JUDGMENT
Manmohan Sarin, J.
(1) Petitioner by this revision petition has assailed an order dt. 15-9-1997, by which the Civil Judge dismissed the petitioner’s application under Order Xiv, Rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Code as well as the application under Order Xviii, Rule 17A of the Code of Civil Procedure, for being given yet another opportunity to lead additional evidence.
(2) Mr. Ravinder Sethi, Sr. Advocate, along with Mr. V.P. Sharma, Advocate, have appeared for the respondent/caveator. Counsel for both the parties have filed their list of dates and synopsis and with the consent of the parties the hearing of the revision petition was taken up.
(3) Learned Counsel for the petitioner urged that the Trial Court had erred in framing issue No. 3, viz. “Whether the plaintiff is tenant in respect of the land in dispute”. At the outset, it may be noticed that the Trial Court has corrected this to read, “Whether the defendant is a tenant in respect of the land in dispute?” Mr. S.K. Bagga. learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that it was his case that there were structures on the land and the tenancy comprised not only the land but the structure as well. The said plea/objection would be covered by another issue framed as under: “WHETHER the suit is barred under the Delhi Rent Control Act?”
It was open to the petitioner to lead evidence in support of his plea that the tenancy was in respect of land with building, thereby falling within the purview of Delhi Rent Control Act and barring a civil suit under section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. After some arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner does not press the challenge to the impugned order in this regard.
(4) Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that though the suit was instituted in 1980, the evidence of the petitioner commenced only on 28th August, 1991. The respondent attributes this delay to the dilatory tactics of the petitioner. Mr. Bagga also referred to the order dt. 26-5-1992, by which the petitioner’s evidence was confined to petitioner himself and the court debarred him from leading evidence of any other witness. He submitted that this order was unwarranted and caused great prejudice to the petitioner, who has undergone a lot of misery on account of his illness and was hospitalised for extended periods of time. Petitioner had even suffered loss of memory and in the interest of substantial justice, petitioner ought to be granted yet another opportunity for leading evidence of other witnesses. Mr. Bagga submits that there would be no further delay in recording the statement of witness and the petitioner ought to be granted one more last opportunity.
(5) Normally, on a plea like this, I have been persuaded to grant yet another opportunity, subject to terms. However, this case represents a classic example of how the legal process can be subverted and abused by adopting dilatory tactics machinations and legal stratagems. A brief recapitulation of what has transpired in this case is called for: (I)Petitioner had filed a suit for permanent injunction in the year 1977 seeking a restraint on the respondent from dispossessing the petitioner from a plot of land with wooden khokha. The suit was filed on the ground that petitioner was a tenant. Respondent claims that he accepted the same with a view to avoid delay and failed a suit for possession after terminating the tenancy. (ii) Issue were framed in the suit in the year 1982 and evidence of the respondent/plaintiff was led on 30-8-1985. The order sheet is writ large with adjournments. All the available techniques in the armory of a Civil Lawyer were used, commencing from amendment of pleadings and on amendments being disallowed, filing of revisions petitions; application for rejection of plaint under Order Vii, Rules 11 Code of Civil Procedure, amendment of issues and petitioner failing to appear resulting in ex parte proceedings which are eventually set aside. (iii) Adjournments were sought on a number of occasions on the grounds of non-availability of the counsel, sickness of the counsel and sickness of the petitioner himself. To this was added the dates on which either lawyers were abstaining from work or the presiding Officer was transferred. An application for transfer of the suit was also moved, which eventually became infructuous. Coupled with this was the illness of the petitioner on account of an accident, which he suffered in July, 1994 The case was repeatedly adjourned to enable the petitioner to recuperate. (iv) The crunch came when it was stated before the court that the petitioner’s medical condition had deteriorated and he was not in a stable mental condition. There was loss of memory. This led the respondent to seek the appointment of the petitioner’s wife as guardian ad-litem. This was allowed. However, when the occasion came for the petitioner’s’ wife to lead the evidence, she appeared before the court and stated that she was not willing to acts as a Guardian ad-litem any further and that the petitioner’s statement should be recorded. The petitioner blissfully improved in health. His statement was finally recorded on 30-7-1997. It is not necessary to notice what transpired on each of the dates. It is sufficient to state that even though when no witness was present on 18-2-1992, the case was repeatedly adjourned to enable the petitioner to lead evidence on 12-3-1997, as last opportunity. Earlier, last opportunity was given on 3-4-1992 an another one on 22-4-1992. The evidence was finally closed on 30-6-1992. This order was recalled vide order dt. 19-9-1992, permitting the petitioner to examine himself only. The order dt. 16-9-1992 and the earlier order dt. 3-6-1992 were not assailed at any time hitherto before. It is these circumstances at the petitioner filed the application under Order Xiv, Rule 5, Code of Civil Procedure, which is dealt with in the earlier part of this order; and application under Order Xviii, Rule 17A Code of Civil Procedure, for leading additional evidence. This application really tantamounts to recalling of the orders dt. 3-6-1992 and 16-9-1992 by which the petitioner, after closure of evidence, was specifically permitted to examine himself.
(6) The learned Civil Judge was fully justified in passing the impugned order dt. 16-9-1997. There is no ground or justification to permit the petitioner to now question the order dt. 16-9-1992, which has become final. No review, appeal or revision was filed against it. Besides, permitting the petitioner to lead evidence of the witnesses, would mean virtual retrial. The respondent/plaintiff has been able to reach the stage of final arguments after nearly 17 years of litigation.
(7) Granting of yet another last opportunity to the petitioner would make the expression “last opportunity” closed its meaning considering that the petitioner availed of more than five such opportunities during the period from March to June, 1992.
(8) Courts accommodate a litigant in case of genuine difficulty and are liberal in allowing amendment so that the parties get the fullest opportunity to present their case. On the other hand, I find the present revision petition to be a sheer abuse of the legal process. A petition of this nature deserves to be dismissed with exemplary costs. This necessary so that litigants get the message that while the procedural laws provided for the fullest opportunity being given to a party to present its case an a liberal attitude is adopted to afford a party sufficient time and opportunity to present its case, the court will come down heavily on litigants misusing the legal process or stratifying the same. Petitioner cannot be permitted to subvert or abuse the legal process by seeking yet another opportunity on the band-wagon of substantial justice.
(9) In the instant case, I find that the suit for possession in respect of a property at Kailash Colony, which happens to be a posh colony and which has witnessed manifold increase in real estate prices. The decision on respondent’s suit for possession is already pending for 17 years on account of legal stratagems adopted by the petitioner, as discussed in the earlier part of the order.
(10) In these circumstances, I find that the revision petition has not merit and is dismissed with costs of Rs. 10,000 out of which Rs. 5,000 would be payable to the respondent/plaintiff and the balance Rs. 5,000 to be deposited with Delhi Legal Service Authority.