JUDGMENT
V.K. Jhanji, J.
1. This judgment shall dispose of Regular Second Appeal No. 1422 of 1985, Regular First Appeals No. 142 and 257 of 1979.
2. Regular First Appeals No. 142 and 257 of 1979 arise out of suit filed by Ved Parkash plaintiff (respondent No. 1 herein) where by his suit for specific performance of the contract of the sale regarding shop No. 30 situated in New Grain Market, Bhatinda, stated to have been entered into by the plaintiff and in the alternative suit praying for decree for joint ownership and possession of share in both the shops, was decreed by the trial Court. A preliminary decree was passed for possession by way of specific performance of ¼ share of shops No. 29 and 30 in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant No. 1 i.e. State of Punjab. It was also held that the plaintiff and defendant No. i.e. Pritpal Singh are owners of shops No. 29 and 30 by virtue of oral agreement. The order passed by the Administrator was also held to be illegal. Administrator, Consolidation Department, Punjab was directed to execute the sale deeds of shops No. 29 and 30 afresh in the joint name of Ved Parkash and Pritpal Singh, defendant No. 3 The plaintiff and defendant No. 3 were also directed to pay the balance amount in equal shares subject to adjustment of the amount already deposited by the parties. Plaintiff was held entitled to apply for final decree by partition as he was held entitled to get specific portion of the shops which may fall to his share on partition. Regular First Appeal No. 142 of 1979 has been filed by Pritpal Singh defendant No. 3 whereas Regular First Appeal No. 257 of 1979 has been preferred by the State of Punjab, challenging the passing of the preliminary decree by the trial Court. Regular Second Appeal No. 1422 of 1985 has been filed by Pritpal Singh defendant impugning the final decree.
3. According to the plaintiff. State of Punjab after acquiring some land for the proposed new Grain Market in Bhatinda, carved out plots for shops and sold the same in Public Auction in June, 1956, Plaintiff attended the auction held at the spot and gave bid for shop No. 30. His bid being the highest was accepted for Rs. 6100/- On the same very day, shop No. 29 was auctioned in the name of defendant No. 3 Pritpal Singh for Rs. 3100/-. At the time of auction, the plaintiff as well as Pritpal Singh defendant No. 3 entered into an oral agreement vide which they decided to keep both the shops in their joint names and requested the officer conducting the auction to issue Challan form for deposit of 25 per cent of the price of the shops in their joint names After the challan forms were issued on 18 6.1956, plaintiff deposited the money in the treasury A sum of Rs. 1,525/- was deposited under Receipt No. 4846 and Rs. 552/- under receipt No. 4853. Thereafter, plaintiff also deposited Rs. 2100/- for shop No. 30 in his own name on 30.6.1961 and defendant No. 3 started depositing the balance amount due for shop No. 29. Plaintiff having received no further intimation regarding the time of deposit of the balance amount, made enquiries where upon he learnt that defendant No. 3 was trying to get the Sale Deeds in respect of both the shops executed from the Department in his own name. Plaintiff, therefore, wrote, a registered A/d letter to the Colonisation Officer on 23.12.196b. The Colonisation Officer summoned the plaintiff as well as defendant No. 3, who appeared before him on 17.2 1969. According to the plaintiff. Administrator without giving any opportunity of hearing and without enquiring into the matter with regard to tampering with the record, passed an order vide which both the shops No. 30 and 29 were ordered to be registered in the name of defendant No. 3 This order is stated to be arbitrary, illegal and without jurisdiction and against the rights of the plaintiff. Collusion between defendant No. 3 and staff of defendant No. 2 was also alleged as they changed the words in the various correspondence from ‘Ved Parkash’ and ‘Pritpal Singh’ to Ved Parkash for Pritpal Singh. Plaintiff claimed that he never was the agent for defendant No. 3 nor was his attorney and the tampering of the record was done with an ulterior motive to deprive the plaintiff of his right title and interest in the shop. Plaintiff remained always willing and ready to perform his part of the contract and was ready to deposit the balance amount and interest, if any alongwith the stamp and registration charges and to get the Sale Deed registered in his name regarding shop No. 30 but the Administrator refused to honour his commitment. In the alternative it was claimed that in case Court comes to the conclusion that there was an agreement between the plaintiff and defendant No. 3 regarding joint ownership of both the shops, then notwithstanding the deed for plot No. 29, having been got registered by defendant No. 3 in his favour the plaintiff claimed a decree for joint ownership and possession declaring the plaintiff as owner and entitled to separate possession of share in both the Shops No. 29 and 30,
4. The suit was contested by State of Punjab as well as by Administrator and Pritpal Singh, defendant No. 3 State of Punjab and the Administrator filed joint written statement whereas Pritpal Singh defendant No. 3 filed separate written statement. Defendants No. 1 and 2 in their written statement, challenged the jurisdiction of the Civil Court on the ground that such a suit is barred under Section 19 of the Punjab New Mandi Township (Development and Regulation) Act, 1960 They, of course, admitted that plaintiff gave a bid for shops No. 30 and 29 which was accepted by the Additional Deputy Commissioner. Bhatinda. Deposit of amount, as stated by the plaintiff, was also admitted. However, they stated that the Administrator vide order dated 17-2-1969, after verifying the record, ordered conveyance deed to be issued in the name of defendant No. 3 and accordingly conveyance deed of plot Nos. 29 and 30 were executed in favour of defendant No. 3. Rest of the avernments made in the suit were denied. Defendant No. 3 challenged the locus standi of the plaintiff to file the suit. The jurisdiction of the suit was also denied With regard to other averments contained in the plaint, defendant No. 3 of his written statement stated that on the date of auction he gave bid for plot No. 29 in his own name and after that he developed’ stomach pain. He requested the plaintiff to bid for shop No. 30 on his behalf. Plaintiff therefore, gave bid on his behalf for plot No. 30 which was accepted He admitted that the plaintiff made payment on behalf of defendant No. 3 He also stated that on his request plaintiff paid some instalments but this was out of the amount which the plaintiff owed to him. Collusion between defendant No. 2 and 3 was; denied. Oral agreement as set up by the plaintiff was also denied Parties to the suit led evidence m support of their averments made in the pleadings On the appreciation of the evidence the trial Court decided issue with regard to jurisdiction of the Civil Court in favour of the plaintiff. Trial Court also found that bid was given by the plaintiff in his name as well as in the name of defendant No. 3 The, oral agreement set up by the plaintiff was also found to have been’ entered into between the plaintiff and defendant No. 3 Plaintiff was thus held to be entitled to specific performance of the contract as well as in view of the oral agreement between the plaintiff and defendant No. 3, a preliminary decree was passed directing the Administrator to execute sale Deeds in respect of shops No. 29 and 30 afresh in the joint names of Ved Parkash and Pritpal Singh on payment of balance: amount to be paid by them in equal shares subject to adjustment of the amount already deposited by the parties. Plaintiff was also held entitled to apply for final decree by partition for getting the specific portion of the shops, which may fall to his share. These Two appeals have been filed, one by State of Punjab and the other by Pritpal Singh defendant No. 3 challenging the judgment and decree of the trial Court. In pursuance of the decree passed by the trial Court, on art application made by the plaintiff, final decree was passed by the trial Court which is being challenged by defendant No. 3 Regular Second Appeal No. 1422 of 1985.
5. Mrs. Alka Sarin Advocate learned counsel for defendant No. 3 raised the following three arguments:-
(i) That the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to go into the matter as the order passed by the Administrator whereby Sale Deed was ordered to be executed in respect of shops No. 29 and 30 in favour of defendant No. 3 was passed under the provisions of the Punjab New Mandi Township (Development and Regulation) Act 1960 She, therefore argued that the order of the Administrator could be challenged under the Act and not before the Civil Court as the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is bared under Section 9 of the 1960 Act ;
(ii) She challenged the finding of the trial Court on merit of the case by saying that there was no tampering with the records. She went on to argue that the bid was given by the plaintiff on behalf of defendant No. 3 and the amount was deposited on behalf of defendant No. 3 and, therefore, at any stage, the plaintiff was not acting on his behalf but all the time he was acting on behalf oof defendant No. 3
(iii) The suit was stated to be not competent in view of the provisions of Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988. In support of this argument, she argued that Sale Deeds were executed in favour of defendant No. 3 and, therefore, even if that property is being held by defendant No. 3, benami, plaintiff is not entitled to claim or enforce any right in respect of this property by filing a civil suit as the same is barred under Section 4 of the 1988 Act.
6. Mr S. P. Gupta, Advocate, learned counsel for the plaintiff referred to certain documents on record to show that the records were tampered with so as to deprive the plaintiff of his right in the property. He also submitted that the plaintiff gave bid on his behalf as well as on behalf of defendant No. 3. He maintained that the trial Court gave valid reasons for decreeing the suit of the plaintiff which should mot be interfered with by this Court
7. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusal of the entire record, I am of the view that these appeals have no merit.
8. As regards the first argument of Mrs. Alka Sarin, she has failed to point out any provision from the Punjab New Mandi Township (Development and Regulation) £ct, 1960 under which order dated 17-2-1969 could be said to have been passed. Section 19 of the said Act provides as under : –
“19. Bar of jurisdiction :-No Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of the recovery of any arrears or penalty under Section II or in respect of the resumption of any site or building, or both, as the case may be, under Section 13, or forfeiture of any money under that Section, or in respect of any order made by the State Government or any other authority in the exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act ”
9. It will be noticed from the plain language of Section 19 of the Act that only three kinds of suits are barred under that provision, namely: –
(i) suit in respect of recovery of any arrears or penalty under Section 11 of the Act;
(ii) suit challenging resumption of any site or building, or both as the case may be, or forfeiture of any money under Section 13 of the Act: and
(iii) suit challenging any order made by the State Government or any other authority in the exercise of any power conferred by or under the Act.
10. The exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Court has not to be readily interfered. A provision containing a bar to the Civil Court has to be strictly construed. In the present case, the order was not passed either under Section 11 of the Act or under Section 13 of the Act or in the exercise of any power conferred by or under the Act Mrs. Sarin has not been able to point out as to under what Section this order has been passed. Civil Court will have jurisdiction to ; entertain the suit if the order of the Administrator has been passed in excess or beyond his jurisdiction. The Administration has no jurisdiction under the Act to decide the inter-se dispute between the parties relating to the title of the property I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that Section 19 of the Act did not bar the present suit.
11. Now coming to the second argument of Mrs. Sarin, I find from the written statement of defendant No. 3 that he admits the giving of bid by the plaintiff in respect of shop No. 30 but he states that the bid was given on his behalf. Ha also admits that 1/4th of the amount was deposited by the plaintiff in respect of plots No. 29 and 30. Deposit of more instalments by the plaintiff is also admitted. The giving of bid by the plaintiff and deposit of amount by him has been explained by saying that the bid was given by the plaintiff because defendant No. 3 had to leave as he developed stomach pain Deposit of amount was stated to have been paid out of the amount the plaintiff owned to defendant No. 3. Defendant No. 3 has not produced any evidence on record to show that the plaintiff ever owned any amount to him. In case the plaintiff owned some amount to him, defendant No. 3 would have certainly produced some document indicating the amount which was to be paid by the plaintiff for some other transaction He has not given any details with regard to the amount which he stated in his written statement was owned by the plaintiff to him. In absence of any detail or record, trial court rightly found that no amount was payable by the plaintiff to defendant No. 3. Total amount which was deposited by the plaintiff initially at the time of making the bid and also subsequently, comes to Rs. 4,300′-. The amount deposited by defendant No., 3 subsequent to the deposit of the plaintiff is stated to be nearly about Rs. 4,550/-. This shows that the amount was deposited in almost equal shares by the plaintiff and defendant No. 3. This further shows that there was an agreement between the plaintiff and defendant No. 3 whereby they agreed to bid jointly for shops No. 29 and 30 and agreed to deposit the amount in equal shares, in order to show that there was tampering with the record, Dewan K. S. Puri, Document Expert appeared as P.W. 6, He in his statement, after examining the disputed entries, opined that in PW 5|F an entry relating to plot No. 29 and in challan forms, PW 6/3 and PW 6/4, the words ‘for’ have been added with a different ink. He also opined that in file No. 30. the word ‘&’ is still readable though it has been substituted for the word ‘for’ and the word ‘&’ has been struck off. He also opined that it is with a different writing material. The same is stated to be in respect of entry No. 116 relating to the allotment of plots. Mrs. Sarin has not been able to show as to how this opinion of Document Expert is not correct if compared with the documents on record examined by the Expert. I have also gone through the documents so mentioned by the Expert in his statement and 1 find that there is tampering with the record so as to change the word ‘&’ to insert the word -for’. The entries were to the effect ‘Ved Parkash for Pritpal Singh’ Thus the reading of the record and keeping in view the written statement of defendant No. 3, 1 find that the plaintiff has successfully established on record that the bid was given by him for purchase of plots No. 29 and 30 jointly in his name as well as on behalf of defendant No. 3, and amount was also deposited by him in the joint names.
12. I also find no merit in the third argument of Mrs. Sarin. Section 4 of the 1988 Act would come into play only if the plaintiff seeks to enforce any right in respect of any property held Benami against the person in whose name the property is held. In the present case, the plaintiff is not wanting to enforce any such right or saying that the property is held benami by defendant No. 3. His case is simple and short i.e. he gave bid on behalf of defendant No. 3 and on his behalf jointly for plots No. 29 and 30. The amount was deposited by him as there was an agreement between the two of them to hold the plots in the joint names, the price of which was to be shared equally by them. In my view, the provisions of the 1988 Act are not, therefore, attracted to the facts of this case as the present suit is for specific performance of the contract of sale or in the alternative, suit praying for joint ownership and possession of 1/2 share in shops No. 29 and 30.
13. There is also no merit in Regular Second Appeal No. 1422 of 1985 as the final decree was passed in terms and in pursuance of preliminary decree.
14. For the reasons recorded above, I find no merit in these appeals and the same are dismissed with costs.