JUDGMENT
I.A. Ansari, J.
1. For acquisition of a plot of land, measuring 1 acre at Kailashahar, for the purpose of construction of departmental quarters/stores/godowns for Telecom Department, the Land Acquisition Collector, South Tripura, District Kailashahar (respondent No. 1 herein), awarded an amount of Rs. 40,14,990/- and issued a notice on 24.12.1998, under Section 12 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinabove referred as “the L.A. Act”) enabling the petitioners (appellants herein) to receive payment on 29.12.1998. Before issuance of the notice, dated 24.12.1998, aforementioned, the petitioners-appellants had, on 22.6.1998, raised, in writing, a claim (Annexure-3) with the respondent No. 1 demanding compensation @ Rs. 40 lakhs per Kani i.e. Rs. 1 Crore for the said 1 acre of their land, which stood acquisitioned. Pursuant to the notice, dated 24.12.1998, aforementioned issued by the respondent No. 1 under Section 12 of the L.A. Act and received by the petitioners-appellants on 26.12.1998, the petitioners-appellants, once again, made a representation, in writing, (Annexure-5), on 28.12.1998, addressed to the respondent No. 1 stating, inter-alia, that they were going to received payment of the inadequate and insufficient amount of Rs. 40,14,990/- under protest and also making a request therein that a reference be made under Section 18 of the L.A. Act before a Judge of competent jurisdiction for determination of the actual price/value of the acquired land. This representation was sent to the respondent No. 1 by registered post with A/D on 28.12.1998 itself. On 29.12.1998, the appellants went to the office of the respondent No. 1 at Kailashahar and received an A/C payee treasury cheque from the respondent No. 1 in respect of the awarded amount of Rs. 40,12,990/-. This cheque was deposited with Tripura Gramin Bank, Dharmanagar, on 5.1.1999, for collection and the same was, eventually, encashed on 18.1.1998. However, the respondent No. 1 by his letter, dated 16.2.1999, refused to make a reference under Section 18 of the L.A. Act stating, inter alia, that the protest letter, dated 28.12.1998, aforementioned seeking a reference under Section 18 of the L.A. Act was received by the respondent No. 1, on 8.1.1999, while the petitioners-appellants had received the compensation amount without protest on 29.12.1998. The petitioners-appellants, then, approached this Court in WP(C) No. 111/99 seeking, inter alia, issuance of a Writ commanding the respondent No. 1 to make a reference under Section 18 of the L.A. Act asserting therein, inter alia, that on 29.12.1998, when the petitioners-appellants reached the office of the respondent No. 1 and came to learn that their representation, dated 28.12.1998, aforementioned, which had been made under Section 18 of the L.A. Act, had not yet reached the respondent No. 1, they handed over a copy of the said representation to the respondent No. 1 and received the said A/C payee cheque. The respondents resisted the prayer made by the petitioners-appellants by contending, inter alia, that on 29.12.1998, when the petitioners-appellants received the amount, they had not raised any protest and had not handed over any spare copy of the protest letter of their representation, dated 29.12.1998, and that they had received the A/C payee cheque, on 29.12.1998, without protest and as the protest letter, dated 28.12.1998, aforementioned was received by the respondent No. 1 on 8.1.1999, which was long after receipt of the cheque, in question, by the petitioners-appellants, the proviso to Section 31 of the L.A. Act came into play and barred the making of a reference under Section 18 of the L.A. Act and, hence, the respondent No. 1 was justified in declining to make a reference, though sought for by the petitioners-appellants.
2. By the impugned judgment and order, dated 13.8.1999, the learned Single Judge held to the effect that on 29.12.1999, when the petitioners-appellants received the compensation amount, there was no protest raised by them and, hence, the reference under Section 18 of the L.A. Act for enhancement of the compensation was barred under the second proviso to Section 31 of the L.A. Act. On the basis of the conclusion, so reached, the writ petition was dismissed. Feeling aggrieved by the same, the petitioners-appellants have, now, approached this Court in the present appeal.
3. We have perused the materials on record. We have heard Mr. AK Bhowmik, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mrs. A.K. Deb, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioners-appellants, and Mr. U.B. Jaha, learned Senior Govt. Advocate, assisted by Mrs. A.S. Lodh, learned counsel for the respondents.
4. It is submitted by Mr. Bhowmik that the learned Single Judge has completely misconstrued the second proviso to Section 31 inasmuch as this proviso does not require that the protest have to be made simultaneously with the receipt of the payment. It is enough, according to Mr. Bhowmik, if a protest is raised before receiving the payment of the awarded amount and the same is not withdrawn and/or waived at the time of receiving the payment of the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector. In the case at hand, submits Mr. Bhowmik, petitioners-appellants had raised their protest, as far back as on 28.12.1998, and requested the respondent No. 1 to make a reference under Section 18 of the L.A. Act and since this protest had not been withdrawn and/or waived, the mere fact that the petitioners-appellants had received the payment on 29.12.1998 without, once again, repeating the protest, which they had already registered by their letter, dated 28.12.1998, it could not have been logically construed that the protest did not exist. The cheque for the compensation amount awarded by the respondent No. 1, which was received by the petitioners-appellants on 29.12.1998, ought to have been treated by the learned Single Judge, contends Mr. Bhowmik, as an amount received by the petitioners-appellants aforementioned under protest.
5. It is also submitted by Mr. Bhowmik that there is nothing in the law that the protest raised by a person, who receives the amount awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector, cannot be oral and/or must be in writing. This apart, contends by Mr. Bhowmik, there is also nothing in the law that the protest made, in writing, must have been received by the Land Acquisition authority before the payment is actually received by the awardee of the compensation. In support of his submissions, Mr. Bhowmik has placed reliance on AIR 1960 Mysore 264 (K. Krishna Rao, Petitioner v. Land Acquisition Officer and Revenue Officer, Coondapur, South Kanara, Respondent), AIR 1973 Delhi 278 (Union of India, Delhi, petitioner v. Sagwa and Ors., respondents), AIR 1971 Andhra Pradesh 117 (Shanta Bai v. Special Duty Collector, Land Acquisition, Hyderbad, respondent), AIR 1975 Jammu & Kashmir 43 (Collector Land Acquisition, Appellant v. Tarban Singh, Respondent) and AIR 1979 Gujarat 192 (Rabari Mahadev Amra, Appellant v. Prant Officer, Radhanpur, Respondent).
6. It is also pointed out by Mr. Bhowmik that in the present case, the payment was not received by the petitioners-appellants on 29.12.1998. What was received by them, points out Mr. Bhowmik, was an A/C payee cheque and this cheque was, eventually, encashed on 16.1.1999, whereas the protest letter had already been received by the respondent No. 1 on 8.1.1999. The mere handing over the cheque to the petitioners-appellants by the respondent No. 1 was not, according to Mr. Bhowmik, a payment within the meaning of the second proviso to Section 31 and that the payment of the cheque has to be construed to have taken place on the date, when the same was encashed. Support is sought to be derived, in this regard, by Mr. Bhowmik from the case of AIR 2000 SC 1953 (Pankaj Mehra and Anr., Appellants v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., Respondents). Since the cheque was, admittedly, encashed on 16.01.1999, learned Single Judge ought to have held, submits Mr. Bhowmik, that on the date, when the petitioners-appellants had received the payment, their protest already stood received by respondent No. 1 inasmuch as the respondent No. 1 had already received the said protest letter, dated 28.12.1998, on 8.01.199.
7. Controverting the above submissions made on behalf of the petitioners-appellants, Mr. Saha submits that a bare reading of the second proviso to Section 31 clearly shows that the protest has to be raised at the time, when the payment is received, and the mere fact that the protest had been made in the past can be of no avail to a person, who seeks to get compensation determined by getting a reference made under Section 18 of the L.A. Act. In the case at hand, though the protest was made, submits Mr. Saha, on 28.12.1998, no such protest had been received by the respondent No. 1 on 29.12.1998 and since the petitioners-appellants received the money, on 29.12.1998, without registering any protest on 29.12.1998, they were not entitled to a reference under Section 18 of the L.A. Act and the same was, thus, correctly declined by the respondent No. 1. Reliance in support of the submission, so made by Mr. Saha, is placed on the decisions reported in AIR 1980 AP 118 (Nellore Bujjamma and Anr., petitioners v. The Tahsildar Rapur and Anr., respondents), AIR 1958 Punjab 79 (Mst. Parmeshri and Ors., appellants v. Mst. Atti, Respondent), AIR 1980 Cal 155 (Sen and Co., petitioner v. Sm. Mani Mala Sadhu, opposite party), AIR 1975 P & H 66 (The State of Punjab, Appellant v. Smti. Harcharan Kaur, Respondent), AIR 1984 HP 63 (Nathu, petitioner v. State of H.P., respondent) and AIR 1976 SC 2229 (1976) 4 SCC 855 (Damadilal and Ors. v. Parashram and Ors.).
8. It is also submitted by Mr. Saha that the receipt of the cheque by the petitioners-appellants on 29.12.1998, was equivalent to payment of the awarded amount and it is immaterial as to when the cheque was actually encashed and, coupled with this, the affect that the District Collector had received, on 8.1.1999, the protest raised by the petitioners-appellants on 28.12.1998, it is clear, according to Mr. Saha, that the payment was received by the petitioners-appellants long before the date, when the protest was actually registered with the respondent No. 1. Viewed from this angle, contends Mr. Saha, the learned Single Judge has correctly declined to issue any Writ and there is no merit in this writ appeal. It is pointed out by Mr. Saha that tendering of the cheque to the petitioners-appellants, on 29.12.1998, is as good as payment of the awarded amount and that it is not material, reiterates Mr. Saha, as to when the cheque was actually encashed. Reliance in support of this submission is placed by Mr. Saha on AIR 1958 Punjab 79 (Mst. Parmeshri and Ors., appellants v. Mst. Atti, Respondent).
9. Before entering into the rival contentions, it is, to our mind, necessary to lay down, in brief, the scope and ambit of Section 18 of the L.A. Act vis-a-vis Section 31 of the L.A. Act. For this purpose, the Section 18 is reproduced below :-
“18. Reference to Court. – (1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the campensation among the persons interested.
(2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken.
Provided that every such application shall be made
(a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector’s award;
(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under Section 12, Sub-section (2); or within six months from the date of the Collector’s award, whichever period shall first expire.
10. It may also be mentioned that Section 31 of the L.A. Act reads as follows :-
“31. Payment of compensation or deposit of same in Court. – (1) On making an award under Section 11, the Collector shall tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested entitled thereto according to the award, and shall pay it to them unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in the next sub-section.
(2) If they shall not consent to receive it, or if there be no person competent to alienate the land, or if there be any dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or as to the apportionment of it, the Collector shall deposit the amount of the compensation in the Court to which a reference under Section 18 would be submitted :
Provided that any person admitted to be interested may receive such payment under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount :
Provided also that no person who has received the amount otherwise than under protest shall be entitled to make any application under Section 18 :
Provided also that nothing herein contained shall affect the liability of any person, who may receive the whole or any part of any compensation awarded under this act, to pay the same to the person lawfully entitled thereto.
(3) Notwithstanding anything in this section, the Collector may, with the sanction of appropriate Government instead of awarding a money compensation in respect of any land, make any arrangement with a person having a limited interest in such land, either by the grant of other lands in exchange, the remission of land revenue on other lands held under the same title, or in such other way as may be equitable having regard to the interest of the parties concerned.
(4) Nothing in the last foregoing sub-section shall be construed to interfere with or limit the power of the Collector to enter into any arrangement with any person interested in the land and competent to contract in respect thereof.”
11. From a combined reading of the provisions of Section 18 and Section 31 of the L.A. Act read with Section 12 thereof, what transpires is that the Collector shall, according to Section 12, issue a notice of the award to the person interested in the land, which is acquired, to receive the amount awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector. The persons, who is interested in the land so acquired and who has not accepted the award so made, may, by an application addressed to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector to a Court of competent jurisdiction for determination of, inter alia, the amount of compensation. The application, so made, shall contain the grounds on which the objection to the award has been taken. If the Collector makes the reference, the Court to which the reference is made has to decide the reference.
12. The question, now, is as to what is the object and scope of Section 31, which is the subject of controversy in this appeal. A careful reading of Section 31 shows that the Collector had to tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons entitled to receive compensation. The first proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 31 shows that the person to whom the payment of compensation is made may receive the payment under protest as regards the sufficiency of the amount. But the second proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 31 shows that a person, who has received the amount, otherwise than under protest, would not be entitled to make any application under Section 18. The logical conclusion from a careful reading of the second proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 31 is that the person to whom the payment of the awarded amount is tendered by the Collector has the liberty to receive the amount, but if he receives the amount without any protest, then, he shall not be entitled to make any application seeking a reference to the Court. Both the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 31 have to be given realistic and meaningful interpretation. The realistic interpretation will be that the awardee of the amount must raise his protest before he receives the payment. There is nothing in the language of the two proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 31 to indicate that the protest must be made, in writing, simultaneously and/or along with the receipt of the payment and/or at the very moment of receipt of the payment. What the two proviso indicate is that the protest must be raised after the payment of the amount awarded is tendered by the Collector and must continue to exist at the time, when the payment is received, meaning thereby that there is no impediment on the part of the person to raise a protest on any day after the amount awarded is tendered to him and before he actually receives the payment of the awarded amount. Such a person will forfeit or lose his right to seek a reference under Section 18 only if he either waives the protest, which he had already raised, or withdraws the protest he had raised before actually receiving the awarded amount. In the absence of waiver or withdrawal of protest, the real and logical conclusion will be that the protest raised by such a person has continued to exist at the time, when he received the payment.
13. In the present case, the notice in Form 12 of the L.A. Act was issued by the respondent No. 1 to the petitioners-appellants requesting them to receive the payment of the awarded amount of Rs. 40,14,990/- on 24.12.1998. This notice was nothing but tender of payment of the awarded amount by the respondent No. 1 in terms of the Sub-section (1) of Section 31. The petitioners-appellants, admittedly, received the said notice, dated 24.12.1998, on 26.12.1998 and they promptly, on 28.12.1998, sent a letter of their protest by registered post with A/D addressed to the respondent No. 1. The fact that the petitioners-appellants had sent their protest letter, on 28.12.1998, is not in dispute at all. Since the petitioners-appellants had sent their protest letter, dated 28.12.1998, on 28,12.1998 itself and there is not even an iota of material on record to show that they withdrew their protest letter, which they had addressed to the respondent No. 1 on 28.12.1998, by registered post, the logical inference is that the protest raised by the petitioners-appellants, on 28.12.1998, continued and did exist even on 29.12.1998, when they actually received the cheque. Whether the receipt of the cheque will amount to payment of the awarded amount is a question, which need not detain us in this case.
14. Even if, for a moment, it is assumed that the receipt of the cheque by an awardee is tantamount to receipt of payment of the awarded amount, yet the fact remains that in the facts and circumstances of the case at hand, the protest did exist on 29.12.1998, when the petitioners-appellants received the payment of the said awarded amount. We have minutely scrutinised the averments made by the respondents in their affidavit-in-opposition, but we find neither any assertion nor any material indicating that the petitioners-appellants had waived and/or withdrawn their protest on 29.12.1998, when they received the said cheque. Situated thus, the conclusion reached by the learned Single Judge that the petitioner appellants had received the amount awarded without protest is not sustainable at all.
15. As regards Mr. Saha’s submission that since the protest was received by the respondent No. 1 on 8.1.1999, whereas the payment had been received by the petitioners-appellants on 29,12.1998, no protest can be said to have existed under the law on 29.12.1998, when the petitioners-appellants had received the payment, suffice it to say that there is, we notice, inherent fallacy, in the submission, so made, on behalf of the respondents. The golden rule of interpretation of statutes is that a statute shall be interpreted by giving the statute its natural meaning and nothing must be imported into the statute, while interpreting the same. We are unable to read into the second proviso to Section 31 that the protest, which is envisaged under this proviso, has to be received by the District Collector before the payment is actually received by the awardee of the amount. What the second proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 31 Indicates is that that the awardee of the compensation amount must receive the same under protest; whether the protest has actually been received by the District Collector or not at the time, when the payment is received, is not at all material.
16. In all the cases of which Mr. U.B. Saha has relied upon, the protest was not raised before receipt of the payment and since the protest was raised after receipt of the payment, the Court observed that the protest must be raised at the time of receipt of the payment and not otherwise. None of these cases lay down a proposition of law that if the protest has already been raised, when the payment of the awarded amount is tendered and continues to exist, a fresh protest has to be registered, once again, at the time of actual receipt of the payment. The case law, relied upon by Mr. Saha, has, therefore, no relevance to the issue under consideration.
17. In the case at hand, by their letter, dated 28.12.1998 aforementioned, the petitioners-appellants had, if we may reiterate, already lodged their objection to the awarded amount of Rs. 40,14,990/- and had requested the District Collector (respondent No. 1) to make a reference and the same was sent by registered post with A/D on 28.12.1998 itself. In the face of such a letter which was not withdrawn, it cannot be said that the protest had not existed and/or the application for making reference did not exist, on 29.12.1998, when the petitioners-appellants actually received the payment.
18. A careful perusal of the impugned judgment shows that the learned Single Judge has not taken note of the fact that by their letter, dated 28.12.1998, aforementioned, the petitioners-appellants had already raised their protest/objection to the quantum of compensation amount awarded by the respondent No. 1 and had already requested the respondent No. 1 to make a reference. The learned Single Judge has, thus, completely omitted to make note of an extremely relevant fact in coming to the conclusion, which he has, eventually, reached and on account of the omission to notice this fact, the learned Single Judge has come to the conclusion that on 29.12.1998, the petitioners-appellants received the payment without any protest. Not a word appears in the impugned judgment indicating that the learned Single Judge applied his mind to the fact that the petitioner appellants had already made an application, on 28.12.1998, registering their protest/objection to the quantum of amount awarded and also requested the respondent No. 1 to make a reference and that the protest, so raised, had not been withdrawn and/or waived. Situated thus, we are firmly of the view that if the impugned order is not interfered with, it will cause serious miscarriage of justice.
19. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, this writ appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment and order shall accordingly stand set aside and the respondent No. 1 is hereby directed to make a reference with the regard to the subject matter of controversy in terms of Section 18 of LA Act.
20. With the above observations and directions this writ appeal shall stand disposed of. No order as to costs.