High Court Kerala High Court

P.D.Nanu Balan vs Lakshmanan on 14 October, 2010

Kerala High Court
P.D.Nanu Balan vs Lakshmanan on 14 October, 2010
       

  

  

 
 
  IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

AS.No. 34 of 1997(C)



1. P.D.NANU BALAN
                      ...  Petitioner

                        Vs

1. LAKSHMANAN
                       ...       Respondent

                For Petitioner  :SRI.R.PARTHASARATHY

                For Respondent  :SRI.T.A.RAMADASAN

The Hon'ble MR. Justice A.K.BASHEER
The Hon'ble MR. Justice P.S.GOPINATHAN

 Dated :14/10/2010

 O R D E R

A.K. Basheer & P.S.Gopinathan, JJ.

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

A.S.Nos.34 & 130 of 1997

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Dated this the 14th day of October, 2010
Judgment
Basheer, J:

These two appeals are directed against the preliminary

decree and judgment in a suit for partition. While

A.S.No.34 of 1997 is at the instance of defendant Nos.1 and

2, the other appeal is by defendant No.6. The court below

decreed the suit as prayed for directing partition of the

plaint schedule property and allotment of 7 out of 13 shares

to the plaintiffs and the remaining 6 shares to the

defendants.

2. The crucial issue that came up for consideration

in the suit was whether the plaint schedule property was

thavazhi property as contended by the plaintiffs. The court

below answered the above question in the affirmative and

held that plaintiffs were entitled to 7 out of 13 shares.

3. The case of the plaintiffs may be briefly noticed:

A.S.Nos.34 & 170/1997. : 2 :

4. The plaint schedule property with an old

residential building, well etc. originally belonged to

Perumpada Achu and his brother Kanaran. They

assigned their right in the property in favour of

Perumpada Chappila, Manni, Matha and Mathu

through an assignment deed dated March 28, 1912. On

the same day, the assignees (Smt.Chappila and others)

mortgaged the said property to Perumpada Lakshmi

and her three children viz., Suseela, Nanu (defendant

No.1) and Vasu and handed over possession of the

same to these mortgagees. The mortgage was for a

period of 6 years and the mortgagees were permitted to

effect improvements and take income therefrom. The

mortgage was never redeemed by the mortgagors and

therefore the mortgagees became absolute owners of

the property.

5. It was contended by the plaintiffs that the

A.S.Nos.34 & 170/1997. : 3 :

plaint schedule property was enjoyed as a

Marumakkathayam tharwad property eversince its

acquisition. Lakshmi and her 5 children, including

Bhaskaran and Chandrasekharan who were born after

execution of the mortgage deed constituted by

thavazhy tharwad. Smt.Lakshmi passed away in or

about 1925. Suseela the only daughter of Lakshmi

died in 1980. Plaintiffs and defendant Nos.3 and 4 are

the children and grandchildren of late Suseela.

Bharathan, another son of Suseela died in the year

1981. Defendant No.5 is the widow of deceased

Bharathan. Thus the plaintiffs and defendants 3 to 5

are the members of thavazhy of late Suseela, daughter

of Perumpada Lakshmi. As mentioned earlier,

defendant Nos.1 and 2 are two of the four sons of

Perumpada Lakshmi. Of the remaining sons,

Vasudevan died in 1966. Defendant No.6 is his widow.

A.S.Nos.34 & 170/1997. : 4 :

The other son Bhaskaran died a bachelor in 1989.

6. According to the plaintiffs, defendant No.1

the eldest male member of the tharwad had been

managing the property after the death of Lakshmi.

There are three residential buildings in the property

including the old tharwad house. The tharwad building

was let out on rent to the Kerala State Electricity Board

for a few years. Later, the Board vacated the building

since it became dilapidated due to disrepair. Defendant

No.1 became unable to look after and maintain the

plaint schedule property due to old age. Further, he

refused to share the income from the property to the

thavazhi members.

7. Plaintiffs contended that the property was

liable to be partitioned into 13 shares and each one of

them was entitled to one share each (7/13).

8. Claim for partition was disputed and resisted

A.S.Nos.34 & 170/1997. : 5 :

only by defendants 1, 2 and 6. Defendant No.1 in his

written statement contended that the plaint schedule

property was never treated or enjoyed as a thavazhi

property as alleged by the plaintiffs. The mortgage

deed of the year 1912 (Ext.A1) was only a “simple

mortgage” and possession was never handed over to

the mortgagees. According to this defendant, the

mortgage property was outstanding in the possession

of a tenant on the strength of a registered marupat.

Later, the tenancy right was surrendered by the tenant

to the jenmi and the jenmom right which was

subsequently sold in a Court auction was purchased by

one Kunjiraman with the funds of the Dr.Kumaran, the

father of defendant No.1. Later, Dr.Kumaran got the

jenmom right of the property assigned in his favour

from Kunjiraman on the strength of Ext.B2 assignment

deed of the year 1923. Still later, in 1942 Dr.Kumaran

A.S.Nos.34 & 170/1997. : 6 :

executed Ext.B3 jenmom assignment deed in favour of

his three male children viz., Nanu Balan (defendant

No.1), Vasudevan and Chandrasekharan. Defendant

No.1 asserted that there was no mention of thavazhi in

any of the documents referred to above. He claimed

1/3rd share in the property. He conceded that defendant

No.6 being the widow of his late brother Vasudevan,

would be entitled to get 1/6th share and the remaining

1/3rd would go to defendant No.2. In short, he

contended that the plaintiffs and defendants other than

defendant Nos.2 and 6 had no right in the plaint

schedule property. Alternatively it was also prayed by

him that if it was found that the right under the

mortgage deed of 1912 was still subsisting, only those

persons mentioned in the said document would be

entitled to claim any share. Suseela, the daughter of

Lakshmi would be entitled to get 1/4th share which will

A.S.Nos.34 & 170/1997. : 7 :

devolve on her six children. He further contended that

he would be entitled to get 1/5th share out of his

mother’s share in addition to 1/4th share as a co-owner.

9. The other contention raised by defendant

No.1 was that the existing residential building in the

plaint schedule building was constructed by him with

his own funds and there was a specific understanding

that it would be reserved in his favour in the event of

partition. He further contended that no income had

been obtained by him from the property at any point of

time.

10. Defendant No.2 reiterated whatever had

been stated by defendant No.1 in his written statement.

But in his additional written statement it was contended

by defendant No.2 that Section 4A of the Kerala Land

Reforms Act had no application. Right of redemption

was never exercised within the period of limitation or

A.S.Nos.34 & 170/1997. : 8 :

even thereafter. The contention that the property had

vested absolutely on the strength of continued and

uninterrupted possession was also disputed. It was

further contended that the Court had no jurisdiction to

decide the tenancy right claimed on the strength of

Section 4A, in view of the bar under Section 125 of

the Act.

11. Defendant No.6 (widow of Vasudevan) in

her written statement supported the case of defendant

Nos.1 and 2. and contended that the property was never

enjoyed as a Marumakkathayam thavazy property. The

property was acquired with the funds of Dr.Kumaran,

to be enjoyed by his wife and children. She further

contended that Lakshmi’s 1/4th share in the property

will alone assume the character of thavazhi, and

Bhaskaran and Chandrasekharan, the two sons of

Lakshmi, would get their respective shares only as

A.S.Nos.34 & 170/1997. : 9 :

members of the thavazhy of Lakshmi in respect of her

1/4th share. In short, defendant No.6 contended that if

at all there could be a claim by the plaintiffs for

partition of the property as thavazhy, it had to be

limited to 1/4th share in that property. She claimed

12/44 share in the property which accrued to her late

husband.

12. Defendant Nos.3 and 4, the grandchildren

of Suseela and the only daughter of Lakshmi

supported partition. Defendant No.5, the daughter in

law of Suseela remained absent and she was set ex

parte,

The trial court framed the following issues:

“1. Whether the plaint schedule property
is a tavazhy property and whether the
plaintiffs have share in it?

2. What are the correct shares in case of
partition?

A.S.Nos.34 & 170/1997. : 10 :

3. What are the reservations and
equities?

4. Who is liable to pay share of profit
and what is the quantum?

Addl.5. Whether the plaintiffs are
deemed tenants?”

13. Plaintiff No.1 was examined as Pw.1 and

Exts.A1 to A4 were marked on the side of the

plaintiffs. Defendant No.2 got himself examined as

DW.1 and Exts.B1 to B3 were marked on the side of

the defendants. The report and account submitted by

the Advocate Commissioner were marked as Exts.C1

and C2.

14. As has been mentioned already, the court

below repelled the contentions raised by the contesting

defendants and held that the plaint schedule property

was liable to be partitioned as claimed by the plaintiffs.

The court below held that considering the nature of

A.S.Nos.34 & 170/1997. : 11 :

acquisition of the property and its enjoyment thereafter,

it was liable to be partitioned among the plaintiffs and

defendants, they being “successors in interest” of the

thavazhy property. Plaintiffs and defendants 3 to 5 who

are the members of thavazhy of late Suseela, the only

daughter of Lakshmi, would be entitled to get 1/13

share each in the property, it was held.

15. It is contended by the appellants, who

alone resisted partition, that the findings entered by the

court below are totally illegal and erroneous.

According to the appellants, the property was never

acquired with an intention to be enjoyed as a thavazhi

property and in fact it had never been enjoyed as a

thavazhy property also. It is pointed out by learned

counsel for the appellants that the property was

mortgaged in favour of Lakshmi and her three children

viz., Suseela, Nanu Balan (defendant No.1) and

A.S.Nos.34 & 170/1997. : 12 :

Vasudevan in the year 1912. If in fact the acquisition

was intended to be for the benefit of thavazhy headed

by Suseela, such an intention would have been made

explicit in the document itself. Admittedly Suseela had

5 children. But the other two children viz., Bhaskaran

and Chandrsekharan were not included in the mortgage

deed. It is further contended by the learned counsel

that the mortgaged property was outstanding in the

possession of a tenant at the time of mortgage. The said

tenant (Sri.Puthiyapurayil Aboobacker) had later

surrendered his tenancy right to the Jenmi. The

jenmom right was sold in court auction in execution of

a decree in SC.No.1492/1911. In the court auction the

jenmom right was purchased by one Kunjiraman with

the funds made available by Dr.Kumaran, who later

had assigned the jenmom right over the property in

favour of his three sons viz., defendant No.1,

A.S.Nos.34 & 170/1997. : 13 :

Vasudevan and Chandrasekharan. Thus according to

the learned counsel, the property exclusively belonged

to defendant Nos.1, 2 and 6. At any rate, it can never

be said that the property was being enjoyed as a

thavazhi property.

16. The main plank of the above argument is

that Lakshmi and her three children mentioned in

Ext.A1 mortgage deed had never got possession of the

property pursuant to the mortgage. According to the

contesting defendants, the mortgaged property was

outstanding in the possession of a tenant at the time of

the mortgage. But a perusal of Ext.A1 mortgage deed

will unambiguously show that the said contention is

totally baseless and incorrect. It is seen recited in the

said document, that the entire property including the

building and other structures therein had been put in

the possession of the mortgagees on the date of

A.S.Nos.34 & 170/1997. : 14 :

execution of the document itself. Therefore the

contention that the property was outstanding in the

possession of a tenant falls to the ground.

17. It is true that the document recites that one

Aboobacker had been given the right to take usufructs

(melpattom) from the property. It is seen further recited

in the document that the melpattom right was liable to

be terminated. For this purpose a notice signed by

the mortgagors to be issued to the melpattomdar was

also handed over to the mortgagees. The recitals in the

above document will show that Aboobacker had no

tenancy right in the property as alleged by the

contesting defendants. More importantly, the

contesting defendants had not adduced any evidence to

show that the so called tenant, if any, had surrendered

his tenancy right to the landlord. There is not even

any semblance of evidence to substantiate the above

A.S.Nos.34 & 170/1997. : 15 :

contention. The appellants had not even pleaded as to

when the tenant had surrendered his right, leave alone

producing any document of surrender. Further, Exts.B2

and B3 on which heavy reliance had been placed by the

appellants, will not show that Dr.Kumaran had

obtained any possessory right over the property. It is

evident from the pleadings of the appellant that

Dr.Kumaran had purchased only jenmom right from

one Kunjiraman on the strength of Ext.B2 document.

This is explicit from the said document itself. Ext.B3

will also show that Dr.Kumaran had assigned only

jenmom right over the property in favour of his three

sons including defendant No.1. In short, there is

nothing on record to show that the mortgagees

mentioned in Ext.A1 (Lakshmi and her three children)

had never been put in possession of the property

pursuant to the creation of the mortgage. As mentioned

A.S.Nos.34 & 170/1997. : 16 :

earlier, Ext.A1 clearly established otherwise.

18. In this context it may be noticed that the

contention of defendant No.1 is that he had constructed

the residential building in the property using his own

funds. This necesssarily means that he along with his

mother, sister (Suseela) and others had always been in

possession of the property. In the absence of any

specific pleading as to when he and his brothers got

exclusive possession of the property from the

jenmi/owner after the so called surrender by the tenant,

it can never be said that the mortgagees had not got

possession of the property pursuant to Ext.A1.

19. The other contention raised by the

appellants is that the acquisition of the property was

not for the benefit of the thavazhi at all. In support of

the above contention it was pointed out that all the

children of Lakshmi were not included in Ext.A1

A.S.Nos.34 & 170/1997. : 17 :

mortgage deed. But it is the admitted position that in

the year 1912 when Ext.A1 mortgage deed was

executed, Lakshmi had only three children viz.,

Suseela, Nanu (defendant No.1) and Vasudevan. The

other two sons viz., Bhaskaran and Chandrasekharan

were born subsequently. Still further, the recitals in

Ext.A1 will show that the mortgage money had been

contributed by Dr.Kumaran, the husband of Lakshmi,

and father of the other mortgagees. There is specific

reference to the payment made by Dr.Kumaran for the

purpose of acquisition of this property to be enjoyed by

his wife and then available children. The amount

contributed by Dr.Kumaran is referred to in the

document as “derived out of puthravakasam fund of

Lakshmi and children”. That plaintiffs and defendants

3 to 5 are the members of the thavazhi of Suseela, the

only daughter of Lakshmi was not at all in dispute.

A.S.Nos.34 & 170/1997. : 18 :

20. The contesting defendants in their

respective written statements have practically conceded

that Suseela had at least mortgagee’s right in the plaint

schedule property. Their only contention was that the

children and grandchildren of Suseela could not have

claimed share in the plaint schedule property as though

it was a thavazhy property. But going by the materials

available on record, we have no hesitation to hold that

the property was acquired by Dr.Kumaran and

Lakshmi to be enjoyed by her children as a thavazhy

property. We have no hesitation to hold that the

contentions raised by the contesting defendants to deny

the legitimate right of the lenial descendants of

Suseela are totally without any merit or substance.

21. The court below had also referred to the oral

testimony of defendant No.2 in the case, who was

examined as DW.1. To a question in the course of

A.S.Nos.34 & 170/1997. : 19 :

cross examination, defendant No.2 had admitted that

the Melpattomdar (Aboobacker) mentioned in Ext.A1

document had been given only the right to take

usufructs. The court below had also noticed that

defendant No.1 had never bothered to step into the

witness box. It may be remembered that he was the

only surviving beneficiary (mortgagee) available at the

time of trial of the suit.

22. The court below had also referred to the

order passed on additional issue No.5 relating to

deemed tenancy. After considering the said issue the

court below had held that the question of tenancy was

not liable to be referred to the Land Tribunal. The said

finding was never challenged by any of the parties at

any point of time. The appellants have also not

questioned the validity or correctness of the said

finding in these two appeals.. Further it is on record

A.S.Nos.34 & 170/1997. : 20 :

that Dr.Kumaran had purchased the jenmom right from

the Jenmi. Though in Ext.B3 Dr.Kumaran had referred

to the names of only three of his male children, we are

of the considered opinion that the jenmom right

obtained by the Dr.Kumaran shall enure to the benefit

of all his children including Suseela, the only female

child.

23. The other contention raised by defendant

No.1 was that he had constructed the residential

building in the property with his own funds and that

too with a specific understanding that it would be

allotted to his share in the event of partition. But

defendant No.1 did not adduce any evidence in support

of the above contention. In that view of the matter, the

court below had rightly rejected the above claim made

by defendant No.1.

24. Yet another contention raised by defendant

A.S.Nos.34 & 170/1997. : 21 :

No.1 was that he had not been getting any income

from the plaint schedule property to be shared among

the other members. But this contention was repelled.

Referring to Exts.C1 and C2 report and accounts

submitted by the Advocate Commissioner, the court

below directed that the quantum of share of profits of

the parties can be decided in the final decree

proceedings. Having considered the materials available

on record, we are satisfied that the finding entered by

the court below on issue No.4 does not call for any

interference.

25. While dealing with issue No.2 the court

below has, in our view, correctly, held that the

plaintiffs are entitled to 7/13 shares (1/13 each).

Similarly defendant No.1 to 6 are found entitled to get

1/13 shares each. Since it has already been found that

the plaint schedule property is to be divided as

A.S.Nos.34 & 170/1997. : 22 :

thavazhy property among the thavazhi members, the

finding entered by the court below on issue No.2 also

does not call for any interference.

26. For the foregoing reasons it is held that the

conclusions arrived at by the court below are totally

legal and valid and eminently justified, in the facts and

circumstances of the case. The decree and judgment

are upheld.

27. The appeals are dismissed.

In the facts and circumstances of the case, the

parties shall suffer their respective costs.

A.K. Basheer
Judge.

P.S. Gopinathan
Judge.

an.