s. Exim Aides Silk Exporters, Bangalore 79 (1999) D.L.T. p:414 (SC) it has been held that “`Notice in Writing’ occurring in Section 142 of the Act includes modern devices and
equipment already in vogue – Technical advancement like Facsimile, Internet, E-mail, etc. were on swift progress even before bill for Amendment Act discussed by Parliament”. It is further held that “so if the notice envisaged in clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 was transmitted by fax it
would be compliance with the legal requirement”.
The lower Court record, which is produced, is perused. Para 6 of the complaint filed on 20.9.1994 mentions that the complainant tried to contact the accused, but the accused kept evading meeting the complainant. Then the complainant had to send a telegram dated 24.3.94 to the accused that his cheque had bounced and that he should repay the loan within five days to avoid legl action. The trial court record also contains two telegrams, one dated 24.3.1994 at page 179, which reads :-
“YOUR CHEQUE BOUNCED.
REPAY LOAN WITHIN FIVE DAYS
TO AVOID LEGAL ACTION”
The telegram dated 30.3.1994 at page 185 reads :-
“REMINDING YOU AGAIN TO
PAY MY LOAN IMMEDIATELY
YOUR CHEQUE ALREADY BOUNCED.”
It will be seen from the above telegrams that the same are by the payee/holder in due course Ashok Sharma, after the dishonour of the cheque dated 1.3.1994. Specific demand has been made therein requiring the drawer of the cheque in question to pay the loan immediately as the cheque had already bounced.
I am not inclined to accept the submission on behalf of the respondent that telegram dated 30.3.1994 can not be regarded as a notice within the meaning of clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 of the Act because the same is not within 15 days as contemplated in the said clause because this argument would be available to the drawer of the cheque and not to the drawee and again drawee/holder in due course can not take advantage of his own wrong. A drawer can still pay the money as demanded on receipt of the notice served by the holder in due course. But as far as the drawee/holder in due course is concerned, he can not say that since the telegram dated 24.3.1994/30.3.1994 is not within 15 days of the dishonour of the cheque and the same should not be treated or considered as notice under clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 of the Act.It would be the defense by the drawer
to get the complaint dismissed based on a notice under clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 of the Act if the said notice is not in conformity with the requirement of clause (B), as aforesaid.
5. In view of the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court, as above, the telegraphic notice dated 24.3.94/30.3.94 is a notice under clause (b) of Proviso to Section 138 of the Act for the purpose of accrual of cause of action, as envisaged in Section 142 of the Act.
6. In the case of Sadanandan Bhadran Vs. Madhavan Sunil Kumar while considering the provisions contained in Sections 138 and 142 of the Act, it has been held by the Supreme Court that :
“a cheque can be presented any number of times during the period of its validity by payee. On each presentation of the cheque and its dishonour a fresh right – and not cause of action – accrues in his favour. He may, therefore, without taking pre-emptory action in exercise of his such right under clause (b) of Section
138, go on presenting the cheque so as to enable him to exercise such right at any point of time during the validity of the cheque. But once he gives a notice under clause (b) of Section 138 he forfeits such right for in case of failure of the drawer to pay the money within the stipulated time he would be liable for the offence and the cause of action for filing the complaint will arise. Needless to say, the period of one month for filing the complaint will be reckoned from the day immediately following the day on which the period of fifteen days from the date of the receipt of the notice by the drawer, expires.
Consequent upon the failure of the drawer to pay the money within the period of 15 days as envisaged under clause (c) of the provi so to S.138, the liability of the drawer for being prosecuted for the offence he has committed arises and the period of one month for filing the complaint under S.142 is to be reckoned accordingly. The combined reading of the above two sections of the Act leaves no room for doubt that cause of action within the meaning of S.142 arises and can arise only once.”
7. In the instant case the cheque in question was issued on 1.3.1994. The me was returned dishonoured on 3.3.1994. Vide telegrams dated 24.3.94 and 30.3.1994 the drawee/holder in due course called upon the drawer to make the payment as the cheque had already bounced. There was admittedly no payment made within 15 days of the receipt of the telegram/s by the drawer. Thereafter the cheque was again presented on 16.8.1994. Again dishonoured. on 19.8.1994. Detailed notice under Section 138 of the Act issued on 24.8.1994 and complaint filed on 20.9.1994.
8. In view of the judgment in the case of Sadanandan Bhadran Vs. Madhavan Sunil Kumar (supra) consequent upon the failure of the drawer to pay the money within the period of 15 days from 30.3.1994 as envisaged under clause (c) of proviso to Section 138 of the Act, the liability of the drawer for being prosecuted for the offence committed, arose and the period of one month for filing the complaint under Section 142 is to be reckoned accordingly and that the cause of action within the meaning of Section 142 of the
Act arose only once and that is on failure of the drawer to pay the money within the period of 15 days of 30.3.1994 as per clause (c) of proviso to Section 138 of the Act and liability of the drawer for being prosecuted for the offence he has committed arose.
9. In view of the fact that the notice by telegram dated 30.3.1994 under clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 of the Act was not complied with
within 15 days of the receipt thereof by the drawer and the drawee/holder in due course having failed to file the complaint within one month of the failure of the drawer to pay the money, the complaint case titled “”Ashok
Kumar Sharma Vs. Yoginder Kumar Sharma” pending in the Court of learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Karkardooma Courts, Shahdara, Delhi would be liable to be quashed under the inherent powers of this court since such a
complaint would be nothing but an abuse of process of law.
10. In the result the petition is allowed. Complaint case “”Ashok Kumar Sharma Vs. Yoginder Kumar Sharma” at present pending in the Court of learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Karkardooma Courts, Shahdara, Delhi is hereby quashed.
11. Trial court record be returned.