JUDGMENT
V.K. Bali, J.
1. The petitioner, a Co-operative Society, pressed under the circumstances as it is presently facing, has been constrained to come to this Court for the second time in a span of less than one year. The relief claimed in the petition is to direct the respondents to handover physical possession of the property belonging to the petitioner consequent upon the order de-requisitioning dated October 1, 1990 which was passed by the District Magistrate, Gurdaspur as also to appoint an arbitrator in terms of Section 8(1)(b) of the Punjab Requisitioning & Acquisition of Immovable property Act, 1953 (here-in- after to be referred to as the Act of 1953).
2. Brief facts on which the relief mentioned above, rests, need to be enumerated first. It is pleaded that the petitioner society was constituted sometime in the year 1939 of the persons belonging to the so called ex-criminal tribes who were to be reformed and rehabilitated. A piece of land measuring 12 kanals and 12 marlas was purchased in the name of the Society and later 49 houses were constructed on the said land for its members and the colony was named as the ‘Hari Nagar Reclamation Colony, Pathankot.’ On July 31, 1976, District Magistrate, Gurdaspur issued notices to all the 49 owners of the houses in the said colony in Form-A under the Act of 1953 for requisitioning the property on the ground that the same was being used for immoral trafficking in women. It is pleaded that notice in Form-A sets out the public purpose for which the property is required to be requisitioned and affords an opportunity to the owner to show cause why it should not be requisitioned for the said purpose. No such notice was issued and yet the competent Authority issued a direction for allotment/transfer of the requisitioned property to some third persons vide order, annexure P-1, and the District Magistrate, Gurdaspur straight way directed that the houses, after requisition, be allotted to landless/houseless persons belonging to backward and weaker sections of the society. The allottees were to pay a meagre sum of Rs. 15/- per month as rent. It is further pleaded that it was wrongly stated in the orders that the property was lying vacant and had been abandoned by the owner and as a matter of fact the owners of the houses were forcibly ousted and possession thereof taken in an arbitrary manner. Against the high handedness of the authorities, it is pleaded, complaints were lodged before various authorities. Even though the rent initially fixed per house was Rs. 15/- per month but this meagre amount was further reduced to Rs. 5/- per month vide order dated March 13, 1987. It is pleaded that this amount was rediculously low and was received under protest. When a period of twelve years had gone by when the property was requisitioned under the Act of 1953 and no further orders were being passed so as to further requisition it or de-requisition it and when the property was not being used for the purpose it was requisitioned, the petitioner moved a petition before the District Magistrate, Gurdaspur on July 28, 1988 under Section 6 and 6-A of the Act of 1953 for the release of the property from requisition and for delivery of its vacant possession to the petitioner or in the alternative for its acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act. The matter remained pending before the District Magistrate for about two years where-after finding no solution to the matter, the petitioner was left with no choice but for to file a Civil Writ Petition No. 9861 of 1990 which came up for motion hearing before the Division Bench of this Court and vide orders dated July 25, 1990, respondent No. 2 was directed to decide the claim of the petitioner as made in its application by passing a speaking order in accordance with law within a period of four months. It is only then that respondent No. 2 moved in the matter and after going through the records and hearing the parties passed an order dated October 1, 1990 de-requisitioning the property and ordering further the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Pathankot to arrange to handover vacant possession of the property to the petitioner and also to arrange the payment of rent upto the date of delivery of the possession. While granting the relief as indicated above, the District Magistrate held that under Section 6 of the Act of 1953 the property so requisitioned for public purpose could be kept for five years and after the expiry of said period, the property had to be acquired or derequisitioned. A copy of the order aforesaid has been annexed with the petition as Annexure P-4. After the abovesaid order was passed by the High Court, the petitioner also moved an application before the District Magistrate, under Section 8(1)(c) of the Act of 1953 for appointing an arbitrator to determine the recurring annual compensation payable to the petitioner for the requisitioned property. Even though the petition under Section 6 was decided in the manner indicated above, the one filed under Section 8(1)(c) of the Act of 1953 was left undecided. There after, number of attempts were made by the petitioner to secure possession with the help of respondent No. 3 but no action Was taken for handing over the vacant possession. It is in these circumstances that the petitioner has come up once again in this Court asking for the relief which infact stands granted by the respondent No. 2 but, which in the facts and circumstances is only a paper relief as on the spot those, who were allotted the houses, continue to be in possession which is obviously at the cost of the petitioner. On the facts aforesaid it is pleaded that a legal duty is cast on respondent Nos. 2 and 3 to get the vacant possession of the property delivered to the petitioner forthwith as also to appoint an arbitrator in terms of Section 8(1)(b) of the Act of 1953.
3. The writ has been contested and the defence projected by the respondents is nothing but expressing complete helplessness in the matter. Before the defence as projected in the written statement is considered any further, it requires to be mentioned that those who are in possession having been allotted the houses on payment of monthly rent, moved Civil Misc. Application No. 595 of 1992 for impleading them as party-respondents but they withdrew the same on February 5, 1992. It also requires to be mentioned here that the motion bench while hearing the matter on February 5, 1992 observed, “an anomalous situation has been created by the act of the government in handing over possession of the requisitioned property of the petitioner to various other people. Now that order of the requisition no longer exists, it is clearly incumbent upon the government to hand back the requisitioned property with vacant possession thereof to its true owners. Mr. H.S. Riar, Addl. A.G., Punjab, appearing for the respondents expresses his inability to give any definite date for handing back vacant possession of the property keeping in view the fact that it is in possession of other people who were allowed by the government to occupy it. Such being situation, the case is adjourned to enable the State Government to consider either acquisition of the property or else to take upon itself the responsibility of handing over vacant possession of this property by a definite date.” The matter was adjourned to enable the counsel appearing for the State to seek appropriate instructions in that behalf. However, on the adjourned date, counsel for the respondents sought further adjournment so as to obtain instructions but on the next date of hearing, the matter was admitted. It is obvious from the aforesaid narration of facts that even before the motion bench the respondents had expressed inability to hand over the vacant possession and that being the position, the motion bench was of clear view that it was incumbent upon the Government to either hand back the requisitioned propety and if it could not be done, the property even could be acquired.
4. Reverting to the written statement, as mentioned above, the defence is of complete helpless resignation to the situation in hand. It has been pleaded in para 17 of the written statement that it is not an ordinary thing where possession can be delivered because the persons who have made pucca structures from their own sources are not easily willing to forego their investments and are creating problems in the way of vacation of the property. There are 400 to 450 members of weaker section residing in this colony who have been paying rent. They have installed electric meters and water installations besides construction of pucca roads and temple. It has been further pleaded in the aforesaid paragraph that a notice was issued by the Tehsildar, Pathankot to all the persons i.e. present occupants who have refused to receive the summons in the presence of respectables of the area. It is further pleaded that these people are creating a very big law and order problem which could assume a gigantic problem at the State level because these prople belong to a weaker section and down trodden section. The Tehsildar, Pathankot had reported the matter to the police about their behaviour. Besides expressing helplessness, it has also been pleaded in the written statement that some property out of the total property belonging to the petitioner, has been sold by it and with regard to some other, there is an agreement of sale.
5. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, and perusal of the record, I am of the clear view that the defence projected by the respondents is totally hollow. A duty is cast upon the respondents to restore to its owner vacant possession which was requisitioned under the Act of 1953. The provisions contained in the Act unmistakeably require handing over of vacant possession after the property is no more required for the purpose it was requisitioned or when the order de-requisitioning it is passed. In the present case the authorities slept over the matter for more than a decade. Continuance of the occupation by those who are allotted the property on rent after the purpose of requisition was over, was wholly unjustified and so is the stand of the State that they are unable to restore the possession to its original owner. The State cannot be permitted to take the plea that in the situation that exists presently, it is unable to evict the occupants as it would create a law and order problem at the State level. If the Government, which is entrusted with the sole responsibility of keeping law and order, takes a plea of the kind that has beep taken in the present case, it would completely shatter the faith of a citizen. He shall have no choice in the matter but for to take law in his own hands and that would be an end of the very system which governs the functioning of the Government. The Court of Appeal in R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, 1 (1968) 1 All. E.R. 763 while dealing with the duty of the police officer and the jurisdiction of the Court to issue a writ of mandamus, through Lord Denning, M.R. held “I hold it to be the duty of the Commissioner of Police, as it is of every Chief Constable, to enforce the law of the land In all these things he is not the servant of anyone, save of the law itself. The responsibility for law enforcement lies on him. He is answerable to the law and to the law alone.” Salmon, L.J., in referring to the duties of the Police while dealing with the same case held, “In this Court it has been argued on behalf of the Commissioner that the police are under no legal duty to anyone in regard to law enforcement. If this argument was correct, it would mean that in so far as the most important function is concerned, the police are above the law and therefore immune from any control by the Court I reject that argument. In my judgment, the police owe the public a clear legal duty to enforce the law a duty which I have no doubt they recognise and which generally they perform most conscientiously and efficiently For example, if, as is quite unthinkable, the Chief Police Officer in any district were to issue an instruction that as a matter of policy the police would take no steps to prosecute any house-holder in that district would be able to obtain an order of mandamus for the instruction to be withdrawn.” Edmund Davies, L.J., expressing similar view while repelling the proposition that the law enforcement officers of the country owe no duty to the public to enforce the law observed as follows:
“Carried to its logical limit, such a submission would mean that, however, brazen the failure of the police to enforce the law, the police would be wholly without a remedy and would simply have to await some practical expression of the Court’s displeasure. In particular, it would follow that the Commissioner would be under no duty to prosecute anyone for breaches of the Gaming Acts, no matter how flagrantly and persisently they were defied. Can that be right? Is our much-vaunted legal system in truth so anaemic that in the last resort, it would be powerless against those who, having been appointed to enforce it, merely cocked snook at it? The very idea is as repugnant as it is startling and I consider it regrettable that it was ever advanced.”
6. The officers, who are entrusted so as to enforce law, owe a legal duty to the public to perform those functions for which they exist and a plea that in given circumstances they are unable to do it, has to out rightly rejected. The observations that have been quoted above, equally apply to the District Magistrate, who as given to understand is to head the District police and whose orders are binding upon the police officers.
7. Had the Government and its functionaries applied their mind to the problem, they would have certainly found a solution. Even though the plea raised in the written statement, as noticed above, is totally devoid of any merit and it is impossible to conceive of the situation where a Government and its officers can successfully contend helplessness in enforcing the law but if that ws the thinking circulating in the mind of someone responsible for enforcing law, it was not difficult for the Government to have redeemed its prestige by acquiring the land and paying the compensation to its owner. Such a thinking, it appears, never went across and the only reason that can be called out is that those responsible to enforce law never applied their mind to the situation in hand. A sufficient indication was given by the motion bench hearing the matter and even instructions were sought by the State counsel. Obviously, the instructions were either to acquire the property or make it possible some how or the other to restore possession to the original owner, yet the officers responsible slept over the matter and only gained time by allowing the petition to be admitted at that stage.
8. In the circumstances as are available, I have no choice but for to hold that the action of the respondents is reprehensible and needs to be condemned in severest terms. A Citizen has been deprived of his property without authority of law. The orders passed for restoration of property for long years have gathered dust resulting into immense loss to the petitioner. This petition thus deserves to succeed. A writ in the nature of mandamus is issued to the respondents to handover vacant possession of the land to the petitioner within six months from today. However if the Government may deem it proper, the property may be acquired within the period stipulated above. In case vacant possession of the property, subject matter of dispute, is not delivered within the period stipulated, from the expirty of six months, it shall be deemed to have been acquired and a notification under Section 4 of the Lan Acquisition Act, 1894 shall be deemed to have been issued on the expiry of six months acquiring the land. In that case, it is directed that the Government would ascertain the market value of the land from the deemed date of issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act within a period of one month and pay the same to the petitioner forthwith. The petitioner would, however, have right to challenge the market value by seeking a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and the appropriate authority dealing with the matter would dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible. Since respondent No. 2 did not deal with the application that was filed under Section 8(a)(b) of the Act of 1953 for appointment of an Arbitrator for assessing the compensation, a direction is issued to him to dispose of the said application in accordance with law within three months from the date, copy of order is produced before him.
9. This writ petition is allowed with costs quantified at Rs. 10,000/-.