ORDER
1. This is an application filed under S. 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings in C.C. No. 3 on the File of the Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad.
2. The 1st petitioner is ‘Udayam’ a Telugu Daily, represented by its Chairman Sri. Dasari Narayana Rao. The 2nd petitioner is M/s. Tharakaprabhu Publishers (Pvt) Ltd. Printers & Publishers, represented by its Managing Director Sri. K. Ramakrishna Prasad. The 3rd petitioner is Sri. Dasari Narayana Rao, Chairman, ‘Udayam’ and the 5th respondent is Sri Kondapally Ramakrishna Prasad, Managing Director of the 2nd petitioner-concern.
3. The facts that give rise to this petition may be briefly stated. A news item appeared in “Udayam” Telugu daily dt. 24-3-1985 the contents of which refer to an alleged raid of the house of a senior A.P.S.R.T.C. Officer by C.B.I. Officials on 9-3-1985, and seizure of Rupees Two crores of black money, two K.Gs. of gold and a costly diamond necklace and this revealed by the close associates of the said Officer, who also said that some people having got their work done by the officer must have presented the diamond necklace to the officer’s wife. The news item further reads that since the officer was camping at Delhi to hush up the affair one has to believe that there was a raid. These close circles of the officer also revealed that the said officer is a close associate of Telugu Desam Party leaders and he is also playing a prominent role in establishing Bharata Desam Party and therefore the C.B.I. party raided his house and that these close circles believe that there will be further raids on the houses of other officers who are supporting Telugu Desam Party and also on the houses of the officers belonging to the Central cadre. One Sri. P. S. Ramamohan Rao, I.P.S. who holds the rank of a Special Inspector General of Police and who is functioning as the Vice Chairman and Managing Director of the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, a Government of Andhra Pradesh undertaking, being convinced that the news item refers to him only, felt that the same was defamatory and also got a legal notice issued. The Government of Andhra Pradesh accorded sanction in G.O.Rt. No. 3644, G.A.D. dt. 30-8-1985 under S. 199(2) Cr.P.C. and authorised Sri. P. Seethapathi who was appointed as Special Public Prosecutor to file a complaint. Accordingly the complaint was filed against the petitioners herein for offences punishable under sections 120-B, 500 and 501, IPC and the same was taken on file by the Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad and numbered as C.C. 3 of 1985 and the same is sought to be quashed in this petition.
4. The main submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the complaint filed by the Special Public Prosecutor under the provisions of S. 199(2) Cr.P.C is not maintainable and the Metropolitan Sessions Court ought not to have taken cognizance of the case. According to the learned counsel the officer of the A.P.S.R.T.C. is not a “public servant employed in connection with the affairs” of the State of Andhra Pradesh and therefore the provisions of S. 199(2) Cr.P.C. cannot be invoked by the State Government and that the only remedy available to the public servant is to file a private complaint before the Magistrate.
5. Sub-section (2) of S. 199 Cr.P.C. is a kind of exception to the general rule that only a person aggrieved by the defamatory statement should be permitted to move the court for redress. The relevant provisions of S. 199 read thus :
“199. Prosecution for defamation :-
(1) xx xx xx xx xx xx
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Code, when any offence falling under Chapter XXI of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) is alleged to have been committed against a person who at the time of such commission, is the President of India, the Vice-President of India, the Governor of a State, the Administrator of a Union Territory or a Minister of the Union or of a State or of a Union Territory, or any other public servant employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State in respect of his conduct in the discharge of his public functions, a Court of Session may take cognizance of such offence, without the case being committed to it, upon a complaint in writing made by the Public Prosecutor.
(3) Every complaint referred to in sub-section (2) shall set forth the facts which constitute the offence alleged, the nature of such offence and such other particulars as are reasonably sufficient to give notice to the accused of the offence alleged to have been committed by him.
(4) No complaint under sub-section (2) shall be made by the Public Prosecutor except with the previous sanction –
(a) of the State Government, in the case of a person who is or has been the Governor of that State or a Minister of that Government;
(b) of the State Government in the case of any other public servant employed in connection with the affairs of the State.
(c) of the Central Government in any other case.
(5) No Court of Session shall take cognizance of an offence under sub-section (2) unless the complaint is made within six months from the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed.
(6) Nothing in this section shall affect the right of the person against whom the offence is alleged to have been committed, to make a complaint in respect of that offence before a Magistrate having jurisdiction or the power of such magistrate to take cognizance of the offence upon such complaint.”
6. A careful reading of sub-section (2) shows that it applies only to specified class of public servants employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or State and it provides for a special procedure for the trial of a category of offences of defamation in respect of their conduct in the discharge of public functions. The object underlying this provision is to save a public servant from the embarassment in respect of a defamatory statement or publication made against him in the discharge of his public duties. Under this section, the Public Prosecutor can make a complaint, but that shall be with the previous sanction of the State Government, and upon such complaint being made the Court of Session has to take cognizance of the offence. In the instant case a complaint is made by the Special Public Prosecutor as per the sanction accorded by the State Government, but what the learned counsel submits is that in the instant case, the Vice-Chairman and Managing Director of the A.P.S.R.T.C. is not a “public servant employed in connection with the affairs of the State.” It is submitted that the Corporation is a statutory Corporation and is not a branch or a department of the State Government and the Corporation is a separate legal entity an officer of the Corporation, therefore, according to the learned counsel, cannot be said to have been employed in connection with the affairs of State and hence S. 199(2) Cr.P.C. cannot be invoked. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the petitioners relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Kondala v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation wherein it is observed :
“Though under the provisions of the Act, the State Government has some control, it cannot be said either legally or factually that the State Road Transport Corporation, which is a body corporate having a perpetual succession and common seal, is a department of the State Govt.”
In Public Prosecutor, Angole v. A. H. Dara (1979) 1 Andh LT 227 : (1980 Cri LJ 377) a learned single Judge of this court held that a Block Development Officer of a Panchayat Samithi a body corporate, is not a person who can be said to be employed in connection with the affairs of the State at the relevant time and therefore S. 199(2) is not attracted. In State of Punjab v. Raja Ram , the Supreme Court held that the Food Corporation of India is an autonomous body capable of acquiring holding and disposing of property and having the power of contract, and is not a Government department. In S. S. Dhanoa v. Delhi Municipality : their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that “the term” ‘corporation’ is wide enough to include private corporations. But in the context of Cl.(12) of S. 21 of the Penal Code, the expression ‘corporation’ must be given a narrow legal connotation, and means a corporation created by the Legislature and not a body or society brought into existence by an act of a group of individuals.” Their Lordships also observed :
“A Government employee working on deputation in a co-operative society, can by no stretch of imagination be said to be employed in connection with the affairs of the Union within the meaning of S. 197 Cr.P.C.”
In State of Gujarat v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal a question arose whether the members of the Gujarat Panchayat Service are Government servants. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed thus :
“We do not propose and indeed it is neither politic nor possible to lay down any definitive test to determine when a person may be said to hold a civil post under the Government. Several factors may indicate the relationship of master and servant. None may be conclusive. On the other hand, no single factor may be considered absolutely essential. The presence of all or some of the factors, such as the right to select for appointment, the right to appoint, the right to terminate the employment and the right to take other disciplinary action, the right to prescribe the conditions of service the nature of the duties performed by the employee, the right to control the employee’s manner and method of the work, the right to issue directions and the right to determine and the source from which wages or salary are paid and a host of such circumstances may have to be considered to determine the existence of the relationship of master and servant. In each case, it is a question of fact whether a person is a servant of the State or not.”
7. Relying on the above decisions, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation does not come within the meaning of “State” and therefore the concerned public servant in this case cannot be said to be “employed in connection with the affairs of the State.” I see no force in this submission. The expression “State” is given a wider connotation. In Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India it is observed :
“But ordinarily where a corporation is established by statute, it is autonomous in its working subject only to a provision often times made, that it shall be bound by any directions that may be issued from time to time by Government in respect of policy matters. So also a Corporation incorporated under law is managed by a Board of Directors or committee of management in accordance with the provisions of the statute under which it is incorporated. When does such a corporation become an instrumentality or agency of Government ? Is the holding of the entire share capital of the Corporation by Government enough or is it necessary that in addition, there should be certain amount of direct control exercised by Government and, if so what should be nature of such control ? Should the functions which the Corporation is charged to carry out possess any particular characteristic or feature, or is the nature of the functions immaterial ? Now, one thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the Corporation is held by Government it would be a long way towards indicating that the Corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government. But, as is quite often the case the Corporation established by statute may have no share or shareholders in which case it would be a relevant factor to consider whether the administration is in the hands of a Board of Directors appointed by Government though this consideration also may not be determinative, because even where the directors are appointed by Government, they may be completely free from Governmental control in the discharge of their functions.”
In Biharilal v. Roshan Lal, their Lordships of the Supreme court pointed out as follows :
“The true test of determination of the said question depends upon the degree of control the Government has over it, the extent of control exercised by the several other bodies or committees over it and their composition, the degree of its dependence on Government for its financial needs and the functional aspect, namely, whether the body is discharging any important Governmental functions or just some function which is merely optional from the point of view of Government.”
8. The A.P. State Road Transport Corporation is a statutory corporation established under the provisions of the Road Transport Corporation Act 1950. Section 5 of this Act lays down that the general superintendence direction and management of the affairs and business of a Corporation shall vest in a Board of Directors which, with the assistance of its committees and Managing Director may exercise all such powers and do all such acts and things as may be exercised or done by the Corporation. The State Government has power to appoint one of the Directors as Vice-Chairman of the Board. Section 5(2) of the said Act lays down that the Board shall consist of a Chairman and such other Directors being not less than five and not more than seventeen, as the State Government may think fit to appoint. Section 8 empowers the Government to remove from the office the Chairman or any other Director of the Corporation who incurs some disqualifications. These and other provisions of the said Act go to show that the Government has control and for all purposes it has been well recognised and accepted that the A.P.S.R.T.C. comes within the meaning of “State”. Even otherwise, the establishment of A.P.S.R.T.C. naturally comes within the meaning of the affairs of the State inasmuch as it is a Corporation created by the Government. The word “affairs” is of wider connotation and covers all the activities of the State. In N. N. Pillai v. P. V. R. Kutty Menon, (1979) 2 APLJ (HC) 269 the meaning of the expression “affairs of the Union” has been considered by the Division Bench of which I was a member. There the question arose whether the sanction under S. 197(1)(a) was necessary for prosecuting a Central Government employee deputed to work with the Food Corporation of India, for defamation. The Bench held that expression “affairs of the Union” cannot be given a restrictive connotation and it is of wide import. It is also held that the Food Corporation of India is very much an affair of the Union and all the activities of the Food Corporation of India in all its details are the affairs of the Union and that an employee of the Central Government whose services were lent to the Food Corporation of India, was a “Public Servant and while giving a statement he was discharging an official duty which was connected with the affairs of the Union. The decision of this Division Bench provides a complete answer to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners. In Padmavathamma v. A.P.S.R.T.C., (1978) 2 Andh WR 559 a Division Bench of this court held that the A.P. State Road Corporation is a statutory corporation brought into existence by the Andhra Pradesh State for public interest and that the Andhra Pradesh State Government alone has got full control over it. Therefore, the A.P. State Road Transport Corporation also is a Corporation created under the Statute by the Government and such a Corporation is an affair of the State and the concerned public servant who is a senior I.P.S. Officer appointed as the vice-chairman of the A.P. State Road Transport Corporation is definitely a public servant employed in connection with the affair of the State within the meaning of S. 199(2) Cr.P.C. and hence the said section is applicable.
9. The next submission of the learned counsel is that the complaint reads as though it is filed by the State and not by the Public Prosecutor as required under S. 199(2) and therefore the Sessions Judge ought not to have taken cognizance. I see no force in this submission. In the complaint it is simply mentioned “complaint filed under S. 199(2) Crl.P.C. by the Special Public Prosecutor.” In the cause-title it is noted :
In the court of the Metropolitan Sessions Judge at Hyderabad.
C.C. No. 3 of 1985.
Between :
The State of Andhra Pradesh rep. by Special Public Prosecutor. Complainant, and
1. “Udayam” Telugu Daily 7/1, Azamabad Industrial Area, Hyderabad-500020 represented by its Chairman Sri. Dasari Narayana Rao, 45, Bazullah Road, Madras, Tamil Nadu State.
2. M/s. Tharakaprabhu Publishers (P) Ltd. Printers & Publishers, 7/1, Azamabad Industrial Area, Hyderabad-500020 rep. by its Managing Director Sri K. Ramakrishna Prasad.
3. Sri Dasari Narayana Rao, Chairman ‘Udayam’ Telugu Daily 45, Bazullah Road, Madras Tamil Nadu State.
4. Sri A. B. K. Prasad, Editor, Udayam 7/1 Azamabad Industrial Area, Hyderabad 500020.
5. Sri Kondapally Ramakrishna Prasad, Managing Director, Tharakaprabhu Publishers (Pvt) Ltd. Begumpet, Hyderabad, Accused.”
The learned counsel perhaps relying on this cause title, submits that the State is the complainant. We have to read this cause title along with the compliant and even in the cause title also it is mentioned that the State represented by the Special Public Prosecutor is the complainant and the description is quite accurate.
10. One other submission of the learned counsel is that what all that is mentioned in the news item is that the C.B.I. has raided the house of an officer of the A.P. State Road Transport Corporation and that such a raid is not connected in any way in the discharge of his public functions. Therefore, the learned counsel submits that the publication of the news item does not amount to an offence committed against the public servant in respect of his conduct in discharge of his public functions. But this overlooks the fact that the raid by the C.B.I. people can only be in respect of a public servant and necessarily in connection with his public functions. Therefore, the news item mentioning the raid and other particulars which, according to the officer, is false, has been made only against the public servant in respect of his conduct in discharging public functions. What is more, in the news item it is also mentioned that the said public servant is camping at Delhi to hush up the matter. Therefore, it cannot be said that the publication regarding the alleged raid is not in respect of the public servant and his conduct in the discharge of his public functions.
11. The last submission is that even if all the allegations in the compliant are true, still there is no case whatsoever against A-3 and therefore the proceedings should be quashed at least so far as he is concerned. The 3rd accused is the Chairman of ‘Udayam’ telugu daily. Under the provisions of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, it is the printer and publisher that are mainly responsible for any publication. Section 5 of the said Act provides for making Rules as to publication of newspapers and the printer and publisher have to make a declaration by appearing in person or by agent in accordance with the rules, before a District or sub-divisional Magistrate in whose local jurisdiction the newspaper is to be printed and published. Section 7 as well as other provisions of the said Act and the rules made under the said Act throw the responsibility on them and presumptions can be drawn only against them for any publication. There is no specific allegation against the 3rd petitioner, viz., the Chairman. The 3rd petitioner lives in Madras and by no means can it be said that he will be involving himself in the publication of the day to day news items. Under similar circumstances in Criminal Misc. Petn. No. 3160 of 1985 the proceedings against the Chairman are quashed by Ramanujulu Naidu, J. by his order dated 29-10-1985 (reported in 1986 Cri LJ 888). In that case also the complaint was filed against ‘Udayam’ alleging that some articles published on 15-6-1985 and on 22-6-1985 exposing the activities of the management of the Trinity Public School, Sanjeevareddy Nagar, Hyderabad are defamatory. The Chairman, viz., Sri Dasari Narayana Rao, filed the above criminal Miscellaneous petition for quashing the proceedings. The learned Judge, after referring to the provisions of the Press and Registration of Books Act 1867 held that the Chairman cannot be imputed with knowledge of the contents of the impugned articles. In Bhagat Singh v. Lachman Singh, the liability of the owner of the newspaper for publication of defamatory statement in the newspaper was considered and it is observed thus :
“The owner in order to be liable under S. 499 of the Code has to have direct responsibility for the publication of the defamatory statement and he must also have the intention to harm or knowledge or reason to believe that the imputation will harm the reputation of the person concerned. The owner of a journal has thus no responsibility under the Section. The editor of the paper, even though he might not be directly responsible for a defamatory statement published in his paper attracts the responsibility by virtue of S. 7 of the Press and Registration of Books Act by virtue of his registration as editor under the Act which registration is sufficient evidence that he was also the printer or publisher or printer and publisher of the paper concerned. The printer and publisher by virtue of their duties as such cannot of course avoid the legal liability for defamation. The owner’s liability will be attracted provided it can be shown that he was responsible for the publication with the necessary intent, knowledge or reasonable belief in the matter.”
12. The learned Additional Advocate General however submits that there is every likelihood of evidence being let in to show that the Chairman also conspired. But the compliant should contain some reasonable basis for alleging that the Chairman also is liable. But for the fact that he is the Chairman, there could not have been “general allegation against him also that they all conspired to defame the officer. As discussed above, merely because the 3rd petitioner happens to be the Chairman, he cannot be imputed with any knowledge about the publication of the defamatory statement, nor he can be made responsible for the same.
13. In the result, the proceedings against the 3rd petitioner, i.e. the 3rd accused in C.C. 3 of 1985 on the file of the Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad are quashed. The Criminal Misc. Petition is dismissed as against the remaining petitioners.
14. Order accordingly.