ORDER
1. These contempt proceedings are initiated by the petitioners alleging that the respondents had acted in deliberate violation of the order of this Court dated 16-8-1988 in Writ Petition No.10938 of 1988. The operative portion of the order of this Court reads as follows:
“For the reasons stated therein, I hold that as far as lime stone is concerned, it is a major mineral and no provision in the Act or the Rules has been brought to my notice authorising the respondents to call upon the petitioners to produce certificate relating to payment of royalty on the mineral. I have held that the provisions contained in Rule 26 of the Minor Mineral Concession Rules relied on by the respondents and canvassed for acceptance by the learned Government Pleader do not have application in the present case. In the aforesaid view, it is not necessary to go into the question whether the restrictions violate
Articles 19(1)(d) and (g) and 301 of the
Constitution of India.
3. There shall be a declaration that in respect of lime stone purchased by the petitioners either from the holders of mining lease or from petty contractors in the local market, no statutory obligation can be laid on the petitioners to obtain and produce a certificate relating to the payment of royalty in respect of such mineral.”
2. The petitioners’ grievance, as contended by the learned Counsel, is that the respondents, inspite of the above clear declaration and direction, detained their vehicles and imposed a fine of Rs.5,000/- for each lorry on the ground that the petitioners had not produced evidence to establish that the mineral was subjected to royalty and other taxes, though the petitioners are purchasers of mineral from mine owners. It was also contended that the amounts collected towards fine, i.e., Rs.5,000/- on each lorry, should be refunded and an amount of Rs. 15,000 should be paid towards damages for the illegal detention of the lorries.
3. By an order dated 11-7-1994, my learned brother T.N.C. Rangarajan, J., as he then was, granted two weeks’ time for restitution of the amounts collected from the petitioners towards fine and submitting apology. Subsequently, on receipt of notices, the respondents filed counter-affidavits and contested the matter.
4. It should be noticed that the above order of the learned single Judge has been affirmed by a Division Bench by order dated 26-12-1988, in Writ Appeals Nos.1924 and 1925 of 1988. Thus, the order of the learned single Judge has become final.
5. It is seriously contended by the learned Government Pleader that the above order passed by the learned single Judge is no longer valid. Various Division Benches and also a Full Bench of this Court has taken the
view that the Department could insist for producing documentary evidence in token of paying royalty/seigniorage fees to the Government. It is, therefore, in the above settled position of law, following uniform procedure, the Department has checked the vehicles of the petitioners and taken the action. The intention of the respondent was therefore not to flout or disobey the orders of this Court.
6. It is, therefore, seen that the alleged action taken by the respondents is not disputed. The respondents, however, seek to justify their action in view of the subsequent decisions of this Court.
7. The petitioners sought a writ of mandamus stating that the mineral transported and purchased by them from the lease-holders of the mine was Burnt lime and Hydrated lime, which is a major mineral and hence they cannot be insisted upon to produce all the way-bills or any evidence to show that the royalty in respect of the mineral, was paid. While disposing of the writ petition, as seen from the order extracted above, the learned single Judge has categorically declared that the lime stone was a major mineral and no provision under Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (for short, ‘the Act’) was brought to the notice of the Court, nor Rule 26 of the A.P. Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966, (for short, ‘the Rules’) has application to the case and there can be no statutory obligation to obtain and produce any evidence to establish the payment of royalty in respect of such mineral. This order has been confirmed by the Division Bench and thus became final. It is true that in other matters where the petitioners are not parties, different views have been taken by different Division Benches, which necessitated in referring the matter to a Full Bench.
8. WP No.9776 of 1993 was the case which came up before the Full Bench, where the validity of Rule 26 of the Rules was under challenged. The Full Bench passed the following order:
“Heard. The area in which the Division Bench felt difficult and for which it decided to refer the matter to a Full Bench is indicated in the order of reference in these words:
“If the petitioners themselves are mining operators they must satisfy the authorities that the mineral they are transporting, was extracted from the mines, which were leased out to them in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules. But, if they are purchasers of the mineral from the mine owners, they must produce sufficient documentary evidence to establish that the mineral was subjected to royalty and other permissible taxes.”
The type of evidence required to satisfy that the mineral which was being transported or was in possession of or being used by the person concerned was one in respect of which seigniorage fee as required on the said mineral had already been paid as contemplated under sub-rule (3) of Rule 26 of the A.P. Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966, is indicated in the judgment of a Full Bench of the Court in L. Venkateswara Rao v. Singareni Colleries, . The Court has clearly said that sub-rule (3) in Rule 26 has been introduced with the intention of ensuring that the State is not deprived of the fee and that it imposes an obligation on any person other than the lessee or die transporter who uses or consumes or in possession of any minor mineral to produce the documentary evidence in token of having paid the mineral revenue due to the Government. The rule has been held to be valid and the extent of the proof required is indicated in the said judgment.
The reference is fully covered by the aforementioned Full Bench judgment. The writ petition, if not disposed of, shall be disposed of in accordance with law.”
9. Concurring with the Full Bench decision in L. Venkateswara Rao v. Singareni Catteries, , where the question of production of evidence with regard to minor mineral to establish that royalty has been paid, was involved, the matter has been remitted to the Division Bench. It is, therefore, seen that only minor mineral was dealt with by the learned Judges in the above two Full Benches. In the case on hand, the learned single Judge has clearly declared that lime stone was not a minor mineral, but it was a major mineral and that the rules have no application. It is therefore futile to contend that the respondents are entitled to detain the vehicles of the petitioners and insist upon them to produce the evidence regarding payment of royalty with regard to major mineral, which was admittedly being transported. It is not disputed that the orders passed by the learned single Judge in favour of the petitioners are either varied or modified. Hence it survives. Even assuming that the Full Bench decision is applicable to the case of the petitioners though they are not parties to that case, the respondents being responsible officers of the State, ought to have either filed a petition for review of the order or sought any modification or clarification, in view of the subsequent orders passed by the Full Bench.
10. Learned Government Pleader heavily relies upon the decision in M/s. Shenoy and Co., Bangalore v. Commercial Tax Officer, Circle II, Bangalore, . In the said case, a batch of 1590 writ petitions were filed in the Karnataka High Court challenging the constitutional validity of the Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas for Consumption, Use or Sale Therein Act (1979), for short ‘ 1979 Act’. A Division Bench, by a common judgment, struck down the Act, allowed the writ petitions and issued writ of mandamus against State Government forbearing it from taking any proceedings under the 1979 Act. The State took the matter in appeal to the Supreme Court in one appeal
and the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of Karnataka High Court and upheld the validity of 1979 Act. Thereupon, the authorities appointed under the 1979 Act, issued notices to all the dealers including to those who had filed the writ petitions earlier, to comply with the provisions of the 1979 Act. Contending that the notices were bad, inasmuch as the writ of mandamus issued in their favour by the High Court survived and as no appeals were filed by the State against them, the petitioners filed writ petitions before the High Court. The State met the contention with the plea that the judgment of the Supreme Court was binding on all and no one could escape from it. A learned single Judge dismissed the writ petitions. A Division Bench, in the appeals filed, dismissed the appeals. Hence the matter was brought before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court observed that-
“In this case, the petitioners-appellants assert that the mandamus in their case was issued by the High Court commanding the authority to desist or forbear from enforcing the provisions of an Act which was not validly enacted. In other words, a writ of mandamus was predicated upon the view that the High Court took that the 1979 Act was constitutionally invalid. Consequently the Court directed the authorities under the said Act to forbear from enforcing the provisions of the Act qua the petitioners. The Act was subsequently declared constitutionally valid by this Court. The Act, therefore, was under an eclipse, for a short duration; but with die declaration of the law by this Court, the temporary shadow cast on it by the mandamus disappeared and the Act revived with its full vigour, the constitutional invalidity held by the High Court having been removed by the judgment of this Court. If the law so declared invalid is held constitutionally valid, effective and binding by the Supreme Court, the mandamus forbearing the authorities from enforcing its provisions would become ineffective and
the authorities cannot be compelled to perform a negative duty. The declaration of the law is binding on everyone and it is, therefore, futile to contend that the mandamus would survive in favour of those parties against whom appeals were not filed.”
11. In the above case by a common judgment mandamus was issued by the Karnataka High Court striking down the 1979 Act and directing to forbearing the Government from taking any action under 1979 Act. In the appeal filed only against one writ petitioner, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment and upheld the validity of the Act. Though the petitioners/appellants were not made parties in the appeal before the Supreme Court, as the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Act and as the declaration of the law is binding on everyone, the Supreme Court held that the mandamus issued by the High Court of Karnataka would not survive in favour of other parties also against whom appeals were not filed. The temporary eclipse in the enactment disappeared and the 1979 Act survived and hence all the parties are bound by the provisions of the enactment. Learned Government Pleader, therefore, contends now that though the petitioners in the present case are not parties before the other cases where different views were taken by the Division Benches as well as by the Full Bench, the petitioners are as well bound by those decisions and the respondents being the Government Officers, cannot but follow the Full Bench decision of this Court, in all cases uniformly. I do not agree. The fact situation available in the case ( supra) are entirely different. In that case, the Karnataka High Court disposed of all the writ petitions by a common judgment issuing a writ of mandamus. Admittedly the other judgments rendered by this Court are in various different cases, to which the petitioners are not parties. The petitioners are not aware of those judgments and they are also not brought to the notice of the petitioners before the action is sought to be taken against them. Admittedly the Supreme Court has not passed
any orders in the matters. Are the petitioners not entitled to act relying upon the order passed in their favour ? Arc they be punished if they do so ? Are they expected to go about enquiring whether in other matters a different view was taken by this Court ? The mandamus issued against the respondent in the present case still survives with full vigour. It does not suffer from any eclipse. Hence, I am of the view that the judgment of the Supreme Court has no application to the facts of the present case.
12. The command of the Court therefore should be implicitly complied with. The majesty of the Courts should be respected at all costs. ‘Any conduct that tends to bring the authority and administration of law into disrespect’ would be contemptuous. The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of law Court and their image in the minds of the public. “The Law of Contempt of Court is not a law for the protection of Judges or to place them in a position of immunity from criticism. It is a law for the protection of the freedom of individuals.” If the respondents are permitted to go about saying that they need not obey the orders of this Court on some ground or the other, the petitioners cannot but be expected to loose their confidence in the authority of the Courts. It is also to be seen that the order passed by this Court dated 11-7-1994 directing restitution of the fine collected from the petitioners, has not been obeyed so far and no reason is given for such disobedience.
13. It is stated in the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents 3 to 5, who are vigilance staff, that they have taken the action complained against them after having received clear directions from respondents 1 and 2. In view of this, respondents 3 to 5 cannot be faulted for their actions in stopping the vehicles and levying fine. They cannot therefore be said to have violated the order of this Court deliberately.
14. In the circumstances, there is no room but to come to the conclusion that respondents
1 and 2, who are the concerned officers, had committed contempt of Court. It should be noticed that respondents 1 and 2, though have thought of tendering an apology in the earlier stages of the case, have neither averred in their counter-affidavits nor any argument was advanced on their behalf seeking to tender apology.
15. In the result, respondents 1 and 2 are convicted under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and are sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- (Rupees Two thousand only) each, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of fifteen days.
16. The respondents 1 and 2 are directed to cause restitution of the fine collected from the petitioners, within a period of two weeks from today.
17. The contempt case is accordingly disposed of.