JUDGMENT
P.K. Misra, J.
1. In this appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the General Manager Barsuan Iron Mines, has challenged the decision of the Deputy Labour Commissioner, for Workmen’s Compensation. Rourkela (in short, ‘the Commissioner’), awarding a sum of Rs. 1,78,490 to the respondent, who is the widow of deceased Bhimsen Naik.
2. The deceased was employed in Barsuan Iron Mines. While working as electrical attendant on 26.10.1997 in ‘C’ shift, the deceased died. In the post-mortem report, it was found that the cause of death was possibly due to syncope. Claim application of the widow for compensation was resisted by the employer on the ground that the deceased had died due to preexisting disease and his death had nothing to do with the employment and as such, the accident did not arise out of the employment.
3. The Commissioner found that the deceased was a workman and had died in an accident arising out of and in the course of employment and accordingly awarded compensation.
4. There cannot be any doubt that the deceased died in the course of his employment while he was working as electrical attendant in ‘C shift, that is to say, in the night shift. The only question is whether it can be said that the deceased died in an accident arising out of employment.
5. The learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently contended that the deceased was previously suffering from hypertension and cardiac trouble and died due to such illness and as such the death had got no causal nexus with the employment. In support of such contention, the learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the decisions in Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Ibrahim Mohammad Issak 1969 ACJ 422 (SC) and Employees’ State Insurance Corporation v. Francis De Costa 1996 ACJ 1281 (SC) and contended that unless it is proved that the accident arose out of employment, compensation is not payable. He has further relied upon the decision of this court in SAIL, Rourkela Steel Plant v. Rajesh Kisan 1999 (1) OLR 326, and contended that the claimant has to prove that the accident arose out of employment.
6. There cannot be any quarrel with the general principle of law laid down in the aforesaid decisions. In the decision in Employees’ State Insurance Corporation v. Francis De Costa 1996 ACJ 1281 (SC), the employee while coming to the factory met with an accident one kilometre away from the place of employment and subsequently claimed disablement benefit. While interpreting the meaning of the expression ‘arising out of and in the course of employment’, the Supreme Court observed:
…In order to succeed, it has to be proved by the employee that (1) there was an accident, (2) the accident had a causal connection with the employment, and (3) the accident must have been suffered in the course of employment….
In the case of Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Ibrahim Mohammad Issak 1969 ACJ 422 (SC), while considering the question of payment of compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, it was observed:
(5) To come within the Act the injury by accident must arise both out of and in the course of employment. The words ‘in the course of employment’ mean ‘in the course of the work which the workman is employed to do and which is incidental to it’. The words ‘arising out of employment’ are understood to mean that ‘during the course of the employment, injury has resulted from some risk incidental to the duties of the service, which, unless engaged in the duty owing to the master, it is reasonable to believe the workman would not otherwise have suffered’. In other words, there must be a causal relationship between the accident and the employment. The expression ‘arising out of employment’ is again not confined to the mere nature of the employment. The expression applies to employment as such-to its nature, its conditions, its obligations and its incidents. If by reason of any of those factors the workman is brought within the zone of special danger, the injury would be one which arises ‘out of employment’. To put it differently, if the accident had occurred on account of a risk which is an incident of the employment, the claim for compensation must succeed, unless of course the workman has exposed himself to an added peril by his own imprudent act….
The aforesaid general principle of law has to be applied to the facts of the present case.
7. In the present case, it is revealed that while the deceased was discharging his duty as attendant in the night shift, he was found dead the next morning. The postmortem report reveals that he died as a result of syncope. Even assuming that the deceased was previously suffering from hypertension and cardiac trouble, it can be reasonably concluded that the fact that the deceased had to discharge his duty in the night shift, contributed to the death and possibly accelerated it. It is, no doubt, true that the claimant has to prove that the accident arose out of employment. However, the court deciding such matter is required to draw reasonable inferences from the proved facts.
8. DW 1, the doctor examined on behalf of the employer, had stated:
…It may be that while standing the deceased developed syncope and fell down due to unconsciousness causing injuries to self. The hypertension and cardiac trouble, which the deceased was suffering from previously, may have led to syncope….
From the aforesaid evidence, it cannot be concluded that there was no causal connection between ultimate death of the deceased due to syncope and the nature of employment. Having regard to the fact that possibly the deceased was already suffering from hypertension and cardiac trouble, the very fact that he had to undertake the work in the night shift must have aggravated the disease.
9. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the prior illness of the deceased was not within the knowledge of the employer and as such, the employer cannot be blamed if the deceased was employed in the ‘C shift. The question here is not as to whether the employer was aware of the disease or not. The question is whether the nature of employment accelerated or contributed to the cause of death. In the decision of the Supreme Court in Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Ritta Fernandes 1969 ACJ 419 (SC), it was observed:
…It is well established that under this section there must be some causal connection between the death of the workman and his employment. If the workman dies as a natural result of the disease from which he was suffering or while suffering from a particular disease, he dies of that disease as a result of wear and tear of his employment, no liability would be fixed upon the employer. But if the employment is a contributory cause or has accelerated the death, or if the death was due not only to the disease but the disease coupled with the employment, then it could be said that the death arose out of the employment and the employer would be liable.
Even if a workman dies from a preexisting disease, if the disease is aggravated or accelerated under the circumstances which can be said to be accidental, his death results from injury by accident….
(Emphasis added)
Applying the ratio of the aforesaid decision and keeping in view the facts and circumstances appearing on record, it can be well concluded that the arduous nature of the employment, namely, the work as attendant in the night shift, was a contributory cause or has accelerated the death.
10. The learned counsel for the appellant has, however, placed strong reliance upon the decision of this court in K. Mallika v. Executive Engineer, Potteru Irrigation Division, Balimela, 2001 ACJ 712 (Orissa). In the aforesaid case, the deceased was previously suffering from peptic ulcer and just prior to his death, he had taken some analgesic to suppress the pain he was having due to tooth-ache and there was sudden perforation of the peptic ulcer and the deceased had to be immediately operated upon which ultimately resulted in his death. In such background, it was held that taking of analgesic caused the perforation and ultimately caused the death and there was no causal connection of the death with the nature of the work of the deceased. The aforesaid decision is, therefore, clearly distinguishable.
11. For the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any merit in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
12. I must place on record my appreciation for the able manner in which the learned counsel for both sides have argued the appeal.