REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1453 OF 2003
State of A.P. ....Appellant
Versus
Guvva Satyanarayana ....Respondent
JUDGMENT
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of the
Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court directing
acquittal of the respondent (hereinafter called as the
`accused’). The accused was convicted for offence punishable
under Sections 302 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(in short `IPC’) and sentenced to RI for life and two years
respectively and a fine with default stipulation by the trial
Court.
2. Two charges were framed against the respondent.
Firstly, it was alleged that the accused on 11.4.1994 at about
8.30 p.m. subjected his wife (hereinafter referred to as the
`deceased’) to cruelty and thereby committed the offence
punishable under Section 498A. Second charge was that he
had committed the murder of his wife by causing her death.
Accused pleaded innocence and, therefore, trial was held.
3. Prosecution version in a nutshell is as follows:
Smt. Guvva Renuka (hereinafter referred to as the
`deceased’) was married to the accused 7 years prior to her
death at Bhongir. At the time of marriage, the accused was
presented cash of Rs.5,000/- and 3 tolas of gold. For one
year, their marriage life went on happily. Thereafter, accused
2
began to demand his wife to get Rs.5,000/- from her parents,
and she could not comply the said demand. He began to ill-
treating and harassing her physically and mentally. In a
panchayat, he was also admonished. However, he did not
mend his ways and he was beating Renuka, coming fully
drunk. On 11.4.1994 at about 8.30 p.m. the accused
quarrelled with Renuka, doused her with kerosene and set her
on fire. At 9.15 p.m. Renuka’s paternal uncle Pittala
Anjaneyulu (PW-1) lodged report with Bhongir town police,
and Y. Venkat Reddy, Sub-Inspector (PW-11) registered the
case. He rushed to the house of the deceased and prepared
Ex.P.3 scene of offence panchanama in the presence of Indla
Ramesh (PW-6) and another. He seized 5 litre kerosene
empty tin M.O.I. He also prepared a rough sketch of the
place. Renuka was shifted to Government Hospital, Bhongir,
and from there to Gandhi Hospital, Secunderabad.
Sri K. Seetharam Naidu, XIII Metropolitan Magistrate,
Secunderabad (PW-9), recorded the dying declaration of
Renuka on the same night, in the presence of Dr. I. Bhaskara
3
Raju (PW-12), Casuality Medical Officer, Gandhi Hospital,
Secunderabad.
Renuka succumbed to injuries at 2.30 p.m. on
23.4.1994. On receiving the intimation the Sub-Inspector
(PW-11) requisitioned M.R.O. PW-8 to conduct inquest, and it
has been conducted in the presence of PW-7 and another
panch. Ex.P.4 is the inquest panchnamma.
Dr. N. Dudaiah (PW-10) conducted autopsy over the dead
body of the Renuka and issued Ex.P.8 Post-mortem
examination report.
Charge sheet was filed in the Court of Additional Judicial
Magistrate, 1st Class, Bhongir, who committed the case to the
Court of Sessions, Nalgonda. The I Addl. Sessions Judge,
Nalgonda, framed charges under Sections 498-A and 302 IPC.
The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
4
4. The trial Court relied on the dying declaration
purportedly to have been made by the deceased and recorded
conviction as noted above. In appeal, the High Court set aside
the conviction. The High Court found that the charge in
respect of Section 302 IPC rests on dying declaration
purportedly to have been made by the deceased at 5.40 a.m.
on 12.4.1994. Offence had taken place on 11.4.1994 at 9
p.m. The High Court found that the accusations so far as
Section 302 IPC cannot be established and the dying
declaration was not free from suspicion. However, the charge
relatable to Section 498A was held to have been proved. For
the same, sentence of two years RI imprisonment enhanced to
three years RI.
5. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the
appellant submitted that the High Court was not justified in
discarding the dying declaration. In the dying declaration
deceased stated her husband poured kerosene on her and set
fire. He intended to kill her. On asking why he did so, she
stated that he had asked her to bring money from her house
5
sometime and she stated that her mother was widow and was
not in a position to pay amount demanded. As noted by the
High Court, the first information report was given on
11.4.1994 at 2115 hrs. i.e. immediately after the occurrence.
In this report the informant had stated that the accused
demanded dowry from the deceased and was beating her. On
the date of incident he was drunk and demanded additional
dowry. Unable to bear the agony, the deceased poured
kerosene over her and set herself ablaze. In the first
information report, therefore, the allegation was that deceased
committed suicide by setting herself on fire after pouring
kerosene. When the complainant was examined as PW-1, he
accepted the contents of the report and stated that the report
was on the basis of the information heard, given by a boy but
no enquiry was made from the deceased. He also could not
talk to her. The boy who had given the information and what
was the source of information was not known to him. He
stated that the deceased was unconscious and regained
consciousness only the next day around noon. The mother of
the deceased accompanied the deceased to the hospital also
6
claimed that the deceased was unconscious and regained
consciousness only on the second day. As rightly noted by the
High Court, this was contrary to the evidence on record. The
Magistrate purportedly recorded the dying declaration of the
deceased at 5.40 a.m. on 12.4.1994. That means the deceased
was conscious at 5.40 a.m. and doctor certified that she was
conscious and coherent.
6. To add to the vulnerability, Ex.P/12 was record of the
case maintained by the hospital. When the doctor examined
the deceased she was conscious. The doctor noted that the
deceased had stated to have sustained burns around 9 p.m.
at her residence. She was given some treatment and referred
to the resident medical officer. Here again the doctor noted
that the deceased alleged to have sustained burns accidentally
at her residence. It was further noted that she was conscious
and coherent. It is, therefore, established that she was
conscious when she was admitted to the hospital at 11.45
p.m. on 11.4.1994. If the accused had poured kerosene and
set her on fire she would have stated the same in normal
7
course to the doctor. Therefore, the factors highlighted by the
High Court appear to be on sound footing.
7. That being so, the order of the High Court does not suffer
from any infirmity to warrant interference.
8. The appeal is dismissed.
……………………………………J.
(Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)
……………………………………J.
(Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA)
New Delhi,
September 24, 2008
8