JUDGMENT
Ranjan Gogoi, J.
1. This Writ Appeal, at the instance of the writ petitioners, seeks to assail the validity of the order dated 17.3.1997 passed by the learned single Judge rejecting the writ application filed and refusing to interfere with the order impugned in the writ proceedings.
2. The facts in brief may be noted at the outset. The writ petition giving rise to the present writ appeal had been originally filed by one Maisnam Ibomcha Singh in a representative capacity on behalf of the villagers of Thangtek Village. On his death, the present appellants were substituted, such substitution having been allowed by this court by order dated 20.1.1984.
By an order dated 27th November, 1978 (Annexure-A/8 to the writ petition) an area of land measuring 14.05 acres covered by C. S. Dag No. 1 and 52 of Village No. 90 Thangtek was divested from the village grazing ground and thereafter, in exercise of power conferred by Section 14(2) of the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The aforesaid area of 14.05 acres of land was allotted in favour of the respondent No. 2 for agriculture purposes. The validity of the said order was challenged by the appellants on a number of grounds and such challenge was negated by the learned single Judge by the impugned Judgment and order dated 17.3.1997. In negating the aforesaid challenge, the learned single Judge took the view that under the provisions of Section 14(2)(a) of the Act, as the State Government was competent to allot government land for the purpose of industries or any purposes of public utility, allotment of land to the respondent society for agricultural purposes must be understood to be for a purpose of public utility. The learned single Judge on the said basis thought it proper to hold that no infirmity could be attached to the order impugned and consequently, the writ petition deserved dismissal. The validity of the aforesaid order is under challenge in the present proceedings.
3. We have heard Mr. A. Nilamani Singh, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants and Mr. Kh. Nimaichand, learned Government Advocate. None has appeared on behalf of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in spite of due service of notices.
4. Mr. A. Nilamani Singh, learned Sr. Counsel for the appellants, in support of the challenge made in the present appeal, by relying on the provisions of Section 13 of the Act read with the provisions contained in Rules 9 to 13 of the Rules framed under the Act, has contended that the power of reservation of Government land for grazing purposes is vested in the Deputy Commissioner to be exercised by following the provisions laid down in Rules 9 to 13. Divestment/Derequisition of such land is contemplated under Rule 14 of the Rules, which power is again vested in the Deputy Commissioner. The power to derequisition, it is contended, has to be exercised by following the provisions of Rules 9 to 13 in view of Rule 14. In the instant case, the procedure prescribed for divestment was not followed. Besides, it is contended that the impugned order ex facie would go to show that sanction for divestment of the land from the area reserved for grazing ground was granted by the State Government. According to the learned counsel, the provisions of the Act and Rules framed thereunder do not visualise any role of the State Government in the matter.
It has also been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the impugned order dated 17.3.1997 ex facie recites that the land in question has been allotted to the respondent society for agricultural purposes and therefore, under the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act, it is the Deputy Commissioner and not the State Government who would be competent to make allotment in question. The learned counsel has further submitted that as the statute has vested the power to make allotment of land for agricultural purposes in the Deputy Commissioner, the learned single Judge has gone clearly wrong in construing agriculture to be a purpose of public utility and on that basis in upholding the order impugned. Reliance in this regard has been placed on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Iboton Mia v. State of Manipur reported in (1983) 2 GLR (NOC) 4.
The learned counsel for the appellants has further argued that as the Thangtek Village on whose behalf the writ proceeding was instituted had been in long possession of the land, the impugned order could not have been passed to the prejudice of the village in question without affording an opportunity of hearing.
5. Controverting the submissions made on behalf of the writ appellants, Mr. Kh. Nimaichand, learned Government Advocate has argued that the learned single Judge has correctly interpreted and held agriculture to be a purpose of public utility and therefore, the State Government would be competent under Section 14(2)(a) to make the allotment in question. The procedure applicable to divestment as enjoined by the provisions of the Rules was followed in the instant case; in any case there is no material to hold that such procedure was not observed, it is argued by the learned State Counsel. It is on the aforesaid broad basis that the learned State Counsel has sought to support the order passed by the learned Single Judge as impugned in the present appeal.
6. We have considered the submissions advanced on behalf of the respective parties. As the learned single Judge has dismissed the writ petition on the solitary basis as noticed hereinabove, the tenability of the order of the learned single Judge on the reasons assigned needs to be considered at the first instance. Thereafter, if required, the other contentions advanced on behalf of the appellants may be gone into.
7. In the case of Iboton Mia v. State of Manipur reported in (1983) 2 (NOC) 4, a Division Bench of this Court while interpreting Section 14 of the Act has held that the two limbs of Section 14, i.e., Section 14(1) and Section 14(2) operates in two different fields and that when under Section 14(1) of the Act, power has been conferred upon the Deputy Commissioner to make allotment of land for the purposes specified, it would not be open for the State Government to impose any fetters on the exercise of such power.
The question, therefore, for determination would be as to whether the allotment of land for agricultural purpose would still be allotment for the purposes of public utility within the meaning of the said expression as appearing in Section 14(2)(a) of the Act. When the statute has empowered the Deputy Commissioner to make allotment of land for agricultural purposes, any allotment of land for such purposes can not be reasonably understood to be an allotment for the purpose of public utility within the meaning of the said expression, i.e., “Public Utility” as appearing under Section 14(2)(a) of the Act. The provisions of a statutory enactment has to be interpreted reasonably and the different limbs of a statutory provision mast be harmoniously construed. Each of the two limbs of Section 14 of the Act mast be given a rational meaning having regard to the expressed language used by the Legislature. To held that “agricultural purposes” as appearing in Section 14(1) of the Act would also be a purpose of public utility under Section 14(2)(a) of the Act would be to set at naught the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act. Such a coarse of interpretation rendering the expressed provisions of Section 14(1) nugatory must, in our considered opinion be avoided. We are, therefore, of the view that the expression “Public utility” appearing in Section 14(2)(a) of the Act must exclude agricultural purposes in view of the clear language of the two parts of Section 14 of the Act.
8. In view of the foregoing conclusion reached by us, we are inclined to hold that the learned single Judge has gone wrong in holding that allotment of the land in question for agricultural purposes to the respondent society would be for the purposes of public utility so as to confer power and authority in the State Government to make the allotment in question. As the allotment of land to the respondent Society was made for agricultural purposes which purpose we have already held, for the reasons indicated, not to be a purpose of public utility, we have no hesitation in allowing this writ appeal by interfering with the order dated 17.3.1997 passed by the learned single Judge. The appeal, therefore, succeeds and the order dated 17.3.1997 passed by the learned single Judge shall stand set aside. Consequently, the order dated 27.11.1987 (Annexure-A/8 to the original writ petition) shall also stand set aside and quashed.
Writ Appeal is allowed as indicated above.