JUDGMENT
Binod Kumar Roy and Dharmpal Sinha, JJ.
1. As a Staff of this Court had nullified our judicial directions made repeatedly, we initiated these proceedings in Contempt invoking Article 215 of the Constitution of India, remembering that Halsbury in Laws of England, Third edition–Volume 8, defined–Any act done or writing published which is calculated to bring a court a Judge into Contempt or to lower his authority or to interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process of the Court is a Contempt of Courts (quoted with approval in Thakur Jugal Kishore v. Sitamarhi C. C. Bank Ltd. ).
2 After the proclamation made by the Governor-General of India on 22-3-1912 constituting a separate province called Provinces of Bihar and Orissa governed by Governor-General-in-Council, pursuant to Section 113 of the Government of India Act, 1915 read with clause 1 of the Letters Patent, the High Court of Judicature at Patna i. e, to say this Court was erected ard established in 1916.
3. Section 108 (1) of the Government of India Act, 1915 runs as follows:
Each High Court may be its own rules provide, as it thinks fit, for the exercise, by one or more Judges, or by division courts constituted by two or more Judges, of the High Court, of the Original and Appellate Jurisdiction vested in the Court.
4 The draft rules of this Court were prepared and considered passed and directed to be published by the proceedings of a Full Court meeting held on the Ist of March, 1916.
5 Proviso (c) rule 1 (xv) of Part I Chapter II of the Rules of this Court reads thus: “Any application in suit, appeal or other proceeding which is pending before a Bench shall be presented to that Bench.
6 This rule clearly recognises the inherent powers of any Bench to entertain motions in regard to the matters which are pending before that Bench.
7. Rule 10 of Chapter II of the Rules of the High Court runs as follows:
10. Save as provided by Law or by these rules or by an order of the Chief Justice every other case shall be heard by a Bench of two Judges.
8. Rule 10-A in Chapter II was added by another Full Court meeting, held on 31st March, 1916, which runs as follows:
Subject to the provisions of these rules, the Chief Justice shall direct what cases or class of cases shall be placed before each Judge or Bench.
9. A bare perusal of Rules 10 and 10-A aforementioned show that they put an express bar on the powers of the Hon’ble the Chief Justice to do anything in regard to the pending matters before a Bench.
10. With the rise in the number of writ applications in this Court, since around sixties the previous Hon’ble Chief Justices started allotting the cases Act/Subject-wise.
11. In view of the resolutions passed by the Chief Justices Conference, the Computer technology entered this Court which became fully operational during the tenure of our present Hon’ble Chief Justice, who joined on 18th March, 1991. Re-arrang3ments were made for speedy disposal of writ cases pending ‘For Admission’ before this Court by further feeding of floppies and getting computerised lists prepared. Different subjects were put under specified groups for taking up Admission of Constitutional cases by the specially constituted Benches by the Hon’ble Chief Justice under Rule 10 A of Chapter II of the Rules of the Court. The Hon’ble the Chief Justice by a notice dated 2-12-1991 had notified as follows: “(1) All matters repuired to be heard on priority basis or as a specially fixed mater must be mentioned before the Bench concerned and not any where else. (2) All matters shall come in the list on the basis of the date of filing, unless ordered otherwise by the particular Bench.” Another notice dated 12-10-1991, which was reiterated on 19th October, 1992 was to the following effect: “It is directed ihat the cases should be mentioned for appropriate orders only before the Bench which has been assigned with the subject in the respect ve groups.” The aforementioned notices were printed in the daily cause lists for the purpose of information to all concerned including us. On the basis of the aforementioned notices Counsel have been mentioning in Court showing urgency to take up the matters and we, after being satisfied, have been issuing dirertions to place such cases before us on a date fixed by us. It was detected that some cases belonging to different Acts/Subjects were listed before the Benches consisting of one of us not in seision of those Acts/Subjects. Repeated orders on the judicial side were passed delisting those cases. Grievances were made by the Bar in some cases that despite our direction they are not being listed. Earlier it was thought that it was a teething problem. The X-mas vacations intervened.
12. The Court’s list dated 4-1-1993 showed Group No. 7, with which we are concerned, presently consisting of the following subjects as having been allotted to us:
(i) All matters relating to Corporation/Boards.
(ii) Salary.
(iii) Promotion, Excise Act, Absorption, Date of Birth, Bank Services and Essential Commodities Act.
13. Group No. 2, inter alia, has been entrusted with the subject ‘municipality’.
14. On 19-1-1993 a motion in writing in the pen of Shri Ashok Kumar, Advocate, in C.W.J.C. No. 589 of 1993 was made through Shri Krishna Prakesh Sinha, a Senior Counsel of this Court. Relevant part of the motion in writing ran as follows:
Since the Patna Municipal Corporation is bent upon to attach and auction sale the holding of the petitioner, therefore, the matter is urgent and it may be placed for admission tomorrow i. e. on 20-1-1993 before appropriate Bench.
15. The motion was allowed by us in view of the urgency explained by Mr. Sinha. The following order, made by us on 19-1 1993, was recorded by the Bench Clerk:
Put up for admission day after tomorrow.
16. There was some inaccuracy in recording our order as we had directed to place that case on 20-1-1993. Our Bench Clerk states that besides sending the motion incorporating our order in the Section, he had also orally informed the S. O.
17. Mr. Krishna Prakash Sinha on 20-1-1993 made yet another motion in the pen of Shri Ashok Kumar, Advocate before us in Court ventilating a grievance that the case has not been listed, We again dictated the following order which stands recorded on the motion:
Put up tomorrow i. e. on 21-1-1993 for admission.
18. The case unfortunately was not listed again. Again a motion was made by Mr. Sinha ventilating a grievance of non-compliance of our direction and his faith having been shaken and left, embarassed and appreciating the helplessness and enxiety of the Learned Counsel, we dictated the following order:
Civil Revision No, 39 of 1993 is said to have been converted as CWJC No. 589 of 1993 (M/s. Pradeep Lamp Works v. The Patna Municipal Corporation) pursuant to an order dated 15th January, 1993.
A motion was made before the Bench to place this writ application under the heading for its admission amongst priority cases, on the ground that Patna Municipal Corporation authorities have issue ‘ a warrant of attachment and sale of the properties of the writ petitioner.
Accordingly, the Bench had directed to place the said writ application for admission as in Group VII all the matters related to Corporation have been allotted to it. Unfortunately, the office failed to obey the command.
From the enquiry it transpires that this was done on the pretext that this writ application relates to Group II which does not appear to be correct.
Accordingly, the office is directed to place this case under the heading for admission tomorrow amongst priority cases, with a written explanation of the office in this regard.
19. On 22-1-1993 the writ application was listed ‘For Admission’. An explanation was famished by the Contemner, which is on the record, The Contemner showed us a list said to be the allotments made by the Hon’ble Chief Instice with corrections in red ink. After perusal we told him that this list has nothing to do with the present list. Then he adopted a peculiar defiant attitude. He did not even tender any apology nor expressed any willingness to comply with our directions in future. We delisted the writ case from our list as we thought proper not to hear that case. We passed the following order separately, while initiating these proceedings.–
By our direction on a motion made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, we had directed to put up C.W.J.C. No. 589 of 1993 on 20th of January, 1993.
On 20th of January, 1993, the case, however, was not listed. Another motion was made by the learned Counsel on a slip. We again directed to put up this writ application on 21st January, 1993.
On 21st January, 1993 when the case was again not listed, we got an enquiry made. The Incharge was summoned by us. He gave an explanation orally. We were not satisfied with his oral explantion and hence we directed that his explanation must be furnished in writing which has been done.
We are anguished to express for the present that our direction was nullified by the Deputy Director of Computer of this Court.
On a bare interpretation of the notice as printed in the daily cause list showing assignment of works to different Benches unequivocally showed that “all matters of Corporation and Board” are to be placed for admission before Group No. 7 i.e., to say our Bench. The aforesaid notice also shows that Group No. 2 will take up the matters concerning ‘Municipality’. If the explanation of the office is accepted then we fail to apprectate as to why the matters connected with Municipality have been placed before this Bench.
By our judicial orders, when it came to our notice that the cases arising out of Municipality matters have been listed, we directed them to go out of out list and be placed before a Bench, which has been assigned Municipality matters under the orders of the Hon’ble C. J. We, therefore, call upon the Deputy Director of Computer to submit a further show cause by Thrusday dated 28-1-1993.
Let a separate file be opened and the matter be put in our Chambers, if we are not sitting in Court on 29-1-1993 at 2.15 p.m. The D. D. C. is directed to be present in Court at that time.
20. A notice was issued pursuant to which the Contemner appeared on 29-1-1993 and filed a show cause without supported by any affidavit, stating, inter alia, to the effect that the Bench slips in question were not moved or mentioned before the appropriate Bench; that the slips mentioned only before the appropriate Bench are required to be attended to; that only service matters relating to Municipality, Notified Area Committee, Municipal Corporation and all other Corporations have been/are our assigned subjects; and that on a motion being made before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice, C.W.J.C. No. 589 of 1993 was listed before a Division Bench concerning Group No. 2 which has been assigned with the subject ‘Municipality’.
21. On 29-1-1993, during hearing the Contemner tried to justify his defence. He also did not offer any apology and we put certain questions which he answered about which we will refer later on. Finally we passed the following orders:
The Contemner is present in Court. The show cause, however, has not been supported by his affidavit. He states that he does not intend to engage any counsel but will defend the motion personally. In this view of the matter, we adjourn this case to Monday next (1-2-1993) giving an opportunity to the Contemner to support his show cause by his affidavit. The Contemner shall remain present in Court on the next date.
We direct that the Court Marshal with necessary police force should be present on that date so that the proceeding could be conducted without any interruption.
Let the Registrar communicated of this direction immediately.
22. The Registrar was informed of our order aforesaid. On 1st February, we resumed the further hearing.
23. The Contemner appeared and submitted that this proceeding is bad for defect of two necessary parties, namely, Hon’ble the Chief justice and the Registrar, who should be summoned; that he being staff of the High Court does not come within the purview of the Contempt proceeding; that there was no wilful disobedience of the directions of this Court; that the proceeding is bnd on the ground that the same has not been initiated in his name; that the writ petition arose out of Municipality matters which stands assigned to group No. 7, with which we are concerned; that wrong mentioning and orders are not required to be attended by him; that he has been instructed by the Authority not to attend the directions made by Court which are not inseisin of the subjects and shall not abide by those direction; that he has stopped by and large the corruption prevalent while listing of the cases on account of many Advocates.
24. The Contemner also placed reliance on a Division Bench judement of Calcutta High Court in Sohan Lal Baid v. State of West Bengal and Ors. and reiterated that he is not bound by our orders.
25. During hearing we recapitulate what we had put to the Contemner and what he answered: (i) To the question put to him as to whether he has any authority to disregard or not to obey the command of the directions made by us on the judicial side in Court, he stated that he has instructions from the authority not to regard it. (ii) To the question as to whether he informed the Hon’ble the Chief Justice or to the Registrar of the directions made by us, he stated that he had not informed them, (iii) When we put a question to him that C.W.J.C. No 589 of 1993 was listed before us ultimately on 22-1 1993, he said that this is not a fact. We got called for the records of the aforementioned writ application and showed him to falsify his stand, then he stated that this has been done by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice by making it an assigned case, (v) When we pointed out that certain other matters relating to Patna Municipal Corporation has also been listed before, us and accordingly his defence is not correct he stated that this was because of the mistake committed by his predecessor.
26. The plight of the litigants, lawyers and the Court in this regard was noticed by a Division Bench, consisting of one of us, in two writ petitions filed by two learned Advocates of this Court, when the previous Hon’ble Chief Justice Sri G. G. Sohoni refused to delist their cases from another list of an Hon’ble Judge of this Court on the ground that he has no such jurisdiction. The judgment of one of which is reported in 1990 B. B. C. J. 813 An Advocate v. The Registrar, Patna High Court and Ors. The ratio laid down therein reportedly stood affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court by the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition of the learned Counsel. In Paragraph 16 it was observed as follows:
The plight of this Court, which is only at the present 11 short of its sanctioned strength, in taking up cases for their Admission/ Hearing is no secret. There are cases and cases numbering from 450 plus to 1000 plus writ cases alone before specially constituted 5-6 Division Benches on our daily board, pending merely for their admission alone. Still we entertain a request made by any learned member of the Bar or litigant to take up them out of turn, if we really find that there would be a failure of justice.
Rule 10-A Chapter II Part I. of the Rules of the High Court at Patna, 1916 was also examined and held as follows:
18. A bare reading of the aforesaid Rule makes it clear that the Chief Justice of this High Court has been vested with the discretionary powers as to what case or case or class or’ cases shall be placed before a particular Judge eirher sitting singly or in Bench Divisions/Special/Full. This rule does not permit transfer of cases, already listed before Judge or Judges, or direct placing, on the basis of appearance of a particular counsel in a case or class of cases before any Bench. (Emphasis supplied).
26-A. Even the then Nagpur High Court through a Division Bench in Zikar v. The Government of State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in AIR 1961 Nagpur 11, categorically held that the power of the Chief Justice to regulate the sittings of the Court does not include a power to withdraw or transfer a case of which a Division Bench is inseisin; besides, the Hon’ble the Chief Justice as such has no special judicial power although he arranges the sittings of the Court. But it is also a settled practice of ours, when cases are required for the purpose of business of any other Hon’ble Judge, on a request made to us, we release some cases out of our Court.
27. The stand on which the Contemner has disregarded our direction and the grounds alleged by him compels us to examine the constitutional position of the Chief Justice vis-a-vis the other Judges of the High Court:
(A) Article 216 of the Constitution of India reads thus:
Every High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and such other Judges as the President may from time to time deem it necessary to appoint.
In State of Uttar Pardesh v. Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi and Anr. , while interpretating Article 216 of the Constitution the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that “High Court” under Article 216 means the entire body of Judges appointed to the Court. Thus by no stretch of imagination it can be conceived that the Chief Justice alone constitutes this Court.
(B) The Special Committee consisting of six Hon’ble Judges (M/s. M. N. Roy, B. C. Basak (our Hon’ble C. J.), A. Bhattacbarjee (present Hon’ble C. J. of Calcutta High Court) G. N. Ray (presently of the Hon’ble Supreme Court), S. Ahmad and L. M. Ghose) of the Calcutta High Court in their report dated 24-8-1990 (whereas the judgment in Sohan Lal Baid relied upon by the Contemner is of 5-9-1989) in regard to the Arrears Committee Volume I (popularly known as Malimath Committee) correctly stated their consitutional position as follows:
It is fit and proper that the relation between the Chief Justice and the puisne Judges should be proper; otherwise it would act at the detriment of the administration of justice in the State as a whole. As on the one hand puisne Judges should have proper respect for the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice in his turn should also have proper respect for the puisne Judges.
The Chief Justice is entitled to all co-operation from puisne Judges and the puisne Judges are also entitled to all co-operation from the Chief Justice. The constitutional provision regarding the Chief Justice does not entitle him to exercise administrative supervision of the judicial work of the puisne Judges or their performance. He is merely the Chief among the equals. The Chief Justice has merely some various administrative powers and duties which the puisne Judges do not have. A judieial work of a puisne Judge can only be judged “judicially” (Emphasis added).
(C) The Hon’ble Supreme Court also through a 4 Judges Bench in Sub Committee of Judicial Accountability v. Union of India and Ors. reported in Judgments Today 1991 (3) SC 659, rejected the prayer made for restraining a Judge from discharging judicial functions holding as follows:
Indeed, no co-ordinate bench of this Court can even comment upon, let alone sit in judgment over the discretion exercised or judment rendered in a came or matter before another coordinate bench.
** ** **
It is for that bench and that bench alone to decide that question. Judicial propriety and discpline as well as what flows from the circumstance that division bench of this Court functions as the Court itself renders any interference by one bench with judicial matter before another lacking as much in propriety as in jurisdiction. (Emphasis added)
This legal position is also true in relation to the Chief Justice vis-a-vis Judges of the High Courts Accordingly discretions exercised by us cannot be nullified by the Hon’ble Chief Justice either administratively or while sitting in a Division Bench.
28. Now we proceed to consider Sohan Lal Baid’s case (supra) relied upon by the Contemner:
(A) This case has got to application no the facts and circum tances of the instant case. No direction like ours was violated by any one in the Calcutta High Court.
(B) Section 108(a) of the Government of India Act, 1915 was considered by a three Judges Division Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in National Sewing Thread Co. Limited v. James Chadwick and Brothers Limited, and it was observed as follows:
The Section is an enabling enactment and confers power on the High Courts of making rules for the exercise of their jurisdiction by Single Judges or by division courts. The power conferred by the Section is not circumscribed in any manner whatever and the nature of the power is such that, it had to be conferred by the use of words of the widest amplitude. There could be no particular purpose or object while conferring the power in limiting it qua the jurisdiction already possessed by the High Court when in the other provisions of the Government of India Act it was contemplated that the existing jurisdiction was subject to the legislative power of the Governor General and the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court was liable to be enlarged, modified and curtailed by the Legislature from time to time…. We are, therefore, of the opinion that Section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1913 conferred power on the High Court which that Court could exercise from time to time with reference to its jurisdiction whether existing at the coming into force of the Government of India Act, 1915 or whether conferred on it by any subsequent legislation.
The power permitting exercise by Single Judges, Divisional Courts or Full Special Benches flows from the Rules framed by this Court and not from its Chief Justice alone though through Rule 10 Chapter II Part I the Full Court had delegated its powers in its Chief Justice for more efficient administration of justice. This case is no authority to hold that the Chief Justice alone has aay inherent power to overrule directions/orders passed ever by a Single Judge Court what to talk of those made by the Divisional Courts.
(C) In the State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Shamrao Puranik and Ors. a question arose before a three Judges Division Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court about the constitutionality of a notification issued by the Chief Justice of Bombay High Court in exercise of his powers under Sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the State Reorganisation Act, 1956 and in that regard it was observed that the power to appoint the sittings of the Judges and Division Courts of the High Court for a new State at places other than the place of the principal seat, is in the unquestioned domain of the Chief Justice, the only condition being that he must act with the approval of the Governor, after clarifying that there is no territorial bifurcation of the Bombay High Court merely because the Chief Justice by the impugned order issued under Sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act directed that the Judges and Division Courts shall also sit at Aurangabad. This decision has nothing to do with the powers of High Court vested in it by the authority under Section 108(1) of the Government of India Act, 1915.
(D) Article 225 of the Constitution of India runs as follows:
Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the provisions of any law of the appropriate Legislature made by virtue of powers conferred on that Legislature by this Constitution, the jurisdiction of and the law administered in, any existing High Court and the respective powers of the Judges thereof in relation to the administration of Justice in the Court, including any power to make rules of Court and to regulate the sittings of the Court and members thereof sitting alone or in Division Courts, shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of this Constitution:
Provided that any restriction to which the exercise of original jurisdiction by any of the Courts with respect to any matter concerning the revenue or concerning any act ordered or done in the collection thereof was subject immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall no longer apply to the exercise of such jurisdiction.” (Emphasis added).
The jurisdiction of the High Court Judges and their powers in relation to the administration of justice, has been left in tact, though subject to the provisions of the Constitution and to the provisions of any law of appropriate Legislature made by virtue of the powars conferred on that legislature by this Constitution Their jurisdiction, thus, cannot be curtailed by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice.
(E) Article 235 of the Constitution of India runs as follows:
The control over district courts and courts subordinate thereto including the posting and promotion of and the grant of leave to, persons belonging to the judicial service of a State and holding any post inferior to the post of district Judge shall be vested in the High Court, but nothing in this article shall be construed as taking away from any such person any right of appeal which he may under the law regulating the conditions of his service or as authorising the High Court to deal with him otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of his service prescribed under such law.
A bare perusal of the aforementioned provision leaves no manner of doubt that the High Court and not its Chief Justice alone, has got control over the Subordinate Courts.
(F) Even while exercising jurisdiction under Article 229 of the Constitution, to quote the words of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in JV. C. Putta Swamy v. Hon’ble of Chief Justice Karnataka reported in AIR 1991 SC 299 “the Chief Justice of any other Administrative Judge is not an absolute ruler. Nor he is free wheeler.
(G) Section 108 (2) of the Government of India Act authorises the Hon’ble the Chief Justice to determine only as to which Judge in each case, is to sit alone, or in a Divisional Court or in Full Special Bench.
(H) Judgment in Sohan Lal Baid’s case (supra) was rendered on 5-9-1989 whereas the constitutional position of the Chief Justice vis-a-vis Judges of a High Court was correctly stated later on by the Special Committee in its report dated 24-8-1 90, extracted as above, which also stands fully supported in Sub-Committee of Judicial Accountability (supra).
(I) In the case reported in AIR 1962 SC 876 it was held that Chief Justice has got inherent jurisdiction to refer a matter to a more larger bench. However the Chief Justice has got no jurisdiction to send back any case to a Single Bench or Divisional Bench when that Bench refers a case by a judicial order for its adjudication by a Full or Special Bench.
(J) Under Section 108(1) of the Government of India Act, 1915 this Court had framed Rules vesting powers in the Hon’ble the Chief Justice. In 1990 BBCJ 813 (supra) this Court (through one of us) had already said that allotment of cases or class of cases to a Single Judge or Division Court by its Hon’ble Chief Justices has worked so far and should not be made subject-matter of any judicial proceedings, expressing full faith and hope m its Chief Justice.
(K) A five Judge’s Special Bench decision of Calcutta High Court in Chairman Budge Budge Municipality v. Mongru Mian interpreting Section 108(2) of the Government of India Act, 1915 was not considered in Sohan Lai Baid. The Special Bench speaking through its Chief Justice held as follows;
Section 108(2) is the only provision which empowers the Chief Justice to determine what Judge shall sit singly and what Judges shall constitute the Division Courts. That part of the Section also is now incorporated in Article 225. Out side Section 108(2), now Article 225, there never was and there is not now any other provision which gives power to the Chief Justice to nominate from time to time particular Judges for particular Courts or Benches, It is inconceivable that any Legislative Act should purport to give such power to the Chief Justice in respect of any new jurisdiction that it may confer and no Act has ever sought to do so. When therefore, a particular Judge sits in a particular Court, he does so under a determination by the Chief Justice whatever jurisdiction he may exercise and since such determination can only be made under Section 108 (2) now Article 225, he sits and exercises jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 1C8. Even if it be conceded that the exercise of a particular jurisdiction may reach the stage of Section 108(1) otherwise than under rules made under that Section, it can never reach the stage of Section 108(2). All judgments of Judges of a High Court must therefore, be pursuant to Section 108 in this sense, except in the not easily conceivable case of a judge of Judges usurping some jurisdiction. Even if a case goes to a single Judge Court or a Division Bench under rules framed not Section 108 but under some particular Act, still the particular Judge or Judges sitting in that Court or on that Bench will do so under a determination made under Section 108 (2) and to that extent at least, the judgment must always be pursuant to Section 108.
(1) The Court which passes any interim order alone retains jurisdiction to alter/modify it, unless it is not available. It is also a settled law that the Court also retains jurisdiction to extend time granted by its peremptory orders (See Ramesh Biju v. Pashupati Rai, reported in AIR 1979 SC 1799 (paragraph 34). In Harban Singh v. State of U. P., reported in 1982 SC 849 the Supreme Court laid down that this Court retains and must retain, on interest power and jurisdiction for dealing with any extraordinary jurisdiction in the larger interest of justice and for preventing manifest injustice being done.” What is true of the Supreme Court is also true of this Court. In this view of the matter also the Court retains its jurisdiction to direct placing of such cases in Chambers or in Court in which it had passed orders earlier before it which require modification though after notice to avoid violation of principles of natural justice. In fact this has been the consistent practice of this Court and in this regard no Chief Justice including our present Hon’ble Chief Justice ever raised any finger, like on in Baid’s case which is also not a binding precedent on us.
29. This Court being a Court of Record has got ample jurisdiction to purish any one for its contempt to maintain its dignity and not to allow the confidence of the citizens/litigants/counsel/or any one to be shaken. Section 22 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 which reads “the provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of, the provisions of any other law relating to Contempt of Courts,” leaves no doubt that the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 has not done away with the powers vested in this Court by virtue of being a court of record. The following observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Delhi v. Judicial Serviee Association Tis Hazari Court, Delhi State of Gujarat and ethers, in this regard are also relevant:-“Article 129 provides that the Supreme Court shall be a Court of record and shall have all the powers of such a Court including the power to punish contempt of itself. Article 215 contains similar provision in respect of High Court. Both the Supreme Court as well as High Courts are Courts of record having powers to punish for contempt including the powers to punish for Contempt of itself. (Vide paragraph 19)…”Inherent powers of a superior Court of record have remained unaffected even after codification of Contempt of Law.” (vide paragraph 26)…. “The power to punish Contempt is vested in the Judges not only for their personal protection but for the protection or public jurstice, whose interest requires that decency and decorum is preserved in Courts of Justice. Those who have to discharge duty in a Court of Justice are protected by the law and shielded in the discharge of their duties, any deliberate interference with the discharge of such duties either in Court or outside the Court by attacking the presiding officers of the Court would amount to criminal contempt and the Court must take serious cognizance of such conduct.” (vide paragraph 43).
30. This Court has also got ample jurisdiction to award punishment in the form of admonition, warning, severe warning (See the State v. The Editors and Publishers of Eastern Times and Prajatantra and Bijoyananda v. Balkrishna , Satinath Sikdar v. Ratanmani Naskar reported in (1911) 14 IC 808).
31. The allocation of our business by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice gave no doubt in our mind that the words ‘all matters relating to Corporation/ Boards’ vested authority/jurisdiction in us to take up the cases relating to these subjects which covered C.W.J.C. No. 589 of 1993.
32. During his earlier submission, the Contemner wanted that the Hon’ble the Chief Justice and the Registrar be summoned by us as the violation if any was done by them. By making an oral prayer to summon the Hon’ble the Chief Justice he had tried to embarass us. Our Full Bench in Harish v. Justice Ali Ahmad is clear that no contempt proceeding can be initiated against the Judges of the High Court or of the Supreme Court. None of them has flouted any direction of this Divisional Court. We found no justifiable reason to accept his prayer rather we found the same a misconceived one and rejected orally observing that if he chooses to file a written application, the same will be considered in accordance with law. The Contemner, however, did not file such an application.
33. We also do not see any merit in his objection that he has not been impleaded by his own name, for the reasons that we had no doubt about his identity and that he also entered appearance and is very much before us.
34. During his submissions the Contemner pressed that since he is a staff, therefore, this proceeding is not maintainable. We reject it outright as we see no force in it.
35. The Contemner miserably failed to show us that the word ‘all matters’ in the notice dated 4-1-1993 had any exception. Even assuming that there was any confusion in his mind it was meet and proper for him to draw the attention of this Court and not to sit tight over our repeated directions. On his own statement made before us the Contemner did not inform the Hon’ble the Chief Justice or the Registrar in this matter and, thus, blocked the course of administration of justice.
36. The Contemner failed to convince us as to how other matters concerning Patna Municipal Corporation were listed before us after X’ mas vacation.
37. We clarify that our repeated directions were not nullified by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice by any executive order or were tried to be ignored, as no sooner the Registrar came to know of the defiance of the Contemner he reported (sic) appraised the Hon’ble Chief Justice and the case was listed before us.
38. Amidst this judgment, the Contemner tendered apology orally yesterday and filed a supplementary show cause, supported by his affidavit, today stating as follows:
(1) That the deponent has the highest regard for the dignity of this Hon’ble Court.
(2) That the deponent tenders unqualified apology to this Hon’ble Court.
(3) That it is stated that earlier the Contenner had filed a show cause petition for his discharge from the Rule Contempt.
(4) That the Contemner after re-thought to the matter does not wish to press this said show cause filed earlier.
(5) That the Contemner is an employee of this Hon’ble Court having served this Hon’ble court for long number of years and has the highest regard and reverence for the orders passed by this Hon’ble Court and sincerely believes in the majesty of law and dignity of this Hon’ble Court.
(6) That the Contemner prays for unqualified apology for any act of omission and commission on his part being the subject-matter or this proceeding.
39. Sri Ganesh Prasad Singh, Sri Rajendra Prasad Singh, learned Senior Counsel and also a number of other learned Counsel including Sri Phulendra Kumar prayed to implead them either in their own individual capacity or as representatives of the Bar stating that reckless allegations have been made against the Bar which are all false and that the Contemner himself is corrupt. The Contemner expressed regrets and apologised to the Bar and the matter was treated as closed by the Bar.
40. The question now is as to what we should do with the Contemner. The unqualified apology came only amidst judgment and not at the earliest. Today the Contemner prays to accept his additional show cause and his unqualified apology supported by his affidavit. Remembering the words ‘better Jate than never’ and what Shakespeare said in Othello through Iago (Act 111 Seene III) ‘I humbly do beseach you of our pardon’ treating it to be a sincere, but not to be tremed as a precedent, we close this unfortunate chapter and discharge the Rule.
41. Before we part, we hope and trust that now any order/direction passed by any Bench will not be disregarded on the ground as alleged by the Contemner reminding that Judicial Orders/Directions cannot be disregarded in preference to any verbal or written executive instructions. We also direct the Registrar to apprise the Bench of any change in regard to its Subjects to avoid any one’s embarassment. We also clarify that as the subjects arc vivid and some topics over lap each other, it would be appropriate for the office to apprise the Bench by indicating in writing while placing the cases through an office notes.