JUDGMENT
R.P. Sethi, J.
1. As all these appeals involve the same question of law and similar facts, they are being disposed of by this common judgment.
2. Relevant facts have been extracted from W.A. No. 506 of 1996 arising out of W.P. No. 8194 of 1987.
The writ petitioner in that case had challenged the acquisition made by the State Government under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short the ‘Act’) insofar as it related to her property. Similarly, in other writ petitions the respondents herein had challenged the acquisition with respect to the lands belonging to them.
One of the grounds urged by the writ petitioners was that the appellant-Society had acquired vast extent of land, which did not serve any public purpose and that the office bearers of the appellant-Society were making huge profits at the expense of the writ petitioners and others similarly situated. The lands, the subject-matter of the present litigation, had been acquired under the Act vide final notification issued on 21st of February, 1986. Such an acquisition was challenged in various writ petitions including W.P. Nos. 17775 and 17776 of 1982, wherein it was alleged that the lands had not been acquired for the purpose of allotment of sites, but for the purpose of indulging in big commercial venture of sale of sites; the Societies were alleged to have entered into agreements with builders and contractors and had enrolled large number of bogus members and associate members for achieving illegitimate object. It was further contended that the decision of the State Government to accord previous approval and sanction for acquisition of the lands was contrary to law being the result of non-consideration of the relevant factors. The aforesaid acquisition was termed to be a case of a colourable exercise of power.
3. It may be noticed that the constitution, business and management of the appellant-Society had been the subject-matter of enquiry before the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies. This Court considered the Report of the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies in the case of Narayana Reddy and Another v State of Karnataka and Others. After
consideration of the aforesaid Report and various decisions with reference to each of the case, this Court concluded in that case as under:
“As seen from the findings of G.V.K. Rao Inquiry Report, in respect of five respondent-Societies and the report of the Joint Registrar in respect of Vyalikaval House Building Co-operative Society, these Societies had indulged in enrolling large number of members illegally inclusive of ineligible members and had also indulged in enrolling large number of bogus members. The only inference that is possible from this is that the office bearers of the Societies had entered into unholy alliance with the respective agents for the purpose of making money, as submitted for the petitioners. Otherwise, there is no reason as to why such an agreement should have been brought about by the office bearers of the Society and the agents. Unless these persons had the intention of making huge profits as alleged by the petitioners, they would not have indulged in enrolment of ineligible and bogus members. The circumstance that without considering all these relevant materials the Government had accorded its approval, is sufficient to hold that the agents had prevailed upon the Government to take a decision to acquire the lands without going into all those relevant facts. The irresistable inference flowing from the facts and circumstances of these cases is, whereas the power conferred under the Land Acquisition Act is for acquiring lands for carrying out housing scheme by a housing society, in each of the cases the acquisition of lands is not for a bona fide housing scheme but is substantially for the purpose of enabling the concerned office bearers of respondent-societies and their agents to indulge in sale of sites in the guise of allotment of sites to the Members/Associate Members of the Society and to make money as alleged by the petitioners and therefore it is a clear case of colourable exercise of power. Thus the decision of the Government to acquire the lands suffers from legal mala fides and therefore the impugned notifications are liable to be struck down”.
Impressed by the findings recorded by the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies and the judgment of this Court in Narayana Reddy’s case, supra, the learned Single Judge disposed of the writ petitions filed by the respondents herein holding that the appellant-Society had enrolled hundreds of bogus members and had indulged in the sale of sites to make huge profits. The writ petitions were allowed and the notifications issued under the Act insofar as the same pertained to the lands of the writ petitioners were quashed vide the orders impugned in these appeals.
4. The learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that the judgment impugned in Writ Appeal No. 506 of 1996 is liable to be set aside solely on the ground that the learned Single Judge had committed a mistake of law by quashing the acquisition proceedings to the extent of 2 acres and 34 guntas of land in Sy. No. 26/3-B in view of the fact that the writ petitioner in that case had allegedly preferred her
claim to the extent of 17 guntas only. In support of his contention, the learned Counsel has relied upon Annexure-B. In the said Annexure the respondent herein had submitted that the Land Acquisition Officer may drop proceedings in respect of 17 guntas of land in Sy. No. 26/3-B. Such a plea had been raised on the ground that the claimant in that case had executed power of attorneys with respect to the rest of the lands. The argument though apparently attractive yet is devoid of legal substance when considered in the light of the other submissions made in Annexure-B. In that case, the claimant had specifically submitted that:
“The claimant-applicant herein is the absolute owner of land to an extent of 2A-24G in Sy. No. 26/3-B of Nagavara Village, Kasaba Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk. The claimant had purchased the said land under registered sale deed dated 26-12-1956 from her vendor Murard Hanumanthappa (extent:1A-17G) and she also purchased the adjoining land in the same survey number from her vendor Jarmuniappa alias Annayappa under the registered sale deed dated 24-4-1964”.
The mere fact that the claimant had executed the power of attorneys in favour of Shri M. Muniswamappa and K.N. Abdul Raheem would not amount to either the transfer of the aforesaid lands or relinquishment of her rights. Assuming that respondent had executed the power of attorneys, the claimant had incidentally preferred her claim with respect to 17 guntas of land in the objections filed when conceding her rights with respect to the rest of the lands. On assumption of the execution of the power of attorneys in favour of the aforesaid two persons, the claimant had prayed for the grant of compensation. The execution of the power of attorneys could not be made a basis to reject the claim of the writ petitioner preferred in the writ petition filed for quashing of the proceedings on the allegations of alleged fraud played by the appellant-Society. There is, therefore, no illegality in the order of the learned Single Judge on this count, as argued.
5. The learned Counsel for the appellant further argued that as the claimant had prayed for the payment of compensation, the acquisition proceedings could not be quashed. In support of his contention he has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Reliance Petroleum Limited v Zaver Chand Popatlal Sumaria and Others . This argument can also not be accepted in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. The Apex Court in Reliance Petroleum Limited’s case, supra, had specifically held that in view of the facts of that case the intention of the claimant appeared to be not to challenge the acquisition, but to get the maximum price of the land. Such is not the position in the present case. In the instant case, the acquisition of the land had been challenged on the ground of fraud and the alleged bogus membership of the Appellant-Society, which was not the position in the case dealt with and decided by the Supreme Court.
6. The learned Counsel for the appellant has also half-heartedly argued that the learned Single Judge was not justified in quashing the acquisition of the lands pertaining to the respondents on the basis of the findings of the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies and the judgment of this Court in Narayana Reddy’s case, supra. After going through the pleadings, extracts of the reports of the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies and the judgment of this Court in Narayana Reddy’s case, supra, we are of the opinion that there is no substance in the submissions made in that behalf. The learned Single Judge has rightly concluded that the acquisition had been initiated for the benefit of a Society, which was not entitled to the conferment of privileges in view of the report of the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies.
7. While arguing the other appeals, that is, Writ Appeal Nos. 9751 to 9756, 9757 and 9758 of 1996, the learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that such petitions should have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. In support of his contention he relied upon the judgments of the Apex Court in Hari Singh and Others v State of Uttar Pradesh and Others , Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v Industrial Development and Investment Company Private Limited and Others and the judgments of this Court in Subramani M. v Union of India and in Writ Appeal Nos. 7122 to 7134 of 1996, decided on 12th of September, 1996. We are of the opinion that such a contention can also not be accepted to set aside the orders of the learned Single Judge who has found on fact that the acquisition proceedings were the result of the fraud and delay was not a ground which could be made a basis for rejection of the claim. It may further be noticed that the writ petitioners had satisfactorily explained the delay. Explaining the delay it was submitted that:
“the petitioners were not aware of the acquisition proceedings and they have not been served with notices either of preliminary notification or of the final notification and to the knowledge of the petitioners no awards have been passed and the petitioners or the predecessors in title have received Sections 9 and 10 notices nor Section 12 notices with regard to acquisition of their lands. The petitioners were served with a notice issued by the City Civil Court, Civil Station, Bangalore, wherein the 4th respondent has filed a suit for injunction against the petitioners in O.S. No. 10572 of 1990 and the petitioners were served with notices during the month of December 1990 and January 1991 and on their engaging their Counsel and verifying the matter, the petitioners came to know that their lands have been acquired under the notification Annexure-B. Immediately the petitioners made further verifications and made arrangements to approach this Hon’ble Court by these petitions. The acquisition in favour of the 4th respondent is wholly illegal, bad in law and null and void and the petitioners
have a good case on merits and it is learnt that similar questions raised in these petitions is the subject-matter of adjudication in Writ Petition Nos. 17775 to 17776 of 1986 and connected batch of this Hon’ble Court. Moreover the petitioners have not been served with any notices and they were not aware of the impugned acquisition and for the reasons stated above the delay in approaching this Hon’ble Court is bona fide, unintentional and beyond their control. The petitioners humbly pray for condoning the delay if any and consider the matters in the interest of justice and equity”.
8. It is settled position of law that the delay by itself is not an absolute bar in exercise of the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court may refuse to exercise the writ jurisdiction where the petitioner is found guilty of unexplained delay and laches. In a petition for certiorari where the allegation may show that the impugned action is manifestly erroneous and without jurisdiction or the result of colourable exercise of jurisdiction, the Court would be loath to reject the petition simply on the ground of delay. Once the jurisdiction is exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Appellate Court may not be justified to reject the claim of the petitioner in exercise of the appellate powers on the ground of delay alone in approaching the Court. It is true that normally the Court would not intervene when the delay is not properly explained. But, if the delay is condoned specifically or impliedly, the exercise of such a discretion may not normally be interfered with in appeal unless cogent reasons and specific prejudice is shown to have been ensued by exercise of such a jurisdiction. In view of the fact that the petitioners had explained the delay, which was deemed reasonable, the learned Single Judge exercised the jurisdiction and we do not find any sufficient grounds to interfere with the exercise of such a discretion.
9. The learned Counsel for the appellant apprehends that if the impugned orders are allowed to remain effective, a number of other claimants may approach the Court at this stage seeking quashing of the acquisition on the basis of the aforesaid judgments and the judgment of the Apex Court. Such an apprehension is misconceived in view of the judgment of this Court in Smt. Hanumakka v State of Karnataka and Others, wherein it is specifically held:
“We agree with the submission of the learned Counsel for appellants that law laid down by Supreme Court is binding on all Courts in the Country under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. It is however equally true that in order to apply the law enacted by legislature or pronounced by Supreme Court the basic requirements for initiation of proposed actions are required to be fulfilled. If a person approaching the Court fails to point out the circumstance justifying the obligation of the law enacted or laid down, the question of applicability of Article 141 of the Constitution would not arise. Once the law is proposed to be applied, this
Court has no option but to apply the law as laid down by the Supreme Court but before applying the law the prerequisite conditions as noted herein above are required to be complied with. The petitioners have failed to justify the existence of circumstance warranting the applicability of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is well-settled that laws are applied under the facts and circumstances of each case and not in a mechanical or a routine manner”.
10. In order to allay the apprehensions of the appellant, we deem it proper to observe that no claimant of the properties acquired vide notifications impugned in the writ petitions, the subject-matter of the writ appeals, shall be eligible to challenge the aforesaid acquisition hereafter mainly on the ground of the judgments upheld by us. As and when such a petition is filed, the same may be considered to be barred on the principle of acquiescence and on the ground of delay and laches. Such an observation is necessary to prevent the opening of flood gates of litigation. The purpose of exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is to grant the reliefs to the citizens and to prevent the abuse of process of the Court. We are sure that the observations made herein above would be sufficient to prevent unscrupulous litigants from knocking the doors of justice at this belated stage to challenge the acquisition proceedings on the basis of the orders confirmed by us or the judgments of this Court or the Apex Court in this behalf.
11. The appeals are dismissed with the aforesaid observations. No costs.