JUDGMENT
M.R. Verma, J.
1. This revision petition under Sections 397/401 read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereafter referred to as ‘the Code’) has been preferred by the accused/petitioners (hereafter referred to as ‘the petitioners’) against the order dated 29-11-2002 passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Joginder Nagar whereby their applications for exemption from personal appearance in a criminal case had been dismissed.
2. The sum and substance of the facts leading to the presentation of this petition are that the complainant respondent No. 1 (hereafter referred to as ‘respondent No. 1’) has instituted a complaint against the petitioners and the pro forma respondent under Sections 147, 451, 500, 323, 504, 506/34 of the Indian Penal Code. Admittedly, the trial Magistrate, after finding a prima facie case against the petitioners and pro forma respondent, issued summons to them directing their appearance in person on 29-11-2002. The petitioners, however, instead of putting in appearance in person, applied for exemption from personal appearance by two separate applications. According to the application moved by petitioners Nos. 1, 3 and 4, petitioner Balesaru could not appear because of old age, petitioner Pammi Devi was under medical treatment and petitioner Chanchala was alone at home and in her absence there was none to attend to her children. In a separate application petitioner No. 2 claimed that he is a college student and because of the studies and examination, he is not in a position to attend the Court. The applications were dismissed by the trial Court by the impugned order mainly on the grounds that it has to secure their attendance of the trial and they cannot claim exemption from personal appearance without furnishing bail bonds and that the averments in the applications for exemption are not substantiated by anything on the record. Being aggrieved, the petitioners have filed the present petition.
3. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and have also gone through the material placed on record.
4. The relevant part of Section 205(1) of the Code reads as follows :
“205. Magistrate may dispense with personal attendance of accused. (1) Whenever a Magistrate issues a summons, he may, if he sees reason so to do, dispense with the personal attendance of the accused and permit him to appear by his pleader.”
5. It is clear from a bare reading of the aforesaid provisions that the Magistrate issuing summons to the accused may dispense with the personal attendance of the accused. Thus, evidently it is within the discretion of the trial Magistrate to dispense with the personal attendance of the accused and permit him to appear by his pleader. However, the expression “if he sees reason so to do” requires the Magistrate to exercise his discretion in a judicious manner and he can grant exemption from personal appearance under Section 205 of the Code only if he finds reason to do so. Though in the ordinary course where the Magistrate is satisfied that the accused is “Pardanashin” woman, or old woman, or sick or infirm person and the allegations against the accused are of trivial nature, the approach in granting the exemption must be liberal. However, to exercise the discretion of exempting the accused from personal attendance, the Magistrate must be satisfied about the correctness of the facts on the basis of which such exemption is claimed.
6. In the case in hand, the learned trial Magistrate at the time of issue of the summons did not find any reason to dispense with the personal attendance of the petitioners and to permit them to appear by their pleader. While considering the applications moved by the petitioners, the learned trial Magistrate found (1) that the petitioners had not yet been released on bail and they could not be so exempted unless admitted to bail and (2) that the allegations of one of the petitioners being old, the other petitioner being ill and under medical treatment, the other being a student and sitting in examination and the fourth being a lonely woman were not substantiated in any manner. The applications were not supported by any certificate, nor even by affidavits and, therefore, the learned trial Magistrate came to the conclusion that the grounds of exemption were not substantiated, therefore, the petitioners were not entitled to be exempted at that stage. The learned trial Magistrate having considered the factual aspects of the matter, particularly the grounds on which the exemption was claimed, exercised his discretion keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, his order cannot be said to be illegal nor it can be said that he has failed to exercise the jurisdiction which vested in him in a lawful manner. His observations that the petitioners have not yet been admitted to bail, implies that he was not satisfied that the petitioners would put in appearance as and when they may be so required under the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 205 of the Code unless bound down to do so by executing bail bonds. In these circumstances, the impugned order does not call for any interference.
7. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that after due bail bonds are furnished by the petitioners for their appearance as and when so required, liberty may be reserved to them for making applications for their exemption under Section 317 of the Code. There is no harm in reserving such liberty in favour of the petitioners. If any application is moved by the petitioners for their exemption on any ground about the existence whereof they may satisfy the learned trial Magistrate, he will consider their application(s) for exemption from personal appearance in the Court and permit them to appear by their pleader keeping in view the settled legal position that exemption from personal appearance, particularly in the case of women, sick and disabled persons, must be liberally granted particularly when the case against them is of trivial nature.
8. Subject to the aforesaid observations, the present petition is dismissed.