JUDGMENT
P. K. Mukherjee, J.
1. The continuance of the departmental proceedings simultaneously with the criminal trial initiated on the basis of the first information report, dated 23rd June, 1987, against the writ petitioner, Amarendra Nath Pan, has been challenged in the instant writ petition.
2. At the time of admission of the writ petition, it appears that A.K.. Sengupta, J., issued civil order, together with interim order in terms of prayer (d) of the writ petition, which is set out hereinbelow:
“(d) Ad-interim order of injunction restraining the respondents from continuing with the domestic enquiries initiated against the petitioner in terms of the letters issued by the respondent No. 2 on 2nd July, 1987 and 12th October, 1987, and/or any other domestic enquiry relating to the charges in the criminal proceedings, being C.B.I., S.P.E. Calcutta Case No. R.C. 40 of 1987, till the disposal of the said criminal proceedings”.
3. Thereafter, on 16th May, 1988, the writ petition was mentioned for “early hearing” at the instance of both the parties and the writ petition was heard from time to time.
4. It is the case of the writ petitioner that he was appointed as “chief cashier” of United Commercial Bank, now UCO Bank, at its Bagri branch on 6th March, 1971. From 1971 to 1987, the petitioner had been discharging the duties as “chief cashier” of the said branch, without any difficulty. In the course of discharging function as “chief cashier” the petitioner was transferred to the office of the Divisional Manager, West Bengal Division III at 96, Deshpran Sasmal Road, Howrah. While he was working in the said office, the Divisional Manager, West Bengal, Division III (hereinafter referred to as the disciplinary authority) served the petitioner with a letter, dated 2nd July, 1987, informing that it was proposed to hold “an enquiry”, against the petitioner, under regulation 6 of the UCO Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 (hereinafter, referred to as the “said regulation”). Statement of allegations and the charges framed on the basis of the said allegation was also enclosed along with the said letter and the petitioner was directed to submit written statement of his defence within ten days from the receipt of the said letter. On receipt of the said letter and the enclosure, the petitioner wrote back to the disciplinary authority, generally denying the four articles of charges enclosed with the letter, dated 2nd July, 1987. However, the petitioner in his reply submitted that inasmuch as the charges involved matters relating to accounts maintained more than three years ago, it was not possible for the petitioner to file written statement in defence merely from memory and he prayed for inspection of all relevant documents relating to the said four charges. The petitioner, thereafter, requested that he should be supplied with the certified copy of the UCO Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976, for the said purpose and he should be allowed opportunity to inspect all relevant documents to be relied on, by the bank in support of the statement of allegations. The petitioner also prayed for appointment of “a lawyer” for his defence before the disciplinary authority and submitted that unless such inspection is made available, the petitioner will not be in a position to defend his case. True copies of the said letters have been annexed as Annexures “A” and “B” to the present writ petition.
5. By the letter, dated 10th July, 1987, the petitioner was informed by the disciplinary authority that it had been decided to hold a “domestic enquiry” in respect of the charges against the petitioner and that the petitioner would be given an opportunity to inspect the documents, on the basis of which the charge-sheet had been framed, when the proceedings wo uld be started by appropriate enquiring Officer.
6. In the meantime, the petitioner was arrested on 14th July, 1987, in connection with C.B.I., S.P.E. Calcutta Case No. R.C. 40 of 1987, initiated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment, Calcutta branch, against the petitioner, on the basis of the first information report, under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 5(2) and Section 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.
7. Subsequently, the petitioner was “released on bail” and on 21st September, 1987, while the petitioner was attending the Office of Central Bureau of Investigation, Special Police Establishment, Calcutta branch, he was served with a copy of a letter, dated 24th July, 1987, written by the disciplinary authority, being respondent No. 2, informing the petitioner that, inasmuch as the aforesaid criminal proceedings had been initiated against the petitioner, and in connection with which, the petitioner had been remanded in police/jail custody with effect from 14th July, 1987, it had been decided by the disciplinary authority to place the petitioner “under suspension” with “retrospective effect” from 15th July, 1987, under regulations 12(1)(b) and 12(2)(a) of the UCO Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline arid Appeal) Regulations, 1976.
8. In paragraph 10 of the writ petition, the petitioner has categorically stated that by simultaneous holding of the domestic enquiry during the pendency of the criminal trial, the petitioner would be compelled to disclose his defence, which he intends to use in the criminal trial, since the charges on which the domestic enquiry is based, are the same as those in the criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the petitioner has expressed his apprehension that the petitioner would be seriously prejudiced, if the criminal proceedings which are pending at the stage of investigation and no charge-sheet has been issued at the time of moving of the writ petition (subsequently charge-sheet has been issued during hearing of the writ petition) would give an unfair advantage to the prosecution, which is not intended in a criminal trial.
9. In short, the petitioner tried to make out a case of double jeopardy within the meaning of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, which runs as follows:
“Article 20(3): No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
10. Mr. Altamas Kabir, appearing in support of the writ petitioner has placed strong reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan, reported in : 1960 (1) LLJ 520. It appears that the said decision arises out of a proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the same arose in the matter of not granting approval under Section 33(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In the said case, analysing the facts available before their Lordships, the Supreme Court observed as follows:
“We may, however, add that if the case is of a grave nature or involves questions
of fact or law, which are not simple, it would be advisable for the employer to await the decision of the trial court,
so that the defence of the employee in the criminal case may not be prejudiced”.
The said view has been followed by the Supreme Court in the case of Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen 1966 (2) LLJ 602. In paragraph 9 of the said judgment, their Lordships observed as follows:
“There is yet another point which remains to be considered. The Industrial Tribunal appears to have taken the view that since criminal proceedings had been started against Raghavan, the domestic enquiry should have been stayed pending the final disposal of the said criminal proceedings. As this court has held in the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan 1960- 61 19 FJR 183 : 1960 (1) LLJ 520 it is desirable that if the incident giving rise to a charge framed against a workman in a domestic enquiry is being tried in a criminal court, the employer should stay the domestic enquiry pending the final disposal of a criminal case”.
11. Mr. Hirak Mitra, appearing for the bank, has strongly placed reliance on a judgment of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Ramu Bahadoor v. Tungabhadra Sugar Works (P) Ltd. 1980 57 FJR 25. The learned Single Judge of that Court, in dealing with a revision petition under the Code of Civil Procedure and propriety of grant of injunction, in terms of Order 39 Rules I and 2 of the Code, had considered as to whether parallel proceedings during the enquiry of the criminal trial, on the same charge are competent. It appears from the said decision that the decision in the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills : 1960 (1) LLJ 520 and another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jang Bahadur Singh v. Baij Nath Tewari 1969 (1) LLJ 567 has been taken into consideration. In that case, the plaintiff having filed a suit attempted to restrain the defendant by means of a permanent injunction from proceeding with the departmental enquiry until the termination of the criminal proceedings, being C.C. No. 1 of 1978 on the file of the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shimoga. The case of the plaintiff was that if during the pendency of, the criminal trial, the plaintiff is put to the necessity of facing a parallel departmental enquiry, the defence, in the criminal trial would be disclosed in the departmental enquiry and development of such a situation would jeopardise his defence in the criminal trial. The learned Judge appears not to have accepted the said contention in the facts of that case.
Mr. Mitra next submitted that the criminal trial might take years to conclude the hearing, as the Central Bureau of Investigation might take much time in presenting the case and the case may be delayed for want of presiding Officer in the Special Court, and as such, it is desirable that this Court should not interfere with the departmental proceedings, which also involve some other materials, apart from the charge-sheet submitted in the criminal trial.
12. At the hearing, a copy of the charge-sheet which has been submitted by the Central Bureau of Investigation has been submitted in court and forms a part of the writ petition.
13. Mr. Mitra tried to analyse that there are some other materials, other than the four charges, in the departmental proceedings, which did not form part of the charge-sheet and, as such, the departmental authorities should be given green signal to proceed with the departmental enquiry and this Court may not interfere with the same.
14. Mr. Mitra referred to the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the bank and submitted that the charges are simple and, as such, the respondents should not wait till the final conclusion of the criminal trial.
15. On being enquired into by the Court, by Mr. Mitra appearing for the bank authori-
ties, of course, could not satisfy the court as to why, the departmental proceedings shquld not wait till finalisation of the criminal trial, as, in view of the accepted principles of law, in the event the writ petitioner is convicted in the Special Court, in that event, the writ petitioner would be automatically dismissed and/or removed from service, without taking recourse to formalities in the departmental proceedings and, in the alternative, if the criminal case fails for want of evidence, by order of discharge and not acquittal, in that event also, the departmental authorities would be entitled to proceed with the departmental enquiry, even after passing of such order of discharge by the criminal court, as, according to this Court, none of the decisions of the Supreme Court cited from the Bar had the occasion to decide the matter from the said angle, but proceeded only with the view that it would be desirable to stay the departmental enquiry, as the defence of the delinquent might be exposed.
16. In reply, Mr. Kabir has referred to a decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta, in the case of Abdullais Khan v. State of West Bengal reported in 1986 Services Law Reporter (3) page 16, wherein the Members of the Tribunal in paragraphs 33 and 34 of the judgment, after following the case of Khushi Ram v. Union of India reported in 1974 L.I.C. 553, quoted the law, which is set out hereinbelow:
“Their Lordships, in the interest of fair play observed that it is expedient to stay the departmental enquiry pending criminal proceeding”.
17. It appears, that in the case before the Tribunal, the learned Government Pleader was called upon to submit any authority expressing a contrary view, but no authority was cited. As such, the learned Members of the Tribunal were inclined to follow the said authority in Khusi Ram’s case , 1974 L.I.C. 553.
18. After having heard the parties at length and having considered the cases cited from the Bar, in my opinion, the respondent-bank authorities will be getting opportunity to start the departmental proceedings in the event, the criminal proceedings end in an order of discharge.
As such, in my view, it would not be expedient for both the parties to proceed with the departmental enquiry and thereby squandering money of the public sector bank, as the investigation and trial has already commenced at the instance of Central Bureau of Investigation and charge-sheet has been submitted which has been disclosed during the hearing of this case before me.
Accordingly, in my opinion, it would be just and proper to direct the Inspector, Central Bureau of Investigation, to expedite the criminal case, as soon as possible, without taking any adjournment and it is also desired that the writ petitioner will co-operate in the matter, without taking any unnecessary adjournments, so that the trial may be concluded at an early date.
However, during the pendency of the criminal trial, the respondent-bank authorities will be restrained from proceeding further with the departmental enquiry, against the petitioner, in terms of the charge-sheet, referred to, in the writ petition.
The writ petition is thus disposed of. There will be no order as to costs.
19. As prayed for, operation of this judgment shall remain stayed for a period of four weeks in order to enable the respondent-bank authorities to have the proposition tested in the Court of Appeal, subject to the continuance of the interim order granted by Ajit Kumar Sengupta J, at the time of admission of the writ petition.