PETITIONER: DEB SADHAN ROY Vs. RESPONDENT: STATE OF WEST BENGAL DATE OF JUDGMENT07/12/1971 BENCH: REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN BENCH: REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN PALEKAR, D.G. CITATION: 1973 AIR 1331 1973 SCR (3) 691 CITATOR INFO : D 1974 SC2337 (15) ACT: West Bengal (Prevention of Unlawful Activities) Act 1970--confirmation of Advisory Board's recommendation for detention beyond three months under s. 12 by State Government--Confirmation must be within three months of detention--Must be in writing--Must be communicated to detenu within reasonable time--Grounds of detention whether vague because they did not mention names of associates of petitioner in the acts alleged against him--Disturbance of public order in s. 3(2)(c)---What amounts to. HEADNOTE: The petitioner was arrested on January 29, 1971 in pursuance--of a detention order dated January 16, 1971 under the West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act 1970. The State Government's order under s. 12 of the Act confirming the report of the Advisory Board recommending detention of the petitioner for more than three months 'was passed on April 4, 1971 The order of configuration was communicate to the petitioner on August 26. 1971. In his petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution the petitioner urged; (i) that the order of confirmation under s. 12 should not only have been passed within three months of the deten- tion but also communicated to the petitioner within that period; (ii) the grounds of detention were vague; (iii) that the facts alleged did not amount to disturbance of public order. HELD : (i)(a) The confirmation. of the opinion of the Advisor Board to continue the detention beyond three months must be within threes months from the date of detention in conformity with the mandate in el. (4) of Art. 22 of the Constitution (Reasons discussed. [794 D] Dattatraya Moreshwar Pangarkar v. The State of Bombay,. & Ors., [1952] S.C.R. 612, distinguished. Kaur Singh v. The State, A.I.R. 1952, Pepsu 134, Dhadhal Kanthad Valeg v. Saurashtra State A.I.R. 1953 Sau. Umd Singh Narubho v. Stale, A.I.R. 1953, San. 51, Sangapua Mallappa Kodi & Ors. v. The State of Mysore & Ors., A.I.R. 1959, Mysore 7, Aswini Kumar Banerjee, v. The State & Ors., 1970-71 (Col. LXXV) Calcutta Weekly Notes-866, approved and applied. (b)The confirmation cannot purely be a mental act. a subjective one but must result in an objective action, namely, that it should be recorded in writing [795 C-D] Further, though there is no provision in the Act an order of confirmation, which has the effect of extending the period of detention beyond the mandatory period of three months, must be made known to the detenu. There is no warrant or justification for such an order remaining in the files of the executive without the same being communicated to the person most concerned-the detenu-whose freedom. has been objected to jeopardy. He is entitled to know that the Board have considered his representation, as well as his personal submissions if he has chosen to appear before it. and that it had been found that there was sufficient cause for his detention and that the State Government had agreed with it. The cow- 788 within a reasonable time. The effect of non-communication, however, may be an irregularity which does not make the detention otherwise legal, illegal [795 D-796 C] Mohammad Afzal Khan v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, [1957] S.C.R. 63, Achhar Singh v. State of Punjab, Petn. No. 359 of 1951-decided on 22-11-1951, Biren Dutta & Ois. v. Chief Commissioner of Tripura & Another, [1964] 8 S.C.R. 295, referred to. In the present case the order of confirmation by the State Government was made within three months of the order of detention. Although the communication to the detenu was after three months he was not shown to have been prejudiced by it. [796 D] (ii) There was no validity in the petitioner's contention that the grounds of detention were vague because the names of his associates were not supplied. It was not necessary for the petitioner to make an effective representation to specify his associates because they may not have been known [797 E] (iii) In this case what is said to have been defiled by the petitioner and his associates is the statute of Rabindranath Tagore, a poet and sage Venerated by all in this country and affords sufficient ground for detention. The other grounds also directly connected the act with the disturbance of public order within the meaning of s. 3(2)(c) of the Act. [798 F] State of West Bengal v. Ashok Dey and Ors. etc., Crl. Appeal Nos. 217 to 233 of 1971-decided on 19-11-1971, Madhu Limaye v. Sub Divisional Magistrate Monghyr and others [1970] 3 S.C.R. 764 Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar and Ors,. [1966] 1 S.C.R 709, referred to. JUDGMENT:
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 218 of 1971..
Under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for a writ in the
nature of habeas corpus)
S. K. Mehta, for the petitioner.
D.N. Mukherjee, G. S. Chatterjee and Sukumar Basu, for
the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
P.Jaganmhan Reddy J. This petition under Article 32
challenges the detention under the West Bengal (Prevention
of Violent Activities) Act, 1970 (hereinafter called ‘the
Act’)’. It may be mentioned that this and other Writ
Petitions were adjourned till the decision of this Court on
the validity and vires of the Act which has now been decided
in the State of West Betir gal v Ashok Dey & Ors. etc.etc(1)
In that case it, has been held that the provisions of the
Act do not contravene any of the mandates of the
Constitution, as such this Petition and the others which had
stood over till that decision have come up for consideration
as to whether the detention ire legal.
789
In this and other petitions three main contentions have been
urged on behalf of the respective petitioners by Shri S. K.
Mehta who is assisting us as Amicus Curiae. They are : (i)
Whether the mandatory provisions of the, Act have been
complied with; (ii) whether the grounds are irrelevant or
vague and (iii) whether the State Government has confirmed
the opinion of the Advisory Board that there was sufficient
cause for detaining them within three months from the date
of the detention and whether the communication to the
detenue has been made within that period.
We shall give the dates of relevant steps taken in respect
of each of the detenues but before we do so it will be
convenient to deal with the legal submissions in the light
of which the facts of each case can be better appreciated.
The mandatory requirements under the Act are that the order
of detention must be passed by the detaining authority, that
it should be forthwith communicated under sub-sec. (4) of
Section 1 to the State Government together with the grounds
of detention. It is provided by Section 8 that the grounds
of detention must be served on the detenue within 5 days
from the date of detention, that these must be approved by
the State Government within 12 days from that date and
thereafter as soon as may be a report of this fact together
with grounds and other particulars on which the order has
been made should be made to the Central Government under
clause (5) of Section 3 and that under Section 10 the State
Government is required to place within 30 days from the date
of detention before the Advisory Board (hereinafter called
‘the Board’) constituted under Section 9, the grounds of
detention, the representation of the detenue, if any, along
with the report made in case of a detention by an officer
specified in sub-sec. (3) of Section 3. Thereafter it is
incumbent on the Advisory Board after hearing the detenue in
person, if he so desires, to report the State Government
under Section 11 its opinion within ten weeks from the date
of detention, as to whether or not there is sufficient cause
for the detention of the person concerned. Under Section 12
where the Board is of opinion that there is sufficient cause
for detention of a person, the State Government may confirm
the detention order and continue the detention of the person
concerned for such period as it thinks fit. In case the
opinion of the Board is that there is no sufficient cause
for detention the State Government shall revoke the
detention order and cause the person to be released
forthwith. The maximum period for which any person may be
detained- in pursuance of any detention order which has been
confirmed shall under Section 13, be twelve months from the
date of detention, but the State Government can within that
period notwithstanding that the order has been made by an
officer specified in sub-section (3) of
790
Section 3 revoke or modify the order of detention, which
however, does not preclude it from making a fresh order
under Section 3 against the same person in a case where
fresh facts come into existence after the date of revocation
or expiry provided either the State Government or the
officer specified in subSection (3) of Section 3 as the case
may be considers that such an order should be made.
The learned Advocate for the Petitioner contends that the
State Government must confirm the opinion of the Board that
there is sufficient cause for the detention within three
months from the date of detention and the confirmation
should also be communicated to the detenu within that
period. This submission is based on the analogy of the
requirement of sub. sec. (2) of Section 12 where the State
Government on receipt of the opinion from the Board that
there is no sufficient cause for the detention has to revoke
the order and direct the release of the detenue forthwith,
which implies that the State Government should apply its
mind immediately as soon as a report is received from the
Board irrespective of whether in its opinion there is
sufficient cause or not for the detention. The State
Government he says has therefore to make up its mind to
confirm the opinion and extend the period of detention
immediately after the receipt of the report from the Board
which under the provisions of the Act has to be within 10
weeks from the date of detention and in any case not later
than three months. On behalf of the State however it is
strenuously contended that there is no warrant for this
submission as neither the Act nor clause (4) of Article 22
of the Constitution enjoins on the State Government the duty
to confirm the Board’s report within three months much less
the duty to communicate such confirmation to the detenue.
Relying on the decision of this Court in Dattatraya
Moreshwar Pangarkar v. The State of Bombay & Ors.(1) he
submits that all that is required is for the Board to submit
its report within three months and thereafter the State
Government may confirm the opinion and extend the period
within a reasonable time.
It may be pertinent to refer to clause (4) of Article 22 of
the Constitution under which no law providing for Preventive
Detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a
longer period than three months unless a Board consisting of
persons who have or have been or are qualified to be
appointed as Judges of the High Court, as referred to above,
has reported within three months that there is in its
opinion sufficient cause for such detention. It is evident
from this provision that a law for Preventive Detention upto
three months can be made under clause (4) subject to the
limitation contained in clauses (5) to (7) of the
(1) [1952] S.C.R. 612.
791
Article. If a longer period of detention is to be provided
for the law must subject to clauses (5) to (7) make
provision for a reference to a Board as provided in clause
(4) and for it to report on the sufficiency or otherwise of
the detention which should be within three months from the
date of determined. This requirement however is not
insisted upon in cases where a law is made under sub-clause
(a) of clause (7) of the said Article. In cases where the
law provides for a reference to the Board or the receipt of
its affirmative opinion the initial detention is only ten-
tative for three months and only when the Board reports that
there is sufficient cause for the detention that the
question of confinnation and extension of the period beyond
three months will arise. The mere fact that the provision
of a law under Article 22(4) requires a reference to be made
to the Board within a particular period or for the Board to
make its report by a specified time is not enough. The
State Government has to take action only after a report is
received from the Board expressing its opinion as to the
sufficiency or otherwise of the detention. If the opinion
of the Board that there is sufficient cause is received
after three months from the detention the detention will be
illegal as it is a contravention of the mandatory provision
of clause (4). In cases where the report is received within
three months that there is no sufficient cause for detention
but no action is taken thereon by the State Government to
release the detenue or where its opinion is that there is
sufficient cause, the detenue is neither automatically
released nor is the period of his detention extended. It is
therefore a crucial requirement of the Constitutional
provision that the appropriate Government has to take action
on the report of the Board, because as we said on that
action would depend the revocation of the order and his
release or the continuance of the detention beyond three
months. In other words even where the Board is of opinion
that there is sufficient cause the State Government is not
bound to confirm that opinion. It can notwithstanding that
opinion revoke the order. No doubt such a power can be
exercised even after the confirmation of the order but that
is not to deny the State Government the power to revoke the
order even before confirming it. Viewed from any angle it
is essential that the appropriate Government should take
positive- action on the report of the Board which action
alone determines whether the detention is to be terminated
or continued. It would therefore prima facie appear that
action should be taken immediately after the receipt of the
opinion of the Board or at any rate within three months from
the date a person is detained. It is for this reason after
the Constitution every legislation dealing with Preventive
Detention has made specific provision for confirmation and
continuance of detention in view of the Constitutional
mandate contained in Article 22(4). A period
792
within which the appropriate Government has to make a
reference to the Board, the period within which the Board
has to make a report on the sufficiency of the ground for
detention is provided for, which has been uniformly one
month and ten weeks respectively-. The period of ten weeks
for the submission of the report by the Board where Article
22(4) provides for twelve weeks is designedly fixed because
that would give the appropriate Governments two weeks to
confirm and extend the period or not to confirm. of course
the opinion of the Board need not necessarily be given on
the last day of the expiry of the ten weeks. It is quite
possible that this information may be submitted to the
appropriate Government well within ten weeks. In such cases
a question whether the confirmation and extension has to be
made by the appropriate Government within a reasonable
period may arise for consideration, but in any case failure
to confirm and extend the period within three months will
result in the detention becoming illegal the moment the
three months period has elapsed without such confirmation.
Any subsequent action by the appropriate Government after
the three months cannot have the effect of extending the
period of detention. This view of ours is further fortified
by Section 13 of the Act where the maximum period for which
any person may be detained in pursuance of any detention
order which has been confirmed under Section 12 shall be 12
months from the date of detention. This requirement would
suggest that the extension of the period of detention beyond
three months upto a maximum of 12 months is from the date of
confirmation of the opinion of the Board which if
unconfirmed would not extend the period beyond three months.
If so at what point of time should that be confirmed ? It
would be meaningless to suggest that the confirmation of the
Board’s opinion can take place beyond three months when the
period of detention has come to an end and has not been
extended by the want of it. Looking at it in a different
way what these provisions amount to is that no person can be
detained for any period beyond three months or for any
period thereafter upto 12 months unless the Board’s opinion
is confirmed within three months.
A similar view has been taken by the several Courts in this
country right from 1952 onwards on Section 11 and 11 (A) of
the Preventive Detention Act which is analogous to Section
12 and Section 13 of the Act. See Kaur Singh v. The
State(1), Dhadhal Kanthad Valeg v. Saurashtra State(2), Umed
Singh Narubha v. State(3). A Bench of the Mysore High Court
in Sangappa Mallappa Kodli & Ors. v. The State of Mysore &
Ors. (4). referred to these decisions. The learned Advocate
General in
(1) AIR 1952 Pepsu 134.
(2) AIR 1953 Sau. 138.
(3) AIR 1953 San. 51.
(4) AIR 1959 Mysore 7.
793
that case had contended on behalf of the State as was
contended in the case before us on behalf of the State of
West Bengal that the confirmation mentioned in Section 11 of
the Preventive Detention Act was a mere formality and became
redundant in view of the fact that the Government had
already approved of the order of detention, because the word
‘may’ in Section 11 does not make the confirmation of the
detention mandatory. It was further argued that there was
nothing illegal in confirming the order of detention beyond
the period of three months from the date of detention either
under the Constitution or under the Act itself, because what
the Constitution lays down is that unless the Board has made
a report to the effect that there is sufficient cause for
such detention within three months from the date of deten-
tion, there can be no detention of a person under any law
for a longer period than three months and nothing more, but
it does not however say that the order of confirmation has
to be within three months from the date of detention. S. R.
Das, C.J. rejecting this contention observed at page 9 :
“In my opinion having regard to the different
provisions of the Preventive Detention Act,
the order of confirmation which the Government
is required to make under Section 11 of the
Act has to be made within a period of three
months from the date of detention. In my
opinion the contention of the petitioners on
this part of their case finds support from the
very sections of the Preventive Detention Act
and particularly from the wording of sub-
section (1) of Section 11 itself. That sub-
section, to my mind, makes it clear that the
confirmation order in question has to be made
if the Government after receipt of the report
from the Advisory Board decides to continue
the detention and in view of the provisions of
clause (4) of Article 22 of the Constitution
such confirmation has to, be made within three
months from the date of detention”.
The Calcutta High Court has recently construed the provi-
sions of the Act Ashvini Kumar Banerjee v. The State & Ors.
(1) 1, which we are now construing on the question whether
the confirmation under Section 12(1) should be made within
three months from the date of detention. It considered the
several cases to which we have earlier referred and held
that where there is a specified time provided for in clause
(4) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India the concept
of reasonable time cannot be introduced in interpreting the
provisions of sub-sec. (1) to Sec. 12 of the Act. ‘The
absence of a time limit in express terms in the body of
Section 12(1) of the Act does not render it to be
(1) 1970-71 (Col. LXXV) Calcutta Weekly Notes-866.
794
ambiguous and that the Board cannot be equated with the
State Government because it can only advise and not act by
way of passing an order of detention or continuing it
thereafter. This is left to the over-riding discretion of
the State Government.
We agree with the views expressed in these cases.
The case of Dattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar(1) does not deal
with this aspect. There the two questions which were con-
sidered were (1) whether the order of confirmation was to be
in writing and should be expressed in the form required by
Article 166(1) of the Constitution, and (2) if a
confirmation order is made by the, appropriate Government
what is the period for which the detention has to be
extended, that is does it have the effect of extending the
period and if so for what period. That was a case under
Section 11 ( 1 ) of the Preventive Detention Act. The
majority Mahajan J, dissenting, decided that the omission to
state the period of further detention while confirming the
detention order under Section 11 (1) of the Preventive
Detention Act could not render the detention illegal. In
our view therefore the confirmation of the opinion of the
Advisory Board to continue the detention beyond three months
must be within three months from the date of detention in
conformity with the mandate in clause (4) of Article 22.
The next submission is that the confirmation should not only
be in writing but it should be communicated to the determine
within the period of three months from the date of
detention. While we consider the former submission to be
valid the latter has no justification. No doubt in Mohammed
Afzal Khan v. State of Jammu & Kashmir(1), this Court had on
the construction of Section 14 of the Jammu & Kashmir
Preventive Detention Act had held that the Section does not
in terms provide for the making of a formal order but that
was on the construction of a provision which is not in
parimutuel of the provisions of the Act. Section 14 of the
Jammu & Kashmir Preventive Detention Act does not provide
for the confirmation of the Board’s opinion because that was
a provision made under clause 7 of Article 22 where it pro-
vide for the detention or continuation in detention of a
person without obtinig the opinion of a Board for a period
longer than three months but not exceeding any years from
the date of detention, where such a person is detained with
a view to preventing hint from acting in a manner
prejudicial to (i) the security of tile State, (ii) the
maintenance of public order. on the question of the
communication to detenue of the decision to continue his
detention beyond three months, Das, C. j. said that there is
no warrant for the proposition that the decision of the
Government
(1) [1952] S.C.R. 612.
(2) (1957) S.C.R. 63.
795
must be communicated to the detenue nor has it been shown
how the communication of this decision would have been
beneficial to the detenue. He referred to the case of
Achhar Singh v. State of Punjab(1), where this Court had
said that ‘the omission to convey the order under Section 1
1 of the Indian Preventive Detention Act does not make the
detention illegal or result in infringement of the
petitioner’s fundamental rights’. After referring to this
decision this Court however, pointed out, if that be the
position under Section 11 of the Indian Preventive Detention
Act which provides for the making of a formal order all the
more must the position be the same under Section 14 of the
Jammu & Kashmir Preventive Detention Act which does not in
terms require any formal order to be made. Whatever may be
the position under the Jammu & Kashmir Act under the Act
which we are considering as pointed out earlier the State
Government has to confirm the opinion of the Board that
there is cause for the detention of the person concerned
which confirmation cannot purely be a mental act, a
subjective one but must result in an objective action namely
that it should be recorded in writing. Though there is no
provision in the Act an order of confirmation which has the
effect of extending the period of detention beyond the
mandatory period of three months must be made known to the
detenue, in our view there is no warrant or justification
for an order confirming the detention on the opinion of the
Board which has the effect of extending the period of
detention remaining in the files of the executive without
the same being communicated to the person most concerned-the
detenue-whose freedom has been subjected to jeopardy, He is
entitled to know that the Board had considered his
representation as well as his personal submissions if he has
chosen to appear before it and that it had been found that
there was sufficient cause for his detention and that the
State Government had agreed with it. In Biren Dutta & Ors.
v. Chief Commissioner of Tripura & Another (2), another
Constitution Bench of this Court had to consider this
matter on the provisions of Rule 30(1) (b) and Rule 30A(8)
:of the Defence of India Rules 1962. Gajendragadkar, J.
speaking for the Court held that even those rules the
authority exercising the power under rule 30A(8) should
regard its decision clearly and unambiguously extending the
Period of detention beyond six months which was the limit
under those rules, for he observed, “After all, the liberty
of the citizen is in question and if the detention of the
detenue is intended to IV continued as a result of the deci-
sion reached by the appropriate authority it should say so
in clear and unambiguous terms”. While the decision of the
Government to confirm the opinion of the Board which
according to
(1) Petn. No. 359 of 1951-decided on 22-11-1951. (2)
[1964] 8 S.C.R. 295.
796
the decision in Dattatraya Moreshwar Pangarkar(1), has the
effect of extending the period of detention beyond three
months is in consonance with the tenor of the Act as well as
the provisions of the Constitution, there is nothing to
warrant the submission that the order of confirmation and
extension of the period of his detention should also be
within three months from the date of detention. Nonetheless
the communication must be within a reasonable time. What is
a reasonable time must necessarily depend upon the
circumstances of each case. The effect of noncommunication,
however, may be an irregularity which does not make the
detention otherwise legal, illegal. In Biren Dutta’s
case(1) the Court was of the view that though under Rule
30A(8) there is nothing to indicate that the appropriate
authority should communicate to the detenue the decision to
extend the period beyond three months, “it is desirable and
it would be fair and just that such a decision should in
every case be communicated to the detenue”. In this case
there is no allegation that the detenue suffered any
prejudice by the delay and in the absence of such an
allegation the State is justified in its submission that
there may be sufficient grounds for the delay in not
communicating it within a reasonable time should the
communication itself be considered by this Court to be
unduly delayed.
We will now examine the merits of the case to determine
whether the confirmation was made within three months from
the date of the detention and whether the grounds of
detention are irrelevant or vague. The order of detention
was made by the District Magistrate, Bankura on 16-1-71 and
petitioner was arrested on 20-1-71. On the same day he was
served with the order and the grounds of detention. The
District Magistrate made a report to the Government also on
the same day which was approved by the State Government on
27-1-71 so that the mandatory provisions of the Act both in
respect of the report to be made to the State Government
within 5 days from the date of the order and the approval of
the detention within 12 days from the date of detention were
satisfied. On the 27th itself a report was made to the
Central Government as required under section 13. The State
Government placed the detention order, the grounds and the
report etc. before the Advisory Board on the 18th February
1971 which is also within 30 days from the date of detention
as required under section 10. The State Government rejected
the representation made by the detenue on the 15th
March’1971 and the Advisory Board submitted its report that
there was sufficient cause.for his detention on the 23rd
March 1971 which was confirmed on 8-4-71. In the note file
of the Government which we
(1) [1952] S.C.R. 612.
(2) [1964] S.C.R.205.
797
perused, though confirmation was recorded within three
months, the communication was made later on the 26th August
1971. The mandatory provisions, therefore, are fully
complied with.
The next question is whether the grounds are vague and
irrelevant. These are as follows:-
(i) that on 7-1-71 night you and your
associates including Somesh Chandra Deb
mutilated the statue of the eminent Indian
Poet Rabindra Nath Tagore installed in a
public place at Boilapara in Bishnupur town
and thereby caused insult to an object of
public veneration.
(ii)That on 11-1-71 at about 01.45 hrs. you
and your associates broke into the Post Office
situated at Rashikguni in Bishnupur town and
caused mischief to it by fire by destroying
its official records by burning.
It was contended that the associates of the petitioner have
not been specified and therefore it will be difficult for
the petitioner to make effective representation in respect
thereof. We think there is no validity in this submission.
Not only the dates and the time in each of the grounds have
been mentioned but the acts of the petitioner have been
specified in detail to enable him to make an effective
representation. In our view it is not necessary for the
petitioner to make an effective representation to specify
all his associates because they may not have been known.
The petitioner is being detained in respect of his acts and
if in association with others he has acted in a manner
prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order, his
detention cannot be said to be illegal.
It is again contended relying on Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divi-
sional Magistrate, Monghyr and others(1) and Dr. Ram Manohar
Lohia v. State of Bihar and Ors.(2) that the acts specified
in each of the grounds do not amount to disturbance of
public order though they may affect law and order. This
contention is equally untenable because section 3(2) of the
Act defines the expression “acting in any manner prejudicial
to the security of the State or the maintenance of public
order” as given in sub-clauses (a) to (e) of the said sub-
section. We are here in this case concerned with the
definition given in section 3 (2) (c) which makes any act
‘causing insult to the Indian National Flag or to any other
object of public veneration whether by mutilating, damaging,
burning, defiling, destroying or otherwise, or instigating
any person to do so. The explanation to this sub-clause
includes in the
(1) [1970] 3 S.C.R. 746.
(2) [1966] 1 S.C.R. 709.
798
causing of insult to any object of public veneration, any
portrait or statue of an eminent Indian, installed in a
public place as a mark of respect to him or to his memory.
The validity of subsection (2) of section 3 of the Act was
challenged recently in the case of State of West Bengal v.
Ashok Dey and others(3), but this Court held that it was
valid. The challenge to clauses (a), (b), (d) and (e)
dealing with disturbance of a public order in the State with
respect to which it was said there can be no two opinions
about the acts covered by these being likely to be pre-
judicial to the maintenance of public order. In regard to
clause (c) the argument that insulting the object of public
veneration in privacy without the act causing insult being
noticed by anyone who holds them in veneration could have no
rational nexus with the disturbance of public order or
security of State, was in the abstract described as
attractive. In the light of the circumstances in which the
Act was passed the mischief intended to be removed by this
enactment and the object and purpose of enacting it, this
Court held that clause (c) of subsection (2) considered in
the background of sub-section (1) of section 3 can “be
construed to mean, causing insult to the Indian National
Flag or any other object of public veneration in such a
situation as reasonably exposes the act, causing such insult
to the view of those who hold these objects in veneration or
to the public view and it would not cover cases where the
Indian National Flag or other object of public veneration is
mutilated, damaged, burned, defiled or destroyed completely
unseen or when incapable of being seen by anyone whose
feelings are likely to be hurt thereby. The act causing
insult referred to in clause (c) must be such as would be
capable of arousing the feelings of indignation in someone
and that can only be the case when in cult is caused in the
circumstances just explained”, and was accordingly
restricted to such situation. The challenge there was
negatived. In this case what is said to have been defiled
by the petitioner and his associates is the statue of
Rabindra Nath Tagore, a Poet and sage venerated by all in
this country and affords a sufficient ground for detention.
The other grounds also directly connect the act with the
disturbance of public order.
Having regard to the various references the detention of the
petitioner in our view is not illegal and accordingly we
dismiss this petition.
G.C. Petition dismissed.
(1) Cr. App. Nos. 217 to 233 of 1971 decided on 19-11-71.
799