JUDGMENT
Pravendu Narayan Sinha, J.
1. This appeal preferred by the appellants is directed against the judgment and order of conviction by which they were sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 10 years each and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- each i.d. to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 2 years each by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Hooghly for the offence under Section 376(2)(g) of the I.P.C. in Sessions Trial No. 1 of 2000 (Sessions Case No. 398 of 1999) arising out of G.R. Case No. 1163 of 1997.
2. Prosecution story in a nutshell, is that, the victim lady Smt. Arati Dufey (P.W. 1) came out of her house at about 10.00 P.M. on 27.9.97 for attending nature’s call and at that time the appellants came near to her and the appellant Barun Duley gagged her mouth by a napkin and both of them lifted her and took away her over the land of Sukumar Bhattacharya surrounded by bush and forcibly made her lie thereon. The appellant Barun Duley caught hold of her legs and appellant Kalipada Duley raped her and thereafter Barun Duley raped her. P.W. 1’s attempt to raise alarm failed as the accused persons pressed her mouth. In the meantime her husband Anil Duley (P.W. 2) returned to the house with his trolley and not finding his wife in the house, P.W. 2 made a seareh for her and when he reached near the place of occurrence the appellants fled away. The victim lady was brought to house by P.W. 2, her husband and P.W. 1 narrated the entire matter to her husband. On 28.9.97 both P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 came to the Dhaniakhali P.S. and lodged the P.I.R. (Ext.1) which was written by P.W.2. On the basis of the said complaint or F.I.R, Dhaniakhali P.S. Case No. 134 of 1997 was started against the appellants and it ended in submission of charge-sheet against them. The trial that ensued subsequently resulted into conviction of the appellants as already indicated above, and hence this appeal.
3. Mr. H. K. De, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellants being, assisted by Mr. Tapan Dutta Gupta and Iqbal Hussain contended that there is serious discrepancy regarding scribe of the F.I.R. and three versions have been revealed from evidence and materials-on-record. The F.I.R. itself shows that it was written by P.W. 2 whereas P.W. 1, the victim lady in her cross-examination stated that Mejobabu of Dhaniakhali P.S. wrote the complaint and P.W. 2 stated that he wrote the complaint as per dictation of his wife. He further contended that there is serious discrepancy between P.I.R. and evidence regarding arrival of P.W. 2 at place of occurrence. The F.I.R. shows that when P.W. 2 reached near the place of occurrence the appellants fled away. But in evidence P.W. 1, the victim lady did not say in such manner. She in her evidence stated that her husband came near the field for searching her and she narrated him about the incident. P.W. 2 stated that he came back to house with his trolley at about 10.30 P.M. on that night and not finding his wife in the house he searched for her. When he reached near the bush she found his wife lying on the land belonging to Bhattacharya. These discrepancies as stated above indicates that both P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 are not trustworthy witnesses and no credibility can be placed on their evidepce.
4. He further contended that there was delay in lodging F.I.R. and the delay has not been explained. Evidence of P.W. 2 reveals that police station is about 7 KM. from their house and P.W. 2 is a trolley puller having trolley in his own house. They did not go to police station on that night or on early next morning. They came to police station at about 10 A.M. of 28.9.97 as it appears from their evidence and lodged F.I.R. at 12.45 P.M. As the delay has not been explained properly it can safely be presumed that the appellants were falsely implicated in this case out of political rivalry. From the evidence it transpires that P.W. 1 belongs to C.P.I. (M) party and the appellants belong to T.M.C. party.
5. He also contended that the doctor was not examined to prove the alleged rape on victim lady. The napkin with which face of P.W. 1 was gagged was not seized. The vaginal swab and the wearing apparels of the victim lady was not sent for chemical examination to establish the prosecution story of rape on her. He also contended that if a lady was rugged for only 15 minutes by two persons forcibly lying her over rough land there would have been injury on her person particularly on back portion of her body. P.W. 1 stated that she was injured slightly on her knees and thigh but no doctor was examined and no injury report was produced in Court to prove the injuries on the person of the victim. The villagers, Pradhan and other member of the Panchayat did not come forward to corroborate the evidence of P.W.-1.
6. Lastly referring to the decisions reported in 2002 SCC (Cri) 592, AIR 2000 SC 1608, 2003(1) Supreme Today 256 and 2003 C Cr LR (Cal) 346 he contended that, it is well settled that in a sexual offence the prosecutrix is not an accomplice and conviction can be based on the sole evidence of prosecutrix. But in the instant case the infirmities and the discrepancies as indicated above makes it clear that the prosecutrix here, namely P.W. 1, is not a reliable witness and her credibility is in question. No conviction can be based upon her evidence and the findings of the learned Trial Court should be set aside and the appellant should be acquitted.
7. Mr. S.S. Roy appearing for the State being assisted by Mr. R.K. Ghosal contended that question of recognition of the appellants on that night cannot be doubted as evidence of P.W- 1 clearly indicates that the appellants are her neighbours and so the appellants were known to her much before the incident. The victim was a married lady having three children and therefore non-examination of doctor is not fatal and being a married lady having children no question of rupture of hymen due to rape arises injury on the person of the victim is not always expected and it depends upon the nature of the land over which she was forced to lie down at the time of rape.
8. Mr. Roy contended that evidence of P.W. 1, if found believable by the Court is sufficient to convict the appellants and there was sufficient corroboration in this case by her husband, P.W. 2 who heard the entire matter from his wife immediately after the incident. He contended that if the evidence of prosecutrix is found by the Court reliable and trustworthy, corroboration is not always necessary. He contended that the evidence and materials-on-record were sufficient to establish the prosecution case and the learned Trial Court rightly convicted the appellants, in support of his contention he placed before us the decisions and 1998 SCC(Cri) 1725 for our consideration.
9. We have carefully perused the evidence and materials-on-record and considered the submissions made by the learned Advocates of the appellant and the respondent State. We find that in all seven witnesses were examined in the sessions trial and P.W. 1 Smt. Arati Duley is the victim lady and the informant of the case. P.W. 2 Anil Duley is husband of P.W, 1 and is the scribe complaint of F.I.R. (Ext-1). P.W. 3 Uttam Duley is a neighbour of informant and his evidence is of no importance as he stated nothing and was declared hostile witness by the prosecution. P.W. 4 Smt. Sumita Duley is a relative of informant and resides in adjacent village and she heard the incident from P.W. 1 and P.W. 2. P.W.5 Shri A.K. De is the learned Judicial Magistrate, who recorded the 164 Cr. P.C. statement (Ext.2) of the victim lady Smt. Arati Duley on 29.9.97. P.W. 6 Bangshi Badan Sanigrahi is S.I. of Police who submitted charge-sheet in the instant case. P.W. 7 Shri Ananta Soren is another S.I. of Police who received the complaint from Smt. Arati Duley and filled up formal F.I.R. (Ext.3) and started the case and also investigated the case and he is the Investigating Officer (hereinafter called I.O.).
10. It is clear, therefore, that P.W. 1, the victim lady is the main witness for prosecution in the instant case and the fate of the entire prosecution case as well as this appeal depends upon her evidence. There are series of decisions which show that sole evidence of prosecutrix can be basis of conviction and corroboration is not necessary, if the evidence of prosecutrix inspires confidence. It requires mention here that there is corroboration by P.W. 2 and P.W. 4 as they heard the entire incident from P.W. 1. P.W. 2, the husband after returning home on that night did not find his wife in house and he came out of house for searehing his wife and found her lying near the bush on land belonging to one Bhattacharjee. P.W. 4 heard the entire incident from P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 next morning. Therefore, we are unable to agree with the views of learned Advocate for appellants that there was no corroboration and we find that there was sufficient corroboration of P.W. 1’s evidence by P.W. 2 and P.W. 4.
11. Let us scrutinise the evidence of P.W. 1 to find out whether her evidence inspires confidence in the mind of Court. P.W. 1 stated that the incident took place three years back at about 10.00 P.M. She came out of her house to attend nature’s call and her husband did not return home till then. The appellants came near to her and took away her keeping a napkin on her face so that she cannot make any shout. The appellants took her to the land belonging to Sukumar Bhattacharjee and the accused persons raped her against her will, Her husband came near the field for searehing her and she narrated the entire incident to her husband. Next day she came to police station with her husband and submitted F.I.R. and she also narrated the incident to the learned Magistrate and her statement was reduced to writing under Section 164 of Cr. P.C. She also stated that she was examined by doctor.
12. We find that there was a report of doctor which has been marked as ‘X’ for identification by the learned Trial Judge but, it is not clear to us as to why the learned Trial Judge did not take steps to mark the said medical report as exhibit by examining the doctor or any other doctor or competent person who was acquainted with the handwriting of the doctor who after examination of P.W. 1 prepared the injury report. Learned Trial Judge did not consider relevant provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure and Indian Evidence Act regarding admissibility of the injury report into evidence.
13. In the cross-examination of P.W. 1 we did not find any serious defect or lacuna which can impair value of her evidence. Her cross-examination reveals that she knows the accused persons for a long time as the accused persons i.e. the appellants reside near to her house. Her cross-examination further reveals that both the accused persons lifted her from the place where she went to attend nature’s call and she was taken to the land of Bhattacharjee near bush. Her evidence reveals that she tried to save herself but both the accused persons applied force on her and committed rape on her one after another. She stated that after Kalipada raped her she tried to flee away but, appellant Kalipada forced her to lie on the ground and thereafter the other appellant Barun raped her. She stated that she had injury on knee and thigh. If the doctor was examined and medical report was marked as exhibit, her evidence regarding injury on knee and other part of body would have been substantiated. Her evidence further reveals that after the incident she and her husband went to the house of appellant Barun but he threatened them with dire consequences.
14. It was argued by the learned Advocate for the appellant that in village during summer time villagers gossip over road or on culvert and in evidence it transpires that there was a culvert about 50/60 yards from house of P.W. 1 and in summer village people used to gossip upto dead hours of night. But presence of none on that night over culvert makes it clear that prosecution story is doubtful. It was also argued that if two persons one after another committed rape on her forcibly lying her on rough substance there would have been injuries on her back and other portion but there was no such injury on her person. It was further argued that it was impossible to commit rape on her as she stated that one of the appellants caught hold off her legs. Learned Advocate for the appellant contended that if one person catches hold off legs of a lady it is not possible to commit rape on her. These circumstances prove that P.W. 1 is not at all a reliable and trustworthy witness and her evidence does not inspire any confidence.
15. After meticulously scrutinising the evidence of P.W. 1 we are unable to accept the arguments advanced by the learned Advocate for the appellants. There is no evidence clearly as to in which position her legs were caught hold off. If her legs were kept-wide apart possibility of committing rape cannot be ruled out. Here we like to refer a case in which there was allegation that the accused committed rape on victim from behind. It was argued before the High Court that sexual intercourse from behind is not possible. The Kerala High Court in Thomas alias Thomachan v. State of Kerala, reported in 1999 Cr. L. J. 1297, held that the argument of the appellant is not tenable in view of the statement of doctor that such act was possible by using force. Similarly, in this case there is allegation that victim lady was raped forcibly by the accused persons one after another and when appellant Kalipada committing rape on her Barun caught hold off her legs. There is no evidence that both of her legs were kept straight and, therefore, there is no ground to disbelieve her evidence. We have already stated that learned Trial Judge made mistake by not marking the medical report as exhibit and if it was admitted in evidence it would have substantiated her evidence. We are not quoting what are the contents of the medical report or injury report as it was not admitted in evidence.
16. The argument that there was no injury on her person particularly on back which shows that her evidence is false, is also not acceptable to us. It is settled that absence of corroborative evidence or absence of injuries on person of victim is not fatal in each case. The Supreme Court in the case of Rafiq v. State of U.P., reported in 1980 Cr. L.J. 1344, held that absence of corroborative evidence or absence of injuries on person of victim is not fatal in each case. In Uttam alias Bhadrya v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 1991 Cr. L. J. 1644, the Bombay High Court observed that, mere absence of injury on person of prosecutrix or accused would not prove innocence of accused. In this reported case there was allegation of gang rape of victim lady by two persons and the Bombay High Court came to the decision that there was no delay in filing F.I.R.. and there was no contradiction between F.I.R. and testimony of prosecutrix and ultimately upheld the conviction of the appellants, in the case of Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, , the victim girl was raped by four persons. There was absence of injuries on back of prosecutrix. It was held by the Supreme Court that absence of injuries on back of prosecutrix does not make prosecution case unreliable. The evidence of prosecutrix that she was raped by accused persons one after another was supported by other evidence and the conviction was upheld. Therefore, failure of the prosecution to examine the doctor to prove the injuries on the person of prosecutrix and absence of injury on back of prosecutrix is not fatal in the instant case.
17. The argument that P.W. 1’s evidence is unbelievable as not a single independent witness and not a single villager was examined is not acceptable to us. The argument that absence of any villager on village culvert would make it clear that P.W. 1 has deposed falsely is also not acceptable to us. Her evidence makes it clear that on the relevant date there was not a single villager on the village culvert. Simple word “dead hours of night” does not carry any sense particularly in the surrounding atmosphere of village. It is unthinkable that villagers would remain gossiping in culvert till dead hours at night when it is most common and known to all that in village the villagers take supper early and go to bed early and they also rise early in the morning. Only the miscreants would prefer to move in village in dead hours of night. P.W. 1’s evidence indicates that it was about 10.00 P.M. when she came out of her room to attend nature’s call it is also common practice amongst the villagers to attend nature’s call in lonely place or inside bushes of village and villagers who live in huts have no bathroom within their house. The evidence of P.W. 1 that she came out of house to attend nature’s call makes her evidence more reliable and her evidence that there was none on the culvert makes her evidence reliable and trustworthy. If there were villagers on culvert which was 50/60 yards from house of P.W. 1 the appellants would not have dared to take away P.W. 1 towards bush lifting her when she came out of her room.
18. We are not convinced with the argument of Mr. H. K. De, learned Senior Advocate for the appellants that there is serious discrepancy regarding scribe of the F.I.R. and three versions have been revealed from evidence and rnaterials-on-record. We find that the discrepancy concerning F.I.R. is minor and ignorable. From the Lower Court Record we find that the original F.I.R. was written by P.W- 2 and the handwriting and the signature of the scribe Anil Duley there tallies with his signature over his deposition sheet as P.W. 2. It was quite natural that he wrote the F.I.R. after hearing the incident from his wife and thereafter-P.W. 1 put her thumb impression over F.I.R. P.W. 1 is an illiterate, rustic village woman and she put her thumb impression also over her deposition sheet in Court. It was her casual statement and stray remark during cross-examination at the suggestion of learned defence counsel that ‘Mejobabu’ wrote the F.I.R. It might be that she understood the endorsement of the police officer over the original complaint or F.I.R. showing the time of receipt of F.I.R. and steps taken as the writing of F.I.R. by ‘Mejobabu’. It is clear that it was P.W. 1’s statement that was reduced into writing by P.W.2. There was no discrepancy at all concerning scribe of the F.I.R.
19. We find that there was no delay in lodging the F.I.R. and we do not agree with the argument of the learned Advocate for the appellants that there was delay in lodging F.I.R. The incident took place after 10.00 P.M. at night and physical and mental condition of P.W. 1 was not good at that time. She was taken to house by P.W. 2, her husband and P.W. 2 heard the incident from his wife. On that night they went to house of accused Barun but, he threatened them with dire consequences. Next morning they came to P.W, 4, one of their relatives and told her about the incident and thereafter they came to police station at about 10.00 A.M. P.W. 2’s statement that thana is about 7 K.M. away is not acceptable to us as he was not a competent person to judge the distance of thana from their village. The formal F.I.R. (Ext. 3) recorded by the police officer shows the probable distance of place of occurrence from police station and it is 14 K.M. south-west of police station. After arrival at the P.S. the F.I.R. was written and handed over to the police officer and police officer received it at 12.45 hours of 28.9.97. Therefore, there was no delay at all in lodging F.I.R. and there is nothing to show that the informant or her husband wasted time and were negligent in lodging the F.I.R. and thereby introduced a false and concocted story.
20. The argument that there is serious discrepancy between F.I.R. and evidence regarding arrival of P.W. 2 at place of occurrence, is not acceptable to us. In the F.I.R. it was mentioned that her husband was searching for her not finding her in house and when he came near them the accused persons fled away. In evidence P.W. 1 stated that her husband came near the field for her search and she narrated the incident to him. P.W. 2 Anil Duley, her husband stated that after returning home at about 10.30 P.M. on that night he did not find his wife in the room and so he came out of the house for searehing her. When he came near the bush he found his wife was lying on the land belonging to Bhattacharjee. He asked his wife and heard about the incident of rape on her by the appellants. P.W. 2 did not state that he saw the accused persons fleeing away from the place of occurrence nor P.W. 1 stated that when her husband came to place of occurrence the accused persons fled away or, that her husband saw accused person to flee away. Therefore, there was no discrepancy at all regarding arrival of P.W. 2 at place of occurrence and it is clear that he came to place of occurrence soon after the incident of rape on P.W. 1.
21. We have already discussed that injury on back is not always expected
and in order to expect injury it was necessary to make out what type of land it
was over which P.W. 1 was made to lie. Evidence of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 makes it
clear that she was made to lie on land near the bushes which belongs to one
Bhattacharjee. There is no evidence that the said land was rocky or very rough.
If there was grass or if it was agricultural land, the said land was not definitely
hard and rough. We have already indicated that P.W. 1 was illiterate rustic
village woman and as such her statement in cross-examination that the place
was rough does not prove, that it was hard and rough land. Moreover, we have
already referred to the decision of Balwant Singh’s case (supra) where the victim
girl was raped by four persons and there was no injury on her back and it was
held that absence of injury on back of prosecutrix does not make prosecution
case unreliable. In the instant case the said principle is quite appropriate and
absence of injury on her back portion of body does not make the prosecution
case unreliable.
22. Non-examination of other villagers, Panchayat member, Pradhan etc. does not throw the prosecution case out of Court. The law is that it is quality of evidence that is to be considered and not the quantity. Therefore, there is no need of examination of men of entire village in a case in which the modesty of a married lady of village is in question. There is sufficient corroboration of evidence of P.W-1 by P.W. 2 and P.W. 4. There are galaxy of decisions in which it has been held that evidence of prosecutrix, if inspires confidence in the mind of Court, corroboration is not necessary. Such a view was expressed in the case of Rafiq v. State of U.P. (supra). The Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, , held that “A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars………… But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the Court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy.” It was ultimately held by the Supreme Court that in a case of sex offence the evidence of prosecutrix does not require corroboration if her statement inspires confidence of Court and accepted by the Court.
23. The argument that the appellants were falsely implicated out of political rivalry is not acceptable to us. Political rivalry cuts both ways and a false case may be started due to political rivalry and, on the other hand, to teach a lesson or take revenge an offence may actually be committed. In the instant case there is no evidence at all that there was rivalry between the appellants and P.W, 1 and P.W. 2 due to the political reasons or any other reason. Nothing transpired in evidence that P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 had grudge against the appellants or, enmity with the appellants. Therefore, plea of false accusation due to political rivalry cannot be accepted. The evidence and circumstances makes it clear that the appellants in order to fulfil their sexual desire and lust over woman flesh lifted P.W. 1 when she came out of house to attend nature’s call and forcibly ravished the married village lady. By their act, not only they outraged the modesty of a married lady but, also tarnished the reputation of the family in the eyes of village people. In village generally a married woman on whose head stigma of outraging of modesty is pasted she is being looked down upon and she and her family members are ostracized in village. It is unthinkable that P.W. 1 would go to such extent so as to stake her prestige and reputation in village in order’ to falsely implicate appellants in a case of rape on her.
24. Evidence of P.W. 1 reveals that she tried to shout but failed as her mouth was pressed and she also tried to flee away but appellant Kalipada forcibly made her lie on ground. Considering all these circumstances and the entire evidence of P.W. 1 we are of opinion that P.W. 1 was not a consenting party and she was ravished forcibly by the appellants. P.W. 1 is a truthful and reliable witness.
25. The investigation was not proper as it appears to us. The I.O. did not send the wearing apparels of the victim lady for chemical examination. No step was taken to collect vaginal swab of P.W. 1 and to send it for chemical examination. The I.O. remained content only with seizing the wearing apparels of the victim which in our opinion was not sufficient and he should have send the wearing apparels for chemical examination. The defect in investigation in this case is not fatal and due to this the prosecution case cannot be thrown out of Court.
26. The decisions cited by the learned Advocate for the appellants namely Dilip v. State of M.P., reported in 2002 SCC (Cri) 592, Joseph v. State of Kerala, reported in AIR 2000 SC 1608, Vimal Suresh Kamble v. Chaluverapinake Apal S.P., reported in 2003(1) Supreme Today 256 and Harka Bahadur Rai v. State of West Bengal, reported in 2003 C.Cr.L.R. (Cal) 346, do not come to the aid and assistance of the appellants in the instant case. The Supreme Court decisions are concerning reliability of testimony of the prosecutrix and this is the basic principle which has been settled by the Supreme Court in offence concerning sex. In the instant case after giving marathon narration of the evidence of P.W. 1 and closely scrutinising her evidence we have come to the decision that she is reliable and trustworthy witness. According to the settled principle of law pronounced by the Supreme Court in several cases referred to above conviction can be based on the basis of sole evidence of prosecutrix in a case concerning sex offence if her evidence is found reliable to Court and no corroboration is necessary. The decision of Harka Bahadur Rai’s case is not applicable in the instant case as the learned Trial Judge examined the appellants under Section 313 Cr. P.C. properly. All the materials and elements that transpired in evidence were put to the appellants by several questions one after another and the appellants gave answer to all the questions. In 313 Cr. P.C. examination the appellants only took the plea that they are innocent and did not make out any specific defence case, and also denied to examine witness on their behalf. There is nothing to show that the appellants were prejudiced during their examination under Section 313 Cr. P. C. We are of the opinion that there was no defect at all in the examination of appellants under Section 313 Cr. P. C. and the appellants were not at all prejudiced in the instant case during their examination under Section 313 Cr. P. C.
27. Before conclusion we like to cite decisions of few more cases to establish that prosecution has been able to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts against the appellants. In the case of Manga v. State of Haryana, , the victim girl was deaf and dumb and the victim girl was not examined in the sessions trial. In spite of that, the appellants were convicted relying on the evidence of other witnesses including eye-witness to the incident of rape which were believed by the Court. Ultimately the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the appellant. In the case of Krishan Lal v. State of Haryana, reported in 1980 Cr. L J 926, the victim was a minor and her complaint to parents and presence of blood on her clothes were held by the Court as testimony which warrants credence and the conviction was upheld. In the case of Radhya Sham v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, reported in 1988 Cr. L J 447, it was held that supposed contradictions and discrepancies unless of fatal nature would not throw out otherwise reliable prosecution case and it was further held that conviction can be based on sole evidence of prosecutrix, if her statement inspires confidence.
28. In Pramod Mahto v. State of Bihar, , plea that false case was started due to communal feeling was rejected by the Supreme Court. It was held by the Supreme Court that, it is inconceivable that an unmarried girl and two married women would go to the extent of staking their reputation and future in order to falsely set up a case of rape on them for sake of communal interest. We have already indicated that in the instant case there is no evidence at all that P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 had any grudge or rivalry against the appellants and it has not been transpired in evidence that there was political rivalry between P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 and the appellants. Merely P.W. 1 is a supporter of one political party and the appellants are supporters of other political party is not a ground to come to the conclusion that a false case was started against the appellant due to political rivalry.
29. The above discussion makes it clear that the prosecution was able to establish its case and the charges against the appellants beyond all reasonable doubts. Learned Trial Court made no mistake by convicting the appellants under Section 376(2)(g) of I.P.C. In our opinion the sentence of 10 years imprisonment cannot be regarded as disproportionate to the offence and harsh. In a case of such nature where the appellants lifted a married woman and committed rape on her which amounted to a stigma on her reputation, no leniency can be shown to the appellants. Conviction of the appellants under Section 376(2)(g) of I.P.C. and the sentence imposed on them by the learned Trial Judge are confirmed.
30. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed.
31. Send down the Lower Court Records along with copy of judgment to the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Hooghly for information and necessary action.
32. Send a copy of judgment to the Inspector General of Prisons, Government of West Bengal at Writers’ Buildings, Calcutta through Registrar General, High Court, for onward communication to the convict/appellants in the particular Correctional Home where they are lodged at present.
Amit Talukdar, J.
33. I agree.