ORDER
1. Since the above appeals arise out of a common order and a common question of law arises for consideration in all the appeals they are taken up together and disposed of by a single order. The above appeals have been filed in pursuance of the order of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in W.P. No. 9853/81 giving the appellants a right of filing the appeals within 4 weeks from the date of the order of the Writ Petition viz 4-11-1986. The appellants herein are small scale units manufacturing goods falling under Item 68 of the Central Excise Tariff. The appellants claimed benefit under Notification No. 176/77, dated 13-6-1977 on the ground that the value of the Plant and Machinery installed in the respective industrial units of the appellants did not in each case exceed Rs. 10 lakhs as provided for in the notification and that the value of the goods cleared for home consumption from the industrial unit of the each of the appellants did not exceed Rs. 30 lakhs during the preceding financial year. It is not disputed before us that if the aforesaid conditions are satisfied the appellants would be entitled to the benefit in terms of the said notification totally exempting the goods. The only question that arises for consideration before us in the batch of appeals is whether the appellants can be said to be manufacturers within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (Act for short) so as to claim benefit under the notification referred to supra or whether the suppliers of raw materials hereinafter referred to as Customers on whose behalf and on whose account the appellants manufactured and cleared the goods falling under T.I. 68 can be said to be manufacturers within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Act.
2. Shri Tamizhmani, the learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that the appellants are independent manufactures and merely because they manufactured goods according to the specifications of the suppliers of the raw material the customers they would not be ceased to be manufacturers within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Act. The learned Counsel submitted that the issue is no longer res integra and is covered by number of judicial pronouncements. The learned counsel placed reliance on the Division Bench Ruling of the Madras High Court in the case of Paragaon Industries, Trichy and Ors. v. Asstt. Collector of Central Excise, Trichy in W.P. No. 2185/77 and connected Writ Petitions decided on 6-1-1981 wherein the Division Bench of the Madras High Court has taken the view that the fact that the goods were manufactured on behalf of the customers would have no relevance to construe the notification referred to supra. The learned Counsel also placed reliance on the ruling of the Special Bench, CEGAT, New Delhi in the case of Mahavir Metal Industries, Bombay v. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay reported in 1987(28) E.L.T. 85 (Tribunal) and also on another Special Bench ruling of CEGAT, New Delhi in the case of Techma Engineering Enterprise, Calcutta v. Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta reported in 1987(27) E.L.T. 460 (Tribunal).
3. The learned DR contended that inasmuch as the appellants manufactured and cleared the goods only on behalf of and on account of raw material suppliers who are the customers, the appellants cannot be said to be manufacturers within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the Act and the learned DR placed reliance on the ratio of the ruling of the Special Bench of the CEGAT in the case of H. Guru Instruments (Pvt.) Ltd., Calcutta v. Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta reported in 1986(8) E.T.R. 665 and contended that the status of the appellants is no better than that of hired labour and it is not disputed that the appellants received only job charges for the goods manufactured by them. The learned DR therefore submitted that the appellants would not be entitled to the benefits of the notification in question as a small scale unit since they are not the manufacturers. The learned DR placed reliance in the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Bajrang Gopilal Gajabi v. M.N. Balkundri and Ors. 1986(25) E.L.T. 609 (S.C.) and contended that the raw material suppliers are in reality the owners of the goods manufactured by the appellants.
4. We have carefully considered the submissions made by both the parties. It is not disputed before us that if the appellants are considered to be manufacturers of the goods in question they would satisfy the conditions envisaged by the exemption notification referred to supra in respect of the goods manufactured and cleared by them. The only point on which the department joins the issue with the appellant is that the appellants are not manufacturers at all within the meaning of Section 2(f) and therefore the question of their being entitled to any exemption in terms of the aforesaid notification would not arise since the total clearances of the appellants should be deemed to be the clearances of the raw material suppliers and would not qualify for to the benefit of any exemption notification at all. We are not inclined to accept the plea of the learned DR that the appellants are not manufacturers within the meaning of Section 2(f) with reference to the goods manufactured and cleared by them. It is not the case of the department that the appellants who are independent manufacturers were mere surrogates of the raw material suppliers or that the appellants were set up as mere dummies by the raw material suppliers. It is not the case of the department either that the appellants herein are the agents of the raw material suppliers nor can it be disputed that the dealings between the raw material suppliers and the appellants are on principal to principal basis. The very fact that the appellants manufactured the goods on the raw materials supplied by the various customers and according to their specifications would not ipso facto either make the appellants the agents of the raw material suppliers or their nominees. The ratio of the Division Bench ruling of the Madras High Court referred to supra and the other decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellants would clearly bear out that it is the appellants who are manufacturers of the goods in question and not the raw material suppliers. We also find that the Special Bench, CEGAT, New Delhi comprising 3 learned Members in the case of Metal Box India Limited, Calcutta v. Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta has dealt with a similar issue and has held that mere supply of raw material to the appellants with specifications regarding the nature of the goods to be manufactured would not make the raw material suppliers the manufacturers of the goods in question. The ruling of the Supreme Court relied upon by the learned DR has no relevance to the facts and circumstances of this case because that was a case where the Supreme Court upheld the finding of the High Court which observed :
“These particulars and details go to show that there was clear and cogent evidence on the record of the department to enable the assessing authorities to make inferential findings that the transactions of alleged sale of yarn by Tejpal to the powerloom owners and the transactions of alleged purchase of cloth by the petitioner from the powerloom owners were camouflage for the petitioner to get powerloom cloth manufactured by himself by employing powerloom of the power-loom owners”.
As we stated earlier it is not the case of the department that the appellants are the dummies or the agents of the raw material suppliers. Likewise the ruling reported in l986(8) ETR 665 in the case of H. Guru Instruments (Pvt.) Ltd., Calcutta v. Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta relied upon by the learned DR is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case because that was a case where the finding had been reached that the manufacture and sale was not “on principal to principal basis but one unit employing another unit on hired labour basis”. In the instant case it cannot be gain-said that there is absolutely no connection whatever between the two units namely The units supplying the raw material and the appellants who are manufacturing finished goods. Therefore on consideration of the facts and circumstances of this case in relation to the goods manufactured by the appellants and following the ratio decided in the various ruling referred to supra we are inclined to hold that the appellants were entitled to the benefits of the notification cited supra and in this view of the matter the respective impugned orders appealed against are set aside and the appeals are allowed.