JUDGMENT
S.K. Agarwal, J.
1. By this petition, under Section 439 and 482 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short
“Cr.P.C.”) read with Section 18 of Juvenile Justice Act,
1986 (hereinafter “the Act”), petitioner is seeking
quashing of the order dated 9th August, 2000 passed by
the Juvenile Justice Court, Delhi or in the alternative
bail in the case FIR No. 15/2000 under Sections
376/363/341/34 IPC P.S. Malviya Nagar.
2. Brief facts are that on 12th January, 2000
petitioner was arrested in the above noted case and was
sent to judicial custody. He moved an application that
he was less than 16 years of age and was juvenile. In
support of his submission he produced a school leaving
certificate showing his date of birth as 14th August,
1986. Prosecution contested the same. The Juvenile
Court acting under Section 32 of the Act decided to hold
an enquiry to find out whether the petitioner was
juvenile or not. Prosecution in support of its case
examined CW-1 Dr. Rajneesh Juneja, Radiologist, HRH
Hospital who deposed that he had examined the X-ray.
plates of the petitioner which were taken for the
purpose of determining his bone age and opined that his
age is between 18 to 21 years. The petitioner examined
CW-2 Kallan, Asstt. Teacher, from Prathmik Vidhlaya,
Fatehpur, U.P. who produced the school record and
stated that on 31st July, 1991 the petitioner was
admitted in the school and his date of birth was
recorded as 14th August, 1986. His name was removed
from the school on 9th May, 1996 and he proved the
school leaving certificate. Petitioner has also
examined CW-3, his father, who stated that his age was
around 50-60 years; that he has 7 children (5 daughters
and 2 sons), and that petitioner is his youngest child.
However, he was not able to tell the date of birth of
any of his children. He only stated that petitioner was
born before a day of Independence Day. He did not
remember the date of birth or the age of the petitioner
and stated that the school teacher had written the date
of birth of the petitioner on admission form himself and
he had only put his signatures on the admission form.
On the basis of the above material, the learned court,
rejected the contention of the petitioner that he was
less than 16 years of age and held:
“However, in the present case, there is
enough material throwing doubt on the
entries in the school record. The
admission form is signed by the father of
the delinquent but he has stated that he
does not know the age or the date of
birth of the delinquent. When asked, he
stated that year was mentioned by the
school teacher himself while filling up
the admission form of the delinquent. He
further stated that he only singed on the
admission form and rest of the form was
filled by the school teacher. He has
clearly stated in the court that he did
not tell the date of birth in the school
and it was written by the school teacher
himself. As the school teacher himself
has written the date of birth as per the
father of the delinquent, therefore, the
same can not be believed as it is also
not the defense of the delinquent that
the school teacher was related to him.
It seems that the father of the
delinquent knew only to sign and is not
aware of the date of birth or the age of
any of his children. Therefore, he only
signed the admission form and rest of the
details were filled up by the teacher.
In these circumstances, the date of birth
as mentioned in the school register
cannot be believed as the same was not
filled up by the parents himself neither
the same has been stated to the teacher
by the father. The teacher has stated
the year himself.”
Revision petition filed by the petitioner
against the said order was dismissed by the Addl.
Session Judge. This order has been challenged before
this court.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that
while determining the age of a child the liberal
approach should be adopted and that the evidence of CW-1
Dr. Rajneesh Juneja is only an opinion evidence and it
could not be preferred over the date of birth recorded
in the School showing his date of birth. He argued that
petitioner’s father Mr. Matroo is an illiterate person
and merely because he was not able to give the date of
birth of the petitioner or of his other children could
be the ground for preferring the opinion/evidence of
doctor over the school leaving certificate. In support
of his submission reliance was placed on the Supreme
Court’s decision in Bhoop Singh v. State of U.P., 1989
SCC (Cr.) 486 and Full Bench decision of the Patna High
Court in in Krishna Bhagwan v. State of Bihar, 1991
CRI.L.J. 1283. Learned APP for the State argued to the
contrary.
4. I have considered the rival contentions.
There can be no dispute about the principles of law laid
down by the Supreme Court. In this case, entries in the
school leaving certificate were not rejected merely on
the ground that parents understate the age of the
children at the time of admission to School, but on
different grounds. The Juvenile court on the basis of
the material on record appreciated the evidence and
declined to accept the evidence of the father of the
petitioner. The reasoning adopted by the Court while
rejecting entries in the School Leaving Certificate is
in accordance with the well established principles of
law. I find no illegality or impropriety in the
impugned order so as to warrant interference at this
stage. Facts of the judgments relied upon by learned
counsel for the petitioner were entirely different which
are not applicable to the facts of case at hand. The
contention of the petitioner that he was a juvenile is
therefore rejected.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner also argued
that assuming the petitioner is not a juvenile; he is a
young boy of impressionable age; after completion of
investigations, challan has already been filed; that
petitioner has a good case on merits and there is every
likelihood of his being acquitted; if he remains in the
company of hard-core criminals in Jail, his entire life
may be spoiled, therefore, he be released on bail. He
is in custody for more than two years. The Learned APP
for the State does not contest these facts.
6. In the facts and the circumstances of this
case, petitioner is ordered to be released on bail on
his furnishing personal bond in the sum of Rs. 10,000/-
with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction
of the trial court.
7. Petition stands disposed of.