IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P ( C ) No. 4426 of 2002
with
WP(C ) Nos. 1123 and 5605 of 2003
Smt Kant Devi ( WPC No. 4426 of 2002)
Janardan Prasad & Others ( WPC No. 1123 of 2003)
Smt Tarit Barani Devi ( WPC No. 5605/2003) ... Petitioners
Versus
The State of Jharkhand & Others (in all cases )..... Respondents
Coram : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D.G.R. PATNAIK.
For the petitioner(s) : M/s B.B. Sinha, Sr. Advocate & Lily Sahay
For the respondents : Mr. P.P.N. Roy, Sr. Advocate.
CAV On 12.5. 2009. Pronounced on 17/07/2009
Heard the counsel for the petitioners and the State.
All these three writ petitions are directed against a
common order dated 28.8.1996 passed by the appellate authority, namely
the respondent no. 2, in three separate appeals whereby the order dated
10.6.1994
passed by the Special Officer, Scheduled Area Regulation,
Ranchi, was set aside and also against a common order dated 3.7.2002,
passed in the three separate revision applications, by the Commissioner,
South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi, confirming the order of the
appellate authority.
2. Facts and the disputes involved in all these writ
petitions are identical and relate to a land bearing plot no. 1080, Khata
No.112, area 35 decimals, of village Pandra, district Ranchi, which was
originally recorded as a raiyati land in the name of one Soma Oraon, in
the records of right.
3. The facts in common of the petitioners’ case are as
follows:
(i) Much prior to the coming into force of the Chotanagpur
Tenancy Act ( Amendment Act 1947), the disputed land was acquired by
Sukhram Prasad, father-in-law of petitioner Kanti Devi, in the year 1947
by way of purchase from the original recorded raiyat Soma Oraon for a
consideration of Rs. 850/- and after the purchase, he came in possession
thereof and continued to remain in peaceful occupation and possession of
the same.
2
(ii) such acquisition and possession of the land by Sukhram
Prasad was confirmed in Title Suit no. 30 of 1965 and Title Suit No. 511 of
1967 filed by Sukhram Prasad, and the suit was decreed in favour of
Sukhram Prasad by a compromise decree dated 26.3.1965.
(iii) Later, Soma Oraon, filed an application under section 71A
of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act for restoration of his land vide Misc.
Case No. 49 of 1975. The application was dismissed by order dated
15.5.1978 passed by the Special Officer, Scheduled Area Regulation, on the
ground that the CNT Act was not applicable to the lands falling within
Municipal Area. No appeal was preferred by the claimant against the
order of the Special Officer in SAR No. 49 of 1975.
(iv) Much later, in the year 1990, one Jaipal Oraon, son of
the original recorded tenant Soma Oraon, filed a fresh application No.
SAR No. 98 of 1990 against Sukhram Prasad under section 71A of the
Chotanagpur Tenancy Act for restoration of the same land. In this
application, the petitioners in WP[C] no. 1123 of 2003, and petitioners in
WP[C] no. 5605 of 2003 were also impleaded as opposite parties. The
petitioners Kanti Devi had also got herself impleaded as an opposite party
in the aforesaid restoration proceeding on the ground that she had
acquired a valid right, title and interest over 11 decimals of disputed land
by virtue of sale deed executed in her favour in the year 27.7.1991 by
Sukhram Prasad.
(v) One Kauleshwar Pd Choudhary who was one of the
opposite parties in the restoration case, got his case separated from the
others on 1.7.1993. The Special Officer by order dated 13/9/1993 while
disposing of the restoration application concerning the said Kauleshwar
Prasad Choudhary, had ordered him to pay a sum of Rs. 21,900/- to the
applicant as compensation, which having been paid by him and accepted
by the applicant Soma Oraon, his case was closed.
(vi) The case in respect of the other remaining opposite
parties including the present petitioners, was also disposed of by the
Special Officer by directing them to pay compensation of specified
amounts to the applicant. The compensation amount paid by the
petitioners was accepted by the applicant Jaipal Oraon and his father
Soma Oraon. However, Ghurta Oraon, another son of Soma Oraon who
3
was also impleaded as a co-applicant in the proceedings, did not accept
the amount and challenged the order passed by Special Officer in SAR
No. 98 of 1990 in appeal.
4. By the impugned appellate order dated 28.8.1996 the
Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, set aside the order of Special Officer as
passed in SAR No. 98 of 1990 and directed the respondents in the appeal,
namely the present petitioners, to restore the land to the originally
recorded tenant, namely, Soma Oraon. Being aggrieved with the order of
the appellate authority, the petitioners filed separate revision applications
before the Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Ranchi. By the impugned
order dated 3.7.2002, the Revisional authority dismissed the revision
applications of the petitioners.
5. The grounds on which the petitioners have challenged
the impugned orders of the appellate authority and of the Revisional
authority in these writ petitions are as follows :
(i) both the impugned orders as passed by the appellate
authority and the revisional authority, are bad and the findings recorded
therein are perverse and contrary to the facts and the materials on record;
(ii) the restoration application filed by Jaipal orain son
of Soma Oraon in which his father Soma Oraon and brother Ghutra
Oraon were impleaded as co-applicants, was barred by the principles of
res judiicata in view of the compromise decree passed in favour of the
predecessor in interest namely, Sukhram Prasad, in Title Suit No. 30 of
1965 and also in view of the order of dismissal of the earlier restoration
application no. SAR No. 49 of 1975 which had attained finality, and an
extinguished claim has been sought to be revived and the petitioners are
being harassed by repetitive litigations.
(iiii)The restoration application was barred by limitation
as the aforesaid predecessor in interest Sukhram Prasad had remained in
possession of the disputed land for more than 12 years since 1947 i.e. much
prior to the date when the Schedule Area Regulation Act, 1969, came into
effect. Bar of limitation also applied because of expiry of more than 30
years since 1947, prior to the date of institution of the subsequent
restoration case.
4
(iv) the land, by change in user, was no longer an
agricultural land and therefore the dispute under section 71A of the CNT
Act is not maintainable.
(v) There is no pleading or proof of any fraudulent act
either on the part of the petitioners or their predecessor in interest
Sukhram Pd.
(vi) In the matter of Kauleshwar Pd. Chaudhury, who is
one of the opposite parties in SAR No. 98 of 1998, his case was separated
and compensation was ordered to be paid and after acceptance of the
compensation amount by the applicants, his case was finally closed. But
case against the petitioners is being kept alive by applicant Ghurta Oraon
who did not accept the amount of compensation.
(vii) Even otherwise, considering the fact that the
petitioners remained in adverse possession of the land for more than 30
years and have constructed residential building and structures thereon,
the court ought to have passed order under the third proviso to section 71
A of the Act.
6 Assailing the impugned order and elaborating each of
the grounds advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners Mr.
B.B.Sinha, Senior Advocate, would argue that both the Appellate
Authority and the Revisional Authority have committed serious error
causing prejudice to the petitioners by failing to consider and accept that
even as per the admission made by the recorded tenant Soma Oraon, the
land was transferred in favour of Sukram Pd in the year 1947. On the date
of transfer the restriction in respect of transfer of tribal land did not come
into force. The admission by the recorded tenant, Soma Oraon about the
transfer of his land in favour of Sukhram Pd in the year 1947 was made not
only in the Title Suit no. 30 of 1965 in which compromise decree was
passed in favour of Sukhram Prasad, but also in the subsequent restoration
case no. SAR No. 49 of 1975.
Learned counsel submits that in view of the above
admission by the recorded tenant, the fact as stood confirmed is that
Sukhram Praad came in possession of the disputed land in the year 1947,
that is, more than 12 years prior to filing of SAR case no. 49 of 1975 and 30
years prior to the date when the second restoration application was filed.
5
Under such circumstances, the second Restoration Application was
hopelessly barred by limitation. Placing support to his argument, learned
counsel refers to and relies upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the
case of Situ Sahu Vs. State of Jharkhand ( 2004 [4] JCR 211 (SC) and in the
case of Fulchand Munda Vs State of Bihar [ 2008(2) JCR 1 (SC).
7 Referring to the second ground, learned counsel would
argue that the claim raised by the applicant in SAR case no. 49 of 1975
which was dismissed, has been sought to be revived and the petitioners
are being harassed by repeated litigations. Referring to the order of the
Special Officer in SAR No. 49 of 1975, learned counsel submits that the
Special Officer had recorded a finding that the provision of 71A of the
CNT was not applicable in respect of land which fell within the municipal
areas as per law at the relevant time. No appeal having been filed against
the aforesaid order, the same had attained finality and could not be re-
agitated by the applicant. Learned counsel argues further that even
otherwise, the original recorded tenant Soma Oraon who had sold the land
to Sukhram Prasad in the year 1947 being alive, his sons, Jaipal Oraon
and Ghurta Oraon, had no locus standi to file the second restoration
application. Learned counsel contends that in view of the aforesaid fact,
the second restoration application was barred by the principles of res
judicata. In support of his contention learned counsel would refer to and
rely upon the judgment passed by this Court in the case of Gadia Oraon Vs
State of Jharkhand [2004(1) JCR 237 (Jhr) and to an earlier decision of this
Court in the case of Md. Salimuddin Vs Commissioner, South Chotanagpur
Division, Ranchi [ 1993(1) PLJR 14 ].
8. Referring to the next ground, learned counsel submits
that the disputed land, by change in user, had no longer remained
agricultural land and as such the provisions of section 71A of the CNT Act
was not applicable. The fact that agricultural land came to be
subsequently converted into chaparbandi land has been held in the
findings recorded in SAR No. 98 of 1990 by the special officer. This fact has
been erroneously ignored by both the appellate authority and the
revisional authority. To buttress his argument, learned counsel relies
upon the judgment of the Patna High Court in the case of Akhileshwar Pd
Srivastava Vs. Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division [ 1990 PLJR 707 ].
6
Adding further to his arguments, learned counsel
submits that in the light of the admitted fact that the petitioners had
constructed buildings and structures on the disputed land, and in the light
of findings of the special officer in SAR Case No. 49 of 1975, the
petitioners having remained in adverse possession of the land for more
than 30 years, the provision of section 71(3) of the Act is applicable and
the benefit thereof ought to have been given to the petitioners . In support
of his argument, learned counsel refers to and relies upon the judgment of
this Court passed in Lucas Kharia Vs Baraik Bahadur Singh (2005(3) JCR 132
(Jhr) and also on the earlier judgment in the case of Md. Salimuddin
(supra).
9 In the counter affidavit, the respondent State has denied
and disputed the entire claim of the petitioners. The stand taken by the
respondents is as follows :
(i) In absence of any documentary evidence, the claim
of petitioners that the land stood transferred in the year 1947 in favour of
Sukhram Pd cannot be tenable. Such transfer being in violation of the
provisions of section 46 of the CNT Act, cannot be accepted as a valid
transaction.
(ii) There is no valid evidence that the petitioners or
their predecessor-in-interest, namely Sukhram Pd came in possession of
the disputed land in the year 1947.
(iii) The decree in Title Suit no. 65 of 1970 being a
collusive decree, the same does not create any right in favour of the
petitioners since it is in violation of mandatory provisions of the CNT Act.
(iv) There is no proof to confirm that the raiyati land has
been converted into chaparbandi land. Even if the raiyat is authorized to
erect building/house on raiyati land, on the basis of the prevailing
customs, the respondents are not authorized to change the nature of land.
(v) The order passed in SAR No. 49 of 1975 is not
applicable in the present case, inasmuch as the judgmnet was delivered on
the basis of the existing ruling laid down by the judgment of the Patna
High Court at that time. The ruling having undergone change, the
position is now different and, as held by several judgments of the High
Courts, the provisions of the C.N.T Act are applicable also in respect of
7
raiyati lands which fall within municipal areas and as such, the judgment
in SAR No. 7 of 1975 does not create a bar against the second restoration
application.
(vi) The plea of petitioners that Jaipal Orain had no
locus standi to file restoration case during the life time of his father Soma
Oraon, who is the recorded tenant, is misconceived and irrelevant in view
of the fact that the Deputy Commissioner who is the competent authority
under the Act, can proceed under the provisions of section 71A of the
CNT Act to restore the raiyati land/ tribal land of the raiyat.
10 Though no separate counter affidavit appears to have
been filed by the private respondents namely the widow and sons of
Ghutra Oraon, son of Soma Oraon, but Mr. PPN Roy, learned counsel
representing them, has contested the claim of the petitioners in these
cases by adopting the stand taken by the respondent State.
Learned counsel would argue that the plea of the
petitioners that the land was acquired by virtue of sale deed executed in
favour of Sukhram Pd cannot be tenable in absence of proof by way of
registered sale deed. Learned counsel submits that the petitioners have
not adduced reliable evidence, that they came in possession of the dispute
land in the 1947.
Referring to the compromise decree relied upon by the
petitioners passed in Title Suits no. 30 of 1965 and 511 of 1967, learned
counsel submits that the decrees passed in both the aforesaid suits are
apparently collusive and even though the purported agreement between
the raiyat Soma Oran and Sukhram Prasad may not be a fraud on the
court, but it certainly is a fraud against the statute since the law under the
CNT Act specifically prohibits transfer of tribal land in favour of a non-
tribal. The petitioners are therefore not entitled to take advantage of
such collusive decree in their favour.
Learned counsel adds further that the applicant Ghurta
Oraon, son of Soma Oraon who was impleaded in the restoration
proceeding, had challenged the order of the Special Officer passed in
restoration application on the ground that he had not received
compensation, nor did his father Soma Oraon receive any amount of
compensation. In this context, relying upon the judgment in the case of
8
Mahindra Singh Vs State of Jharkhand (2008(3) JCR 449 Jhr), learned counsel
adds further that the petitioners’ claim of title by adverse possession for
more than 30 years is also incorrect and misleading and the further claim
of petitioners that they had constructed building and structures over the
land much prior to 1969 is also incorrect and misleading and the same
cannot be accepted in absence of any cogent and reliable evidence.
Learned counsel adds further that in the light of the
categorical admission of the respondent Ghurta Oraon that he has not
been paid any compensation whatsoever by the petitioners, it clearly
indicates that the petitioners had practised fraud upon the respondent
Ghurta Oraon.
11 As stated above, the main grounds of the petitioners on
which the impugned order has been assailed is that the vendor of the
petitioners namely Sukhram Prasad had purchased the disputed land from
the original recorded tenant raiyat Soma Oraon in the year 1947 and at that
time, the rigors of the provisions of section 46 was not introduced in the
Chotanagpr Tenancy Act. The petitioners have wanted to confirm the
purported acquiring of the land by relying upon the compromise decree
passed in the Title Suit.
12 As it appears from the facts admitted by the petitioners
themselves, no document of transfer was produced either by the
petitioners or their vendor, to confirm that the land was transferred by
way of sale to Sukhram Prasad. If, according to the petitioners, the land
stood legally transferred from the original recorded raiyat to Sukhram
Prasad, then there could be no occasion for Sukhram Prasad to file the title
Suit in the year 1963 against the raiyat and to obtain a compromise decree.
The fact that the original raiyat namely Soma Oraon had filed a petition
under section 71A of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act in the year 1975
before the appropriate authority for restoration of his land, amply
indicates that Soma Oraon had not accepted to have transferred his land
in favour of Sukhram Prasad. These facts suggest that the claim of the
petitioners that the land stood transferred in favour of their vendor
Sukhram Prasad in the year 1947, has not been substantiated by any
legally tenable evidence. On the contrary, the facts indicate that the
alleged transfer even if made was in violation of the provisions of section
9
46 of the C.N.T. Act, and in such view of the matter, the compromise
decree passed in the title suit would amount to a fraud upon the Statute
itself and cannot create any right in favour of the petitioners or their
vendor Sukhram Prasad.
13. The petitioners’ next claim is that after dismissal of the
first restoration application filed by the recorded tenant in 1975, the second
restoration application in which the impugned orders were ultimately
passed, is barred by the principles of res judicata. This ground is
apparently misconceived. The dismissal of the earlier restoration
application was not on consideration of the merits of the claim, but was
solely on the ground that since the disputed land fell within the municipal
area, the provisions of the CNT Act being not applicable to such lands, the
application for restoration was not maintainable. By a subsequent
Amendment in the corresponding Act, the land belonging to the members
of the Scheduled Tribes falling within Municipal area, was also included
and the provision of sections 71 and 71A of the Act applied in equal
measure also to the lands falling within municipal area. Under such
circumstances, the order passed in the claim of the original tenant for
restoration of his lands made in the year 1992, cannot be said to be barred
by the principles of res judicata.
14 The next ground advanced by the petitioners is that the
restoration application is bared by limitation in as much as, it was filed
more than 30 years from the date of dispossession of the raiyat.
From the facts as it would appear, the petitioners have
not been able to bring any convincing evidence on record to confirm that
the petitioners’ vendor, namely Sukhram Prasad, had acquired the
disputed land and had come in possession and occupation of the same in
the year 1947. It was for the first time when the title suit was filed by
Sukhram Prasad in 1963 and in which compromise decree was obtained in
1967, that evidences were sought to be introduced that Sukhram Prasad
had come in occupation of the disputed land and had also constructed his
dwelling house thereon in the year 1964. Thus, even though the
compromise decree in the Title Suit does not create any right in favour of
the purported purchaser Sukhram Prasad, but an inference may, at best,
be drawn from the admission made by the petitioners themselves in the
10
restoration proceedings before the Special Officer, that they came in
absolute possession of the disputed land only after the compromise decree
was passed in the title suit in the year 1967 and they had constructed their
respective dwelling houses thereon. These observations were made by the
Special Officer in the restoration proceeding filed by Jaipal Oraon, son of
Soma Oraon in the year 1990. Since apparently, the restoration application
filed by Jaipal Oraon in the year 1990 was well within the period of 30
years from the date on which the petitioners came in absolute possession
of the disputed land, the Special Officer had rightly rejected the
petitioner’s claim of the restoration proceeding being barred by limitation.
15. The next ground advanced by the petitioners is that
since after the petitioners came in occupation of the disputed land, they
had constructed their dwelling houses thereon after incurring expenditure
of more than Rs. 10,000/- and therefore the petitioners are entitled to the
benefit of the proviso to section 71A of the CNT Act. The contention of the
petitioners is that such benefit in respect of a portion of the same plot of
land was extended in favour of Kauleshwar Pd Choudhary and the same
was accepted by the applicants. The petitioners standing on the same
footing cannot be discriminated.
16. From perusal of the order passed by the Special Officer
in the restoration application, it appears that pleadings and evidence was
adduced in the proceedings by the parties which were accepted and relied
upon by the Special Officer to the effect that since the land was situated by
the side of Ranchi Daltonganj Road, the villagers had converted part of
the land for use as access road and in the remaining portion of the land,
the dwelling house of Sukhram Prasad and that of the petitioners existed
and as such the nature of the land did not remain as agricultural land any
more. Evidence was also adduced by and on behalf of the petitioners that
they had constructed their respective dwelling houses on their individual
portions of the disputed land much prior to the year 1969. These facts do
not appear to have been denied or disputed by the applicants in the
restoration proceedings. On considering all these aspects, the Special
Officer had, by extending the benefit of the second proviso to section 71A
of the Act, had directed the petitioners either to give the same area of
land of equal value to the applicant or to pay compensation @ Rs. 7,000/-
11
per katha to the applicant. It also appears that an identical order was
passed separately in favour of Kaulsehswar Pd. Choudhury in respect of
a portion of land within the same plot and the amount of compensation as
ordered, was paid by the said Kauleshwar Pd. Choudhury and was
received by Soma Oraon, father of Jaipal Oraon. It may be noted that
though the restoration application was filed by Jaipal Oraon, son of the
originally recorded tenant Soma Oraon, but later on, Soma Oraon’ s
second son Ghurta Oraon was allowed to be impleaded as a party
intervener. No attempt by the applicant Jaipal Oraon or his brother Ghurta
Oraon was made to implead their father in the restoration proceedings .
It also appears that while neither Soma Oraon or his
sons including the appellant Ghurta Oraon, raised any dispute or
grievance against the order passed by the Special Officer in the restoration
application filed against the said Kauleshwar Pd Chaudhury and had
even accepted the compensation amount, yet Ghurta Oraon, being not
satisfied, had filed appeal against the order of the Special Officer passed in
the restoration proceeding.
17. From perusal of the impugned appellate order, it
appears that the grievance of the appellant Ghurta Oraon against the order
of the Special Officer passed in the restoration application, is his
dissatisfaction over the amount of compensation and also on the ground
that the petitioners have not paid the amount of compensation at all. It also
appears that a petition purportedly containing the LTI of Soma Oraon
along with his affidavit was filed in the proceedings before the appellate
authority, stating that Soma Oraon has not received any compensation
amount from the petitioners.
18. The principles of law relating to the claim for
restoration of the land belonging to the member of a Scheduled Tribe is
clear and specific and the Deputy Commissioner under section 71 of the
Act has the power to evict the transferee from the land if he finds that the
transfer has taken place in contravention of section 46 Act, or any other
provision of the Act, or by fraudulent method and such power can be
exercised by him at any time. However,the second proviso to section 71 A
of the Act is equally relevant and cannot be ignored. The second proviso
to section 71A of the Act reads as follows :
12
Section 71A. Power to restore possession to member of
the Scheduled Tribes over land unlawfully transferred :
Xxx xxxx
Xxx xxxx
“Provided further that where the Deputy Commissioner is
satisfied that the transferee has constructed a substantial structure
or building on such holding or portion thereof before coming into
force of the Bihar Scheduled Areas Regulation, 1969, he may,
notwithstanding any other provisions of the Act, validate such
transfer where the transferee either makes available to the transferor
an alternative holding or portion thereof as the case may be, of the
equivalent value of the vicinity or pays adequate compensation to be
determined by the Commissioner for rehabilitation of the transferor.”
Xxx xxxx
19. It appears that the claim of the petitioners that they
had constructed their dwelling houses over the disputed land much prior
to the year 1969 and the supporting evidence adduced in this regard was
accepted by the Special Officer in absence of any denial by the applicants,
the same has been brushed aside by the appellate authority on the ground
that the petitioners did not adduce satisfactory evidence to confirm that
they had constructed their dwelling houses after incurring expenditure of
more than Rs. 10,000/- prior to the year 1969 and that even otherwise, the
very transfer of the land being against the provisions of law, the
petitioners could not have converted the agricultural lands into dwelling
houses.
As observed above, it is not a case where the petitioners
have not adduced any evidence whatsoever in support of their claim that
they had constructed their dwelling houses over the disputed land much
prior to the year 1969. The order of the Special Officer categorically
indicates that the claim of the petitioners that the nature of the land was
altered even by the villagers for the purpose of using portion of the same
as an access road and the fact that the petitioners had established their
dwelling houses on the remaining portion of the land was not denied and
disputed by the applicants. It also appears that an identical claim
advanced by the said Kauleshwar Pd. Choudhury having established his
dwelling house prior to the year 1969, was accepted by the original
raiyat/applicant Soma Oraon and his sons including the appellant Ghurta
Oraon and they had even accepted the awarded compensation amount
from him. Having accepted such compensation the benefit of the second
13
proviso to section 71A of the Act was extended to said K.P. Choudhury
without any dispute and no further grievance has been raised against
him either by Soma Oraon or his sons. It also appears that the main
grievance of the appellant Ghurta Oraon was on account of his
dissatisfaction over the compensation amount awarded by the special
officer and also his contention that even the compensation amount was not
paid to him. The appellate authority, as would be evident from the
impugned appellate order, does not appear to have adverted to the above
aspects as appearing in the evidence in the restoration proceedings, nor
has recorded any reason as to why the petitioners should be treated
differently from the said K.P. Choudhury who is admittedly in occupation
of a portion of the same disputed land.
20. The petitioners have rightly claimed that in the matter
of application of the second proviso to section 71A of the Act, they have
been discriminated and this has perpetrated injustice to them. In this view
of the matter, there is reason to infer that while passing the impugned
order, the appellate authority did not apply his judicial mind to the
evidences on record, and therefore, it is manifest that the findings recorded
in the impugned order, is perverse and fit to be set aside. It also appears
that the revisional authority has also not adverted to above aspects
appearing in the evidences in the restoration proceedings and has merely
adopted the impugned order of the appellate authority.
21 For the reasons aforesaid, these writ petitions are
allowed and the impugned orders passed by the appellate authority and
the revisional authority are hereby quashed.
The matter is remitted back to the appellate authority to
record a fresh finding by passing a reasoned and speaking order within
four months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order,
after considering the entire evidences and materials on record in the
restoration proceedings.
Ambastha/ (D.G.R. Patnaik,J)