PETITIONER: MECHELEC ENGINEERS AND MANUFACTURERS Vs. RESPONDENT: M/S. BASIC EQUIPMENT CORPORATION DATE OF JUDGMENT01/11/1976 BENCH: BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH BENCH: BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH RAY, A.N. (CJ) SINGH, JASWANT CITATION: 1977 AIR 577 1977 SCR (1)1060 1976 SCC (4) 687 ACT: Civil Procedure Code, S. 115--Jurisdiction of High Court to interfere with the Trial Court's discretionary order, when exercisable. HEADNOTE: The appellant issued the respondent a cheque which was dishonoured. The respondent alleged that the cheque was the consideration for goods supplied. The appellant admitted issuing the cheque but denied by privity of contract. The respondent filed a suit under order 37 C.P.C., and the appellant applied for the required leave to defend, which was granted by the trial Court unconditionally. On revision under section 115 C.P.C., the High Court held that triable issues arose for adjudication., but, it considered the defence to be dishonest. If allowed the revision petition and gave conditional leave to defend on the ground that the defences were not bona fide. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: It is only in cases where the defence is patently dishonest or so unreasonable that it could not reasonably be expected to succeed that the exercise of discretion by the Trial Court to grant leave unconditionally may be questioned. In other cases, it is not fair to pronounce a categorical opinion on such a matter before the evidence of the parties is taken so that its effects could be examined. High Court's interference under sec. 115 C.P.C. with the correct exercise of its discretion by the trial Court was patently erroneous. 11062 Santosh Kumar v. Bhai Mool Singh [1958] S.C.R. 1211 at 1215, Jacobs v. Booth's Distillery Co. [1901] 85 L.T. 262 followed. Smt. Kiranmoyee Dassi and another v. Dr. J. Chatterjee (49 C.W.N. 246 ,at 253) distinguished. M.L. Sethi v.R.P. Kapur [1973] (1) S.C.R. 697: The Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Bulana- gar, Hyderabad & A nr. v. A Ajit Prasad Tarway, Manager (Purchase and Stores). Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Balanagar, Hyderabad (AIR 1973 SC 76); D.L.F. Housing & Construction Co. Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi v. Sarup Singh & Ors. [1970] 2. S.C.R. 368; and Milkhiram (India) (P) Ltd. and Ors. v. Chamanlal Bros. (AIR 1965 SC 1998) referred to. JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 508 of 1976.
(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order
dated 27-10-1975 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Revision
No. 115/75).
S.N. Andley, Urea Dutta and T.C. Sharma, for the
appellant.
K.C. Agarwala and M.M.L. Srivastava, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BEG. J. The plaintiff-respondent ,alleged to be a regis-
tered partnership firm filed a suit on 25th April, 1974,
through Smt. Pushpa Mittal, shown as one of its partners,
for the recovery of Rs. 21,265.28 as principal and Rs.
7655/-, as interest at 12% per annum. according to law and
Mercantile usage, on the strength of a cheque drawn by the
defendant on 12th May, 1971, on the State Bank of India,
which, on presentation, was dishonoured. The plaintiff
alleged that the cheque
1061
was given as price of goods supplied. The defendant-appel-
lant firm admitted the issue of the cheque by its Managing
partner, but, it denied any privity of contract with the
plaintiff firm. The defendant-appellant had its own version
as to the reasons and purposes for which the cheque was
drawn.
The suit was instituted under the provisions of Order
37 Civil Procedure Code so that the defendant-appellant had
to apply for leave under Order 37, Rule 2, of the Code to
defend. This leave was granted unconditionally by the Trial
Court after a perusal of the cases of the two sides. Order
37, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code lays down:
“( 1 ) The Court shall, upon application
by the defendant give leave to appear and to
defend the suit, upon affidavits which dis-
close such facts as would make it incumbent on
the holder to prove consideration, or such
other facts as the Court may deem sufficient
to support the application.
(2) Leave to defend may be given uncondi-
tionally or subject to such terms as to
payment into Court, giving security,
framing and recording issues or otherwise as
the Court thinks fit”.
A learned Judge of the High Court of Delhi had on a
revision application under Section 115 Civil Procedure Code
interfered with the order of the Additional District Judge
of Delhi granting unconditional leave, after setting out not
less than seven questions on which the parties were at
issue. The learned Judge had, after discussing the cases of
the two sides and holding that triable issues arose for
adjudication, nevertheless, concluded that the defences were
not bona fide. He, therefore, ordered:
“For these reasons I would allow the
revision petition and set aside the order of
the trial Court. Instead I would grant
leave to the defendant on their paying into
Court the amount of Rs. 21,265.28 together
with interest at the rate of 6 per cent per
annum from the date of. suit till payment and
costs of the suit (Only court fee amount at
this stage and not the lawyer’s fee). The
amount will be deposited within two months.
There will be no order as to costs of this
revision”.
The only question which arises before us in this appeal
by special leave: Could the High Court interfere, in
exercise of its powers under section 115, Civil Procedure
Code, with the discretion of the Additional District Judge,
in granting unconditional leave to defence to the
defendant-appellant upon grounds which even a perusal of
the order of the High Court shows to be reasonable ?
Santosh Kumar v. Bhai Mool Singh(1), was a case where a
cheque, the execution of which was admitted by the defend-
ant, had been dishonoured. The defendant had set up his
defences for refusal to pay.
(1)[1958] SCR 1211-1215.
1062
This Court noticed the case of Jacobs v. Booth’s Distill-
ery Company(1), where it was held that, whenever a defence
raises a really triable issue, leave must be given. Other
cases too were noticed there to show that this leave must be
given unconditionally where the defence could not be shown
to be dishonest in limine. This Court observed there (at p.
1215):
“The learned Counsel for the plaintiff-
respondent relied on Gopala Rao v. Subba Rao
(AIR 1936 Mad. 246, Manohar Lal v. Nanhe Mal
(AIR 1938 Lah. 548), and Shib Karan Das v.
Mohammed Sadiq (AIR 1936 Lah. 584). All that
we need say, about them is that if the Court
is of opinion that the defence is not bona
fide, then it can impose conditions and is not
tied down to refusing leave to. defend. We
agree with Varadachariar J. in the Madras case
that the Court has this third course open to
it in a suitable case. But, it cannot reach
the conclusion that the defence is not bona
fide arbitrarily. It is as much bound by
judicial rules and judicial procedure in
reaching a conclusion of this kind as in any
other matter”,
On general principles, relating to the exercise of
jurisdiction of High Courts under section 115, Civil Proce-
dure Code, several cases were cited before us by Mr. Andley:
M.L. Sethi v.R.P. Kapur(2); The Managing Director (MIG)
Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Balanagar, Hyderabad & lint. v.
Ajit Prasad Tarway, Manager, (Purchase & Stores), Hindustan
Aeronautics Ltd., Balanagar, Hyderabad(3); D.L.F. Housing
& Construction Co. Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi v. Sarup Singh & Ors.
(4); Milkhiram (India) Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Chamanlal
Bros.(5)
We need not dilate on the well established principles
repeatedly laid down by this Court which govern jurisdiction
of the High Courts under section 115 C.P.C. We think that
these principles were ignored by the learned Judge of the
High Court in interfering with the discretionary order after
a very detailed discussion of the facts of the case by the
learned Judge of the High Court who had differred on a pure
question of fact–whether the defences could be honest and
bona fide. Any decision on such a question, even before
evidence has been led by the two sides, is generally hazard-
ous. We do not think that it is fair to pronounce a cate-
gorical opinion on such a matter before the evidence of the
parties is taken so that its effects could be examined. In
the case before us, the defendant had denied, inter alia,
liability to pay anything to the plaintiff for an alleged
supply of goods. It is only in cases where the defence is
patently dishonest or so unreasonable that it could not
reasonably be expected to succeed that the exercise of
discretion by the Trial Court to grant leave unconditionally
may be,
(1) [1901] 85 L.T. 262. (2) [1973] 1 S.C.R. 697.
(3) AIR 1973. SC 76. (4) [1970] (2) SCR 368.
(5) AIR 1965 SC 1698.
1063
questioned. In the judgment of the High Court we are unable
to find aground of interference covered by Section 115
C.P.C.
In Smt. Kiranmoyee Dassi & Anr. v. Dr. J. Chatterjee(1),
Das. J., after a comprehensive review of authorities on the
subject, stated the principles applicable to cases covered
by order 17 C.P.C. in the form of the following propositions
(at p. 253):
“(a) If the Defendant satisfies the Court
that he has a good defence to the claim on its
merits the plaintiff is not entitled to leave
to sign judgment and the Defendant is entitled
to unconditional leave to defend.
(b) If the Defendant raises a triable
issue indicating that he has a fair or bona
fide or reasonable defence although not a
positively good defence the plaintiff is not
entitled to sign judgment and the Defendant is
entitled to unconditional leave to defend.
(c) If the Defendant discloses such facts
as may be deemed sufficient to entitle him to
defend, that is to say, although the affidavit
does not positively and immediately make
it clear that he has a defence, yet, shews
such a state of facts as leads to the infer-
ence that at the trial of the action he may be
able to establish a defence to the plaintiff’s
claim the Plaintiff is not entitled to judg-
ment and the Defendant is entitled to leave to
defend but in such a case the Court may in its
discretion impose conditions as to the time or
mode of trial but not as to payment into
Court or furnishing security.
(d) If the Defendant has no defence or the
defence set up is illusory or sham or practi-
cally moonshine then ordinarily the Plaintiff
is entitled to leave to sign judgment and the
Defendant is not entitled to leave to defend.
(e) If the Defendant has no defence or the
defence is illusory or sham or practically
moonshine then although ordinarily the Plain-
tiff is entitled to leave to sign judgment,
the Court may protect the Plaintiff by only
allowing the defence to proceed if the amount
claimed is paid into Court or otherwise se-
cured and give leave to the Defendant on such
condition, and thereby show mercy to the
Defendant by enabling him to try to. prove a
defence”.
The case before us certainly does not fall within the
class (e) set out above. It is only in that class of case
that an imposition of the condition to deposit an amount in
Court before proceeding further is justifiable.
49 C.W.N. 246, 253.
1064
Consequently, we set aside the judgment and order of the
High Court and restore that of the Additional District
Judge. The parties will bear their own costs.
M.R . Appeal allowed.
1065