ORDER
V.M. Jain, J.
1. This is a Revision Petition against the order dated 15.3.2000 passed by the Trial Court, directing the defendant-petitioners to deposit the rent within a period of 7 days from the date of the said order, failing which their defence shall be struck off under Order 15 Rule 5 CPC.
2. The facts which are relevant for the decision of the present Revision Petition are that Manga Ram, etc.-plaintiffs had filed a suit on 4.8.1998 for possession by way of eviction against the defendants and also for recovery of a sum of Rs. 1,26,000/- for use of occupation of the Booth in question at Panchkula at the rate of Rs. 6000/- per month for the period from 7.11.1996 to 31.7.1998. During the pendency of the said suit, the plaintiffs filed an application dated 19.1.1999 under Order 15 Rule 5 CPC for striking off the defence of the defendants on account of non payment of arrears at the rate of Rs. 6000/- per month w.e.f. 1.11.1996 upto date alongwith interest etc. The said application filed by the plaintiffs was contested by defendant No. 1 by filing written reply dated 17.5.1999, alleging therein that defendant No. 1 was not a tenant in the booth in question whereas M/s. Kamal Flour Mill of which Kamal Kumar is the proprietor, is the tenant in the premises in question. The learned trial court after hearing both the sides and after perusing the record vide order dated 15.3.2000 found that as per the rent agreement dated 10th July, 1990 defendant No. 1 was the tenant on the premises in question at a monthly rent of Rs. 6000/-. Accordingly the learned trial court directed the defendants to deposit the arrears within a period of 7 days from the date of the order failing which their defence shall be struck of under Order 15 Rule 5 CPC. Aggrieved against this order of the trial court dated 15.3.2000, the defendants filed the present revision petition in this court. In the grounds of revision the date of the order vide which the petitioners were aggrieved was not mentioned, though in the opening sheet for the civil revision it was mentioned that the revision was being filed against the order dated 23.3.2000 vide which the defence had been struck off. Similarly, on the page of containing “SYNOPSIS” it was mentioned that the impugned order was passed on 23.3.2000 vide which the defence had been struck off. The revision petition is dated 4.4.2000. Along with the revision petition certified copy of the order dated 15.3.2000 has been attached, being the impugned order, besides typed copy of the said order.
3. When the revision petition came up for preliminary hearing on May 4, 2000, the petitioners were directed to place on record copies of various zimni orders passed by the trial court, from the date when the suit was filed upto date. In pursuance of the said direction the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners placed on record photo copies of various zimni orders right from 13.10.1998 till 30.3.2000, passed by the trial court in this suit.
4. In have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and have gone through the record carefully.
5. At the outset it may be mentioned here that vide impugned order dated 15.3.2000 (through the date mentioned in the revision of the impugned order is 23.3.2000), the learned trial court had not struck off the defence of the defendants but had only directed the defendants to deposit the rent within a period of 7 days from the date of the order failing which their defence shall be struck off. A perusal of the various zimni orders, photocopies of which have been placed on record by the learned counsel for the petitioners, however would show that on 30.3.2000 the learned trial court had struck off the defence of the defendants because the defendants had failed to deposit the rent within a period of 7 days from the date of the order dated 15.3.2000 as ordered by the trial court. There is nothing on the record to show that the said order dated 30.3.2000 has been challenged by the defendants by way of revision petition or otherwise.
6. The learned counsel appearing for the defendant-petitioners submitted before me that since the defendants had denied the relationship of the landlord and the tenant between the parties, the defendants were not required to deposit the arrears of rent on the first date of hearing of the suit, as the defendants were not admitting the payment of arrears of rent. It is submitted that this being the position the defence of the defendants could not be struck off on account of non payment of arrears of rent. It was further submitted that the defence of the defendants is not to be struck off mechanically. Reliance has placed on Kumar Medical Agencies v. Smt. Mirmal and Ors., (1994-1)106 P.L.R. 154 and Jai Bhagwan v. Chandra Mohan and Ors., (1995-3)111 P.L.R. 154. In the grounds of revision reliance has also been placed on the law laid down by their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case reported as Bimal Chand Jain v. Gopal Aggarwal, AIR 1981 SC 1657
7. After hearing learned counsel for the petitioners and after perusing the record, I find no merit in the present revision, which is liable to be dismissed in limine
8. A perusal of the various zimni orders, copies of which have been placed on record, would show that on 13.10.1998 defendant No. 2 was proceeded against ex-parte as no one had put in appearance on his behalf inspite of service. On 19.1.1999 the plaintiffs had filed an application under Order 15 Rule 5 CPC for striking off the defence of the defendants. Notice of this application was given to defendant No. 1. On 18.5.1999 the counsel had put in appearance on behalf of Respondent No. 1 and had filed the Vakalatnama and the case was adjourned far filing the written statement. On 21.9.1999 defendant No. 1 had filed the written statement and the reply (even though the reply is dated 17.5.1999), the case was adjourned for filing replication, framing of issues and for consideration. On 4.11.1999 replication was filed and the case was adjourned for consideration on application under Order 15 Rule 5 CPC and for framing issues. Finally on 13.3.2000 the arguments in the said application were heard and the case was adjourned to 15.3.2000. On 15.3.2000 vide separate order of even date the application under Order 15 Rule 5 CPC was decided and the case was adjourned to 22.3.2000 for tendering of rent. The next order is dated 30.3.2000. In the said order it is mentioned that vide order dated 15.3.2000 the defendants were given 7 days time to tender the rent. It was further mentioned that since the file could not be traced on the date fixed i.e. 22.3.2000, the case was adjourned to 30.3.2000 for the said purpose. It further shows that on 30.3.2000 an application was filed by defendant No. 1 praying for extending the time for compliance of the provisions of order dated 15.3.2000, stating therein that he wanted to engage another counsel. Apart from this, no other ground was taken for extending the date of payment of rent. The learned trial court after considering that the change of counsel was not a sufficient ground for extending the date of payment, dismissed the said application and since the rent had not been tendered within the prescribed time, the defence of the defendants was struck off vide order dated 30.3.2000 and the case was adjourned to 23.5.2000 for framing of issues.
9. From the perusal of the above, it would be clear that neither defendants had tendered the arrears of rent on the first date of hearing nor the defendants had tendered the monthly amount due for the subsequent period till 15.3.2000 when the impugned order was passed or even till 30.3.2000 when the subsequent order striking off the defence of the defendants was passed by the trial court. This was inspite of the fact that vide order dated 15.3.2000 the learned trial court had given one week’s time to the defendants to deposit the rent.
10. Order 15 Rule 5 CPC, as incorporated by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh vide Notification dated 13.5.1991 for the States of Punjab, Haryana and Union Territory of Chandigarh, reads as under:-
Order XV, Rule 4.
“(1) In any suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee after the determination of his lease and for the recovery from him of rent of compensation for use and occupation, the defendant shall, at or before the first hearing of the suit, deposit the entire amount admitted by him to be due together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum and whether or not he admits any amount to be due, he shall throughout the continuation of the suit regularly deposit the monthly amount due within a week from the date of its accrual, and in the event of any default in making the deposit of the entire amount admitted by him to be due or the monthly amount due as aforesaid, the Court may, subject to the provisions of sub rule (2) strike off his defence.
Explanation 1: The expression first hearing means the date for filing written statement or for hearing mentioned in the summons or where more than one of such dates are mentioned in the last of the dates mentioned.
Explanation 2: The expression entire amount admitted by him to be due means the entire gross amount whether as rent or compensation for use arid occupation, calculated at the admitted rate of rent for the admitted period of arrears, after making no other deduction except the taxes, if any, paid to a local authority in respect of the building on lessor’s account and the amount, if any, deposited in any court.
Explanation 3: The expression ‘Monthly amount due’ means the amount due every month, whether as rent or compensation for use and occupation at the admitted rate of rent, after making no other deduction except the taxes, if any, paid to a local authority, in respect of the building on lessor’s account.
(2) Before making an order for striking off defence, the Court may consider any representation made by the defendant in that behalf provided such representation is made within ten days of the first hearing or, of the expiry of the week referred to in sub section (1) as the case may be.
(3) The amount deposited under this rule may at any time be withdrawn by the plaintiff.
Provided that such withdrawal shall not have the effect of prejudicing any claim by the plaintiff disputing the correctness of the amount deposited.
Provided further that if the amount deposited includes any sums claimed by the depositor to be deductible on any account, the Court may require the plaintiff to furnish the security for such sum before he is allowed to withdraw the same.”
11. From the perusal of the above it would be clear that there are two parts of Order 15 Rule 5 (1) CPC. The first part casts an obligation upon the lessee to make payment of the entire amount admitted by him to be due together with interest on the first date of hearing failing which the court has the power of strike off the defence of the defendant. The second part envisages a situation where the defendant may or may not admit any amount to be due but nonetheless an obligation is cast upon him to pay throughout the continuation of the suit such monthly amount which is due within a week from the date of its accrual failing which the court has got the power to strike off the defence. Reliance in this regard may be placed on the law laid down by this court, in the case reported as Mrs. Ablinder Chawla v. Shri R.K. Gupta (1994-2)107 P.L.R. 219 In this authority it was further held by this court that the object behind the addition of this provision seems to be that no landlord should be .deprived of his right to receive the rent and no tenant should be allowed to live in the premises free of charge simply because all sorts of pleas can be taken in the pleadings.
12. In the present case, even if the defendants had denied the relationship of the landlord and the tenant between the parties and were not admitting that any amount was due towards arrears of rent, may not be liable to pay the arrears of rent together with interest thereon on the first date of hearing and the defence may not be struck off on that account. However for the subsequent period during the pendency of the suit the defendants were liable to deposit the monthly amount due regularly throughout the continuation of the suit, within a week from the date of its accrual, whether or not the defendants were admitting any amount to be due. However this would be subject to the provision of sub rule (2) of Rule 5 of Order 15 CPC. In the present case, as referred to above, defendant No. 2 was proceeded against ex-parte on 13.10.1998, whereas defendant No. 1 had put in appearance before the court on 18.5.1999. Even if defendant No. 2 could avoid the payment of arrears of rent on the first date of hearing, by denying the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, yet, for the subsequent period (after defendant No. 1 had put in appearance before the trial court) Defendant No. 1 was required to deposit the amount due throughout the continuation of the suit regularly within a week from the date of its accrual, whether or not defendant No. l was admitting any amount to be due. This having not been done, within the specified period, the defence of the defendant No. 1 was liable to be struck off unless a case was made out and a representation was made in this regard within the specified period and material was placed on record to show that the defence should not be struck off. However, in the present case, neither the defendants filed any representation under Rule 5 (2) of Order 15 CPC nor the defendants placed any material on the record which may make out a case for not striking off the defence of the defendants under Order 15 Rule 5 CPC, even though the defendants had failed to deposit the monthly amount due during the pendency of the suit. Under these circumstances, in my opinion, the Learned Trial Court would have been perfectly justified in striking off the defence of the defendants. However the learned trial court still took a lenient view of the matter. Instead of striking off the defence of the defendants, the learned trial court gave one week’s time to the defendants to deposit the rent from the date of the order dated 15.3.2000 failing which the defence of the defendants was to be struck off. In my opinion, no fault could be found with the order dated 15.3.2000 passed by the trial court giving one week’s time to the defendants to pay the rent. This is especially so, when the learned trial court had prime facie found, from a copy of the rent agreement dated 10th July, 1990, that the premises in question was let out by the plaintiffs to defendant No. 1 at a monthly rent of Rs. 6000/-. As referred to above, the defendants failed to deposit the rent within the period given by the trial court and accordingly vide subsequent order dated 30.3.2000 the defence of the defendants was struck off.
13. On the facts and circumstances of the present case, referred to above, in my opinion, it could not be said that the learned trial court had acted mechanically in striking off the defence of the defendants. On the other hand, after considering the entire matter, including the material available on the record, the learned trial court had given one week’s time to the defendants to deposit the rent, vide order dated 15.3.2000. This being the position, it could not be said that the orders passed by the trial court suffer from any illegality or irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction, which may require interference by this court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. This is especially so, when the defendants had not even paid the monthly amount due during the pendency of the suit, nor they had placed any material on the record which may make out a case for not striking off their defence.
14. The authority (1994-1)106 P.L.R. 154 (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners, in my opinion, would have no application to the facts of the present case, especially when, in the present case it could not be said that the trial court had struck off the defence in a mechanical manner. On the other had, the defendants were given time to pay the rent. Similarly, the authority AIR 1981 SC 1657 (supra), mentioned in the grounds of revision and which was relied upon by this court in (1994-1)106 Punjab Law Reporter 154 (supra), would be of no help to the petitioners, in as much as, in the present case it could not be said that the trial court had struck off the defence in a mechanical manner or that trial court had not taken into consideration the material which was available on record before passing the impugned order dated 15.3.2000. The authority (1995-3)111 P.L.R. 191 (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel of the petitioners, would also be of no help to the petitioners, on the facts and circumstances of the present case.
15. For the reasons recorded above, finding no merit in this revision petition, the same is hereby dismissed, in limine.