ORDER
M.S.A. Siddiqui, J.
1. By this petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. the petitioner seeks quashing of the criminal proceedings emanating from the complaint filed by the Food Inspector under Sections 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (for short “the Act”).
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to this petition are that on 30.10.1988, Shri S.P. Gupta, Food Inspector purchased the sample laddoors from the petitioner for analysis. At that time, the laddoors were stored in an open tray, for sale. The public analyst, to whom one of the three samples, which were prepared in conformity with the provisions of the Act and Rules framed thereunder, was sent, declared the sample as conforming to the prescribed standard but added that the permitted coaltar colour (tatrazine) was present therein. The presence of colour without a label declaration amounts to misbranding under Section 2(ix)(j) of the Act and so the petitioner was prosecuted for the offences punishable under Sections 7/16 of the Act for contravening the provisions of Rules 24 and 32 of the Rules framed under the Act. On the complaint being filed, the learned Magistrate framed a charge under Sections 7/16(1) of the Act against the petitioner. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has come up before this Court under Section 482 Cr. P.C.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that admittedly the sample was lifted from the open tray and so there was no legal obligation to make formal declaration as required by Rule 32 of the Rules framed under the Act. According to the learned counsel, normally the sweets from the open tray are purchased on the basis of the name of the sweets displayed and the consumer rarely makes any inquiry about ingredients. Therefore, considering the normal market practice that inquiry about ingredients not being resorted to, there is apparently no ground to mislead the consumer and so the petitioner cannot be charged for violating the provisions of section 2(ix)(j) of the Act and Rules 24 and 32 of the Rules framed thereunder. Thus the question is whether the tray used for displaying the laddoors for sale falls within the definition of “package” as defined in Section (x) of the Act. Section 2(x) is as under :
“Package means a box, bottle, casket, tin, barrel, case, receptacle, sack, bag, wrapper or other thing in which an article of food is placed or packed.”
4. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Sunder Dass, (1980) I Delhi 1980, this Court had occasion to consider the question whether an open container like a Bhagona falls within the definition of the word “package” and it was held that the definition of the word “package” is wide enough to take within its sweep an open container like a Bhagona. The following observation in the said judgment in contextually quotable:
“The word “package” as defined in Section 2(x) means a box, bottle, casket, tin, barrel case, receptacle, sack, bag, wrapper or other thing in which an article of food is placed or packed. This definition is wide enough to take within its sweep an open container like a Bhagona and, in our view, it is futile to argue
that Rules contained in Part VII are applicable to such food stuff as is contained in closed packets. The absence of word “closed” or “sealed” is by itself enough to repel such interpretation.”
5. Taking cue from the said decision it must be held that the definition of “package” under Section 2(x) of the Act is of wide amplitude and it embraces within its fold an open container like a tray. Admittedly, the tray from which the sample laddoors were taken had no label as required by Rule 32 of the Rules framed under the Act. Rule 32 is as under :-
“Rule 32. Package of food to carry a label. – Every package of food shall carry a label and unless otherwise provided in these rules, there shall be specified on every label:-
(a) the name, trade name or description of food contained in the package;
(b) the names of ingredients used in the product in descending order of their composition by weight or volume as the case may be;
(c) the name and complete address of the manufacturer or importer or packer;
(d) the net weight or number or measure or volume of content;
(e) a distinctive batch number or lot number or code number;
(f) the month and year in which the commodity is manufactured or prepacked.”
6. In this view of the matter, the learned Magistrate was perfectly justified in framing the impugned charge against the petitioner.
7. Next it was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Dwarka Nath Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, , the petitioner cannot be convicted for a technical breach of Rule 32. In that case it was found that there was a technical breach of Rule 32 (e) and it was held that the accused cannot be convicted for the said breach alone. It was further contended that the prosecution for the said technical breach of the Rule is also liable to be quashed on the ground of delay in the conduct of the trial.
8. It is pertinent to mention that the legal position adumbrated by the Supreme Court in A.R. Antulay Vs. R.S. Naik that the right
to speedy trial flows from Article 21 of the Constitution and encompasses all the stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and re-trial remains unaltered. In Kartar Singh Vs. State of Punjab JT 1994 (2) SC 423, it was observed that:
“91. The right to a speedy trial is not only an important safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration, to minimise anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation and to limit the possibility of impairing the ability of an accused to defend
himself but also there is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial. This right is actuated in the recent past and the Courts have laid down a series of decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental rights. In fact, lot of cases are coming before the Courts for quashing of proceedings on the ground of inordinate and undue delay stating that the invocation of this right even need not await formal indictment or charge.”
9. In the instant case, the sample was taken on 30.10.1988 and the complaint was filed on 19.4.1989. The petitioner entered appearance on 19.4.1989. The charge was framed on 20.1.1998. Nine witnesses have been cited in the complaint and out of them only two witnesses have been examined in the case. Thus, the petitioner has undergone the proceedings for a period of nearly ten years and this must have caused immense mental agony to the petitioner besides financial loss. Having regard to all the attendant circumstances including the nature of the offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioner, trial of the case cannot be allowed to prolong indefinitely due to the lethargy of the prosecuting agency.
10. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is allowed and the proceedings emanating form the complaint filed under Sections 7/16 of the Act and pending on the file of the Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi are quashed. The petitioner’s bail bonds are discharged.