IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Dated : 23.07.2010
Coram
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE M. VENUGOPAL
C.R.P.(NPD)Nos.2818 to 2825 of 2009
and
M.P.Nos.1,1,1,1,1,1,1 and 1 of 2009
D.Varadharajulu ... Petitioner in all CRPs
Vs.
1.K.Narasimman,
2.Mrs.Lakshmikantham
3.R.Mohan ... Respondents
Civil Revision Petitions are filed under Section 25 of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1960 to set aside the Order dated 13.04..2009 passed in M.P.Nos.656, 657 and 659 to 664 of 2008 respectively in R.C.A.Nos.484, 486, 493, 492, 491, 490, 485 and 489 of 2007 respectively on the file of the Learned VII Judge, Small Causes Court (Appellate Authority), Chennai.
For Petitioner : Mr.N.Sreenivasalu
For Respondents : Mr.T.Jayaramaraj
for 1st respondent
in all CRPs and
for 2nd and 3rd respondents
in C.R.P.Nos.2818 to 2820 of 2009
and 2823 and 2824 of 2009
COMMON ORDER
The Revision petitioner/Respondent/Appellant has filed these civil revision petitions as against the Common order dated 13.04.2009 in M.P.Nos.656, 657 and 659 to 664 of 2008 in R.C.A.Nos.484, 486, 493, 492, 491, 490, 485 and 489 of 2007 dated 13.4.2009 passed by the Learned Appellate Authority viz., VII Judge, Small Causes Court, Chennai.
2.The Learned Appellate Authority viz., VII Judge, Court of Small Causes, Chennai while passing Common order in M.P.Nos.656, 657 and 659 to 664 of 2008 in R.C.A.Nos.484, 486, 493, 492, 491, 490, 485 and 489 of 2007 dated 13.4.2009 has among other things observed that ‘the Petitioners (Respondents 2 and 3 in Civil Revision Petitions) are the Trustees of Thiruneelakandar Trust and they are coming under the definition of Landlord under Section 2(6) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. The Petitioners are necessary parties in the Appeals. The reasons stated in the petitions are tenable. No prejudice will be caused to the Respondents herein in allowing these petitions’ and resultantly, allowed the Miscellaneous Petitions without costs.
3.Being dissatisfied with the Common order dated 13.4.2009 passed by the Learned Appellate Authority viz., VII Judge, Court of Small Causes, Chennai in M.P.Nos.656, 657 and 659 to 664 of 2008 in R.C.A.Nos.484, 486, 493, 492, 491, 490, 485 and 489 of 2007, the Revision Petitioner/ Respondent/Appellant has preferred these Civil Revision Petitions before this Court.
4.According to the learned counsel for the Revision petitioner/Respondent/Appellant (in Civil Revision Petitions) the Learned First Appellate Authority has come to the wrong conclusion that the Respondents 2 and 3 are necessary parties without taking into account the contentions of the Revision Petitioner and in fact, the Learned First Appellate Authority has misinterpreted the definition of Landlord as per Section 2(6) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960.
5.Advancing his arguments, the learned counsel for the Revision Petitioner submits that the First Appellate Authority has not considered the averments made in the counter to the miscellaneous petitions filed by the Respondents 2 and 3 and indeed, there is an obligation on the part of the Revision Petitioner as an Executor of the Will to collect the arrears of rent due to the Testator, but these aspects of the matter have not been looked into by the First Appellate Authority in a proper perspective, which has resulted in serious miscarriage of justice.
6.That apart, it is the contention of the Learned counsel for the Revision Petitioner that the Revision Petitioner holds the properties/estate of late M.Venugopal Reddy in the capacity of the Testator till the probate formalities are completed as per Sections 317 and 319 of the Indian Succession Act etc. and till then, the Respondents 2 and 3 do not have any right over the properties even to collect the rents, but this legal plea has been overlooked by the Learned First Appellate Authority.
7.In short, the contention of the Revision Petitioner is that the reasonings assigned by the First Appellate Authority while passing Common order in M.P.Nos.656, 657 and 659 to 664 of 2008 in R.C.A.Nos.484, 486, 493, 492, 491, 490, 485 and 489 of 2007 dated 13.4.2009 by allowing the miscellaneous petitions are illegal and contrary to the fact and therefore, prays for allowing the Civil Revision Petitions to prevent an aberration of justice.
8.In response, it is the submission of the learned counsel for the Respondents 1 to 3 (in Civil Revision Petitions) that the Common order passed by the Learned First Appellate Authority in M.P.Nos.656, 657 and 659 to 664 of 2008 in R.C.A.Nos.484, 486, 493, 492, 491, 490, 485 and 489 of 2007 dated 13.4.2009 is a valid one in the eye of law because of the simple fact that the Respondents 2 and 3/Petitioners (in M.P.Nos.356, 357, 359 to 363 of 2008) are the Trustees of the Thiruneelakandar Trust and since they do come under the ambit of the definition of Landlord under the Rent Control Act, they are necessary parties in Rent Control Appeals and hence, the said Common order so passed by the Learned First Appellate Authority viz., VII Judge, Small Causes Court, Chennai need not be interfered with by this Court sitting in Revision.
9.The Learned counsel for the Revision Petitioner cites the Full Bench decision of this Court in THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX MAURAI V SMT.P.MANONMANI (2000 (II) CTC 1) wherein, it is observed that ‘the explanation to the extended of ‘Executor’ under Section 168 of the Income Tax Act 1960, is intended to apply for Defacto Administrator of the deceased person who had died testate besides person to whom Letters of Administrator with a copy of Will annexed is granted by Court’
10.Also, in the aforesaid decision at page 5 in paragraph 13, it is observed as follows:
In Case of wills which are executed at places falling outside those specified in S.57 of the Succession Act, and not relating to immovable property within the areas specified in S.57 (a) by persons belonging to the religions specified in S.58 of the Succession Act and by exempted persons, it is not essential to obtain probate or letters of administration. In such cases, the estate of the deceased where no executor has appointed by the testator may for some time be under administration by one of the legatees. A person so administering the estate, without having obtained administration from the Court, cannot be regarded as Administrator for the purpose of Indian Succession Act. Such a person could not have been regarded as Administrator for purpose of S.168 of the Income-Tax Act, but for the Explanation to Section 168. The reference in the Explanation to’… other person administering the estate of a deceased person’ is intended to apply to those persons who are found to be administering, without having been appointed by the Court as Administrator, the estate of a deceased person who has left behind a will without naming an executor, and in-respect of whose wills it is not necessary to obtain Letters of Administration and have an Administrator appointed by a Court.
11.He also relies on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K. LEELAVATHY BAI AND OTHERS V P.V. GANGDHARAN AND OTHERS (AIR 1999 SC 1267) wherein, at paragraph 9 it is held as follows:
“On facts, there is no dispute that the testator had originally appointed 3 persons as executors of his will, and after the relinquishment of his duties as executors by Mr. Paramasivan, still two other executors were left, namely Smt.Suseela and Mr. ED Sadanandan (elder one) who continued to be the joint executors of the Will in Question. Under Section 211 of the Act, these two executors became the legal representatives of the deceased testator for all purposes and the properties bequeathed vested in these two executors. Until and unless the said executors assent, the title of the property would not pass on to the legatee. (See Section 332 of the Act). Of course, in law, by the assent of the executor the title of a specific property would pass on to the legatee and this assent could be verbal. Express or implied. (See.Section 333 of the Act). The appellants want us to infer that such an assent of the executor could be inferred from the act of elder Sadanandan in executing a possessory mortgage Ex.A-1 in favor of S V Sivaramakrishnan Iyer by which Act the elder Sadanandan had acted as a legatee which conduct is sufficient to infer at least the implied assent of the executor to the transfer of title in favor of the legatees. If so, in the eye of law, title of the property had vested in the legatees. Hence, the property in dispute was available in execution for satisfaction of the decree in O.S. No.63/56. In our opinion , this pre-supposes the fact that the action of the one executors would suffice to confer the tittle of executors of the legatees. We are unable to agree with this proposition of law. Under Section 211 of the Act the property of the deceased testator vests in all the executors and if there are more than one executor, all of them together become legal representatives of the deceased testator. In such a situation, it is futile to contend that the estate of the deceased testator could be either controlled or represented by one of the legal representatives of the deceased to the exclusion of other legal representatives. We find support for this conclusion of ours from the judgment of this Court, referred to above,which is incidentally a case arising out of the same Will which is involved in this case. The view expressed in that case, though arising out of Income-tax proceedings, applies on all fours to the facts of this case also. This Court in the case held:
“If there are more than one executor of a deceased person all of them will be his representatives, and for the purpose of Section 24B(2), all of them only can represent the estate of the deceased.”
12.Also, in the aforesaid decision at page 1271, it is among other things observed as follows:
“On facts, there is no dispute that one of the executors, namely, Mrs. Suseela did not join the other executor in execution of Ex.A-1. Hence, the act of the elder Sadanandan in executing Ex.A-1 would not in any manner amount to assenting to vesting of the bequeathed property on the legatees because the elder Sadanandan could not have represented the estate independently to the exclusion of other legatee. Any such unilateral act of the sole executor, when there are more than one executor, would not bind the estate of the deceased. The contention of the appellant based on Section 311 of the Act also, according to us, does not in any way help the case of the appellant. Though Section 311 says that in the absence of any direction to the contrary in the case of several executors, powers of all may be exercised by any one of them but this Section itself says that such exercise of power by one of the executors should be by any one of them who has proved the Will on the date of execution of Ex.A-1 in this case, the Will in question was not even probated much less by elder Sadanandan to attract the enabling provisions of Section 311. Therefore, in our opinion, the act of elder Sadanandan cannot be protected under Section311 of the Act and the said act cannot be construed as grant of an implied assent as contemplated in Sections 332 and 333 of the Act. If this be so, the right of a legatee will remain to be an incohate right in legacy and the executors will continue to have their right under the Will”.
13.However, the learned counsel for the Respondents cites the decision in W.O. HOLDSWORTH AND OTHERS V. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH (1958 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 296) wherein, it is observed as follows:
“The case of the owner does not require any elaboration. He holds the land on his own behalf and also for his own benefit. He certainly cannot come within the scope of S.11(1) of the Act. The position of a trustee is also similar to that of the owner. A trust is thus defined in English Law:
“A trust in the modern and confined sense of the word, is a confidence reposed in a person with respect to property of which he has possession or over which he can exercise a power to the intent that he may hold the property or exercise the power for the benefit of some other person or object” (Vide Halsbury’s Laws of England, Hailsham Ed., Vol.33,P.87,para.140).
“The property affected by the confidence is called the trust property or trust estate. It is usually in the legal ownership or under the legal control of the trustee. The cestui que trust is said to have a beneficial or equitable interest in it.” (Ibid P.89 para.142).
A trustee is thus usually the legal owner of the trust property or the trust estate and holds it for the benefit of the cestui que trust.
Reliance was however placed upon an observation of Sir John Romilly, M.R.,in Lister V.Pickford(1 ):
“A trustee, who is in possession of land is so on behalf of his cestuis que trust, and his making a mistake as to the persons who are really his cestuis que. trust cannot affect the question.”
14.He also cites the decision in JANARDAN BADRINARAYAN PATEL AND ANOTHER V. SHETH HIMATLAL AND OTHERS (AIR 1999 Gujarat 162) wherein, it is laid down as follows:
“IT CAN, NEVER BE SAID THAT THE EXECUTORS ACQUIRED ANY BENEFICIAL INTEREST UNDER THE Will, when the Will required them to take over the possession of the properties covered under it, as if they were the owners thereof. It is only the legal estate that vests in the executor and the vesting is not of any personal benefit. The words “as such” used in S.211 of the Act clearly indicate that the executor is not the absolute owner of the property that vests in him, in the sense of being beneficial owner thereof and that the property vests in him only for the purpose of its administration under the Will. There is a presumption in law that a legacy to a person appointed as executor is given to him in that character And is attached to the office and if he claims it otherwise than as attached to his office, it would be incumbent on him to show something in the nature of the legacy or other circumstances arising under the Will to rebut that presumption. (para 13.9)
where there was absolutely nothing which would go to show that any of the properties covered under the Will were intended by the testator to be given beneficially to any one of the executors and these executors cannot be said to have taken any beneficial interest under the Will, Therefore, it was held that there was no suspicious circumstance of the propounder-executors having any beneficial interest under the Will”.
15.Furthermore, in the aforesaid decision at page 183 and 184 it is observed as follows:
“Thus, the executor derives title under the Will and testator’s properties vest in him from the death of the testator. therefore, he may seize and take in his hands the testator’s properties, which are covered under the Will, and there can be nothing suspicious in the fact that the properties and effects of the testator covered under the Will are found in the custody of the executor. the property bequeathed by the testator vests in the legatee, only when assent of the executor is given, as provided by Section 332 of the said Act. When the executor gives his assent to A sPecific bequest, that would be sufficient to divest his interest as executor and to transfer the subject of the bequest of the legatee, unless the nature or the circumstances of the property require that it shall be transferred in a particular way, as provided in Section 333 of the said Act. Assent of executor is required even to his own legacy, as provided in section 335, which lays down that when the executor or administrator is a legatee, his assent to his own legacy is necessary to complete his title to it, in the same way as it is required when the bequest is to another person. these provisions make it abundantly clear that the executor does not acquire any personal benefit, when the property of the deceAsed persons vests in him in his capacity AS an executor. IT CAN, THEREFORE NEVER BE SAID THAT THE EXECUTOR acquired any beneficial interest under the Will, when the Will required them to take over the possession of the properties covered under it, as if they were the owners thereof. It is only the legal estate that vests in the executor and the vesting is not of any personal benefit. the words” as such ” used in Section 211 of the Act clearly indicate that the executor is not the absolute owner of the property that vests in him, in the sense of being beneficial owner thereof and that the property vests in him only for the purpose of its administration under the Will.
He gets completely divested of such legal interest as executor, when the property is transferred to the legatee, as envisaged by Section 333. The assent of the executor to a legacy gives effect to it from the death of the testator, as provided by Section 336 of the said Act and therefore, an executor gets divested of his interest as an executor with effect from the death of the testator, when he assents to a specific legacy. This clearly means that no benefit to the executors in their personal capacity was ever intended to be given under the Will. Exh.77, and all the powers or rights that they acquired were given to them in their capacity as executors and vested in them only by virtue of their office. Even though these executors have been described as ‘trustees’ in the Will, Exh.77, it is clear that the word ‘trustee’ is used by the testatrix in a loose sense, and what is meant is that they shall be the executors of her property, appointed generally to administer her estate. On the reading of the Will, it is clear that they have been assigned duties to administer the estate and no bequest is intended to be given to them in their personal capacity. There is a presumption in law that a legacy to a person appointed as executor is given to him in that character and is attached to the office and if he claims it otherwise than as attached to his office, it would be incumbent on him to show something in the nature of the legacy or other circumstances arising under the Will to rebut that presumption. In a case before the Chancery Division, Rees’ Will Trusts, Williams v. Hopkins, reported in (1949) 1 AII ER 609, where a testator, after appointing his friend and his solicitor to be executors and trustees of his Will, referring to them as “my trustees” devised and bequeathed all his property, subject to the payment of his funeral and testamentary expenses and debts to ‘my trustees” absolutely they well knowing my wishses concerning the same and I direct them to permit my brother LJR to have and receive the rents and profits of my property at V during his life time” and LJR predeceased the testator and before signing his will the testator had intimated to his friend and his solicitor that he desired them after his death to make certain gifts, which amounted in value to some 8,000 pounds and he then told them that they were to have the surplus for their own use and his residuary estate amounted to more than 30,000 pounds, the House of Lords held that on the true construction of the Will, the gift was made to the testator’s friend and solicitor as trustees and the Court being bound to disregard any evidence to the contrary, they were not beneficially entitled to the surplus. In the present Will, Exh.77, there is absolutely nothing which would go to show that any of the properties covered under the Will were intended by the testator to be given beneficially to any of the executors and these executors cannot be said to have taken any beneficial interest under the Will. We, therefore, hold that there is no suspicious circumstance of the propounder- executors have any beneficial interest under the Will existing in the present case.”
16.The proposed 2nd and 3rd Respondents/Petitioners have filed M.P.Nos.656, 657 and 659 to 664 of 2008 in R.C.A.Nos.484, 486, 493, 492, 491, 490, 485 and 489 of 2007 under Section 151 of Civil Procedure Code before the Learned VII Judge, Small Causes Court, Chennai, praying permission of the authority to implead them as Respondents 2 and 3 in Rent Control Appeals.
17.The stand of the Respondents 2 and 3/Petitioners is that the 2nd Respondent/1st Petitioner is the surviving Founder Trustee and administering the property and further, that the tenants in occupation of the Trust property have been depositing the monthly rent promptly and regularly in the Trust account in the Bank etc.
18.The Respondents 2 and 3/Petitioners in M.P.Nos.656, 657 and 659 to 664 of 2008 have also pleaded that the Revision Petitioner/1st Respondent/Appellant has filed an eviction petition against all the tenants in occupation of the Trust property knowing fully well that the Learned Rent Controller has no jurisdiction and the Learned Rent Controller has dismissed all the eviction petitions on coming to the conclusion that the petition property is owned by a Public Trust and as such, it is exempted from the purview of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, against which, the Revision Petitioner/First Respondent/Appellant has preferred batch of Rent Control Appeals.
19.The core contention of the Respondents 2 and 3/Petitioners is that inasmuch as the tenants in occupation of the Trust property cannot satisfy the Learned Appellate Authority in regard to the nature of Trust and since there is no relationship of Landlord and Tenant between the Revision Petitioner and the tenants and it is just and essential that the Respondents 2 and 3 may be impleaded in Rent Control Appeals as the Respondents 2 and 3 for adjudicating issues involved in the appeals, because they are proper and necessary parties.
20.Per contra, the Revision Petitioner/First Respondent /Executor has averred in his counter to M.P.Nos.656, 657 and 659 to 664 of 2008 that 3rd Respondent/2nd Petitioner is not a Trustee appointed by the husband who formed the Trust and he has been appointed by the 2nd Respondent/1st Petitioner without observing the due formalities of appointment and without consent of all other Trustees and thereby he is legally disqualified to represent the Thiruneelakandar Trust validly.
21.It is the further contention of the Revision Petitioner that on grant of probate for the Will executed by M.Venugopal Reddy, by virtue of his office as an Executor under the Will, he is in the capacity and character as an Executor, is legally entitled to collect the rents from the tenants as the entire properties have been vested on him on the death of the Testator M.Venugopal Reddy as per Section 211 of the Indian Succession Act, being his Legal Representative for all purposes etc.
22.According to the Revision Petitioner, as per Section 332 of the Indian Succession Act, the assent of the Executor or Administrator is necessary to complete a legatee’s title
to his legacy and due to non cooperation of the Respondents 2 and 3/Petitioners, the estate administration formalities have not yet commenced and since he has been entitled to ascertain the net assets of the Testator which is required for Administration of Estate.
23.The pith and substance of the contention of the Revision Petitioner/First Respondent is that he is legally entitled to maintain the Rent Control Original Petitions and Rent Control Appeals as an Executor of Will dated 9.2.1990 of Testator M.Venugopal Reddy, as probated in O.P.No.213 of 2005 as per Order of this Court dated 19.4.2005.
24.The Legal plea of the Revision Petitioner is that the activities of Thiruneelakandar Trust will commence only after himself as an Executor hand over the assets to the beneficiary of the Trust as per Section 337 of the Indian Succession Act after fulfilling the probate formalities and till such time any activity of the Trust pertaining to the Testator property is premature and that the Respondents 2 and 3/Petitioner have no right to collect the Rents from the Tenants and further as an ‘Executor’ under the ‘Will’ there is a Landlord and Tenant relationship for the estate of the deceased Testator and the respondents 2 and 3 have no authority to collect rents from the tenants.
25.It is to be pointed out that an Executor derived his title from the Will and immediately on the death of the Testator his property vests under the Executor, for the law knows no time gap between Testator’s death and the vesting of the property. To put it precisely, probate is not necessary to act as an Executor as the property of the deceased Testator vests in the Executor immediately on his death as per the decision in BALIRAM DHOTE V BUBENDRANATH BANERJEE (AIR 1978 CALCUTTA 559). Really speaking, the grant of probate is giving title to the Executor, but it makes his title definite/certain. However, these aspects will depend on the facts whether an Executor has accepted his office under the Will as per the decision in VEKATA SUDARSANA V ANDHRA BANK (AIR 1960 ANDHRA PRADESH 273). An Executor has no title to the property and he has no right to dispose of. The title of the Executor in Law is only a representative title to the property which belonged to the Testator and over which, he has a disposing power as per the decision in BEHARY LAL V JUGGOO MOHUN 4 CALCUTTA 1 (5). The Executor is to be appointed only in respect of the property bequeathed and not intestate property in respect of which the appointment of an Administrator is visualised as per Section 213 of the Indian Succession Act as per decision in ANANT TRIMBACK V VASANT PRATAP (AIR 1980 BOMBAY 69).
26.It is to be borne in mind that where a person has accepted the office of an Executor under the Will, he cannot file a suit as an heir of the Testator as if on intestacy. In fact, he must obtain probate before the suit being filed as per the decision in NARASAYYAMMA V ANDHRA BANK (AIR 1960 ANDHRA PRADESH 273). Moreover, the vesting is not of the beneficial in the trust in the property, but only for the purposes of representation as per the decision in JANARDHAN BADRINARAYAN PATEL V SHETH AMBALAL HIMATLAL (AIR 1999 GUJARAT 162).
27.The Executor or Administrator, by means of his office takes an estate in the property of the deceased and a legal character is vested in him. The property of the Testator vests in the legatee for the purposes of enjoyment but, it vests in the Executor for the purpose of administration therefore, as the Executor he is entitled to file a suit for recovery of a debt due to the estate of the deceased even after the death of a sole legatee as per decision in KALOO V BINI RAMZO (60 IC 350 (351). In the instant case, the Civil Revision Petitioner has obtained probate in O.P.No.213 of 2005 dated 19.4.2005 from this Court in respect of Will dated 92.1990 of the Testator and therefore, he becomes a Legal Representative of the deceased Testator and the property of deceased vests in him as such, as per decision in KANDASAMI V MURUGAPPA (26 IC 472 (474).
28.Admittedly, the provisions of Civil Procedure Code will not apply except to the extent mentioned by the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. Equally, there is no provision in the Rent Control Act or the Rules framed under Act for any of the applicability of Civil Procedure Code in respect of the action since instituted under the Act. In this connection, this Court, aptly points out that Order 1 Rule 10 (2) of Civil Procedure Code cannot apply to any proceedings initiated under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1960 as per the decision of this Court in ARUPPUKOTTAI DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM V M. PERIASWAMI AND ANOTHER (1974 TNLJ 247 and 248).
29.Besides the above, it is well accepted principle in Law that an Executor is to administer the estate till the administration is complete and as such, he is quite competent to bring a suit for recovery of the debts due to the estate of the Testator, even after the death of single legatee because of the reason as long as any debt is liable to be paid to the estate of the Testator, the administration of the estate in Law is not complete. If the administration is completed and the objects of the will have been satisfied, then the Administrator becomes functus officio, as opined by this Court.
30.As far as the present case is concerned, the Revision Petitioner is an Executor of the Will of the Testator M.Venugopal Reddy dated 9.2.1990 and the Will has been probated in O.P.No.213 of 2005 on the file of this Court on 19.4.2005. Since he is an Executor of the Will of the Testator as the Legal Representative of the deceased, he is the competent person to deal with the estate, but he is not a ‘Executor’ or ‘Administrator’ always. As soon as the administration is over, his role comes to an end in the considered opinion of this Court.
31.Added further, in regard to the Rent Control Petition it is not the ownership of the property that enables the individual to project an eviction petition, but when an individual comes within the purview of definition of ‘Landlord’ described in Section 2(6) of the Act, he is certainly entitled to maintain an eviction petition. The definition of Landlord as per Section 2 (6) and the definition of Tenant as per Section 2 (8) of the Act are complementary and symmetrical as per decision of this Court in RAVAL AND COMPANY V RAMACHANDRAN, (1966 (1) MLJ at 68 and 69).
32.The High Court under Section 25 of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Least and Rent Control) Act, 1960 can satisfy itself as to the propriety, correctness or legality of any order passed. The power showered on the High Court under Section 25 of the Act is one of superintendence and parental in nature.
33.A reading of the Common order dated 13.4.2009 passed by the Learned First Appellate Authority viz., in M.P.Nos.656, 657 and 659 to 664 of 2008 in R.C.A.Nos.484, 486, 493, 492, 491, 490, 485 and 489 of 2007 indicates that it does not expressly refer to the Revision Petitioner’s contentions set out in the counter filed to the aforesaid Miscellaneous Petitions and in fact, the said order is conspicuously silent as to the probate proceedings dated 19.4.2005 in O.P.No.213 of 2005 on the file of this Court and also the ingredients of Sections 211,317,332 and 337 of the Indian Succession Act.
34.In law, the order of a Court of law, the Rent Controller or the Rent Control Appellate Authority must be a speaking reasoned order which is a mandatory one. In the present case, the Common order of the Learned Appellate Authority viz., VII Judge, Small Causes Court in M.P.Nos.656, 657 and 659 to 664 of 2008 in R.C.A.Nos.484, 486, 493, 492, 491, 490, 485 and 489 of 2007 dated 13.4.2009 is bereft of qualitative and quantitative details and particulars touching upon the provisions and the legal aspects of the Indian Succession Act. Suffice it for this Court to state that an unreasoned order may be just, but may not appear to be to the person affected. Per contra, the reasoned order will have the appearance of Justice.
35.Be that as it may, on a conspectus of the overall assessment of facts and circumstances and in view of the fact that the Revision Petitioner is an Executor of the Will of the Testator dated 9.2.1990, as Probated in O.P.No.213 of 2005 dated 19.4.2005 by this Court, this Court is of the considered view that the Revision Petitioner as an Executor is legally competent to administer the estate till the administration is completed and as such, the Respondents 2 and 3/Petitioners are not necessary and proper parties to be impleaded as Respondents 2 and 3 in the Rent Control Appeals and in that view of the matter, this Court allows these Civil Revision Petitions by setting aside the Common order dated 13.4.2009 passed by the Learned Appellate Authority viz., VII Judge, Small Causes Court, Chennai in M.P.Nos.656, 657 and 659 to 664 of 2008 in R.C.A.Nos.484, 486, 493, 492, 491, 490, 485 and 489 of 2007 in furtherance of substantial cause of justice.
36.In the result, the Civil Revision Petitions are allowed. The Common order dated 13.4.2009 passed by the Learned Appellate Authority, viz., VII Judge, Small Causes Court, Chennai in M.P.Nos.656, 657 and 659 to 664 of 2008 in R.C.A.Nos.484, 486, 493, 492, 491, 490, 485 and 489 of 2007 is set aside by this Court for the reasons assigned in these revisions. The M.P.Nos.656, 657 and 659 to 664 of 2008 in R.C.A.Nos.484, 486, 493, 492, 491, 490, 485 and 489 of 2007 filed by the Respondents 2 and 3 are dismissed as not maintainable. Having regard to the facts and circumstances, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. Consequently connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.
cla
To
1.VII Judge,
The Registrar,
Small Causes Court,
Chennai.
2.The Record Keeper,
V.R. Section, High Court,
Madras