JUDGMENT
B. S. Chauhan, J.
1. This is a reference made by learned single Judge vide order dated 24.8.1995 hearing the Writ Petition No. 16337 of 1987 and the following two questions have been referred for our opinion :
“(1) Whether in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, the State, of U. P. will be the appropriate Government for making the reference in question on which the impugned award has been passed? and
(2) Whether in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, the respondent No. 2 was correctly held to be a workman as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947?”
2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that the respondent-employee, Shri R. K. Sharma was appointed by the petitioner-company as a Medical Representative vide order dated 17.10.1973 (Annexure-3) and given the area of Allahabad for its operation. His services stood terminated vide order dated 8th March, 1985 (Annexure-7) with effect from 20.3.1985. The Government of Uttar Pradesh, vide order dated 23.4.1986 (Annexure-2), made a reference to the Labour Court under Section 4K of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the “U. P. Act”) as to whether the termination of service of the respondent-employee with effect from 20.3.1985 was valid, and if not to what relief he was entitled for. In response to the said reference, Case No. 18 of 1986 was registered before the Labour Court, Allahabad. Written statement was filed by the present petitioner-employer on 2nd August, 1986 (Annexure-9) taking the plea that respondent-employee was a Medical Representative for the purpose of selling company’s products and he was getting the salary of Rs. 2,447 per month on the date of termination, thus, as such was not a workman within the meaning of the provisions of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the ‘Central Act’). The respondent-employee took the plea that he had also been assigned the duty of selling the products of the petitioner-company and also recovery of the money of sale proceeds and, thus, he was a workman. After considering the evidence led by the parties, the Labour Court made award on 30th May, 1987 (Annexure-1) holding that the respondent-employee was a workman and his termination was unjust and illegal and thus, directed to reinstate him in service with back wages, treating that there had been no break in service. Being aggrieved, the petitioner-company filed a writ petition wherein the aforesaid two questions have been referred to for our opinion.
3. Shri Tarun Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that as the respondent-employee had exclusively been appointed as a Medical Representative for advertisement and sale of the medical products of the petitioner-company, he does not fall within the definition of workmen under the “Central Act”. The case of respondent-employee was governed by the provisions of the Sales Promotion Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1976, (hereinafter called the “Act 1976”) thus, as he was not a workman, the reference itself was bad. More so, as the petitioner-company does not have any office or branch office in the State of U. P. and its entire business is in other States, the Government of U. P. and not the “appropriate Government”, and thus, competent to make the reference. Therefore, the award is a nullity.
4. On the contrary, Shri Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-employee, has submitted that the employee had been working in State of U, P. ; he had been involved in advertisement and sale of the products of the company ; had been obtaining the sale orders ; and was also involved in recovery of the money and sending daily and monthly progress report to the Head Office. He was doing the work of manual, skilled and clerical nature and, therefore, he was a workman and as he had been working in Allahabad, the Government of U. P. was competent to make the reference.
5. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
6. In the instant case, as the reference is to determine the scope and application of law in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, no purpose would be served in answering the legal questions only involved herein. It would be more appropriate to decide the matter on merit also. With the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, we proceed to answer the questions as well as to decide the petition on merit.
7. Learned counsel for the parties have first made submission on second question, therefore, we are dealing with the Question No. 2 prior to dealing with the Question No. 1.
8. The question ; whether a particular person/employee is a ‘workman’ or not, has been examined by the courts time and again. A person, to be a workman within the meaning of the definition, must be one employed in an industry for hire or reward, His term of employment may be express or implied. It is not the nomenclature of the post he holds but the nature of his duties which is the determining factor whether he falls within the definition of ‘workman.’ Therefore, the Appropriate Government, Court or the Tribunal must examine what is the nature of duties attached to his office or the power vested in him. Where an employee performs multifarious duties, the determining factor would be the dominant performance of his employment because while performing such a duty, he may be doing some other work also.
9. In Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, AIR 1958 SC 130 ; Bihar State Road Transport Corporation v. State of Bihar and Ors.. AIR 1970 SC 1217 ; Samishta Dube v. City Board, Etawah, AIR 1999 SC 1056 ; and Sharad Kumar v. Government of N.C.T. of Delhi and Ors., JT 2002 (4) SC 49, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that nomenclature of post is totally irrelevant for determining as to whether an employee is a workman. It is in fact nature of duties assigned to him which are to be taken into consideration. The Court held that an employee maintaining ledgers, files, correspondence, and making entries in cash books, etc. was ‘workman’.
10. In Voltas Ltd. v. Its Workmen, AIR 1961 SC 941, the Hon’ble Supreme Court excluded salesmen and apprentices from the definition of ‘workman’ considering the nature of their duties and remuneration as salesmen were paid commission taken on sales and apprentices were getting training of their job at the expenses incurred by the establishment and not contributing to the profit of the establishment.
11. In J. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mill Co. Ltd. v. Labour Appellate Tribunal, AIR 1964 SC 737, the Apex Court held that the words “employed in any industry” contained in Section 2(s) of the Central Act, cannot be construed liberally and any employee engaged in any work or operation, which is incidentally connected with the main industry of the employer, would also be a workman provided he fulfils the other requirements of the definition. The Court emphasised that while dealing with the question of incidental relationship with the main industrial operation, a limit has to be prescribed so as to exclude the operations or activities, whose relation with the main industrial activity may be remote, indirect or far-fetched. The Court was dealing with the issue whether malis employed by the industry maintaining the bungalows of its officers were workmen within the meaning of the definition and held that malts appointed by the employer for the said purpose were workmen.
12. The employee doing occasionally supervisory work, but generally manual, was held to be a workman within the definition of the word in Anand Bazar Patrika (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Workmen, (1970) 3 SCC 248.
13. In Llyods Bank Ltd. v. Panna Lal Gupta and Ors., AIR 1967 SC 428, the Apex Court held that while deciding : whether the workmen are supervisors or not, the Court should not import general considerations about the administrative or supervisory control which are associated with the status of a supervisor or a supervisory officer and a person, claiming the status of a Supervisor, must show that he has to supervise the work of some others who were in a sense below him. Clerks in Audit Department are assigned the duties of checking up the Books of Accounts and entries made in them, which are purely mechanical and it cannot be said to include any supervisory function and such persons are merely workmen.
14. Persons authorised to assign duty and distribute work in a bank were held to be “not workmen” in All India Reserve Bank Employees’ Association v. Reserve Bank of India, AIR 1966 SC 305. Similarly, Blending Supervisors and Fueling Superintendents were held to be “not workmen” in Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distribution Co. of India (Ltd.) v. Burmah Shell Management/Staff Association, AIR 1971 SC 922.
15. In S.K. Maini v. Carona Sahu Co. Ltd., AIR 1994 SC 1824, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that where the functions of an employee appear to be administrative and managerial by virtue of being incharge of the shop, or officer incharge of the management of the shop, he cannot be a workman in spite of the fact that he has also to do himself other required duties of clerical nature. Therefore, the terms and conditions of his appointment and powers conferred upon him must be examined to determine his status.
16. In Secretary, Indian Tea Association v. Ajit Kumar Barat and Ors., 2000 (2) AWC 1139 (SC) : (2000) 3 SCC 93, the Apex Court observed that in a given case, nature of duties of an employee at the initial stage of his appointment may be of a workman but not at the time of his dismissal. Therefore, nature of his duties at the time of removal would be relevant to determine his status. In Hussan Mithu Mhasvadkar v. Bombay Iron and Steel Labour Board and Anr., (2001) 7 SCC 394, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, considered the issue as to whether “Inspector” in the Bombay Iron and Steel Board, constituted under the Maharashtra Mathadi, Hamal and other Manual Workers (Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Act, 1969, was “workman” under the definition and observed as under :
“No doubt, in deciding about the status of an employee, his designation alone cannot be said to be decisive and what really should go into consideration is the nature of his duties and the powers conferred upon as well as the functions assigned to him…….. It is the pre-dominant nature of the services that will be the true and proper test ………. When, as in this case, as disclosed from Section 15 of the Act as also the provisions of the scheme, the primary duties of an employee and the dominant purpose, aim and object of employment was to carry out only certain specific statutory duties in the matter of effective enforcement and implementation of welfare scheme in order to ameliorate and rehabilitation of particular section of labour, and, if need be, on the basis of his own decision, which calls for a high degree of discretion and exercise of power to prosecute the violator of the provisions of the Act, rules and the provisions of the scheme, we are unable to accord our approval to the claim made on behalf of the appellant that he can yet be assigned the status of a ‘workman’ without doing violence to the language of Section 2(s) and the very purpose and object of the I.D. Act, 1947. That apart, even judging from the nature of the powers and the manner of its exercise by an Inspector appointed under the Act, in our view, the appellant cannot be considered to be engaged in doing any manual, unskilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work and the mere fact that in the course of performance of his duties he had to also maintain incidental records to evidence the duties performed by him day to day, cannot result in the conversion of the post of ‘Inspector’ into any one of those nature noticed above……. The appellant cannot fall within the definition of ‘workman’. The power of an Inspector and duties and obligations cast upon him as such are identical and akin to law enforcing agency or authority and also on a par with prosecuting agency in the public law field.”
17. Thus, in view of the above, an employee claiming the status of a workman must fall in either of the categories mentioned in the definition and should not fall in either of the exceptions provided therein and for this purpose, nature of dominant, not mere incidental, duties and power conferred upon him, are the decisive factors, not his designation.
18. In T.P. Srivastava v. National Tobacco Co. of India Ltd., (1992) 1 SCC 281, the Hon’ble Supreme Court examined the issue as to whether a salesman looking after sales promotion, publicity and advertisement of a company’s products, falls within the ambit of workman as defined under the Central Act. The Court observed as under :
“The duties involve the suggesting of ways and means to improve the sales, a study of the type or status of the public to whom the product has to reach and a study of the market condition. He was also required to suggest about the publicity in markets and melas, advertisements including the need for posters, holders and cinema slides. These duties do require the imaginative and creative mind which could not be termed as either manual, skilled, unskilled or clerical in nature. The supervising work of the other local salesmen was part of his work considered by the Tribunal as only incidental to his main work of canvassing and promotion in the area of his operation…………. We may also refer to the subsequent passing of the Sales Promotion Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1976. This Act defines “sales promotion employees” as meaning a person employed or engaged in any establishment for hire or reward to do any work relating to promotion of sales or business or both. This Act is to apply in the first instance to every establishment engaged in pharmaceuticals industry. It enables the Central Government by notification to apply the provisions to any other establishment engaged in any notified industry. If an industry is notified under this Act then the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, would also be attracted to these types of workmen, This is a subsequent enactment and it is not applicable to the termination in the instant case which was long prior to the enactment of this Act. Further no notification under this Act bringing the provisions to the employees like that of the company has been made under the provisions of this Act. The object of this enactment and the employees covered by the enactment also go to show that persons employed for sales promotions normally would not come within the definition of workmen under the Industrial Disputes Act.”
19. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in fact, placed reliance upon the provisions of the Act, 1976, wherein the sales promotion employee had been defined under Section 2(d) as under :
“Sales promotion employee” means any person by whatever name called (including an apprentice) employed or engaged in any establishment for hire or reward to do any work relating to promotion of sales or business, or both, and :
(i) who draws wages (being wages, not including any commission) not exceeding seven hundred and fifty rupees per mensem ; or
(ii)
who had drawn wages(being wages, including commission), or commission only, in either case, not exceeding nine thousand rupees in the aggregate in the twelve months immediately preceding the month in which this Act applies to such establishment and continues to draw such wages or commission in the aggregate, not exceeding the amount aforesaid in a year,
but does not include any such person who is employed or engaged mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity ;”
20. The said Act, 1976, stood amended by the Sales Promotion Employees (Conditions of Service) Amendment Act, 1986 (hereinafter called the “Act 1986”). The Prefatory Note, i.e., Statement of Objects and Reasons thereof read as under :
“The Sales Promotion Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1976, was enacted to regulate certain conditions of service of sales promotion employees as defined in that Act. This definition of “sales promotion employee” is somewhat restricted as it covers only sales promotion employees drawing wages not exceeding the ceiling limits provided in the definition ; the ceiling limits being Rs. 750 per mensem in the case of persons drawing wages not including any commission, and Rs. 9,000 per annum in the aggregate in the case of persons drawing wages including commission, or commission only.”
Clause (d) of Section 2 of the Act, 1976, was amended as under :
“Sales promotion employee” means any person by whatever name called (including an apprentice) employed or engaged in any establishment for hire or reward to do any work relating to promotion of sales or business, or both, but does not include any such person–
(i) who, being employed or engaged in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding sixteen hundred rupees per mensem ; or
(ii) who is employed or engaged mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity.”
21. Therefore, the question arose as to whether a person whose services were governed by Act, 1976, could be a workman within the meaning of the Central Act even if he does not fulfil the conditions prescribed in Section 2(d). As the case in T. P. Srivastava (supra) was of prior to Amendment Act, 1986, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that he was not the workman, at all, under Clause (d) of Section 2 of the Act, 1976.
22. In Glaxo Laboratories (India) Ltd. v. State of Kerala and Ors., 1992 (65) FLR 110, the Kerala High Court considered the same issue as to whether a Medical Representative, by virtue of nature of his duty, may fall within the definition of workman as defined under Section 2(s) of the Central Act, and held that the designation or the nomenclature of his post is immaterial, it is the nature of duties which are the determining factor of the status of the workman and if the services were governed by the Act, 1976, and if person was getting a salary higher than Rs. 750, would not be a workman for the reason that only such sales promotion employees who were governed by Act, 1976, would be governed by the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and only in respect of such employees, reference could be made by the appropriate Government. While deciding the said case, reliance had been placed upon large number of judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, particularly D.P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1983 SC 153 ; S.K. Verma v. Mahesh Chandra and Anr., AIR 1984 SC 1462 ; Arkal Govind Raj Rao v. Ciba Geigy of India Ltd., Bombay, AIR 1985 SC 985 and Ms. A. Sunderambal v. Government of Goa, Daman and Diu, AIR 1988 SC 1700.
23. A Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in H.R. Adyanthaya and Ors. v. Sandoz (India) Ltd. and Ors., AIR 1994 SC 2608, considered the definition of “workman” elaborately and held that a person, claiming to be workman, should prove that he is employed to do any of the categories of work mentioned in the main body of the definition, viz. manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational and further that he is not covered by any of the four exceptions of the definition. The Court was considering : whether the medical representatives were workmen within the definition as provided under Section 2(s) of the Central Act. The Court placed reliance upon large number of its judgments, including Western India Match Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, AIR 1964 SC 472 ; May and Baker (India) Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1967 SC 678 ; and Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distribution Co. (supra) and held that as they were canvassing sales and any clerical or manual work, if they had to do, was merely incidental to their main work, it could not be held to be a clerical or manual work and, therefore, they were not the workmen. While canvassing sale and obtaining orders, even if they had to carry on some correspondence, that was also incidental to their main work of pushing sales of the company. As their work was neither clerical nor supervisory nor technical, they were not workmen. The Court further observed that the work “skilled” is to be construed ejusdem generis and would mean skilled work whether manual or un-manual. The work of promotion of sales is the type of work not covered by the definition and, thus, the contention that the Medical Representatives were employed to do skilled work within the meaning of said definition, was rejected. The Court considered the effect and impact of the amendment Act, 1986 under the Act, 1976, and observed as under :
“In other words, on and from 6th March, 1976, the provisions of the I.D. Act became applicable to the Medical Representatives depending upon their wages up to 6th May, 1987 and without the limitation on their wages thereafter and upon the capacity in which they were employed or engaged.
It appears that the S.P.E. Act was brought on the statute book, as the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the Bill shows, as a result of this Court’s judgment in May and Baker case, AIR 1967 SC 678 (supra). The Committee of Petitions (Rajya Sabha) in its 13th report submitted on 14th March, 1972, had come to the conclusion that the ends of social justice would be met only by suitably amending the definition of the term “workman” in the I.D. Act in the manner that the Medical Representatives were also covered by the definition of workman under the I.D. Act. The committee also felt that other workers engaged in sales promotion should similarly be considered as workmen. The Legislature, however, considered it more appropriate to have a separate legislation for governing the conditions of services of the sales promotion employees instead of amending the I.D. Act, and hence the S.P.E. Act.
It also appears that the Parliament has amended the definition of “industry” by the Amending Act, 46 of 1982 to include, in the definition of industry in Section 2(j) of the I.D. Act, among others, any activity relating to the promotion of sales or business, or both carried on by any establishment. However, that amendment has not yet come into force. But the amendment made by the very same Amending Act of 1982 to the definition of “workman” in Section 2(s) to include those employed to do “operational work”, and to the definition of “wages” in Section 2(rr) to include “any commission payable on the promotion of sales or business or both” has come into force w.e.f. 21st August, 1984.”
24. The Court further observed that the connotation of the words skilled and technical in the context in which they were used, would not include the work of a sales promotion employee, such as the medical representatives, as the words were required to be construed ejusdem generis and would mean skilled worker whether manual or non-skilled, which is of a genre of the other types of work mentioned in the definition. The work of promotion of sales of the product or services of the establishment is distinct from and independent of the types of work covered by the said definition and, therefore, the work of the Medical Representative was neither of skilled nor of technical nature.
25. In J. and J. Dechane Distributors v. State of Kerala and Ors., (1974) 2 LLJ 9, the Division Bench of Kerala High Court held that the Medical Sales Representatives were not the workmen being only salesmen or a sort of canvassing agents to promote sales of the employer’s product.
26. This Court in the petition of this very petitioner in the Anglo French Drug Co. (Eastern) v. State of U. P. and Ors., 1995 (71) FLR 993, quashed the reference made by the Government of U. P. under Section 4K of the U. P. Act on the ground that the Medical Sales Representative getting the total emoluments of Rs. 2,042 per month, was not a workman. While deciding the said case, this Court applied the provisions of the Act, 1976, as stood amended by Act, 1986, and the judgment in H. R. Adanthaya (supra) and held that the Medical Representative mas not a workman and, therefore, no dispute regarding termination of his service could be referred to the labour court under the said Act.
27. Thus, in view of the above, it becomes clear that the instant case is required to be considered in the light of the law, as referred to above.
28. Generally, Medical Sales Representative cannot be a workman. In the instant case, petitioner-employer had from the very beginning submitting that the respondent-employee did not fall within the definition of workman as he was involved in the sale promotion of the medicines prepared by the company. Undoubtedly, there are certain documents on record showing that the employee had been asked to make the recovery of sale proceeds from certain persons but that would not make him the workman being incidental to the main duty. The labour court held that his duties were in respect of canvassing and promoting the products of the company and sending the report about his daily and monthly work progress. He had been trained for the said purpose. His duties were basically manual, technical and clerical as he used to visit large number of doctors in the hospitals and other clinics. It was necessary for him to have the technical knowledge, otherwise he could not have explained anything regarding the medicine and its utility. As he was required to send the report about his work progress daily and monthly, he was performing the clerical duty and, therefore, he was workman within the definition of the Central Act. As the conclusion and reasoning given for reaching the said conclusion is contrary to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in H. R. Adanthaya (supra) the award cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. No reference could have been made to the labour court in respect of termination of his services as the same were governed by the Act, 1976 and stood terminated prior to the Amendment Act, 1986. The findings recorded by the labour court are perverse. It may also be pertinent to mention here that the labour court did not reach the conclusion on the basis of letter written by the petitioner-employer to the employee that his sole duty was to sell the products and recover the sales proceeds, at all, nor reference of those letters had been made in the Award. The respondent-employee was not a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Central Act, in respect of termination of his services, no reference could have been made.
29. The first question refers to the competence of the Government of U. P. to make the reference on the ground only that the respondent-employee, had been operating here and received the order of termination in U. P.
30. In Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union v. State of Bihar, AIR 1970 SC 82, wherein the Court had held that on the ground that it was a case of a Government company carrying on an industry where private sector undertakings were also operating and where it was not an industry which the Government alone was entitled to carry on to the exclusion of private operators, the distinction so made was of no consequence. In Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. Workmen and Ors.. AIR 1975 SC 1737, while deciding a similar case, the Apex Court observed as under :
“The ‘Appropriate Government’ in Section 2(a)(i) certain statutory corporations were incorporated in the function to make the Central Government an appropriate Government in relation to the industry carried on by them. But no public company, even if the shares were exclusively owned by the Government, was attempted to be roped in the said definition…… The other leg of the argument to challenge the competency of the West Bengal Government to make the reference is also fruitless ……… For the purpose of the Act and on the facts of this case, the Berrackpore Branch was an industry carried on by the company as a separate unit. The workers were receiving their pay package at Berrackpore and were under the control of officers of the company stationed there. If there was any disturbance of industrial peace at Berrackpore where a considerable number of workers were working, the Appropriate Government concerned with the maintenance of industrial peace was the West Bengal Government. The grievances of the workmen of Berrackpore were their own and the cause of action in relation to industrial dispute in question arose there. The reference, therefore, for adjudication of such a dispute by the Government of West Bengal, was good and valid.”
31. In D.P. Kelkar Amalner v. Ambadas Keshav Bajaj and Ors., AIR 1971 Bom 124, a Division Bench of Bombay High Court held that the question as to whether a particular industry is carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government, is a mixed question of law and facts and for determining the true nature, the activities carried on by an industry/establishment have to be examined.
32. In Air India Statutory Corporation v. Secretary, Labour Union and Ors., AIR 1997 SC 645, the Hon’ble Apex Court considered a catena of its earlier decisions, particularly in Hindustan Machinery and Tools v. D.R. Shetty, AIR 1979 SC 1628 and Food Corporation of India Workers’ Union v. Food Corporation of India and Ors., AIR 1985 SC 488, and held that the ‘Appropriate Government’ in such a case would be the Central Government. However, that was a case where the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regularisation and Appeals) Act, 1970, were involved.
33. In Air India Statutory Corporation (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court compared the said corporation with a statutory authority and it again described “employer” which means who is running the industry through an agent or servant under or pursuant to the authority of the Central Government.
34. In Bhurinath and Ors. v. State of J. and K. and Ors., AIR 1997 SC 1711, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under :
“………………. .The expression ‘Corporation owned and controlled by the State’ clearly indicates that the control should be total control which is as good as ownership of the corporation of the State. The ownership of the acquired property is through its corporation owned by the State. The corporation is only a cloak. The State should be able to deal with the property transferred to the corporation by virtue of its control as if it deals with the property transferred to itself for the corporation or the corporation is only a conduit pipe itself to use the property as if it is owned by itself. The control of the State …….. should have nexus with the property transferred to the corporation.”
35. Similarly, in Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. v. Secretary, Revenue Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh and Ors., AIR 1999 SC 1734, the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the companies which are incorporated under the Companies Act, have a corporate personality of their own, distinct that from the Government of India. The land and buildings in question in that matter were vested in and owned by the company. The Government of India only owned the share capital.
36. The Apex Court further placed reliance on its earlier judgment in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 564, wherein it had been held that a share-holder has merely an interest in the company arising under its Articles of Association, measured by a sum of money for the purpose of liability and by a share in the distributed profit but the company remains a separate and distinct legal person from its individual members. However, those were the cases where the dispute arose as to whether the Central Government or the State Government was appropriate Government to make a reference. Issue involved in the instant case is quite distinguishable as to whether a company which does not have its Head Office or Branch Office in the State of Uttar Pradesh and keeps a Medical Representative fixing his operational area in Allahabad, whether merely on the ground that he is working in Allahabad or has received the order of termination in Allahabad, could give competence to the Government of U. P. to make a reference. The provisions of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure and of Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India giving jurisdiction to the Court where the cause of action had partly or fully arisen, have been relied upon in support of the contention.
37. A Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Association of Medical Representatives (M&V) v. Industrial Tribunal, Madhya Pradesh, Indore and Ors., AIR 1967 MP 117, considered a case where the Medical Representatives were working in Madhya Pradesh but the company was not carrying on business or having an office or industry in Madhya Pradesh on the date of reference. The services of the said representatives was being controlled from Bombay. He was supervisor in that office and dismissal order was also passed from Bombay office. The question arose as to whether Government of Madhya Pradesh was competent to make a reference. The Court placed reliance upon the Bombay High Court judgment in Lalbhai Tricum Lal Mills Ltd. v. D.M. Vin, AIR 1955 Bom 463, wherein it had been held that the reference can be made by the Government in whose jurisdiction the industry was situate and not where the employee was working. The Madhya Pradesh High Court held that the Government of Madhya Pradesh was not competent to make the reference and, thus, the reference was quashed.
38. In Superintending Engineer v. Workmen of Machkund Hydroelectric Project and Anr., AIR 1960 Ori 205, a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court examined the similar issue and held that in such a situation where the industry is situate in other State and the employees are working in another State, it is not possible that both the Governments could make a reference nor it is possible to make a joint reference by the two States. The test would determine regarding the competence of the appropriate Government, is where the industry substantially was situate.
39. In J. and J. Dachne Distributors (supra), the Division Bench of Kerala High Court held that there must be a nexus between the industrial dispute and the territory of the State for making the reference. There can be only one Government which can be regarded as an Appropriate Government for the purpose of making a reference under Section 10(1)(c) of the Central Act. Thus, the test would determine as to which Appropriate Government has a competence to make a reference, is where the dispute substantially arose and in case his services are controlled from other State and the order giving rise to the industrial dispute if passed from the said State, only that State will have competence to make a reference.
40. In General Superintendent Company of India Ltd. v. General Secretary, Goa Dock Labour Union and Ors., (1984) 1 LLJ 56, a similar view has been reiterated.
41. In Lipton Ltd. and Anr. v. Their Employees, AIR 1959 SC 676, the Hon’ble Supreme Court examined the issue in a case where the industry was situated in Delhi but the employees were working outside. They were controlled from Delhi Office ; received their salaries from Delhi Office and had been supervised from there. The matter of their leaves, transfers etc., were also governed from Delhi. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that it is the Delhi Government which was Appropriate Government to make a reference to the labour court and not the Government of the State where the workman had been working.
42. In Workmen of Shri Rangavilas Motors (P.) Ltd. and Anr. v. Shri Rangauilas Motors (P) Ltd. and Ors.. AIR 1967 SC 1040, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that for determining the competence of appropriate Government to make a reference, the determination test is where the industrial dispute arose/ sponsored, i.e., the nexus between the dispute and the territory of the State is the relevant factor. While determining the issue, the Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgment in Indian Cable Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen, (1962) Supp 3 SCR 589, wherein the dispute has arisen if there is a separate establishment and the workman is working in that establishment, the dispute would arise at that place and in that situation, the nexus between the dispute and the territory of the State may be relevant. Therefore, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, it has to be determined where the dispute arose substantially.
43. Thus, in view of the above, the legal position can be summarized that the law does not envisage a joint reference by two States or reference by several States simultaneously. There may be an establishment having its workmen working in different States of the country, if they are controlled from the Head Office and they are supervised from there, and their salaries, transfers, leaves, etc. are being governed from that office and the order giving rise to the industrial dispute, if passed from that office, only the State within those territories that office situate, would have the competence to make a reference. If it is held otherwise in a given case, all States wherever the workmen are working, would have a competence to make a reference and the employer may face the conflicting awards of different labour courts situate in different States, therefore, while deciding the issue, it is to be kept in mind as to which was the office controlling the services of the workmen and where the dispute has substantially arisen. There has to be a nexus between the industrial disputes and the territory of the State competent to make a reference to the labour court.
44. In the instant case, undoubtedly, the services of the respondent-workman had been controlled from Bombay Office of the employer. He had been issued appointment letter from there. Every letter he has received in respect of his service, had been issued from Bombay. Even, the letters to improve his performance dated 16th May, 1984, 21st May, 1984, 5.6.1984 and 13.6.1984 had been written from Bombay. There is not a single letter on record which had been issued from any office situate in the State of U. P. In his deposition before the labour court, an officer of the company, Shri P. D. Sahani has submitted that he was a Zonal Sales Manager having its office in Kanpur which has subsequently been transferred to Lucknow in 1978 but no letter to the respondent-employee in regard to his service or performance having been issued from Lucknow or Kanpur, had not been placed on record. There is nothing on record to show that his service was controlled by any means from Lucknow or Kanpur or he was getting instructions from Lucknow or Kanpur. In the writ petition, employer had denied categorically that it has office in Lucknow and Kanpur and has submitted that its officer Shri P. D. Sahani was posted in Kanpur and subsequently transferred to Lucknow. So, it may be the office of that officer but not of the company.
45. Be that as it may, as there is nothing on record to show that the services of the respondent-employee were being controlled or he was being supervised by any officer having an office in State of U. P., it is beyond imagination to hold that the industrial dispute, i.e., termination of the services of the respondent-employee, had substantially arisen in the State of U. P. Mere receipt of the termination order will not confer upon the Government of U. P. to make a reference and in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, it is difficult to hold that the Government of U. P. would be an Appropriate Government and, thus, the reference itself is liable to be quashed.
46. To conclude, the Question No. 1 is answered that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, as the services of the petitioner had been controlled and supervised from the office in Bombay and there is nothing on record to show that any person having any office in the State of U. P. was having any control/ supervision over him and all his service matters including transfer, increment of salary, pay fixation, leave, etc. were governed from Bombay. Merely because he received the termination order in the State of U. P., would not confer competence upon the Government of U. P. to make a reference and, thus, we hold that the State of U. P. was not the appropriate Government for making a reference.
47. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, as the respondent-employee had been appointed as a Medical Representative and had been indulging in canvassing and promoting the sale of the products of the employer, even if he had made certain sales and was also asked to make recovery that may not be held to be his dominance, therefore, he cannot be held to be a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Central Act. More so, as the services of the respondent-employee stood terminated prior to Amendment Act, 1986, in Act, 1976, and he was getting salary more than Rs. 750 per month on the date of termination, he could not be held to be workman.
48. As we are also disposing of the matter on merit, in view of the above, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned award dated 30th May, 1987, is hereby set aside.
49. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.